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Abstract
What explains the puzzling variation in America's foreign policy posture? This study proposes
and tests a theory of American grand strategy that places an emphasis on two key variables: the
ideological content of American liberalism and geopolitical conditions abroad. It distinguishes
between two varieties of thought within the American liberal tradition-termed negative liberty
and positive liberty-and deduces implications for American foreign policy from their content.
Differing concepts of liberty cause American statesmen to adopt different interpretations of
international threats, different choices in managing strategic trade-offs, and different preferences
for military and diplomatic policy tools. Systemic pressures also integrate strategic ends and
means, making foreign policy more coherent over time. These propositions are united together
with several insights from geopolitical theories to form a Theory of Liberal Foreign Policy
(TLFP), which predicts America will pursue distinct grand strategies under different ideological
and systemic conditions.
This study uses a variety of primary source documents to measure TLFP's variables and
assess its theoretical power. TLFP is tested through five structured, focused comparisons of
American grand strategy towards Europe in the twentieth century: American foreign policy in
the period of the Great War (1914-1920); under the interwar Republicans (1921-1932); in the
run-up to World War Two (1937-1941); during the origins of the Cold War (1945-1952); and at
the strategic transition of America's Cold War strategy (1953-1963). Each case tests for
congruence between TLFP's independent variables and its predicted strategic outcomes, as well
as searching for process-tracing evidence expected by the theory. The general finding is that
TLFP does indeed explain the major variation in American grand strategy during the twentieth
century, although other factors do exert an impact.
The study makes several contributions. First, it explains an empirical puzzle that has
previously resisted a unitary interpretation. In so doing, it suggests that existing realist, liberal,
and domestic political theories of American foreign policy are in need of revision. Second, it
advances scientific knowledge by synthesizing the best elements of past theorizing into a new
theory that generates unique predictions. Third, and novelly, it advances our understanding of
liberal ideology by suggesting that variation in liberal approaches to foreign policy is caused by
variation in the content of liberalism itself, rather than changes in the international environment.
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5Chapter One
Introduction: the Puzzle of American Foreign Policy
In September 1796, President George Washington gave perhaps the most important public
speech in the history of American foreign policy. The advice of his "farewell address" would
dominate American foreign policy for the next hundred years and haunt American strategic
debates in the century that followed. In contemplating the development of contemporary
American foreign policy, Washington's advice is worth quoting at length:
Europe has a set of primary interests which to us have none; or a very remote relation. Hence she must be
engaged in frequent controversies, the causes of which are essentially foreign to our concerns. Hence,
therefore, it must be unwise in us to implicate ourselves by artificial ties in the ordinary vicissitudes of her
politics, or the ordinary combinations and collisions of her friendships or enmities. Our detached and
distant situation invites and enables us to pursue a different course.... Why forego the advantages of so
peculiar a situation? Why quit our own to stand upon foreign ground?
Today, America stands upon foreign ground, not just in Europe, but across the globe.'
This study offers an explanation of how America quit the advantages of its peculiar
situation with regard to Europe. In so doing, it grapples with the most fundamental international
commitments of the United States during the twentieth century. Why did America at times
engage with European great power politics and at other times prefer to keep its diplomatic
distance? Why did it prefer military strategies based on naval, air, and nuclear weapons in some
eras, while committing to extensive ground force deployments in other periods? Why did
American statesmen sometimes perceive the mere fact of European disorder as a threat, yet on
other occasions shrug off political and economic chaos on a grand scale? In sum, what causes
the basic posture of American foreign policy to change, and how does this posture lead to the
individual commitments America makes?
Beyond their historical importance, these questions raise broader theoretical issues.
Realist theories of international relations agree that states will pursue their interests defined in
terms of power, but have disagreed on how much power states will seek and the strategies by
which they will pursue it. Theories of liberal ideology agree on a basic content to liberal
strategic culture, but differ as to the method by which liberal philosophy will be applied in
international affairs.
From both perspectives, American foreign policy is an outlier case: geopolitical and
ideological variables each take "extreme" values. The United States is perhaps the most
geopolitically safe and ideologically liberal great power in world history. American grand
strategy is also an anomalous case, poorly accounted for by existing theories and therefore fertile
ground for deducing a new one. The case also possesses "intrinsic" interest: for good or for ill,
the future of international politics will tum heavily on how American commitments are deployed
abroad. A theory that can powerfully explain past American behavior offers the possibility of
anticipating future challenges. 2
"Washington's Farewell Address," Senate Document No. 106-21, (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing
Office, 2000).
2 On extreme values and intrinsic interest as case selection criteria, see Stephen Van Evera, Guide to Methodsfor
Students of Political Science (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1997), pp. 77-88. On theoretical anomaly, see
Ronald Rowgoski, "How Inference in the Social (but Not the Physical) Sciences Neglects Theoretical Anomaly," in
This study proposes a new theory of American grand strategy and applies it to explain the
pattern of American policy towards Europe. I argue that, properly understood, the distribution of
power abroad and the changing character of American liberalism at home explain the major
variation America's European posture. Specifically, I contend in Chapter Two that there have
been two competing interpretations of liberalism in American politics-negative liberty and
positive liberty-and that these dueling liberalisms have very different implications for
American grand strategy. Novelly, this approach roots changes in liberal foreign policy in the
content of liberal ideas themselves, rather than environmental factors of one sort or another. I
call the theory expounded in this study a Theory of Liberal Foreign Policy, or TLFP for short.
This chapter sets the stage for delineating TLFP and explains the goals of the project. I
proceed in three parts. First, I briefly sketch the major changes in America's European strategy
during the twentieth century, in order to illustrate the compelling nature of the historical puzzle.
Second, I outline the requirements for a theory of American grand strategy by illustrating the
theoretical indeterminacy of larger research paradigms and the empirical inadequacy of several
more specified theories. Finally, I set out my basic research design and explain the scope and
limits of the study.
The Puzzle ofAmerican Grand Strategy
Accounts of American foreign policy have tended to privilege geopolitical and
ideological explanations for American commitments abroad. But the overall pattern of
American behavior appears puzzling from both perspectives. Consider the following examples. 3
In 1919 and in 1991, a war ended-one hot, the other cold. In both situations, the liberal
United States of America was blessed with an enviable power position: more powerful by a
considerable margin than other great powers, possessed of a carefully honed fighting machine,
and aggressively sought after as an ally. But in each situation, America chose a radically
different and surprising path. After World War 1, liberal America chose to demobilize its
military, eschew European security commitments, and largely turn inward for twenty years to
protect its values at home-during one of the least stable and most geopolitically threatening eras
in world history. After the Cold War, liberal America kept a sizeable number of forces in
Europe, expanded the scope of its security alliance, and launched several wars against unpleasant
regimes on behalf of its values abroad-during one of the least geopolitically threatening eras in
memory. Under apparently similar structural and ideological conditions, the United States
adopted different grand strategies, each of which clashes with our intuitions about the
geopolitical and ideological threats and opportunities at hand.
This is not the only puzzle in America's strategic history. When the United States was at
the pinnacle of its strength after the Second World War, a Democratic and Republican president
alike went to great lengths to avoid a permanent troop commitment to the European continent.
They only reluctantly engaged at all for fear of the Soviet Union swallowing West European
industry whole, through conquest or ideological subversion. During the 1960s, American
Rethinking Social Inquiry: Diverse Tools, Shared Standards, ed. Henry Brady and David Collier (Lanham, MD:
Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2010).
3 Hence forward, I will refer to the variation about to be described as "the puzzle." Note that I do not yet define and
conceptualize "grand strategy," nor do I yet offer an account of how we might think about its variation. These tasks
await treatment in Chapter Two. As such, I write here only in terms of a general sense of American "commitments"
overseas, rather than any explicit description of strategic choice.
relative power declined, the appeal of Communism dropped, American burdens rose at home and
on the periphery, and there were threats to the stability of the entire world economic system. But
it was during this era that American statesmen of both parties decided on a permanent European
commitment. Anxious to avoid commitments at the zenith of American might, American
statesmen undertook the costs and risks associated with a stronger commitment in a much less
geopolitically propitious situation. And each of the approaches was adopted by statesmen as
apparently ideologically dissimilar as Truman and Eisenhower, or Nixon and Kennedy.
Finally, the United States twice entered the European civil conflict commonly referred to
as the World Wars. Both times America was lead by an ideologically center-left president
known for his imprint on American attitudes towards foreign affairs; both times America entered
late; both times it was faced with an apparently deteriorating balance of power. Of the two
conflicts, World War 1I was probably objectively more threatening, since the United States faced
a potentially stable stalemate in 1917 and a nearly collapsed political order after May 1940. But
Wilson's aid to his European allies was quicker, more massive, and more ambitious than the
comparatively restrained and laggard support of Roosevelt, despite a plausibly similar ideology
and a less threatening situation.
I should note that this interpretation of American foreign policy is not universally shared
and is certainly open to dispute. Nonetheless, I think it is basically correct and that its
implications for international relations theory are underappreciated. It is to these implications
that I now turn.
Theoretical Problems
The cases just highlighted appear puzzling because they clash with our intuitive
expectations for realist and liberal theories of grand strategy. This clash underscores theoretical
indeterminacies of long-standing in both realist and liberal approaches. A new theory is required
to solve the puzzle, while synthesizing and recasting the insights of past work that make it
interesting in the first place.
Such a theory must accomplish three tasks. First, it must be a theory of foreign policy,
not a theory of international politics that describes only permissive conditions for action.
Second, it must resolve the theoretical indeterminacy of realist and liberal theories. In this
regard, it must describe the motor force of American strategy, explaining what makes the United
States expand and retract its commitments abroad. Third, it must remedy the empirical
difficulties of extant theorizing by better explaining the puzzle than its rivals.
In this section, I examine the possibility of explaining the puzzle with existing social
scientific tools. I analyze three broad families of international relations theories: realist theories;
theories of liberal ideology; and theories emphasizing domestic politics. I show that at its
broadest level, each paradigm is under-specified: they all lack sufficient assumptions to make
determinate predictions about American grand strategy. I also contend that more highly-
specified theories drawn from each paradigm are empirically inadequate: they can explain only
some parts of the puzzle. Far from causing the abandonment any of these approaches, such
problems incentivize a search for theoretical refinement.
REALIST THEORIES
Structural realist theories expect that, under conditions of anarchy, balancing coalitions
will tend to form because they promote survival. These assumptions alone are insufficient to
predict foreign policy behavior, since the mechanisms of selection and socialization need not
operate uniformly, or at all, on each unit in the system. Whether individual states will balance,
the conditions under which they balance, and how much commitment they will make remain
open questions. A purely third image theory of American foreign policy must identify additional
systemic variables, or additional invariant conditions of the system, to generate the forces
necessary to predict strategic behavior. Taken collectively, the offensive and defensive realist
schools of thought can claim to have identified such forces. Unfortunately, even so configured,
each realist approach has serious problems explaining the puzzle of American grand strategy
among the European great powers.
STRUCTURAL REALIST INDETERMINACY. Kenneth Waltz famously drew a distinction
between theories of international politics and theories of foreign policy. His own work was a
theory of international politics. Because it ostensibly relies only on system level processes like
selection and socialization, structural realism can only predict outcomes in world politics, not the
choices of individual states. By Waltz' own admission, "international political theory deals with
the pressures of structure on states and not how states will respond to those pressures."
Structural theory has little to tell us about why and when states make particular choices about
grand strategy or otherwise. It cannot tell us about the sources of foreign policy. A theory of
international politics can only say that the system will tend towards certain recurrent outcomes
produced from the combination of all foreign policies.4
Essentially, a structural theory tells us about permissive conditions: it specifies the
constraints and opportunities that states face as they compete in the international system and are
socialized to its effects. Applied to the United States, a theory of international politics reveals an
extraordinarily permissive environment. Throughout the twentieth century, the United States has
maintained a massive advantage in the basic measures of economic and industrial might. In
economic terms, it has simply been the most powerful state in the system for more than a
century, with variation only in the margin of its superiority. At the same time, America also has
a very favorable geopolitical position. The United States is isolated from the great powers of
Europe and Asia, protected by the giant defensive moats of the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans, and
surrounded by countries of trivial economic and military strength. These conditions have not
varied much, if at all, in the course of the period under study, yet the United States has taken on
highly varied levels of commitments.
In addition to specifying permissive conditions, any theory of foreign policy must
provide a motor force-a source of preferences and beliefs that explains state action. In
particular, such a theoretical motor must accomplish two tasks: it must power the vehicle of the
American state both forward and backward. It must specify a "propulsive force" that explains
when and why America chooses to make commitments outside of its secure base in the Western
4 Kenneth N. Waltz, "Structural Realism after the Cold War," in America Unrivaled: The Future of the Balance of
Power, ed. G. John Ikenberry (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2002), p. 51. Waltz gives an excellent example
of the limits of structural theory in his seminal book: "Germany and Austria-Hungary formed their Dual Alliance in
1879. Since detailed inferences cannot be drawn from the theory, we cannot say just when other states are expected
to counter this move. France and Russia waited until 1894. Does this show the theory false by suggesting that states
may or may not be brought into balance?" Waltz believes that it does not, unless the intervening period shows
behavior "directly out of accord with the theory." But explaining the policy of France and Russia in the intervening
years is exactly the kind of prediction we want a theory of grand strategy to make. For this example, and more on
the limits of structural theories, see Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Reading, MA: Addison-
Wesley, 1979), pp. 125, 73-77, respectively.
hemisphere, and it must explain the character of those commitments. At the same time, it must
also posit a "retractive force" that explains when and why America chooses to abandon its
commitments or avoid new ones, and it must stipulate the character of those limitations.
Structural realist theory therefore leaves two important questions unanswered: under
what conditions do individuals states make or avoid commitments and what changes in the
international system cause this variation. Structural realism lacks what E.H. Carr called the
"springs of action" necessary to explain political behavior: the goals, motivations, and
mobilizing forces that account for the choice of one path over another. An explanation of
American grand strategy requires a theory of foreign policy: a theory that can explain when and
why America chooses or avoids particular commitments. The realist paradigm has developed
two strands of theorizing that could plausibly meet these demands: offensive and defensive
realism.5
OFFENSIVE REALISM. Offensive realism proposes that states will expand to the limits of
their power. Theorists of realpolitik since Thucydides have alleged that states "by a necessary
law of their nature rule wherever they can." As Gideon Rose puts it, "the relative material power
resources countries possess will shape the magnitude and ambition... of their foreign policies: as
relative power rises states will seek more influence abroad, and as it falls their actions will be
scaled back accordingly." Such states, in a sort of mindless fashion, reach out for whatever they
can grab.6
John Mearsheimer, whose sophisticated treatment of the power-maximizing proposition
is the best developed, crafted a theoretical reason for this behavior: the international system
contains deep structural uncertainty. States can never know how much power is "enough," since
sometimes material capabilities are translated inefficiently into military prowess. One can never
know what the distribution of power will be in the future, and friends today could easily become
enemies tomorrow. "Given the difficulty of determining how much power is enough for today
and tomorrow," Mearsheimer argues, states will "act offensively to amass as much power" as
possible. Conversely, when powerful states are rampaging about, it pays to conserve one's
strength. It is always better let another state commit to oppose threatening expansion, rather than
exhaust one's own resources on the front lines of a fight-because who knows what will happen
7
after a war is over.
5 E. H. Carr, The Twenty Years' Crisis 1919-1939: An Introduction to the Study of International Relations (London,
England: Palgrave Macmillan, 2001).
6 Thucydides, The Landmark Thucydides: A Comprehensive Guide to the Peloponnesian War, ed. Robert B.
Strassler, trans. Richard Crawley (New York: Free Press, 1998), p. 354; Gideon Rose, "Neoclassical Realism and
Theories of Foreign Policy," World Politics 51, no. 1 (October 1998): p. 151. Others who have taken the line that
expansion and retraction move in tandem with power are Fareed Zakaria, From Wealth to Power: The Unusual
Origins ofAmerica's World Role (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1998); Robert Gilpin, War and
Change in World Politics (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1981); Colin Dueck, Reluctant
Crusaders: Power, Culture, and Change in American Grand Strategy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press,
2006); Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations: The Strugglefor Power and Peace (New York: A. A. Knopf,
1948); Paul M. Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and Militamy Conflict from
1500 to 2000 (New York: Random House, 1987); Eric J. Labs, "Beyond Victory: Offensive Realism and the
Expansion of War Aims," Security Studies 6, no. 4 (1997): 1-49.
7 John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York: Norton, 2001), p. 35; see also pp. 20-21,
31-40, and esp. 34-36. 1 use Mearsheimer as the paradigmatic example of offensive realism, because he explicitly
roots the conditions of state expansion in the international system. However, an important qualification is in order:
because Mearsheimer gives great weight to geography, he is actually a defensive realist as regards the United States,
and his predictions for American behavior track defensive realist predictions. I nevertheless treat his theory as what
In sum, deep uncertainty about the future produces a drive to maximize power. A
propulsive force exists to expand into power vacuums and to dominate weaker states. A state
will also be propelled to make commitments against expanding enemies whose threat is
undeniably present: those hegemons who must be stopped now before it is too late. A retractive
force exists in the urge to conserve strength and await future opportunities. States will retreat
and retrench in the face of resolute opposition in force and will attempt to limit and minimize
their commitments to stopping the strong. The key variable driving change is the distribution of
power: the presence or absence of power vacuums and very powerful aggressors.
But power-maximizing theories confront important anomalies when faced with the puzzle
of American European grand strategy: several periods of low or limited commitment in the face
of potential hegemons and power vacuums. Superficially, at least, one might explain the
American intervention in the First World War and support for the League of Nations on the
basis of a power vacuum or anti-hegemonic rationale. But why then did America turn on its heel
in the inter-war period and disengage from political commitments abroad and military armament
at home? There was no less of an opportunity to expand after the war. Indeed, there was an
even larger power vacuum to be filled: Germany was temporarily shattered and the Western
Allies were begging for increased American commitments.
Similarly, the American expansion after the Cold War might seem natural to an offensive
realist. America was the sole remaining superpower and had lots of room to throw its weight
around. But there has never been a larger power vacuum than the one after World War Two:
Europe in 1945 has been aptly described as a "zero-polar" situation, with all the European great
powers thoroughly devastated. Yet America moved to fill this vacuum only haltingly and
unwillingly, constantly seeking to shift responsibility to others and looking for the exit. It was
only after Europe recovered economically, and the Soviet Union developed militarily, that the
United States committed to permanently managing European politics.
Finally, American entrance into the two World Wars looks discrepant. Perhaps 1917 was
the ideal opportunity to extend American influence on the continent. But in that case, America
missed an opportunity in 1939, and then failed to act decisively to defend the remaining great
powers after the fall of France. On the other hand, if World War II did not constitute an
opportunity to expand offensively or an incentive to contain for defensive purposes, then the
Great War is inexplicable. These empirical problems cast serious doubt that on the viability of
purely offensive realist explanations for American grand strategy.
DEFENSIVE REALISM. Defensive realists propose that states will seek only enough power
to be secure, because other states will surely check too much expansion. But security also surely
requires firm commitments to check the aggression of others. So how much commitment is
enough? Defensive realists tend to answer with reference to the "offense-defense balance."
Defined narrowly, the balance is a characteristic of the international system: it asserts that
geography and technology at any point in time and space determine whether conquest is easier or
more difficult. Depending on the character of the balance, competition will be more or less
intense, and state strategies more or less committed. When geography and technology are more
favorable to the offense, conquest is easier and security is harder to get. This situation generates
a propulsive force: states expand more often and commit more quickly to stop expansion. When
a "pure" offensive realism would predict for America. Agreeing with this assessment are Christopher Layne, The
Peace ofIllusions: American Grand Strategyfrom 1940 to the Present (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2006),
pp. 23-25; Barry R. Posen, "The Best Defense," National Interest (2002): 119-126.
geography and technology favor the defense, states are more secure. Such a defensive advantage
is a retractive force, leading states to commit themselves less frequently and with more
limitations.
Attempts to operationalize and measure the offense-defense balance have not met with
great success. But from the point of view of the United States, determining the balance is easy.
American geography is a massive defensive advantage in all eras. To threaten the sovereignty or
territorial integrity of the United States, an aggressor would have to be able to defeat the
American Navy and launch an amphibious invasion of American shores. Alternatively, one can
imagine an aggressor building up an army in a proxy state located on the land mass of North or
South America and advancing in conquest from there. Or potentially, a series of well
coordinated naval and land operations could result in a strangling economic blockade of the
United States.
But all of these operations would be extremely difficult, if not impossible, to execute.
They could only be undertaken in situations where military technology favored the offense.
Most importantly, only extremely powerful aggressors-potential hegemons-could possibly
make the attempt: states with a truly massive amount of economic and industrial resources, and
without rival great powers balancing against them at home. Such states are rare. In short,
America should only fear a potential hegemon. The United States should be propelled into
commitments in order to prevent one great power from conquering Europe and mobilizing its
resources against the Western hemisphere. Otherwise, it should return to its secure home,
favoring minimal commitments if any.
Once again, history poses a problem for realist theory. Defensive realism cannot explain
American commitments abroad in several periods that lacked a credible potential hegemon.
Perhaps an offense-defense perspective can tell us why America returned to isolation after the
First World War: a multipolar Europe posed few threats to the homeland. But it cannot explain
why America went to war in the first place. In 1917, Germany was opposed by no less than
three European powers, even if it was menacing American merchants with its submarines.
Moreover, the military technology of the day was woefully inadequate to assault the Western
hemisphere: imagine Gallipoli on a massive scale or the Western Front trench line somewhere on
the Yucatin peninsula. America had no credible security fears in 1917. From the point of view
of the offense-defense balance, World War I was a war of choice. Even more inexplicable is the
Wilsonian post-war strategy-with Germany in tatters, what needs an American commitment?
But the propulsion of American power abroad was central to Wilson's post-war plan.
In the same vein, defensive realism may perform well in explaining American
commitments against Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union. With Europe in disarray and the
British Empire exhausted, these look like states that could quickly assimilate most of the
important industry and territory in the developed world. Moreover, they came to power in the
age of carrier warfare and blitzkrieg, more favorable technologies for conquest. But how can
8 Leading exponents of defensive realism include Barry R. Posen, The Sources of Military Doctrine: France,
Britain, and Germany Between the World Wars (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1984); Robert Jervis,
"Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma," World Politics 30, no. 2 (January 1978): 167-214; Stephen M. Walt,
The Origins of'Alliances (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1987); Charles L. Glaser, "Realists as Optimists:
Cooperation as Self-Help," International Security 19, no. 3 (December 1, 1994): 50-90; Charles L. Glaser, "When
Are Arms Races Dangerous? Rational versus Suboptimal Arming," International Security 28, no. 4 (April 1, 2004):
44-84; Jeffrey W. Taliaferro, "Security Seeking under Anarchy: Defensive Realism Revisited," International
Security 25, no. 3 (December 1, 2000): 128-161.
defensive realism explain the transition of American Cold War strategy from lesser to greater
commitment? The economic might of Western Europe rivaled the Soviets by the mid 1950s.
And second strike nuclear arsenals-a technological outcome which at least makes conquest
much more difficult-were available by the mid-1960s at the latest. Yet this was the period
when America re-doubled its commitments abroad. All of this is to say nothing of American
expansion after the Cold War, which must remain completely inexplicable to defensive realist
theories.
SUMMARY. Structural realist theories of international politics cannot explain American
grand strategy because they cannot explain when and why America chooses to make or avoid
commitments. Structural realism specifies permissive conditions, but does not propose a motor
force for when America deploys forward or pulls back. For this purpose we need a theory of
foreign policy. Offensive realist theories identify that motor as the deep uncertainty that infuses
the international system, which propels states forward into power vacuums and backwards from
costly engagements. Defensive realists locate the motor in the offense-defense balance, which
spurs commitments to stop potential hegemons but otherwise indicates indifference. Both
perspectives cannot explain large portions of American strategic history, reinforcing the puzzle.
To construct an adequate explanation of American grand strategy, one must add other variables
beyond the international system.
THEORIES OF LIBERAL IDEOLOGY
Theories of liberal ideology posit a liberal strategic culture that normatively values peace,
trade, and democracy. This culture also promotes corresponding causal beliefs that the
expansion of liberalism through free trade, regime change, and international law will lead to
peace. But liberal strategic culture is indeterminate with regard to predicting American foreign
policy: it does not specify when America will propel itself forward and when it will ratchet back.
However, two important research programs shed light on the conditions under which liberalism
will switch from holding itself as an example at home to vindicating its values abroad: these
programs might be termed "liberal expansionism" and "ideological distance." Interestingly,
neither program sees variation in liberal behavior as having much to do with the content of
liberal ideas. Both programs face major anomalies in addressing the puzzle that call their utility
as comprehensive explanations into question.
INDETERMINACY IN LIBERAL STRATEGIC CULTURE. National culture has often been cited
as a variable with major impact on American foreign policy. Specifically, the unique course of
American development-the enlightenment ideas surrounding its formation, its lack of a feudal
past, the absence of revolutionary and reactionary responses to modernization, and its broad
based middle class society-are said to have led to a society thoroughly dominated by
philosophic liberalism. Loosely defined, liberalism is an ideology committed to human freedom
and specifying the manner of bringing it about. This national ideology influences political
outcomes by confining the parameters of political debate and setting the terms on which
ideological disputes affect political conflict.9
9 The most famous statement of the American liberal society thesis is Louis Hartz, The Liberal Tradition in
America: An Interpretation ofAmerican Political Thought since the Revolution (New York: Harcourt, 1955), who
also noted liberalism's effects on foreign policy, e.g., pp. 12-14, 284-288. A sample of works on the liberal
consensus in American culture include Samuel P. Huntington, American Politics: The Promise ofDisharmony
(Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press, 1981); Richard Hofstadter, The American Political Tradition and the Men Who
Philosophic liberalism has influenced foreign policy as well as domestic politics. The
development of the liberal tradition led to a corresponding set of ideas about normative goals for
international relations, the most effective causes of peace and human flourishing, and the origins
of war and other deviations from human progress. A basic consensus among international
relations theorists exists about the content of liberal ideas in world politics.
First and foremost, liberalism is "anti-realist" in orientation: it views the competing
armaments, violent wars, secret diplomacy, and shifting alliances of the international realm as
unnatural and evil. Liberalism rejects power politics as an aberration, alleging that the symptoms
of realist behavior among states just listed are themselves the causes of continuing tragedy and
destruction in world affairs.' 0
Second, liberalism posits an alternative vision of politics among nations, which privileges
peace and international progress as the natural state, while specifying the causes of, and solutions
for, the war problem. Scholars agree that international liberalism consists of a number of inter-
linked propositions, starting with "the apparently uncontroversial thesis that peace is good and
war is bad." Historically, liberals saw "war as neither desirable nor inevitable.... it was
perceived as a marker and consequence of social and moral backwardness." Another liberal idea
is that commercial exchange and war are negatively linked. Among liberals "Trade and
commerce were presented as both morally elevating and ethically superior to war.... Their
contrast and exclusivity meant that to the extent that one was predominant the other declined.""
The major problem of international politics, for liberals, is that bad actors dam up the
peace-inducing effects of trade and start wars that serve their own interests but hurt the global
public. Atavistic social classes and violent regime types are the source of international conflict;
the obvious solution is more democracy and public control over foreign affairs. As arch
Manchester-liberal Richard Cobden put it, "There is no remedy for [war] but in the wholesome
exercise of the people's opinion on behalf of their own interests. The middle and industrious
class of England can have no interest apart from the preservation of peace. The honors, the
fame, the emoluments of war belong not to them; the battle plain is the harvest field of
aristocracy, watered with the blood of the people." Finally, a basic structure of international law
will help states compete peacefully and enrich themselves with trade. Tony Smith summarizes
the liberal world-view well: in its mature form, liberalism calls for a community of "democratic
states bound together through international organizations dedicated to the peaceful handling of
conflicts, free trade, and mutual defense."' 2
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Philosophic liberalism thus sees human progress as advancing towards a natural state of
peace, trade, and democracy, and views illiberal actors and their power political behavior as the
major impediment to its vision. However, scholars also agree that history has seen at least two
distinctive ways of applying the content of liberal theories to foreign policy. These differ not in
their normative goals, but in a dispute about the best way to achieve them. In America, these
differences stem from the very hegemony of liberal ideology. As Hartz quips in another context,
"It is only when you take your ethics for granted that all problems emerge as problems of
technique." To wit: some liberals believe that international progress will occur when America
serves as an example to inspire the world; other liberals believe America must vindicate liberal
values by its own action."
Liberal "exemplarists" believe that America can "better serve the cause of universal
democracy by setting an example rather than by imposing a model." They tend to see the
harmonious development of world politics as slow but inexorable, as the march of human
progress inevitably leads international relations towards its natural state. They also believe
interference with this development is unwise. As Jonathan Monten summarizes, "Exemplarism
also contains a claim about the efficacy of democracy promotion and the limits to U.S. power.
Exemplarists have been comparatively skeptical toward the U.S. capacity to produce liberal
change in the world. Because democracy is fragile and difficult to propagate, the ability of the
U.S. government to directly promote and consolidate democratic institutions is limited and
constrained." What is worse, it may also lead to compromising American liberal institutions at
home. The best course is to improve America's own domestic politics to serve as a beacon for
others; to trade with whoever will consent to commercial exchange; and to propagate and obey,
but not enforce, international law."
Liberal "vindicationalists," by contrast, believe that America must act in foreign policy so
as to "vindicate the right." The liberal millennium will not come about under its own power-
vindicationalists tend to believe of foreign affairs that "If the obstacles to man's advancement are
removed, and the flaws in his institutions corrected, progress will be swift and sure; otherwise it
will be slow and uncertain." What is worse, a lack of progress will be dangerous-
vindicationalists consider the "exemplarist expectation that other states will emulate the U.S.
example... as at best inefficient and at worst utopian." If the illiberal causes of war are allowed
to flourish, they will certainly come to threaten the United States. The best course is to use
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America power to advance liberalism abroad: to promote and defend democratic regimes; to
expand free trade; and to take responsibility for organizing international politics."
Like structural realism, liberal theories of foreign policy have a core set of insights that
remain underspecified for predicting foreign policy behavior. Under what conditions will
America make commitments to promote its values and when will it restrain itself? When will the
liberal motor produce vindicationalist propulsion and when will explemarists put the ship of state
in reverse? And what is it about liberalism that will cause this variation? Also like realism,
liberal theorists have two plausible approaches that could answer these questions: "liberal
expansionism" and the "ideological distance" approach.
LIBERAL EXPANSIONISM. The first line of argument holds that liberal ideology mandates
an extensive and aggressive role in the world-liberalism is an essentially expansionist ideology.
Drawing on arguments from the liberal peace literature, "liberal expansionists" hold that liberal
states are extremely distrustful and fearful of non-liberal states. Illiberal states use illegitimate
coercion and violence against their own people, and are therefore expected to behave with
similar aggression in international politics. Indeed, a world with illiberal states will not remain
at peace for long, and liberal states will either be threatened by illiberal violence from without, or
by illiberal transformation from within.' 6
When faced with such a world, liberals fear America will come under threat from
expanding illiberalism, and may have to wreck its economy and society defending itself,
destroying the liberal values it sought to defend. Thus, its own liberalism forces America to
adopt an aggressive grand strategy. American statesmen will seek to end the threat from
illiberalism overseas by transforming international politics into the image of American domestic
society. As Layne puts it, the liberalism will export the "imperialism of idealism" by marrying
"a heritage of expansionism and a conviction of mission." Liberals will promote commerce, the
rule of law, and democratic forms of government-if necessary, by the sword.' 7
At the same time, when opposed by countervailing power abroad, liberals will be forced
to hold back their expansionist urges. What liberalism needs to vindicate its values are
opportunities for expansion; in essence, liberal foreign policy is offensive realism aimed at
liberal goals. Desch summarizes that "Liberalism, at least since the writings of Kant, manifests
consistent expansionist 'urges'," but it was the "relative power positions of Britain and the
United States that changed their foreign policy." Layne argues several "systemic preconditions
had to be met" before liberal America could pursue a vindicationalist foreign policy in Europe:
"the United States needed to enjoy a significant relative power advantage over the other major
states in the international system" and "because rising powers usually expand into regions where
they won't encounter strong opposition, the distribution of power... had to tilt decisively in
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Security 32, no. 3 (Winter /2008 2007): 7-43; Mark Peceny, Democracy at the Point ofBayonets (University Park,
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America's favor." In short, the motor in the liberal vehicle is always propelling American
foreign policy forward at full tilt, but a car pushing against a brick wall won't go anywhere."
This perspective faces similar problems to offensive realism: there have been numerous
opportunities for liberal expansion in Europe that America passed up. Following the First World
War, the United States had enormous opportunities to help manage European politics on behalf
of its values, but more or less ignored them. Entry into both World Wars might be conceivably
explained in terms of a vindicationalist foreign policy, but fighting in massively costly great
power conflicts hardly seem like "golden opportunities" provided by a lack of strong opposition.
The timing and manner of entry into these wars seems odd as well, since it is difficult to
understand why a uniform liberalism assumed very different approaches for when and how to
spread its values. Liberal expansionism does well with the unipolar era, but has difficulty with
the Cold War transition, since opportunities for commitment were being reduced just as America
was entrenching its position.
IDEOLOGICAL DISTANCE. Another body of research contends that liberalism is just one of
several transnational ideologies, and that the character of liberal foreign policy depends on the
international ideological environment in which it operates. "Ideological distance" theories
explain the variation in liberal foreign policy by the degree of illiberalism present in world
politics. When international affairs are dominated by states with domestic ideologies far-
removed from liberal goals, liberals will adopt confrontational strategies based in power politics.
When faced with more-like minded states, they will adopt more benign policies. In Mark Haas'
words, "the core claim is that there exists a strong relationship between the ideological distance
dividing states' leaders and their understandings of the level of threat they pose to one another's
central domestic and international interests."1 9
These patterns are caused by human psychology and the desire for domestic power.
Distant ideologies abroad will be mistrusted and feared as internationally dangerous "out-
groups." Conversely, state leaders will have a psychological affinity to their ideological
confreres abroad. At the same time, ideologues in one state will fear or cheer the potential
diffusion effects of ideological battles abroad-an enemy ideology's victories elsewhere are
perceived as domestic defeats and vice versa. Ideological "adherents will derive positive utility
from the gains of a state governed by their ideology," while also seeing such gains as a buttress
for their ideology at home. Such perceptions will cause an "increasing desire to convert
ideological rivals" abroad. Finally, it will simply be more difficult for ideological opponents to
18 Desch, "America's Liberal Illiberalism," pp. 18, 19; Layne, The Peace ofIllusions, pp. 28-29.
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reach agreeable settlements because different world views will lead to mutual
misinterpretation-ideological distance causes communication break-down and misperception.2
Ideological distance theories are most usefully aimed at explaining the conflictual or
cooperative nature of American commitments, rather than the extent of such commitments. But
this prediction does suggest a potential motor for change in American grand strategy: ideological
changes abroad. When America perceives hostile ideologies overseas, vindicationalist pressures
will push its commitments outward in order to protect American security and values. When
other European powers are perceived as ideologically friendly, cooperative relations with them
may allow the retraction of commitments.
Ideological distance theories also confront empirical issues in the history of American
grand strategy. Specifically, the United States has been frequently confronted with similar
ideological distributions in Europe and adopted very different strategies. While ideological
distance theory could potentially interpret American alignment during the two World Wars, it
would have a hard time explaining the timing and route to American entry. During the Cold
War, it would be difficult to argue that America's ideological distance from the Soviet Union
changed dramatically, yet America strategy shifted in the middle of the superpower conflict. If
one seeks to employ party identification as an ideological proxy, as ideological distance theorists
often do, America employed similar Cold War and post-Cold War strategies under Democratic
and Republican administrations. And in Western Europe, at least, America was confronted with
basically democratic countries after the First World War and the Cold War-yet American
commitments were entirely different in each period.
SUMMARY. Liberal ideology, in the abstract, cannot explain variation in American grand
strategy. The ideational content of the liberal approach to foreign affairs is uniform, in that all
liberals tend to believe peace is the natural state of world politics; that increasing trade,
democracy, and international law will increase peace; and that war and insecurity are caused by
illiberal actors and power political practices. But two different approaches exist in applying
liberal values to foreign policy, and liberal theories require a source of variation in order to
explain the adoption of exemplarist and vindicationalist approaches at different times. Liberal
expansionists can posit an ideological motor in the international system, with uniformly
vindicationalist liberalism advancing when international opportunities for expansion present
themselves. Ideological distance theorists might point to the changing distribution of European
ideologies or partisan changes at home to explain the propulsive and retractive forces driving
American commitments. But neither perspective can explain large portions of the American
puzzle.
THEORIES OF DOMESTIC POLITICS
Several other broad theoretical families have been used to explain American foreign
policy, roughly grouped here into second image explanations emphasizing domestic political
variables. Bureaucratic politics theories claim that foreign policy will be the outcome of pushing
and hauling between self-interested organizations seeking to increase their size, wealth, and
autonomy. Institutional theories point towards the fractured nature of the American state-the
20 Owen, "Transnational Liberalism and U.S. Primacy," p. 125; Haas, The Ideological Origins of Great Power
Politics, 1789-1989, p. 18. These mechanisms are outlined most thoroughly in Haas, The Ideological Origins of
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division of power between the executive and the legislative branches, and the importance of
public opinion-to explain the nature of American commitments. Sectoral economic theories
argue that American grand strategy is the product of changing political coalitions representing
economic interests, which make or retract strategic commitments based on their economic
spillover effects. Bureaucratic and institutional perspectives are indeterminate, as they are
largely useful for predicting strategic coherence rather than expansion and retraction. Of the
three perspectives, only sectoral economic theories can point to a theoretical motor explaining
the expansion and retrenchment of American commitments. Unfortunately, this motor is in need
of empirical and theoretical repair.
INDETERMINACY OF BUREAUCRATIC AND INSTITUTIONAL THEORIES. Organization
theory has long noted the potentially sizeable impact that the apparatus of the modem state can
have on foreign policy making. Bureaucracies are large, hierarchically structured, and
functionally differentiated organizations. They have incentives to champion policies that
privilege the importance of their function, the material interests of their hierarchy of personnel,
and their freedom of action in a highly uncertain environment. Such organizations will seek to
maximize their size, wealth, and autonomy from external interference. These goals serve the
organizations' material needs and protect their capacity to execute policies on a large scale. The
modern state is made up of several such organizations, and bureaucratic theorists argue that
organizations will compete to shape policy. The outcome of strategic decisions should reflect
the compromises and victories of inter- and intra-organizational struggles.2'
Students of American foreign policy have also underscored the peculiar nature of the
American state as having an important impact on foreign policy. Power is divided into multiple
centers, all of which are open to influence by public opinion. The legislature and the executive
compete to shape foreign policy, while both branches keep a careful watch on their masters, the
American public. John Owen has suggested, for instance, that liberal public opinion restrains
realist elites during times of crisis through the mechanism of American's open institutional
structure; others have argued that Congress plays a particularly important role in limiting and
directing the action of executive agents. In any event, institutional theories imply that we should
expect the special arrangements of government structure to make a big difference for American
commitments abroad.
21 On the Bureaucratic politics paradigm, see Graham Allison and Philip Zelikow, Essence ofDecision: Explaining
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In their extant form, neither bureaucratic nor institutional theories of American foreign
policy can explain the puzzle. While it is conceivable that one could develop either perspective
into a variable that could explain the expansion and retraction of American commitments over
long periods of time, I am not aware of any such attempts. Instead, each paradigm explains best
the incoherency and failure of American commitments. Bureaucratic log-rolls or organizational
power grabs are unlikely to produce a carefully balanced foreign policy with optimal results.
Congress and public opinion are both likely to restrain executive action and make the
coordination of commitments difficult. Both perspectives can tell us a great deal about particular
foreign policies, but both also lack the motor needed to explain the pattern of American strategy
over long periods of time.
SECTORAL ECONOMIC THEORIES. Some theories of American foreign policy find their
theoretical motor in groups of material interests present in American society, usually taking the
form of different economic sectors. Sectoral models of grand strategy include two core elements.
First, they posit a set of domestic economic sectors that have financial interests in security policy
abroad. Second, such sectors use political parties to form coalitions that advocate grand
strategies consistent with their interests. Coalitional politics means that sectors must often
compromise their ideal foreign policy to maintain their coalition, but should still prefer the
resulting strategy to that offered by opposing coalitions.23
There are two essential types of sectoral interest. Domestically oriented sectors do most
of their business in the home economy. These sectors usually compete with imports, and so
favor economic policies that discriminate against foreign trade. More importantly for strategic
purposes, they have no interest in securing foreign markets, thus providing a retractive force for
American grand strategy: domestic sectors think any resources spent on security policies beyond
defending the homeland are wasted. Since these resources are extracted from domestic industry
along with everyone else, an active security policy is viewed with disdain. Domestic interests
tend to be nationalist and inward focused, preferring strategies of isolation or minimal activity
abroad.
23 The primary works on the sectoral sources of grand strategy are: Kevin Narizny, The Political Economy of Grand
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Internationally oriented sectors do much more of their business in foreign markets. They
can be exporters of goods or raw materials, direct investors in foreign business, or banking and
financial entities with loans overseas. These sectors have a great interest in access to foreign
markets, which entails support for free trade, international monetary and financial stability, and
political stability in foreign countries. Security policy can have important distributional impact
for international interests-if commitments abroad can help secure peace, maintain currency
stability, and buttress free trade, then such grand strategies will give them disproportionate
benefits. For these reasons, sectors oriented towards overseas markets produce a propulsive
force in American grand strategy. They will be outwardly focused and internationalist,
preferring active security strategies paid for on the backs of domestic interests. 25
Sectoral approaches imply that grand strategy should alternate with parties exchanging
power. But during the early Cold War, a Republican and Democratic president both pursued the
same strategy of limited commitments to Europe; indeed, if anything, the supposedly inward
oriented Republican administration made greater commitments to the continent. During the late
Cold War period, three Democratic and three Republican administrations made the same basic
kinds of commitments. Likewise, after the Cold War, two Democratic and two Republican
administrations have followed the same path. Party change in the executive proves a poor
predictor of grand strategy. Moreover, American entry into the World Wars shows that there has
been important intra-administration variation in America's most important strategic decisions. It
seems unlikely that coalitional structure or financial incentives changed two or three years into
each conflict.
Theoretically, it is debatable whether the posited strategic preferences of outward
oriented interests make sense. The logic of outward oriented internationalism is that free trade,
international financial openness, and foreign markets must be defended with security
commitments. Outward oriented interests are said to prefer institutional strategies because they
promote peace and stability, keeping commerce flowing and markets open. For the same reason,
international interests are alleged-much more vaguely, it must be noted-to support broad
security commitments. The logic here is that resolute commitments can deter aggressors and
26promote peace.
But it is seriously debatable whether security institutions can help support peace-or
whether they have ever really been tried: even the comparatively robust League of Nations was
hardly the collective security organization of liberal theory. In any case, strong institutional
solutions to security problems are vastly over-predicted by sectoral theories. Moreover,
commitments abroad may promote peace and macro-economic stability, but they may also bring
the onset of war: security commitments may threaten and spiral rather than balance and deter.
The theoretical expectations for a peace-promoting international interest are indeterminate. As
Jonathan Kirshner has shown, the preferences of the financial community-one commonly cited
25 Nolt, "Business Conflict and the Demise of Imperialism," pp. 99-100; Lobell, The Challenge ofHegemony: Grand
Strategy, Trade, and Domestic Politics, pp. 21-24, for the basic positions.
26 See, e.g., Kevin Narizny, The Political Economy of Grand Strategy (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2007),
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Public Policy in the Great Depression," International Organization 38, no. 1 (Winter 1984): 41-94; Jeff Frieden,
"Sectoral Conflict and Foreign Economic Policy, 1914-1940," International Organization 42, no. I (Winter 1988):
59-90; Fordham, Building the Cold War Consensus.
outward interest-have generally been for isolation and appeasement, rather than deterrence and
commitment abroad.2 7
SUMMARY. Sectoral economic, bureaucratic, and institutional interests cannot explain
the pattern of American grand strategy towards Europe. Bureaucratic and institutional
paradigms mostly explain resistance to change and incoherence in policy, rather than variation in
commitments over time. Moreover, policy clearly does change and possesses greater and lesser
degrees of coherence. Of the three, only sectoral economic theories possess a theoretical motor
with sufficient variation to power the changes observed in history. But the approach runs into a
series of empirical problems because of its reliance on partisan coalitions, and it is not even clear
that its predictions for internationally oriented interests are completely coherent.
Research Design and Limitations
I conclude this chapter with a research design informed by the theoretical indeterminacy
and empirical limitations of the major perspectives on American foreign policy. My goal is to
develop and test a new theory of American grand strategy, taking advantage of the insights of
previous work. The paradigmatic origins of the variables are thus viewed primarily in a
complementary rather than a competitive light. After describing the basic theoretical enterprise,
I lay out a strategy for testing the new theory, as well as some inferential limitations inherent in
the project's scope.
A THEORETICAL AGENDA
The preceding discussion shows that existing theories do not adequately explain variation
in American grand strategy towards Europe. These results are hardly surprising. Most theories
of American foreign policy are not empirically comprehensive; that is, they are configured to
explain only some parts of the puzzle. The solution offered here is a synthetic approach: I use
key insights of past ideological and realist work to deduce a new theory of grand strategy,
specific to the American context. I call the model a Theory of Liberal Foreign Policy, or TLFP
for ease of reference.
The principal innovations of TLFP are to root liberalism's theoretical motor in the
changing character of liberal ideology over time, and to integrate these new liberal propositions
with older insights from balance of power theory. This effort is undertaken in Chapter Two. I
then test the new theory across five cases of change in American grand strategy from 1914 to
1963, in Chapters Three through Seven: American foreign policy in the period of the Great War
(1914-1920); under the interwar Republicans (1921-1932); in the run-up to World War Two
(1937-1941); during the origins of the Cold War (1945-1952); and at the strategic transition of
America's Cold War strategy (1953-1963).
I use three methods for evaluating the strength of TLFP. First, I employ congruence
testing: I check to see if the observed values of American grand strategy match those predicted
by the values on the independent variables. To execute this method, I develop conceptual
understandings and measurement schemes for three variables: the international system, liberal
ideology, and grand strategy. While designed with the American case in mind, these concepts
27 Jonathan Kirshner, Appeasing Bankers: Financial Caution on the Road to War (Princeton, NJ: Princeton
University Press, 2007).
have the potential to be of broader comparative use. The independent variables of system
structure and liberal ideology are measured at the beginning of each case cases. Second, I use
process-tracing to observe whether the causal logic developed by TLFP matches that found in the
policy decision-making at the center of each case. Congruence testing and process-tracing
comprise the bulk of the empirical material. Finally, in the conclusion, I engage in comparative
analysis, showing how isolating change in the independent variables over time provides a
powerful explanation for the major variation in America's strategic posture. 2 8
This research strategy is, from a theoretical point of view, synthetic rather than
competitive. A competitive approach would deduce a series of empirical statements from
alternate theoretical paradigms and compare them to observed reality. Ideally, these statements
would contradict each other as applied to the cases under study, since this would allow the
observer to infer which paradigm was more powerful when alternatives were placed head to
head. As suggested above, this kind of approach is likely simply to uncover an empirical and
theoretical morass. Realist theories would be strong in some cases, ideological theories strong in
others, and none would be able to account for major variation over the whole pattern of
American grand strategy. Instead, I use realist and liberal theorizing as a foundation from which
to deduce and integrate a new theory, whose aim is to explain the whole breadth of the puzzling
American case.
This approach does not let TLFP off the hook by giving it the field to itself. Rather, I
raise the bar, pitting TLFP against the performance of the most powerful competing perspectives
in each case. I chose these alternatives on an ad-hoc basis: in some cases economic, institutional,
or bureaucratic theories will be particularly strong; in other cases more pure variants of realism
are examined. The goal is to force TLFP to confront the best existing explanations on their own
turf, in order to determine how much it really adds to our understanding of American foreign
policy.
TLFP is designed to explain a specific empirical domain, which will place limits on how
far the theory can travel outside the context of American grand strategy towards Europe.
Nonetheless, the unique aspects of the American case allow us to make some general statements
about the paradigms that underlie TLFP. First, from the perspective of ideological theories, the
United States is an easy case. Historians and political scientists alike agree that America
represents the preeminent example of a liberal country. The success of ideological variables here
will tell us little about their general power. But because liberalism takes on such an extreme
value, the process driving liberal foreign policy should be especially clear. Observing this
process provides a baseline for further research on the impact of ideological variables in less
favorable contexts and for establishing the conditions under which such variables will be
powerful.
Second, from the perspective of geopolitical theories, the United States is a difficult case.
Isolated from great power politics and protected by natural defensive advantages, the pressures
of the international system will be felt less powerfully in American than in most other countries
of the first rank. If geopolitical forces are found to be important in the American case, this
strengthens the over-all power of the basic structural realist approach.
LIMITATIONS
28 A good discussion of these methods can be found in Alexander L. George and Andrew Bennett, Case Studies and
Theory Development in the Social Sciences (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2005).
There are three principal areas in which this study is limited and may have nothing to say
at all: the foreign policy of other states; American strategy in regions outside Europe; and
American policy in most areas of international economics. These limitations are necessary
because American grand strategy towards the great powers is a conceptually distinct domain. As
a theory designed to operate in this domain, the argument of this study may travel only
intermittently, and with adjustments, to other areas.
AMERICAN EXCEPTIONALISM . Without taking a position on the many barrels of ink that
have been spilled on the topic of American exceptionalism, it is difficult to deny that America
occupies a unique strategic space. It is perhaps the most geopolitically isolated great power in
world history: there has never been another great power in the Western hemisphere, let alone on
the borders of the United States. The Atlantic and Pacific Oceans are barriers the likes of which
have never been crossed in force. During the twentieth century, this geopolitical isolation has
been abetted by massive power: America has been the most dominant state in the system
throughout the period. Economically, the world has been unipolar since the turn of the twentieth
century. And, whether one accepts the power of liberal ideas or not, America's ideological
heritage is certainly peculiar-it missed out on monarchy, aristocracy, fascism, communism, and
a host of minor political causes and movements, all of which were common among European and
Asian great powers. Simply put, America has always had the freedom to do as it pleased, the
capability to plausibly implement its schemes, and a unique set of ideologies permeating its
decisions.
A theory designed to explain the behavior of such an odd country may not do very well in
other contexts. This possibility is unsurprising, since the reverse is also true: the reason
American grand strategy is so puzzling is because theories designed for other contexts do not
travel very well to this outlier case. At most, one might expect the explanation offered here to
travel to other geopolitically isolated great powers that have experience with liberal ideas-Great
Britain, perhaps. But even there, the differences in the amount of isolation, surplus power, and
cultural consistency of ideologies ought to have pronounced effects on its explanatory power.
GREAT POWER POLITICS IN EUROPE. State behavior towards great powers can be very
different than behavior towards other types of states. Great power politics is an intensely
competitive realm: vital interests are at stake, the threat of violence is near at hand, and a
guarantee of help is nowhere to be found. States are locked in struggle and fear for survival.
Whether or not specific realist theories can accurately predict strategic behavior, great powers
live in a broadly realist world. States are both less cooperative and more cautious in this realm
than they may be in others. Great power politics provides a kind of discipline for statesmen, and
focuses them on the main chance: these arenas have priority over others and only the most
important factors tend to drive decisions.
Moreover, the region in which great power relations take place matters a great deal.
Europe is different from Asia: it has a different cultural and political history, a different
economic landscape, and importantly, a different actual landscape. European industrial might is
densely concentrated in a small area easily accessible by military might. Asian economic power
has historically been concentrated on an island: Japan. In the contemporary era, the flat plains of
northern Europe stand in stark contrast to the large mountains and seas of Asia.
TLFP is thus less likely to explain behavior unconcerned with great powers, or taking
place outside of Europe. The relationships and policies America pursues on the periphery are
entirely different from those America has had with Europe. Many things may matter in the
developing world or the Western hemisphere that do not intrude on American strategy towards
Europe. The context for European politics is also very different from that of Asian politics. It is
possible that the theory constructed for American foreign policy in Europe might have some
relevance to Asian great power politics or to great power competition in the periphery. But once
again, these are areas where the theory would need to be reconfigured to accommodate the
wealth of other variables that may influence other contexts.
SECURITY, NOT ECONOMICS. Last, economic intercourse is fundamentally different from
security and diplomatic relations. To be sure, economic might is the foundation of military
power and the ultimate cause of security. Important economic questions do at times intrude on
the world of alliances and military power, and at such times TLFP ought to be able to explain
economic decisions. But at bottom, a sizeable portion of economic relationships are positive
sum games: mutual gains are possible, cooperation is easier, and violence far removed from the
exchange. The factors that influence trade policy, commercial regulation, financial
harmonization, and other classic topics of international political economy will likely be very
different from those at work in the domain of classical grand strategy.
It is therefore very unlikely that the theory of this book will be relevant to most economic
interactions. The lone exception should be those issues that intersect with major security
concerns. I do not aim to argue that international political economy does not matter to grand
strategy. Indeed, several times in the twentieth century, international monetary and financial
issues have had roles of central importance in American strategy, and in such cases I believe the
theory here can be illuminating. But I do believe that most of international economic exchange
represents a distinct domain, and do not expect a theory of political military grand strategy to be
of much use there.
Conclusion
The history of American strategic commitments to Europe in the twentieth century
presents a puzzle. Under constant conditions of geopolitical isolation and massive power,
America has undertaken a highly varied set of international commitments: it went from isolation
to war and back to isolation in a short period of time, briefly adopting an intensely
internationalist strategy of collective security. It entered the Second World War with different
timing and goals than in the first conflict. America then waged a Cold War against the Soviet
Union, but adopted two different grand strategies. First, a limited strategy of temporary
commitments in the early Cold War when the Soviet Union was strongest, and then a more
committed strategy of permanent power management after the balance had equalized and Europe
had grown strong. After its adversary fell apart in 1991, it expanded despite the total absence of
a security threat. These commitments cannot be squared with changes in the balance of power or
in threatening international conditions.
Realist and liberal theories alike fail to capture the major variation in American grand
strategy. Structural realism is under-specified when applied to foreign policy behavior; offensive
and defensive realism disagree as to the effects of the international system and both fail to
explain important parts of the puzzle. Liberal ideological theories have identified the core
content of the liberal worldview, but admit there are at least two ways it has been applied.
Liberal expansionist and ideological distance approaches might be applied to explain this
variation, but both face empirical difficulties in the attempt. Economic, bureaucratic, and
institutional theories either lack a theoretical motor for explaining variation or face empirical
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difficulties. The object of this study is therefore to create and test a new model for American
grand strategy towards Europe that can explain the puzzle: a Theory of Liberal Foreign Policy
(TLFP). TLFP breaks new ground among liberal theories by pointing to the ideological content
of liberalism as a key factor causing strategic shifts. I construct this theory in the next chapter.
Chapter Two
A Theory of Liberal Foreign Policy
This chapter proposes a new theory of American grand strategy. I argue that two variables are of
primary importance for predicting American grand strategy: the character of American liberalism
at home and the nature of international environment abroad.
When liberalism was understood as an ideology that championed freedom from
constraint, American foreign policy was driven by a strong inward impulse. To intervene abroad
was to sacrifice liberty at home by increasing the power of a constraining central state. But when
liberalism has been understood as mandating certain baseline opportunities and resources for all,
American statesmen have had major incentives to intervene abroad. State activity has been seen
as a method of advancing freedom across the domestic and international arenas. When
combined with the influence of the international system-which under some conditions produces
a strong "pull" towards overseas commitment as well as placing restraints on too much
adventurism-this theory explains the major variation in America's grand strategy towards the
European great powers during the twentieth century. It also sheds considerable light on
American foreign policy generally, and indeed on the broader question of how ideas interact with
the structure of the international system to produce state behavior.
This chapter outlines the basis for my argument in several steps. I begin by discussing
the concept of grand strategy and how changes in the basic American foreign policy posture can
be measured. Next, I consider the liberal philosophical tradition and argue that rival
interpretations of liberal norms constitute an important source of ideological variation in
American politics. In the following section, I deduce foreign policy preferences that flow from
two competing concepts of liberty and consider objections to these arguments. This analysis
culminates in a Theory of Liberal Foreign Policy (TLFP): I combine my arguments about liberal
preferences with insights from balance of power theories to predict American strategic behavior
towards the European great powers. I conclude the chapter with a discussion of how to measure
these variables, generating a scheme for tracking liberal ideas and geopolitical threats in order to
produce theoretical expectations for American behavior at different points in time.
Conceptualizing and Measuring Grand Strategy
In order to understand the causes of American commitments, we must first understand
what kinds of values are at stake in making them and how such commitments might be compared
to one another. The study of grand strategy is a ready-made tool for these purposes, as it
encapsulates a broad range of important behaviors at the highest level of foreign policy. Though
grand strategy is a subset of foreign policy more generally, I use the two terms interchangeably.
In this section, I conceptualize grand strategy, describe how it can vary, and suggest how
that variation can be measured. I aim to produce a concept that can capture the puzzling
variation in American commitments abroad and, by fitting within the extant literature on grand
strategy, be of broader comparative use.
CONCEPTUALIZING GRAND STRATEGY
Grand strategy is a geopolitical concept to be understood in terms of managing power
under anarchy. Below, I define the term, give it substantive content, and describe how it can
vary.
DEFINITION AND CONTENT. I define grand strategy as a state's plan for managing the
balance of power. It is not an explicit document or plan per se, but is rather the implicit "theory"
behind a state's foreign policy choices. Grand strategy operates at the highest level of foreign
policy, but it is not any particular policy itself. It is the logic underlying a general pattern of
interlocking policy ends and means; this logic specifies how a state's polices are going to
"cause" the international environment to produce whatever ends it has in view.'
I adopt this definition because, in the broadest sense, states live in a "realist" world.
They live in anarchic environment without a universal sovereign that can enforce law and
produce order. In such a world, other poles of power may obstruct a state's goals or may need to
be induced to cooperate with them. Because there is no guarantee that other powerful actors will
permit a state to achieve its objectives, it will need policies for managing the constellation of
other power centers in a way that maximizes its ability to get what it wants. The presence of
other powerful actors will constrain certain state policies and incentivize others, but states will
still need to make choices about how to best manage the system. In short, grand strategies are
needed to solve the universal problem of pursuing goals in an environment where other states
may stand in the way.2
A grand strategic logic answers two questions about how to manage the balance of
power: (1) "what configurations of power are acceptable or necessary," and (2) "by what
mechanism will these configurations be obtained?" By answering these questions a state's grand
strategy outlines a general foreign policy posture, producing a recognizable pattern in its
behaviors.
A configuration of power indicates the number of other great powers, their relative power
position, and their perceived alignment. Grand strategies contain a vision for a state's preferred
power constellation. That is, state policies imply how many other great powers there "ought" to
be, and whether particular poles need to be increased or reduced in relative power. Strategic
decisions will also often contain implications about the orientation of other poles-whether the
cooperation or non-interference by particular actors is desirable or necessary, and whether other
poles constitute threats to state objectives.
Grand strategies also indicate mechanisms by which the preferred structure of power will
come about. These mechanisms specify how different policy means and ends are connected:
This definition accords with much of the grand strategy literature on several critical points: the focus on the logic
or "theories" underlying state actions; the implicit rather than explicit nature of that logic; the emphasis on broad
patterns of behavior; and the fundamentally geopolitical context of strategy. See, Barry R. Posen, The Sources of
Military Doctrine: France, Britain, and Germany Between the World Wars (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press,
1984), p. 13; Kevin Narizny, The Political Economy of Grand Strategy (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press,
2007), pp. 8-9; Paul M. Kennedy, ed., Grand Strategies in War and Peace (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press,
1991 ), pp. 2-7; Christopher Layne, The Peace ofillusions: American Grand Strategy from 1940 to the Present
(Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2006), pp. 4-5; Colin Dueck, Reluctant Crusaders: Power, Culture, and
Change in American Grand Strategy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2006), pp. 9-13. It differs from
some of the literature in that it does not assume security as a common state motive. Grand strategy is an essentially
geopolitical concept, but I am agnostic about what ends a given state may seek. For a relevant discussion, see
Narizny, The Political Economy of Grand Strategy, pp. 9-10.
2 This is the basic structural realist view. See Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Reading, MA:
Addison-Wesley, 1979); John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York: Norton, 2001).
how a state's policies will adjust or manage the number, size, and alignment of other poles in a
way that produces an acceptable power constellation conducive to a state's ultimate goals. Each
strategic mechanism implies a level of policy activism and the number and kind of commitments
that will be needed to produce a benign balance of power.3
In answering these questions about the balance of power, grand strategies make a
fundamental trade-off between cost and control. Costs are the expense of blood and treasure
necessary to execute a grand strategy. Control denotes the range of policy options open to a state
as well as its ability to affect the orientation of other states. It does not imply an ability to dictate
the policy of other states, only to gain influence or leverage over their behavior; I therefore use
the terms "influence" and "leverage" interchangeably with "control." More costly strategies tend
to provide more influence over international outcomes, and vice versa-states generally can
reduce their costs only at the price of less control over the international environment. So, for
example, if statesmen wish to have a surfeit of military options abroad, they must pay for a large
and extensive military to provide them. If they wish to avoid the costs of foreign alliances, they
must also forgo opportunities to shape the policy of allies.4
TYPOLOGY OF VARIATION. Below, I arrange a typology of grand strategies along a
continuum measuring the degree of power management. Each strategy is denoted by its vision of
the balance of power and its mechanism of operation, and each represents a different mix of cost
and control. I lay out four ideal-typical grand strategies on this scale: non-entanglement,
buckpassing, balancing, and preponderance. Because these strategies rest on a one-dimensional
continuum, the exact place where the level of power management changes type will always be
somewhat arbitrary. Still, I note general markers where one grand strategy ends and another
begins based on their preferences for ordering the balance of power. In the American context,
strategic preferences can be thought about in terms of the desired polarity of the European
system and the relationship of the American pole to European politics.5
A Grand Strategic Typology: The Power Management Continuum
3 Grand strategy is a description of foreign policy at its most abstract level. Thus, similar mechanisms will not
necessarily produce commitments that are identical in type, number, or intensity. States with the same grand
strategy, as classified here, may nonetheless have considerably differences in some of their policies.
4 The trade-off between cost and control is not a fundamental law of grand strategy, but rather depends to some
extent on the international environment. In some circumstances, a small amount of international commitment can
provide a large amount of leverage over the orientation of other poles. A state fighting a war for its survival, for
instance, may accept whatever help it can get, even at the expense of making fundamental changes in policy. At
other times, states can sink a tremendous amount of blood and treasure into hopeless attempts at influencing
immutable aspects of the international power structure. But on the whole the trade-off exists, and it represents a
clash of values for which grand strategies try to find an appropriate mix.
5 The basic four-part one-dimensional typology of grand strategy has support in the grand strategy literature: Barry
R. Posen and Andrew L. Ross, "Competing Visions for US Grand Strategy," International Security 21, no. 3
(Winter 1996): 5-53; Layne, The Peace ofIllusions, pp. 159-161 both use a similar scheme. Though sub-dividing
his typology into seven parts, the same idea is evident in Robert J. Art, A Grand Strategyfor America (Ithaca, N.Y.:




At the lowest level of power management is the strategy of non-entanglement. Non-
entanglement requires very little or no management of the balance of power-it sees few
configurations of power as unacceptable and therefore entails little need to manage the policy of
other states. A state pursuing non-entanglement has one major preference about the structure of
power: that its own alignment be distant from that of other states. Non-entanglement strategies
pursue this preference through the mechanisms of non-interference with other states and the
deterrence of threats to narrowly defined vital interests. In general, non-entanglement incurs
minimal costs and produces little control: in recognizing few threats, it neither invests in
diplomatic and military tools nor reaps their influence. When a state discovers outcomes abroad
that it is not willing to tolerate without a major commitment to forestall, it has ceased pursuing
non-entanglement. In the American context, this vision of the balance of power implies a
position of indifference to the number, size, and orientation of the European great powers,
producing a unilateral and low commitment posture detached in any serious way from European
politics. 6
At the other end of the continuum is a strategy of very intense power management, which
I call preponderance. A strategy of preponderance views many possible power configurations as
dangerous and unacceptable: it envisions a position of dominance over other centers of power, as
the sole pole of major importance. Policy is chosen such that the potential for independent
opposition to a state's goals (whatever they may be) by other actors is minimized.
Preponderance thus requires a great deal of influence over the relative size, policy, and alignment
of other states. It achieves this influence through mechanisms of military dominance and
political preeminence. While a state can never fully control other centers of power short of
occupying and administering their territory, a strategy of preponderance pursues a position as
hegemonic manager of the balance of power as the next best alternative. Preponderance tends to
be expensive but also provides commensurate control over others: it is a strategy that recognizes
many threats and invests mightily to meet them. When a state is unwilling to try and prevent
major independent action contrary to its goals by another pole of power, it has stopped aiming at
preponderance. In the American context, the strategy is often associated with an interventionist
6 For an extended explication and defense of non-entanglement see Eric A. Nordlinger, Isolationism Reconfigured:
American Foreign Policyfor a New Centwy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1995). The strategy goes
today under other names like "restraint:" see Eugene Gholz, Daryl G. Press, and Harvey M. Sapolsky, "Come
Home, America: The Strategy of Restraint in the Face of Temptation," International Security 21, no. 4 (Spring
1997): 5-48.
liberal internationalism. American statesmen pursuing preponderance tend to envision
American commitments as helping to "solve" the problems of power politics through institutions
that approximate a single pole European of power: collective security organizations or alliances
which purport to enforce the scope of legitimate international action, and in which American
power plays a very prominent role.7
In between these two extremes is an area of modest to more intense management of the
configuration of power abroad. Formally stated, strategies in this area seek to manage the
balance of power such that some power configurations do not occur, but are willing to let others
come to pass. But there are greater and lesser requirements for preventing undesirable power
configurations, and different mechanisms for managing them. I therefore divide the broad
middle area of the strategic continuum into two categories: buckpassing and balancing.
Buckpassing is a strategy featuring non-trivial activity to manage the balance of power,
but only on behalf of a narrow set of requirements. Usually, its object is preventing the
dominance of a single other great power, but conceivably buckpassing preferences could extend
to forestalling other undesirable configurations as well. Buckpassing rests on a mechanism of
free riding: it seeks a limited amount of influence over other states and aims to coast by on their
policies. It therefore emphasizes cutting costs over gaining international control, though it will
give at least some priority to the latter. Unlike the alternative of balancing, a buckpassing
strategy is premised on the belief that the balance of power can be managed largely, but not
entirely, through the efforts of others. The mere existence of some international commitments
does not a balancer make. When one state builds up the power of another so that the second
party can absorb a blow, or comes late to a fight to get the spoils of victory, it is buckpassing:
managing the balance of power with a light footprint, low costs, and for more limited outcomes.
When a state has ceased either to make any commitments, or stopped relying on others as a
primary resort for its ends, it has ceased to buckpass. In the American context, this strategy
focuses on maintaining European multipolarity, with a distant but not entirely indifferent
American pole as part of the system.
Balancing is a strategy of greater commitment and more active power management. It is
premised on managing the balance of power to prevent a broader range of configurations:
balancers usually fear more outcomes than just a single unacceptable power distribution.
Common balancing aims are the containment of a particular great power, the deterrence of
7 Preponderance is best described in two strategies from Posen and Ross, "Competing Visions for US Grand
Strategy." Posen and Ross show how the liberal "cooperative security" strategy and the more explicit "primacy"
strategy bear strong resemblance to each other in terms of actual commitments, and are both based on mechanisms
of American military and political predominance. Earlier collective security strategies were even more obviously
aimed at producing a kind of international government intended to act as the sole pole of power and final arbiter of
security. Such strategies can produce terminological confusion, because the liberal logic that drives them is so at
odds with the realist logic of the power management continuum. Nevertheless, they can still be effectively analyzed
in terms of a preferred unipolar structure of power and that pole's corresponding military and political supremacy.
As argued below, it is important to distinguish between the type of grand strategy and its success.
8 Buckpassing is ably described in Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, pp. 157-162. It is often
advocated today under names like "off-shore balancing:" see Layne, The Peace of ilusions, pp. 159-192.
Buckpassing does not have to be a status-quo strategy. Revisionist strategies such as Mearsheimer's "blood-letting"
and "bait-and-bleed", or Schweller's "bandwagoning for profit," share the same limited requirements for control and
a free-riding mechanism, conceptually placing them in the buckpassing category. See Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of
Great Power Politics, Ch. 5; Randall L Schweller, Deadly Imbalances: Tripolarity and Hitler's Strategy of World
Conquest (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998), pp. 75-83.
military aggression, or the management of politics to avoid general war, though a number of
theories of power management might be envisioned. A balancing strategy aims to achieve this
influence by a mechanism of forward commitment: the balancer directly and substantially
entangles itself abroad to gain a handle on particular threats. Balancing thus emphasizes
influencing the shape of the international system over cutting costs, though it is not without
concern for the latter. When a state is no longer content to trade-off greater costs for more
international influence, or when it pursues political preeminence by expansion, it has ceased to
balance. In the American context, balancing is associated with maintaining a bipolar distribution
of power in Europe, with the direct involvement of the United States as one of the two poles.9
Table 2.1: Conceptual Markers of Grand Strategy
Non-entanglement Buckpassing Balancing Preponderance
Vision for Balance Indifferent, except Prevent Prevent some Prevent other
of Power for the state's own hegemony; configurations poles from taking
strategic most other beyond independent
detachment from it. configurations hegemony. action contrary to
acceptable. the state's goals.
Mechanisms Deterrence and Free-riding. Forward Political
non-interference. commitments. expansion and
power
predominance.
American View American pole Multipolar Bipolar American pole
detached. Europe, Europe, preponderant in
American American pole Europe, usually
pole distant. involved. through liberal
scheme.
MEASURING GRAND STRATEGY
How can these grand strategies be measured empirically? There are two kinds of relevant
evidence. First, measurements of grand strategy can be inferred from the pattern of policies
implemented by a state. The question is, "What kind of preferences about the balance of power
and mechanisms for its management would generate this range of policies?" Much of the
literature surveyed in Chapter One implicitly proceeds in just this fashion, providing a narrative
of strategic decisions and showing their logical structure. Second, statesmen often talk about
their strategies in private and about how the international position they seek justifies their
preferred policies. Such comments are credible evidence for coding their grand strategy. In
9 The term "balancing" is often used very loosely in IR theory to indicate a number of possible policies. I adopt
Mearsheimer's distinction between a balancer who "assumes direct responsibility for preventing" undesirable
outcomes and a buck-passer who "attempts to get another state to bear the burden" of managing the balance of
power. See Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, pp. 156-157. Today strategies of forward
commitment are often referred to as "selective engagement:" see Art, A Grand Strategy for America.
addition, it is important not to confuse the issues of grand strategic success and ends-means
integration with the coding of grand strategy itself.
MEASUREMENT TECHNIQUES. In inferring grand strategy from state behavior, I examine
three broad elements of any state's foreign policy posture. Threat perceptions and response are
decisions about "who is against you" in world politics, and whether these enemies demand a
policy response. They are judgments about what other centers of power threaten state goals and
the adoption of a diplomatic posture towards these poles. Diplomatic policies concern "who is
with you" in the international environment, and the manner in which such friends will be
managed. These are judgments about which centers of power need to be induced to cooperate or
facilitate a state's goals, and the adoption of diplomatic initiatives to bring about such
cooperation. Military policy encompasses the size of a state's military power, the type of forces
it buys, and their manner of employment. Military decisions are the most fundamental arbiters
of the costs of grand strategy and the control it can provide. By charting changes in these areas
of foreign policy, changes in strategic logic can be revealed.'0
Such inferences about policy depend in no small part on judgments about what decision-
makers intended their policies to achieve; objective facts about state policies do not simply speak
for themselves. Consider the grand strategy of the Soviet Union in 1939, for example. The
Molotov-Ribbentrop pact implied Soviet balancing commitments to manage the European power
structure. Russia absorbed Polish territory that gave it a more defensible border against potential
German aggression in the future, while buying time for the construction of massive forward-
deployed armies for defense. As the same time, Stalin's policy contained major free-riding
elements, both in terms of "bandwagoning" on German territorial conquest, and in sending the
Wehrmacht west where France and Britain had to bear the costs of balancing Hitler.
Determining the best classification of this strategy requires knowing something about how Stalin
understood his own policy, and how he thought it fit with other actions of the Soviet state."1
SUCCESS, INTEGRATION, AND STRATEGIC MEASUREMENT. In empirically assessing the
character of a state's grand strategy, it is important to keep two considerations in mind. First,
just because a strategy is unsuccessful or has means disintegrated from its ends does not make its
categorization impossible. Hitler's bid for European dominance is one of the most spectacular
strategic failures in world history. Yet it is perfectly reasonable to describe Nazi Germany's
grand strategy in terms of preponderance or hegemony. The failure of a grand strategy to
achieve its goals does not thereby change its position on the power management continuum.
Ambitious institutional strategies may fail, even as they still pursue a unipolar system and
produce extensive diplomatic and military commitments. Similarly, buckpassing strategies are
often attractive choices for states that seek to influence international politics at lower costs. If a
0 For works on the importance of threat perception, diplomatic posture, and military doctrine as crucial elements of
grand strategy, see, respectively, the first chapter of Mark L. Haas, The Ideological Origins of Great Power Politics,
1789-1989 (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2005); Stephen M. Walt, The Origins ofAlliances (Ithaca, NY:
Cornell University Press, 1987); Posen, The Sources of Military Doctrine. Importantly, economic policy is also an
important element of grand strategy. In trying to generalize about the subject, I came to the conclusion that it
probably required a separate book to treat with any rigor. I therefore note the importance of economic
commitments, but simply in terms of their size and number.
" On this example, see the take in Schweller, Deadly Imbalances, p. 66. 1 take no position on the nature of Soviet
strategy. Schweller believes this difficulty shows that strategies as conventionally defined are not mutually
exclusive. Actually, it mostly shows that bandwagoning and buckpassing are variants of the same strategic logic.
There is no reason Soviet strategy can't be objectively classified, it merely requires knowing something about the
aims of Soviet policy-makers.
buckpasser is later drawn into a greater set of commitments and to new mechanisms for
implementing them, that fact does not change the measurement of its earlier strategy. The
characterization of a state's strategy at any given time depends on inferences about its desired
configuration of power and the mechanisms by which policy aims to achieve it-not on its
degree of success or level of strategic integration.
Second, statesmen frequently avoid making trade-offs. Policy-makers would obviously
prefer to have as much influence as possible, and for pennies on the dollar. As will be discussed
in more detail below, they often function as motivated reasoners, actively seeking out causal
stories-some plausible, others preposterous-for how low-cost policies will provide the
leverage essential for achieving high-priority goals. This basic psychological tendency can lead
12to grand strategies that are incoherent, unsuccessful, and even internally contradictory."
In the end, though, the international environment and the broad cognitive rationality of
decision-makers both lead towards the more consistent strategies represented by the ideal types
just described. The international environment provides constraints and incentives toward
behavior that protects the survival of states and can socialize political leaders into more effective
strategies. Basic rationality gives statesmen an incentive to pursue high-priority goals over lower
ones. To the extent that the recognition of international realities moves state strategy towards
greater consistency, or causes it to change type, the balance of power deserves credit as the
independent variable doing the work. As will be discussed below, the international system tends
over time to make grand strategies more integrated, in the sense of increased means-ends
consistency. 3
Liberalism in American Politics
The rest of this chapter constructs a theory to explain variation in American grand
strategy as defined above. A principal independent variable in this theory is liberalism, a
tradition of philosophical ideas dating to the seventeenth century. The liberal tradition, which
places heavy priority on the freedom of individuals, has been the hegemonic political discourse
in America since the founding era.
I begin this section by discussing the character of ideational structures, which are
composed of normative and causal beliefs and are subject to psychological pressures. Next, I
briefly review some of the literature on American political culture discussing the dominance of
liberal norms. The remainder of the section then argues that there are two distinct interpretations
of the central liberal norm of freedom: negative liberty and positive liberty. I sketch the
philosophical differences between negative liberalism and positive liberalism, and consider their
implications for domestic political order. They constitute a source of variation within the liberal
tradition that I will later argue has important ramifications for American grand strategy.
IDEATIONAL STRUCTURES
2 Put another way, it is still possible to usefully classify a state's posture in international politics, even if the ideas
that underlie that policy are flawed.
3 On political-military integration in grand strategy, and the way the balance of power can socialize and constrain
strategy towards more integration, see Posen, The Sources of Military Doctrine, pp. 24-29, 74-79. Motivated
reasoning is discussed below.
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In order to understand how ideology influences policy, it is vitally important to
understand what ideologies are and how individuals adapt them in the face of real-world
discrepancies. To this end, I review here the basic elements of ideational belief structures. I
then discuss how psychological mechanisms impact belief structures and conclude by giving
some examples of how ideologies have impacted major elements of foreign policy.
The upshot is that ideological structures are difficult to change because the cognitive
impulse for simplicity, consistency, and motivated bias militates in favor of retaining previously
held beliefs. Two circumstances will produce change in ideological beliefs. First, unambiguous
information and high-stakes choices will push individuals towards analytic rationality. Second,
when causal beliefs conflict with highly valued norms and the policies that embody them,
individuals will tend to adjust their causal theories, rather than abandoning their norms or
radically changing their policies. These two tendencies are critical for the later discussion of
how different norms produce different foreign policy preferences and for how decision-makers
approach value trade-offs among grand strategies.
ELEMENTS OF IDEOLOGY. Ideational structures, of which political liberalism is an
example, consist of two different types of beliefs that motivate political action. Normative
beliefs specify what kinds of outcomes are valued, what types of behavior are appropriate and
inappropriate, or define the nature of important concepts. Causal beliefs reflect expectations
about how the world works; about what kind of policy "causes" will secure normative "effects."
The most common mechanism by which these ideational structures affect policy is when they
serve as cognitive road maps, wherein causal beliefs direct decision-makers along those policy
routes towards the destination of their desired normative goals.' 4
To use a repugnant example, Hitler's Nazi ideology identified racial purity and anti-
communism as the appropriate values for political pursuit. Hitler also held a related set of causal
beliefs: world politics was characterized by social Darwinist struggle between races and
ideologies; personal and political miscegenation would weaken the power of a given national
race; and the ideological and racial distance between Soviet Russia and other states would make
it unlikely for an anti-German balancing coalition to form. The combination of these ideas
produced obvious policy conclusions-prepare for and wage the inevitable anti-Soviet war by
navigating between East and West, while engaging in racial extermination to prevent the
weakening of the German race.
PSYCHOLOGICAL IMPACT ON IDEOLOGY. In the abstract, there is no logical reason why
ideologies must necessarily propound such closely related normative and causal views. After all,
the "ought/is" distinction reminds us that questions of cause and effect differ from those of right
and wrong. But practically, any ideology worth its salt will produce an ideational structure with
at least some links between its values and an effective manner of obtaining them. An ideology
14 On normative and causal beliefs, and on road maps see Judith Goldstein and Robert 0. Keohane, Ideas and
Foreign Policy: Beliefs, Institutions, and Political Change (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1993), pp. 9-10,
13-17. Also accepting these general distinctions are Alexander L. George, "The Operational Code: A Neglected
Approach to the Study of Political Leaders and Decision-Making," International Studies Quarterly 13, no. 2 (1969):
190-222; Jeffrey Legro, Rethinking the World: Great Power Strategies and International Order (Ithaca, N.Y.:
Cornell University Press, 2005).These are not the only type of ideas that can matter, nor are roadmaps the only
mechanisms by which ideas can influence politics. See Goldstein and Keohane, Ideas and Foreign Policy: Beliefs,
Institutions, and Political Change, pp. 8-9.
" On Hitler's ideology see Haas, The Ideological Origins of Great Power Politics, 1789-1989, pp. 107-111. 1 take
no position on whether Hitler's ideology was the primary cause of Germany's aggressive foreign policy. But if
Nazism drove German grand strategy, the above account sketches a probable mechanism by which it had its effects.
that suggested its vision of the good was unobtainable would not find many adherents.
Furthermore, psychological theories of decision-making give us powerful reasons for expecting
that individuals will try to avoid conflicts between their different beliefs, revise them only under
pressure, and will respond to pressure by adjusting causal views in order to correspond with the
pursuit of normative goals, rather than by changing policy responses or normative goals to match
correct causal beliefs.
Intuitive approaches to cognition suggest that individuals will seek to reduce the strain of
complex calculations and to maintain cognitive consistency. Even under the optimal assumption
of rational decision-making, the environment contains a massive overload of ambiguous
information that human beings simply cannot process. Information overload will thus cause
even the best reasoners to rely on heuristics, analogies, and other mental short cuts that tend to
reinforce pre-existing views. Intuitive reasoning greatly exacerbates this problem, as it posits a
cognitive need for simplicity and consistency that leads only "to options consistent with the
decision-maker's belief system, previous practices, or present policies." Furthermore,
"tendencies towards consistency and simplicity inhibit the recognition of value conflicts."
Because individuals believe that their values are consistent, they can overlook the possibility that
that chosen policies will lead to value clashes.16
Motivational approaches to cognition stress that errors in cognition are often self-
interested, "in the sense of being useful to the actors, of facilitating valued actions, positions, or
attitudes." As Jack Snyder puts it, when under the influence of motivated bias, decision-making
"will become a process of rationalization rather than rationality." Recent psychological research
demonstrates these claims in a particularly relevant way: laboratory experiments show that
individuals will often evaluate causal propositions in a way that biases assessments towards
seeing higher probabilities for highly valued outcomes. Female experiment participants, for
instance, are far less likely to believe the proposition that coffee can have harmful effects on
women than are male participants when presented with the same evidence, even when the
posited effects are very mild. As Princeton psychologist Ziva Kunda puts it, individuals often
"generate theories about the causes of positive and negative outcomes in a self-serving manner"
as well "applying more stringent criteria to evidence with less favorable implications." In many
situations, "the cognitive process is harnessed in the service of motivational ends."' 7
6 Barbara Reardon Farnham, Roosevelt and the Munich Crisis: A Study of Political Decision-Making (Princeton,
NJ: Princeton University Press, 1997), pp. 250, 251. On intuitive models and the need for simplicity and cognitive
consistency see also Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics (Princeton, N.J.:
Princeton University Press, 1976), pp. 128-146, 187-195; Janice Gross Stein and Raymond Tanter, Rational
Decision-Making: Israel's Security Choices, 1967 (Columbus, OH: Ohio State University Press, 1980), pp. 39-47;
Susan T. Fiske, Daniel T. Gilbert, and Gardner Lindzey, Handbook of Social Psychology, 5th ed. (New York: Wiley,
2010), Chs. 8, 15.
17 Robert Jervis, "Deterrence and Perception," International Security 7, no. 3 (December 1, 1982): p. 15; Jack L.
Snyder, The Ideology of the Qffensive: Militaty Decision Making and the Disasters of 1914 (Ithaca, NY: Cornell
University Press, 1989), p. 18; Ziva Kunda, "Motivated Inference: Self-serving Generation and Evaluation of Causal
Theories," Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 53, no. 4 (1987): pp. 636, 637. On self-serving causal
evaluation see Kunda, "Motivated Inference: Self-serving Generation and Evaluation of Causal Theories"; Ziva
Kunda, "The Case for Motivated Reasoning," Psychological Bulletin 108, no. 3 (1990): 480-498; David P
Redlawsk, Andrew J. W Civettini, and Karen M Emmerson, "The Affective Tipping Point: Do Motivated Reasoners
Ever 'Get It'?," Political Psychology 31, no. 4 (August 1, 2010): 563-593; Jervis, Perception and Misperception in
International Politics, Ch. 10. Interestingly, another Kunda experiment showed that students who had chosen to
attend graduate school tended to disbelieve evidence that the probability of success was low and that they did not
have the attributes commonly associated with success.
To quote Snyder again, "people see the 'necessary' as possible," over-rating their ability
to cause desired end states rather than abandoning key goals. More generally, theories of
motivated cognition posit that the stress of decision-making will lead individuals to deny the
necessity for value trade-offs or belief updating. Instead, motivated reasoners will be
"increasingly persuaded that a single policy will permit all values to be satisfied." In sum,
motivated reasoners will resist seeing conflicts between their beliefs and values, and when forced
to acknowledge them, will often modify their causal beliefs to match their valued norms.' 8
To be sure, there is copious evidence that individuals can engage in broadly rational,
analytical decision-making: they have the capacity to organize their attitudes, values, and beliefs
into hierarchical structures; to monitor their environment for new information that would update
their causal beliefs; and to make choices that maximize their preferences. Analytical rationality
is especially likely to hold under situations where the stakes are high and information is
unambiguous. So, the evidence for basic human rationality ought to give us confidence that
value preferences informed by normative beliefs will exert influence over policy choice, and that
decision-makers can indeed make value trade-offs when forced to do so. However, there is also
considerable support for the notion that large elements of non-rational perception in the human
make-up will produce delays in matching policy ends and means. Furthermore, such evidence
also predicts that normative concerns will dominate causal beliefs under conditions of
ambiguity.'9
EXAMPLES OF IDEOLOGICAL PRESERVATION. The literature on military doctrine shows
how slow-changing cognitive structures can affect foreign policy. It is well known that
militaries construct institutional ideologies, consisting of norms about the nature of war and
proper military organization, as well as causal prescriptions about the doctrines most effective
for fighting wars. Many of these beliefs stem from organizational interests in wealth, prestige,
and autonomy, and are adopted instrumentally for those purposes, whether consciously or
unconsciously. But the normative and causal beliefs of militaries can also derive from a
"purpose" or "organizational essence." Such views can be thought of as more purely ideological,
in the sense that these beliefs are held because they are seen to be right, true, and beautiful in
themselves, rather than merely useful.
Two brief examples illustrate the tenacity with which valued norms can be defended,
even at the expense strategic coherency. Before the Great War, the French Army held causal
beliefs indicating that an offensive doctrine was required to win future wars and that only long-
service conscripts could successfully mount an offensive. These beliefs were adopted in large
part because the values, norms, and rhythms of traditional military institutions were threatened
by short-term conscripts who could not be adequately socialized to military life. Despite
increasing evidence that offensives would be suicidal under modem conditions, the French Army
only increased its attachments to the efficacy of the offensive, offering rapidly changing causal
* Snyder, The Ideology of the Qffensive, p. 1 8; Farnham, Roosevelt and the Munich Crisis, p. 257.
" Farnham, Roosevelt and the Munich Crisis, pp. 245-248. On analytical models of reasoning, which even at their
most optimistic, stress limited analysis and bounded rationality, see Stein and Tanter, Rational Decision-Making, pp.
27-32; Herbert A. Simon, Administrative Behavior (New York: Free Press, 1997), Chs. 3-5.
20 Posen, The Sources of Military Doctrine, p. 43. For accounts that develop ideological component of
organizational behavior, including the origin of the term "organizational essence," see Philip Selznick, TVA and the
Grass Roots: A Study of Politics and Organization (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1953); Philip
Selznick, Leadership in Administration: A Sociological Interpretation (Berkeley, CA: University of California
Press, 1957).
arguments that were ever more absurd. The result was the disastrous Plan XVII, which neatly
facilitated German strategy in the opening battles of the Great War. 21
Similarly, before the Second World War, both the British Royal Air Force (RAF) and
civilians massively over-estimated the effectiveness of German and British strategic bombing in
bringing about decisive results. While the RAF had obvious material incentives for pushing a
strategic bombing offensive, politicians of all stripes also accepted that "the bomber will always
get through." Hawks and doves alike found the argument useful for protecting key domestic
values and justifying their preferred strategy. Doves saw the efficacy of German bombers as a
key argument for appeasing Hitler, building the RAF, and avoiding the much hated ground
commitments of the First World War. Hawks saw strategic bombing as a way to mobilize the
lethargic public to oppose Hitler now, before it was too late, as well as seeing the growing
Luftwaffe as confirmation of German aggressiveness. It was only as the pressures of the
international system became obvious that politicians began to look for information to really test
strategic bombing propositions and found them wanting.
I would highlight three take-away points from this discussion of ideational structures.
First, ideologies are composed of norms and causal beliefs, and affect strategy by suggesting
policies that can secure valued ends. Second, human psychology will be resistant to changing
these beliefs, often working to obscure ways in which values clash or causal beliefs are faulty.
Third, as information becomes less ambiguous and the stakes of action rise, beliefs sets will
become more consistent, coherent, and rational. But bias will remain in favor of core normative
values: individuals are more likely to adjust their beliefs about causal forces than they are to
abandon valued norms or policies that embody them. It is to normative distinctions within
liberalism that I now turn.
AMERICA'S LIBERAL CULTURE
American political culture is thoroughly dominated by philosophical liberalism. This
should first be understood as a claim about what American culture is not. Unlike European
societies, America never had a feudal past to tear down. It therefore avoided the radical Marxist
tradition as well as the reactionary modernism of the fascist right, both of which arose out of
grappling with an older social order and an emergent new one. Bereft of both aristocrats and
revolutionaries, endowed with cheap land and scarce labor, and founded when Enlightenment
intellectual currents were at their high-water mark, America developed a broad-based society and
with it the liberal ideology of the bourgeoisie. The absence of an alternative set of ideas makes
liberal thought a powerful legitimating device in American politics. It also ensures that political
23debate is carried out on relatively narrow ground.
21 Snyder, The Ideology of the Qffensive, Chs. 2-3.
22 Jervis, "Deterrence and Perception," pp. 14-17; See also Posen, The Sources of Military Doctrine, pp. 144-146.
23 The preeminent statement of the liberal society thesis is Louis Hartz, The Liberal Tradition in America: An
Interpretation ofAmerican Political Thought since the Revolution (New York: Harcourt, 1955), inter alia pp. 3-14.
See also Samuel P. Huntington, American Politics: The Promise of Disharmony (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press,
1981), pp. 5-10, 13-23. Other broad treatments emphasizing the dominance of the broad liberal tradition in
American political development include James P. Young, Reconsidering American Liberalism: The Troubled
Odyssey of the Liberal Idea (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1996); Eric Foner, The Story ofAmerican Freedom
(New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 1998); Russell L. Hanson, The Democratic Imagination in America:
Conversations with Our Past (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1985); David F. Ericson and Louisa Bertch
This debate encompasses a range of values that still leaves plenty of room for
disagreement. American citizens and leaders have long held to a basic consensus of political
values: constitutionalism and the rule of law; democracy; egalitarianism; individualism; and
most importantly, the primacy of liberty. These values can sometimes contradict each other, and
the working out of such tensions constitutes the stuff of liberal political discourse. For instance,
scholars of the early American republic have pointed to several different ways in which
statesmen grappled with conflicting liberal values. David Erickson identifies a transition
between a relatively public-spirited republican conception of liberalism and a more pluralist and
individualist notion. J. David Greenstone distinguishes between a bourgeois humanist liberalism
and a reform-oriented perfectionist variant. The important commonalities that most analysts
recognize are that liberalism constitutes a powerful driving force in American politics, and that
disputes occur within its limits.
Generally, these disputes contest differing interpretations of the central liberal ideal:
liberty. Given the elevated place liberty has had in American political rhetoric, differing
conceptions of its meaning can have powerful political effects and policy consequences. I argue
that two powerful visions of freedom emerge from trends in the American political debate. To
steal the language of Isaiah Berlin, there have been two concepts of liberty ever present in
American discourse: negative liberty and positive liberty. 25
Negative liberty is freedom from constraint. To be free is to be unbound from the
coercion of others, particularly the apparatus of the state. Positive liberty is the full development
of one's capabilities and their exercise in pursuit of valued ends. To have positive liberty is to be
master of oneself-a fully autonomous human being with both the internal abilities and external
support to effectively act on projects and plans. The difference can be seen in a musical
example: two men who sit down at a piano may be equally free from external constraint, but only
the one who knows how to play the instrument is free to create music. Presumably the second
man's musical liberty is conditioned by, among other things, his access to pianos, the time for
practice, his musical abilities, and his capacity for self-discipline. Thus, positive liberty is the
more demanding of the two interpretations and also the more substantively generous
understanding of freedom.
In general terms both concepts are identifiable in American political discourse from the
beginnings of American history. But a clear pattern of ideational dominance is observed over
time. Until the early twentieth century, the negative conception of liberty was the dominant
interpretation of liberalism among American elites. For the first half of the twentieth century,
the idea of liberty was more contested, with differing conceptions exerting a profound influence
Green, The Liberal Tradition in American Politics: Reassessing the Legacy ofAmerican Liberalism (New York:
Routledge, 1999).
24 On the different values in the liberal creed see Huntington, American Politics: The Promise of Disharmony, pp.
13-23. See also, Hartz, The Liberal Tradition in America, inter alia pp. 14-20, 89-113, 228-248. The debate on
liberalism in early America is large. Providing a good start are David F. Ericson, The Shaping ofAmerican
Liberalism: The Debates over Ratification, Nillification, and Slavery (Chicago, IL: University Of Chicago Press,
1993); J. David Greenstone, The Lincoln Persuasion: Remaking American Liberalism (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton
University Press, 1993).
25 Berlin introduced negative and positive liberty in his famous essay: Isaiah Berlin, "Two Concepts of Liberty," in
Liberty: Incorporating Four Essays on Liberty (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 166-217. While I think
these terms are apt for the changes in liberalism I describe, the reader should be aware that Berlin's usage expands
beyond the liberal tradition and reflects a normative stance on which I pass no judgment. The vast philosophic
debate on Berlin's terns and their meaning is not treated here.
on American politics, depending on the occupant of the White House. By the mid 1960s, the
situation had reversed itself: contemporary American elites have settled on the positive vision of
freedom. Though the rhetoric of negative liberty is sometimes still heard publically, it is a
26decidedly minority position among political actors. As I will argue below, understanding this
contestation in American politics is crucial to understanding variations in American grand
strategy over the last century.
NEGATIVE LIBERTY
Though in eclipse today, the concept of negative liberty has had a profound impact on
American politics. Here I lay out the concept's essential elements and describe its vision of
government.
PHILOSOPHIC ESSENTIALS. Negative liberty is what Charles Taylor calls an "opportunity-
concept." Freedom, on this view, is a matter of the opportunities open to an individual. It
consists in a lack of human obstacles, or the non-restriction of options: "It is a sufficient
condition of being free that nothing stand in the way." Negative liberty is freedom "from;" as
Thomas Hobbes puts it, "by liberty is understood, according to the proper signification of the
word, the absence of external impediments, which impediments may oft take away part of man's
power to do as he would." One is free only to the extent that one faces no obstacles to action.
Furthermore, obstacles inhibit liberty only to the extent that they are external and of human
origin: we do not say that I lack the freedom to play professional basketball; we say that I am
short and slow. As Hobbes argues, "when the impediment of motion is in the constitution of the
thing itselfe; we use not to say, it wants the Liberty, but the Power to move; as when a stone
lyeth still, or a man is fastned to his bed by sickness." Freedom is the opportunity to work one's
will unimpeded by external human actions or institutions, and where such human impediments
exist, freedom is diminished.2 7
An appreciation of negative liberty, and a preservation of some kind of zone of non-
interference, has been one of the primary projects of the liberal tradition. Hobbes himself was no
friend to this project, associating it with the violence of anarchy and often justifying the
suppression of liberty under an absolute state as necessary to maintaining order. But liberals
who followed after Hobbes shared his view of the essential concept. Benjamin Constant, Jeremy
Bentham, John Stuart Mill, and John Locke, to name some of the major thinkers in the tradition
of English liberalism, could agree with Hobbes that "liberties, they depend on the silence of the
law. Where the sovereign hath proscribed no rule, there the subject has the liberty to do or
forbear, according to his own discretion. And therefore such liberty is in some places more, and
in some less, in some times more, and some less." Unlike Hobbes, these thinkers sought to
26 1 discourage attempts to map the following discussion onto contemporary political parties and politics. On my
reading, American politics is presently dominated by two political parties dedicated to variations on positive liberty.
Negative liberals of the type found in the early part of the twentieth century are rarely seen today, and usually only
in think tanks and opinion journalism.
27 First quote, as well as a discussion of "opportunity" and "exercise" concepts, can be found in Charles Taylor,
"What's Wrong With Negative Liberty," in The Idea of Freedom, ed. Alan Ryan (Oxford, England: Oxford
University Press, 1979), p. 177. Quotes in Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, ed. Edwin. M. Curley (Indianapolis, IN:
Hackett, 1994), XIV, 2; XXI, 1. See also Berlin's discussion of external/internal and human/natural impediments,
Berlin, "Two Concepts of Liberty," pp. 169-172. The more philosophically precise definition of negative liberty as
"the non-restriction of options" is often used in connection with these different kinds of impediments. See John
Gray, Liberalism (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 1986), p. 56-60.
increase the zone of non-interference and ensure at least a bare minimum area over which the
sovereign could provide no rules. They argued that the law inhibits freedom, and advocated its
silence to increase liberty's extent. 28
This trend towards a sphere of non-interference has oriented negative liberty in a broad
opposition to power. Power is the source of coercion and thus the root cause of freedom's loss.
As Berlin puts it, "coercion is, in so far as it frustrates human desires, bad as such, although it
may have to be applied to prevent other, greater evils; while non-interference, which is the
opposite of coercion, is good as such, though it is not the only good. This is the negative
conception of liberty in its classic form."29
VISION OF GOVERNMENT. Consequently, negative liberty has been associated with a
distinctive vision of government: anti-statist, rights-protecting, limited to core functions, and
valuing democracy as a useful instrument for obtaining other valued ends. These views have
been especially strong in the United States.
In America, experience and philosophy together molded a strong cultural distaste that has
been called the "anti-power ethic." Early Americans distrusted power of all kinds, considering it
inherently opposed to liberty. But they particularly distrusted the power of the state, which was
the most dangerous source of despotism and of arbitrary depredations of individual rights. By
setting up an opposition between liberty and power in general, and the specific form of power
wielded by governments, freedom came to be defined as the absence on state intrusion. To a
negative liberal the expansion of state power simply is the diminishment of liberty, if it occurs
outside of a very limited sphere of legitimate government authority; conversely, the limitation of
state power represents the advance of liberty. With its focus on freedom from constraint, anti-
statism in American politics is the core of the negative conception of liberty.30
The most familiar example of negative liberal political thought is the social contract
argument of John Locke. Positing a state of nature where humans interacted without
government, Locke argued that the coercive apparatus of government can only be justified by
improvements over the natural state-principally through securing broadly defined property
rights. Tasked with the job of securing basic order and justice, the Lockean state otherwise
leaves well enough alone. The sphere of non-interference is wide and deep, and negative liberty
is maximized within a context of a baseline set of freedoms for all. American history is replete
with this view of liberty, as it animates the opening passages of the Declaration of Independence
and on some accounts has provided the lodestar for American political culture ever since. It sits
at the heart of the American distaste for government and resistance to power and authority.3'
This does not mean the early Americans, or any other advocates of negative freedom,
believed that no government action is legitimate, or that coercion could not be justified under any
28 Quote in Hobbes, Leviathan, XXI, 18. A useful overview of the development of liberal thinkers is Gray,
Liberalism, pp. 9-35.
29 Berlin, "Two Concepts of Liberty," p. 175.
30 Huntington, American Politics: The Promise ofDisharmony, pp. 33-39; Aaron L. Friedberg, In the Shadow of the
Garrison State: America's Anti-Statism and its Cold War Grand Strategy (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University
Press, 2000), pp. 9-18.
3 John Locke, Two Treatises of Government, ed. Peter Laslett (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press,
1988). 1 use Locke as an example of what I mean by negative liberty, though he does not use the term; this
paragraph is obviously a rather superficial summary of his thought. Useful discussions of American political
development from a negative liberal, or classical liberal, viewpoint are Robert Higgs, Crisis and Leviathan: Critical
Episodes in the Growth ofAmerican Government (Oxford, England: Oxford University Press, 1987); Arthur A.
Ekirch, The Decline ofAmerican Liberalism (Oakland, CA: Independence Institute, 2009).
circumstances. Most negative liberty advocates have felt that basic justice compelled at least a
bare minimum of freedom for everyone. Otherwise, as the old saying goes, "freedom for the
pike is death to the minnows." As Hobbes feared, in such a situation liberty becomes nothing
more than the right of the strongest, with its attendant unending fear and uncertainty. Therefore,
government can legitimately regulate an individual's freedom in order to prevent collisions with
the freedom of other individuals. People may have to be coerced into respecting the basic
liberties of others. The basic rationale of the state's role in "collision prevention"--often called
the "night-watchmen state"-is a basic part of all but the most extreme visions of negative
liberty. This kind of state creates and enforces property rights, provides genuine collective goods,
and occasionally regulates the externalities of private interactions. Beyond these fairly
traditional roles of liberal government, negative liberty sees very little role for central authority.
Politically, negative liberals have had an uneasy relationship with democracy, tending to
value it for instrumental reasons. Negative liberty is the concept that answers the question: how
much am I ruled, and what areas are left open as opportunities for my own choice? As such, it
does not imply very much about the ideal form of government or the role of political
participation. As Berlin notes, "just as a democracy may, in fact, deprive the individual citizen
of a great many liberties... so it is conceivable that a liberal-minded despot would allow his
subjects a great measure of personal freedom.... There is no necessary connection between
individual liberty and democratic rule." Of course, no liberal of any stripe would be anxious to
trust a despot on the issue of freedom-liberty would then exist only at the sufferance of his
interests. Thus, in America, the rhetoric of democracy has been used by advocates of negative
liberty mostly as a bulwark against special interests hijacking the state for coercive purposes.
Republican forms of government are valued because they prevent coercion on the behalf of self-
interested factions.
POSITIVE LIBERTY
Positive liberty is the dominant conception of freedom in contemporary American
politics, and its rise to prominence helped shape modern America. Here I describe its primary
elements and the vision of government often associated with them.
PHILOSOPHICAL ESSENTIALS. Positive liberty is the "freedom to" do some thing or other:
it consists in the actual actions of free agents. That is, an agent is free just to the extent that he
can exercise valued faculties or capabilities-positive liberty is for this reason often called an
"exercise concept." A lack of freedom is more than coercion or obstacles: it is the failure to
realize valuable goals. The capacity to exercise valued ends can be denied by internal
impediments, by social norms or institutions, or simply by inadequate provision of resources.
All of these things can place an agent in what amounts to a state of slavery, either to society or
32 Berlin, "Two Concepts of Liberty," p. 174, quote on p. 171. Negative liberals do not necessarily believe in the
minimal state. History's most famous negative liberals have often supported limited state intervention of properly
legitimated types (like those mentioned in the text), as noted in Gray, Liberalism, pp. 73-81.
33 Berlin, "Two Concepts of Liberty," pp. 176-177. On the opposition of republican forms of government to power,
and the negative liberal relationship with democracy, see Ericson, The Shaping ofAmerican Liberalism; David C.
Hendrickson, Peace Pact: The Lost World of the American Founding (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas,
2006). The classic works on early Republicanism remain John Greville Agard Pocock, The Machiavellian Moment:
Florentine Political Thought and the Atlantic Republican Tradition (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press,
1975); Gordon S. Wood, The Creation of the American Republic, 1776-1787 (Chapel Hill, NC: The University of
North Carolina Press, 1969).
circumstance. A person who cannot chose to achieve his ends because he lacks the material or
social capacity to act is not at liberty, even if no external force restrains him. Positive liberty is
therefore a kind of autonomy or self-realization: freedom requires a control over the shape of
one's life and is judged by an implicit standard about the ends to which that control is properly
exerted. As the British liberal T.H. Green put it, the essence of liberty is "a positive power or
capacity of doing or enjoying something worth doing or enjoying, and that, too, something that
we do or enjoy in common with others." 34
In sum, positive liberty addresses a different set of questions than negative liberty. In
Berlin's words, it is the concept that answers the question of "who rules me?" in contrast to
negative liberty's query, "how much am I ruled?" Am I essentially self-governing, or ruled by
others? But there are at least two relevant senses of self-government: as participation in
collective rule or as an autonomous individual.
Some variants of positive liberty stress a collective interpretation of human freedom,
commonly known as republicanism. On this view, real liberty is collective self-direction, the
self-government of a political community. For an individual to be free, he must be an active
participant in a polity characterized by common citizenship and "the possession by all... of the
fully qualified members of a society of a share of the public power." In order to use that power
well, free individuals must possess certain virtues of citizenship, including the self-restraint of
personal interests, independence that breeds public spiritedness, and energy for political
engagement. Society, in turn, must produce these virtues by partaking in some measure of
democracy and encouraging political participation. The virtuous and free individual must be a
part of a virtuous and free community, and vice-versa. The collective version of positive liberty
is the source of the normative priority for democracy and political participation often seen in
American liberal discourse, and indeed, this emphasis is essential-if freedom is collective self-
direction, then a widespread ability to participate in politics is necessary for its exercise. 36
A more individualist variant of positive liberty has been popular in America as well.
Such a view argues that individuals who lack sufficient wealth, abilities, and other resources
cannot meaningfully exercise important liberties. In order to have real liberty, human faculties
must be developed, social restraints undone, and the resources for effective action supplied.
Some individualist versions of positive liberty spell out very carefully the human goods that are
worth exercising freely. For example, if an individual has the potential to, say, be a prominent
musician, he is not free if that capacity remains undeveloped and not acted on. Others assert
simply that certain material preconditions should be granted that allow the exercise of many
desirable goods: for example, to be free everyone has to have enough wealth, education, and
training to act on a broad range of desires. Both views affirm the proposition that resources,
internal deficiencies, and social structures can meaningfully inhibit freedom.
3 See Berlin, "Two Concepts of Liberty," pp. 178-191. Green quoted in Anthony Arblaster, The Rise and Decline
of Western Liberalism (Oxford, England: Basil Blackwell, 1984), p. 286.
3 Berlin, "Two Concepts of Liberty," pp. 177-178.
36 Quote from Ibid., p. 208. An excellent summary of republican freedom and the republican virtue tradition can be
found in Jeff A. Weintraub, "Virtue, Community, and the Sociology of Liberty: The Notion of Republican Virtue
and its Impact on Modem Western Social Thought" (Ph.D. Dissertation, University of California, Berkeley,
Sociology, 1979). This paragraph draws on pp. 3-10.
3 For an approach that specifies a thick concept of the human good to be achieved, see the program laid out in
Martha C. Nussbaum, "Aristotelian Social Democracy," in Liberalism and the Good, ed. R. Bruce Douglass, Gerald
M. Mara, and Henry S. Richardson (London, England: Routledge, 1990); Martha C. Nussbaum, Nature, Function
and Capability: Aristotle on Political Distribution (Helsinki, Finland: World Institute for Development Economics
Indeed, despite some differences, all advocates of positive liberty share in common the
idea that freedom involves the active exercise of some kind of human good, whether individual
or collective, specified or unspecified. And in this they differ radically from the concept of
negative liberty, which holds that "it is important to discriminate between liberty and the
conditions of its exercise. If a man is too poor or too ignorant or too feeble to make use of his
legal rights, the liberty that these rights confer upon him is nothing to him, but it is not thereby
annihilated.... Liberty is one thing, the conditions for it are another." Positive liberals believe
otherwise.38
VISION OF GOVERNMENT. The positive liberal vision of government is quite different
from the negative liberal view. It tends to be more state-centric and rights vindicating, possesses
fewer limits, and values democracy as an intrinsic good.
Positive liberty has a starkly different orientation to power than negative liberty. Rather
than being seen as a source of constraints and therefore an enemy to liberty, power is
conceptually knitted to liberty in a common cloth. Indeed, it will often be the case that citizens
will not have the ability to achieve their goals, whether because of internal obstacles or want of
resources and capabilities. Positive freedom will require power for its exercise, usually the
power of the state. The state will be needed to redistribute resources so that more people may
have the pre-conditions for effective liberty; state power will be needed to shape the capacities of
individuals to exercise the most important higher goals, whatever those may be. Berlin sums up
the difference in orientation between advocates negative and positive liberty nicely: "the former
want to curb authority as such. The latter want it concentrated in their own hands." 39
The most famous exposition of the positive liberal vision is John Rawls' idea of the veil
of ignorance. Rawls asks us to imagine ourselves designing a just society, but without reference
to where we will end up in it. Would we design a society where important freedoms are
accessible only to some people, not knowing if we will be one of the lucky ones? The veil of
ignorance forces the reader to take a positive view of freedom: to secure our liberty in a just
society, we will need the power to develop our capacities and the resources to act on them. The
state will be designed not just to protect our natural Lockean rights, but also to vindicate our
rights to free action through the judicious application of power."
Positive liberty therefore supports an expansive welfare and regulatory state-an
inversion of the traditional American anti-statism. This kind of state must be involved in much
more than just "collision prevention." After all, how does the state prevent collisions between
free individuals, when real freedom is the exercise of human capacities in the pursuit of common
excellent ends? If individuals are colliding at all, it must be because some of them are not really
free in a positive sense-they are pursuing the wrong ends, or society is misdirecting otherwise
free individuals into each other. State power must be used instead to direct everyone on the
correct path and shape society towards the exercise of its proper ends. Thus, according to some
of positive liberty's advocates, "every limitation of power is an abridgement of liberty." The
Research (WIDER), 1987). The pre-eminent philosophical example of the thinner conditions-based approach is John
Rawls, A Theory ofJustice (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1971).
38 Isaiah Berlin, "Introduction to Four Essays on Liberty," in Liberty (Oxford, England: Oxford University Press,
2002), p. 45.
39 Berlin, "Two Concepts of Liberty," p. 212.
40 I use Rawls only as an example of "positive liberty" and can scarcely do justice here to his thought. Rawls
himself considers the philosophical debate about concepts of liberty as secondary to his tasks. See Rawls, A Theory
ofJustice, pp. 176-180.
coercive apparatus of "state assistance, rightly directed, may extend the bounds of liberty," and
the "collective action of the community may and ought to be employed positively... to make the
freedom of the individual a reality and not a pretence."41
Positive liberals value democracy as an end in itself. The collective interpretation of
freedom and the broad focus on the state in all variants of positive liberty lead to an emphasis on
the community that is represented by government institutions. Self-government, as either an
individual or part of a community, requires active participation in political life. Though in
modem politics only a few individuals can actually take part in government, the democratic basis
of representation is a form of participation and self-rule. Moreover, active participation in public
questions, whether through activism or other engagement in politics, is a highly valued end.
Because positive liberty is focused on autonomy and the state, participating in the state's
business is deemed an important part of self-rule.
In sum, there are two very different ways one can look at liberty: as an opportunity
concept that allows a sphere of non-interference and free choice, or as an exercise concept that
achieves mastery of important human ends. Each concept of liberty implies different views
about the nature of power, the major obstacles to freedom, the role of the state, and freedom's
connection to democracy. Furthermore, the extent to which one adheres to either view can have
large implications for a number of other beliefs. The next relevant question for this study is:
what implications does each concept of liberty have for foreign policy?
Table 2.2: Conceptual Markers of Liberalism
Negative Liberty Positive Liberty
Type of Concept Opportunity concept: freedom Exercise concept: active self-
from constraint, non- government, freedom to act
restriction of options autonomously
Obstacles to Liberty Law; state action; other Insufficient resources for
coercion action; undeveloped
capacities; lack of collective
self-rule
Attitude towards the State More skeptical More supportive
Role of Government Limited: rights respecting; Broad: rights vindicating;
collision prevention extend liberty by promoting
autonomy and effective action
41 Quotes are from British theorists and politicians Leslie Smith, Herbert Samuel, and Herbert Asquinth,
respectively. Quoted in Arblaster, The Rise and Decline of Western Liberalism, pp. 287-288.
42 Hartz, The Liberal Tradition in America, pp. 89-110. Hartz discusses the importance of these trends in early
America, particularly in regard to the extension of the franchise. For the positive liberal attachment to democracy,
as well as other aspects of the positive liberal vision of government, see Hanson, The Democratic Imagination in
America; Arthur Ekirch A., The American Democratic Tradition: a History (New York: MacMillan, 1963); Eldon J.
Eisenach, The Lost Promise of Progressivism (Lawrence, KS: University Press Of Kansas, 1994); David Ciepley,
Liberalism in the Shadow of Totalitarianism (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2007).
Type of Government Tasks Night watchman state; Welfare and regulatory state
minimal state
Attitude towards Democracy Instrumentally valued as a Intrinsically valued as a
check on coercion critical part of liberty
Liberal Preferences for Grand Strategy
The variation between negative and positive concepts of liberty has implications beyond
domestic politics. Negative and positive liberty produce different preferences for American
grand strategy. This normative difference explains the dichotomy in liberal approaches to
foreign policy that has been observed in the international relations literature. Negative liberty
seeks to minimize American commitments abroad lest they threaten liberty at home, serving as a
force pushing American foreign policy towards less power management on the grand strategic
continuum. Positive liberty acts as a force pushing towards greater power management, seeking
to vindicate American liberal values through an active foreign policy.
I argue that while nothing compels individuals to hold the views I have outlined, there are
nonetheless good reasons to believe that my logic should be the predominant interpretations of
liberal imperatives among statesmen. The intuitional and motivated biases discussed earlier
cause adherents to different liberal norms to adopt variant interpretations of more broadly held
liberal beliefs about foreign policy.
This section first outlines the general foreign policy beliefs broadly held within the liberal
tradition. I next lay out the relationship between each concept of liberty and grand strategy,
establishing a logic that connects negative and positive liberty to different foreign policy
preferences. I then consider some objections to this logic. For ease of description, I refer to my
propositions about liberalism and their geopolitical counterparts as a Theory of Liberal Foreign
Policy (TLFP).
THE LIBERAL TRADITION AND FOREIGN POLICY
Though predominantly concerned with domestic politics, the liberal tradition has long
had a distinctive approach to international relations. Liberals tend to believe that there is no
reason international politics should fundamentally differ from domestic political life. The liberal
tradition identifies three domestically valued norms as important international goals and natural
conditions: peace, free trade, and liberal political institutions. However, there are two potential
ways to interpret liberalism's implications for foreign policy. Here I outline the general liberal
approach and its competing sub-variants, before showing how alternate concepts of liberty tend
to match themselves with alternate approaches to foreign policy.
GENERAL LIBERAL FOREIGN POLICY BELIEFS. First, a peaceful order tends to foster
liberty in international politics just as it does in domestic politics. As John Owen summarizes,
"The self-government that respects the self-government of others rules out a coercive or violent
life." Peace is seen as both normal and normative; war is thought an aberration and an
abomination; and it is expected that law and institutional restraint favor international peace and
freedom as surely as they protect those values domestically. Second, in the liberal view,
international relations between states should be based primarily on free economic exchange and
peaceful commercial competition. Liberal theorists from Thomas Paine to Richard Cobden to
Joseph Schumpeter have all seen domestic political liberty as intimately tied with free-trade
abroad. In the words of Schumpeter, free polities are "democratized, individualized, and
rationalized" by the forces of the market, and disciplined by the "economic rationalism" of
capitalism. The basic insight that it is more profitable to trade than fight extends naturally across
borders. Third, democracy is politically desirable at home, obviously tied to individual freedom
and international exchange, and thus historically inevitable abroad.43
And yet the world is often at war, commercially restricted, and autocratically governed.
Given the discrepancy between the natural state of the world and observed reality, liberals have
developed a set of causal stories explaining the origins of the difference. Put simply, power
politics is to blame. Liberalism's international orientation is profoundly anti-realist; it sees the
armies, alliances, and atavism of world politics as the cause of illiberalism rather than the effect
of the international system itself. The way to fix international problems is simply to increase
global liberalism: expanding peace-building international institutions, free trade, and political
democracy will create a self-sustaining virtuous circle. As Robert Osgood neatly summarizes,
the liberal view is that "War is immoral, the people are moral; therefore give the people more
power, and war will vanish. War is wicked, it must be caused by wicked men; therefore, convert
the misguided, and peace will reign."44
Thus, if "the people" are allowed self-government through liberal regimes and given the
freedom to trade, conflict will plummet and human liberty will flourish. Liberal regimes will
externalize norms of non-violence; they will understand the superiority of international free trade
over conquest. If the "wicked men," whose autocratic regimes and mercantilist practices drive
international conflict, are removed and their regimes reformed, the causes of war will vanish.
These evils exist only because they serve the interest of atavistic individuals and classes, and
would fall into the dustbin of history if the obvious superiority of democracy and free trade were
not suppressed. Finally, if a kind of international law and order were constructed, states would
have the same foundation for cooperation that individuals do in domestic life. These causal
beliefs form the classic liberal vision for how world politics can make progress: through an
expanding democratic peace, increasing economic interdependence, and more potent
international institutions.4 5
4 John M. Owen, Liberal Peace, Liberal War: American Politics and International Security (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell
University Press, 2000), p. 33; Schumpeter quoted in Michael W. Doyle, "Liberalism and World Politics," The
American Political Science Review 80, no. 4 (December 1986): p. 1153. On the importance of democracy as an
international norm in liberal thinking, see Tony Smith, America's Mission: The United States and the Worldwide
Strugglefor Democracy in the Twentieth Century (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1994). There is
general agreement in the literature on liberalism that the domestic analogues of peace, trade, and democracy as also
considered normative in international relations. See, additionally, Michael Howard, War and the Liberal
Conscience (Rutgers University Press, 1987); Layne, The Peace of-Illusions, pp. 28-36, 118-128; Dueck, Reluctant
Crusaders, pp. 21-26.
44 Robert Endicott Osgood, Ideals and Self-Interest in America ' Foreign Relations (Chicago, IL: The University of
Chicago Press, 1965), p. 93. Other works emphasizing the explicitly anti-realist orientation of liberalism are Dueck,
Reluctant Crusaders; Huntington, American Politics: The Promise of Disharmony; Samuel P. Huntington, The
Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University
Press, 1957).
4- There is general agreement on liberal theories about the causes of war. See, inter-alia, Layne, The Peace of
Illusions, Ch. 6; G. John Ikenberry, "America's Liberal Grand Strategy: Democracy and National Security in the
Post-War Era," in American Foreign Policy: Theoretical Essays (New York: Addison Wesley, 2002); Stewart
Patrick, Best Laid Plans: The Origins ofAmerican Multilateralism and the Dawn of the Cold War (Rowman &
Littlefield, 2009); Doyle, "Liberalism and World Politics."
COMPETING INTERPRETATIONS OF LIBERALISM'S IMPLICATIONS. As argued in Chapter
One, there are potentially two ways in which these central liberal norms and causal beliefs could
produce grand strategy. Colin Dueck explains the tension: "liberal tradition sees the entire
enterprise of grand strategy as somewhat suspect. Secret diplomacy, tiny elites, Machiavellian
ethic, powerful executives, standing armies, security precautions, intelligence services and covert
operations-all of these are common features of national security politics, and all of them seem
suspicious or even sinister from a liberal perspective. The liberal tendency is to want to keep a
very tight lid on such practices. At the same time, such practices are sometimes necessary in
order to protect a liberal society from external dangers." 46
As a result of managing this tension, a pair of liberal approaches to grand strategy has
developed. They give different answers to two questions raised by the more general liberal
beliefs about foreign policy. First, can American strategy effectively spread the liberal causes of
peace, thus securing a less violent world where liberty can flourish for all? Or do liberal
processes in world politics develop best on their own, and does interference amount to a sordid
involvement in power politics? Second, does war-causing illiberalism threaten American
security and values? That is, will encroaching illiberalism force America into the very
involvement in power politics that it seeks to avoid? Or is America secure in its hemispheric
keep, strategically untouched by temporary hiccups on the road to liberal progress?
To briefly reiterate, the "vindicationalist" tradition believes America should act to protect
and promote liberal values abroad for the benefit of American and world citizens. By acting to
ensure free trade, expand political democracy, and construct international institutions, American
and global liberty will prosper in an environment of peace. This approach may require
temporarily engaging in power politics, but holds the promise of resolving international ills once
and for all.
An alternative "exemplarist" tradition maintains that liberal rights "are most properly
secured by each people establishing or altering its own government." America should offer to
trade with anyone, maintain its own institutions as a beacon to the world, and obey but not
enforce customary international law. The exemplarist strand of liberalism concedes that
America may occasionally need to arm and defend itself against threats from an illiberal world
but believes the long-run development of international society towards liberalism will reduce the
incidence of encroaching power politics. At any rate, global liberalism is unlikely to be coaxed
along by American action. Despite these differences, both approaches hold the same liberal
norms and causal beliefs about peace; they disagree only on how to protect American security
and translate liberalism into grand strategy. I now show how these differences can stem from
different interpretations of freedom, reinforced by the psychological mechanisms discussed
earlier.4 7
46 Dueck, Reluctant Crusaders, p. 25.
47 Quoted in Michael C. Desch, "America's Liberal Illiberalism: The Ideological Origins of Overreaction in U.S.
Foreign Policy," International Security 32, no. 3 (Winter /2008 2007): p. 11. Among the many who recognize the
split in American liberal foreign ideologies include H.W. Brands, What America Owes the World: The Strugglefor
the Soul of Foreign Policy (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1998); Walter A. McDougall,
Promised Land, Crusader State: The American Encounter with the World since 1776 (Boston, MA: Houghton
Mifflin, 1997); Walter Russell Mead, Special Providence: American Foreign Policy and How It Changed the World
(New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2001); Dueck, Reluctant Crusaders; Jonathan Monten, "The Roots of the Bush
Doctrine: Power, Nationalism, and Democracy Promotion in U.S. Strategy," International Security 29, no. 4 (Spring
2005): 112-156..
FOREIGN POLICY'S THREAT TO NEGATIVE LIBERTY
Negative liberal anti-statism is fundamentally at odds with an active foreign policy.
Rather than abandon their central liberty norm, negative liberals interpret the liberal approach to
grand strategy in such a way as to make it consistent with anti-statist and anti-realpolitik
attitudes. After first describing negative liberals' bias in favor of less active grand strategies, I
deduce some implications for how negative liberal grand strategies are formed.
NORMATIVE DISSONANCE. Negative liberals tend towards exemplarism in foreign policy.
The central norm of negative liberty underscores for its adherents a fundamental trade-off
between commitments abroad and liberty from state coercion at home.
Because successful foreign policy is strongly associated with a large and intrusive central
state, negative liberals have a motivated bias against vindicationalist beliefs about how
effectively America can promote liberalism internationally. Negative liberals will still believe
that free trade and democracy cause peace; that illiberalism causes war; and that international
law will help bring international progress. But they are much more likely to be skeptical of the
results of foreign intervention and to accept the idea that liberal processes work best when
expanding naturally under their own power.
For the same reasons, they also have motivated incentives to see only a narrow range of
threats. Negative liberals generally regard America as materially quite secure-negative liberals
are much impressed by the sturdy ramparts of the Western hemisphere. They also believe
America can remain ideologically secure from illiberalism abroad as the inevitable march of
history takes place. In both cases, to believe otherwise would require them to acknowledge a
value trade-off between their core anti-statist values and the requirements of international peace
and security. In addition to the difficulty of overcoming motivated bias, acknowledging this kind
of trade-off would place severe strain on intuitive psychological processes that value simplicity
and cognitive consistency-that is, the common human tendencies to overlook value trade-offs
and to believe all favored normative ends can be achieved together.
An active foreign policy violates negative liberal norms in two ways. First, foreign
commitments require a set of restrictions on valuable domestic liberties-important negative
rights will be violated in the process of executing grand strategy. Second, a successful foreign
policy demands a concerted effort toward state-building. Centralization of power is an anathema
to adherents of negative liberty and can easily lead to a future assault on all manner of freedoms.
In short, negative liberty acts as a force pushing American grand strategy on a vector towards
less activity on the power management continuum. Negative liberals favor a grand strategy
approaching ideal-typical non-entanglement and will seek to minimize foreign commitments to
the degree consistent with their narrow vision of American security.
Overseas commitments impose at least three types of immediate restrictions on negative
liberal norms. First, foreign commitments require the extraction of resources from society at
large, with greater commitments producing greater costs. The taxation required for defense
spending and the conduct of foreign policy deprives citizens of the fruits of their labors. It
lowers their purchasing power and limits their sphere of choice and opportunity. Indeed,
taxation beyond a certain level is often viewed as viewed as ipsofacto illegitimate by negative
liberals.
Second, foreign commitments demand a strong military to back them up. They require
the mustering of men and their potential death in battle. The forced labor of military service-
especially via heavily coercive measures like the draft-violates core negative rights. The
infliction of injury or death represents the ultimate deprivation of liberty. Simply put, forcing
people to put life at risk and to labor for the state infringes upon the zone of non-infringement
and represents a major loss of freedom.
Third, a strategy that risks major war will often require centralized management of the
economy. A war economy needs to have its resources channeled towards the production of
violence. Factories must be told what to make; raw materials must be rationed and apportioned
to maximize productivity; investment must be made on a war schedule and in war sectors; prices
must be controlled. If defense spending is high, state interference on a large scale may be
necessary even during times of peace. Such centralized management severely restricts the free
enterprise and imposes restrictions on businesses and individuals in areas often central to their
lives.
Moreover, the foreign commitments that restrict liberty at home also launch dangerous
state expanding episodes whose effects persist long after wars end. Funding foreign adventures
requires constructing intrusive revenue-generating machines, and an extractive capacity built for
war can easily be turned to other purposes. Managing an economy necessitates creating a bevy
of administrative and regulatory structures. Bureaucracies are noxious and coercive in
themselves and also beget more bureaucracy in the future.
The military bureaucracies required by active strategies are particularly obnoxious.
Historically, negative liberals have feared the military-and especially ground forces-as a
potential tool for domestic suppression and a threat to democracy. But even in societies with
strong traditions of civilian control, the creation of military bureaucracies is still worrisome to
negative liberals. Once a bureaucratic entity is built, it becomes a going concern as a political
interest group, and so makes itself a constant drain on public finances. As the keepers of
national security, military bureaucracies are particularly effective at calling on the resources of
the treasury. Furthermore, a larger national security state tends to concentrate political power
and capacity in the executive branch, undermining the equilibrium sought by the separation of
powers. From the perspective of negative liberty, militaries beget future militarism.
In sum, negative liberals have an interconnected, mutually reinforcing set of beliefs that
leads them to minimize international commitments. They doubt that power abroad can menace
America's secure hemispheric fortress. Negative liberals will cheer liberalism abroad from the
sidelines, but if the world does not want to trade with American merchants, adopt American
institutions, or behave like civilized adherents to international law, they will tend to believe
American action could not have helped them anyway. Illiberal states only hurt themselves, and
in the end, the tide of history is against them. In the interim, American merchants can trade with
more enlightened states or with each other, American democracy can serve as a beacon for the
world to emulate, and American security will not depend on international legal authority.
American citizens will therefore be able to enjoy the fruits of liberty without crushing it at home.
Negative liberty thus exerts a retractive force on American grand strategy.
IMPLICATIONS FOR STRATEGY. Negative liberal norms exert their retractive force
through their impact on the different elements of grand strategy. Where negative liberal norms
dominate the policy process-that is, where they shape threat perception, strategic preferences
on the cost/control trade-off, and preferences for diplomatic and military policy tools-a less
active grand strategy will result.
First, negative liberals will have a higher threshold for perceiving international threats.
To prompt action, a foreign power will have to appear very dangerous, possessing large
economic capacity and real or potential military might-the kind of state that could possibly
make trouble in America's secure rear area of the Western hemisphere. This constraint
represents a high bar for international problems to clear, allowing negative liberals to maintain
the pleasing belief that they need not dirty their hands in global power politics suffer the
consequent violation of American negative rights. Ideological illiberalism abroad will be seen as
an unfortunate but unthreatening and historically doomed development.
This low threat perception helps generate a central strategic preference for negative
liberals: they will tend to try and minimize costs by forgoing control in grand strategy, pushing
American strategy leftward on the power management continuum.
This cost-conscious strategic inclination manifests itself in diplomatic and military
policy. Exponents of negative liberty view alliances, international organizations, and other
diplomatic cooperation with great skepticism. Political connections overseas generate
commitments, with all of the attendant defects for the promotion of freedom at home. At best,
they can be necessary and temporary expedients for solving common problems and sharing
burdens. At worst, they are transmission belts for war, serving to embroil America in causes not
her own at excessive and unnecessary cost. Such cooperation as negative liberty advocates seek
will be limited and largely ad hoc. For these reasons, Americans have often scorned
international organizations and alliances; their preference is for the gradual development of
international law that America does not have to enforce.
However, once in an alliance, negative liberals advocate giving allies real influence in
decision-making and treating them even-handedly. They do so because alliances are viewed
principally as a burden-sharing mechanism whose primary role is to reduce American costs.
American diplomats operating under the ideas of negative liberty will be principally concerned
with keeping allies from defecting on such commitments. Operationally, this means they are
willing to cede some amount of policy control to allies, and forgo international influence on
behalf of their preferences, in order to ensure cooperation. Allies will bear more of the load but
will also have more opportunity to set the terms of alliance behavior.
Negative liberals tend to dislike military power in all its forms, but they have a special
distaste for standing armies and other ground forces. Ground forces are more manpower-
intensive than other kinds of military power, which means they tread more heavily upon the
rights of those who must serve in them. Furthermore, they kill and maim personnel in greater
numbers and with greater frequency than other forms of military power, which is the greatest
deprivation of liberty possible. Ground forces tend to require longer and less flexible
commitments, and are a recipe for constant entanglement and quagmires. Thus, adherents of
negative liberty prefer "standoff' military forces like air and naval power. In the nuclear era,
comparatively cheap atomic weapons are strongly favored.
In sum, norms of negative liberty produce preferences for fewer strategic commitments
abroad. In part because of the psychological mechanisms discussed above, negative liberals
perceive few material threats and believe America to be safe from the ideological expansion of
illiberalism. Those who favor negative liberty tend to have minimal foreign policy goals and
favor grand strategies with minimal extractive commitments. They also have preferences for
foreign policy tools that reduce rather than bolster state activity. If alliances are dangerous, why
have any? If one must have them, use them as a burden-sharing opportunity in order to protect
liberty back home. If armies are dangerous and expensive, have navies, air forces, and nuclear
weapons instead. These policies bolster the central norm of anti-statism: fewer commitments,
fewer resources devoted to them, and less intervention into the lives of individuals.










FOREIGN POLICY'S PROMISE FOR POSITIVE LIBERTY
Positive liberals have no hang-ups about an active foreign policy, but they also lack
negative liberals' convenient skepticism about threats. A more active foreign policy to meet
expanded threats is in tension with the anti-realpolitik attitude held by all liberals. Rather than
revise this norm, though, positive liberals interpret the liberal approach to foreign policy so as to
make it consistent with creating a more liberal world. This interpretation is made with ease, as
state action to spread liberty at home appears analogous to similar action abroad. Here I show
how tension between different aspects of the general liberal world view produces motivated bias
among positive liberals towards more active grand strategies, and sketch some implications for
how this shapes positive liberal foreign policy.
NORMATIVE DISSONANCE. Positive liberals will tend towards a crusading approach to
grand strategy. They have none of the psychological incentives of negative liberals to discount
material and ideological threats. Indeed, given that they draw on the general liberal belief that
illiberalism causes war, encroaching illiberalism in the international system will appear quite
threatening. But if illiberalism is threatening to American security and values, then America
risks becoming permanently mired in power politics. Positive liberals therefore have a motivated
bias towards believing that that American foreign policy can vindicate liberalism abroad: grand
strategy can increase economic interdependence, spread political democracy, and construct
effective international institutions.
Positive liberals also see foreign policy as a natural extension of their domestic norms.
Positive liberals reason that state intervention is crucial for spreading the liberty to take effective
action at home; why couldn't it also vindicate American rights abroad and secure liberal values
more generally? To do otherwise would, in essence, be to sacrifice those values. Adherents of
positive liberty are thus inclined to promote and defend liberal values through active grand
strategies with more intense international commitments. Positive liberal ideas act as a force
pushing American policy on a vector towards more activity on the grand strategic continuum.
Two types of considerations support these preferences. First, positive liberty acts as a
permissive force for American activity abroad. Positive liberals do not think state expansion is
necessarily problematic and believe that it can in fact be an essential element of promoting
liberty at home. Less troubled by negative liberal concerns about resource extraction, positive
liberals are open to a larger set of commitments for a wider range of reasons. They will see a
greater number of material threats as dangerous. And the general liberal belief in the war-
causing properties of illiberalism will not be restrained; they will view illiberalism abroad as a
hostile force arrayed against American security and values. Positive liberals are thus not hung up
on the costs of foreign policy per se but are more interested in what can be bought for those
costs.
Second, positive liberty provides a propulsive force for American grand strategy-it
supplies an active overseas agenda for the promotion of liberty. Of great importance is that
positive liberals see the right to free exchange as a positive right that must be vindicated by the
government. An economically closed world is one where American merchants will be
intolerably oppressed in their attempts to advance their interests. Positive liberals will see the
promotion of international openness as a state duty, allowing both Americans and others to freely
act in the pursuit of their goals.
More generally, positive liberals see an analogy between foreign and domestic affairs,
expecting that state-building commitments in both realms can be used to gain control over
important policy domains. And just as state control over policy at home helps to spread freedom,
so too can influence abroad promote liberal values. In domestic affairs, positive liberals are
prone to concentrating state power in order to spread domestic liberty. By redistributing wealth,
creating government programs designed to achieve valued ends, or developing citizen capacities,
state intervention can provide the pre-conditions for the effective use of freedom.
Internationally, these pre-conditions can be provided by commitments that defend or promote
basic liberal values: democratic regimes and open trading systems. Positive liberals see these
traits as the necessary building blocks for a free society, much like the provision of resources is a
building block for a free life at home. In short, positive liberals will support more commitments
abroad in order to promote and defend global liberty and American rights.4 8
IMPLICATIONS FOR STRATEGY. These views lead positive liberty to serve as a propulsive
force towards more active grand strategies in foreign affairs. Positive liberal preferences
manifest themselves in the different elements of grand strategy. When positive liberty dominates
48 Positive liberals favor free-markets abroad in general, though they disagree with negative liberals, and among
themselves, about what constitutes a "free" market. However, the ability to take advantage of the international
division of labor through free trade has been a bedrock liberal principle since the eighteenth century. It is this
standard liberal preference that positive liberals focus on promoting in their foreign policy.
the policy-making process, it impacts threat perception, goals abroad, views of the cost/control
trade-off, and choices for diplomatic and military policy tools.
Positive liberty's permissive nature will lead statesmen to a broader perception of
international threats. They will not adopt narrow definitions of national security by default but
will rather pursue security expansively, often extending their view of threats beyond hegemonic
concentrations of power. For example, ideological and economic arrangements in other regimes
can also create security worries. Closure and illiberalism are, in the broad liberal view, major
causes of war. Positive liberals have none of the incentives of negative liberals to dismiss such
security threats. They will therefore anticipate that an increasingly closed world with a growing
number of illiberal states would require American hyper-vigilance and a serious participation in
the evils of power politics. Positive liberals' motivated bias about the efficacy with which
American can build a more liberal world will also lead them to believe these threats can be
ameliorated by spreading liberalism.
At the same time, positive liberty's propulsive properties will create incentives for
statesmen to promote liberal values abroad. Positive liberals will use their international
commitments to defend American trading rights, democratic institutions, and international
openness where they exist, and promote them where they do not. Such a view does not demand
the universal promotion of liberal values, nor does it require democracy and free markets to be at
the center of every foreign policy decision. In an anarchic world, statesmen are concerned first
with ensuring basic security and with everything else second. Indeed, liberal statesmen will even
tread on democracy and free trade abroad if they think it necessary for national defense. But we
should nonetheless expect advocates of positive liberty to highly value liberal ends and to seek
them where they can.
Greater threat perceptions and larger goals generate a central strategic preference:
positive liberals will favor grand strategies that provide more leverage over foreign affairs. Such
commitments will come, in the main, at a correspondingly higher cost.
These strategic leanings towards more control over international politics will manifest
themselves in diplomatic and military policy. Believers in positive liberty are inclined towards
participation in alliances and international organizations. Unlike their negative counterparts,
positive liberals do not view diplomatic cooperation as primarily having a burden-sharing
function. Instead, it is a mechanism for gaining influence over the policy of others. Given that
believers in positive liberty will champion strategies that actively manage the balance of power
abroad, it stands to reason that the policies of other states will sometimes need to be modified to
suit American plans. By committing itself abroad, America can create economic, military, and
political dependencies among its allies that give it tremendous bargaining power, but which also
come at a cost. In order to better dictate alliance terms, positive liberals will often choose to
bear more alliance burdens.
Advocates of positive liberty believe that when it comes to military power, the more the
merrier. All military options are viewed as valuable tools of the state, and it would be a mistake
not to complete one's toolbox as far as is possible, even at high cost. But the preference of
positive liberty for international influence will often lead to a focus on ground forces-land
power is the surest way to set the details of complex policies on the ground and to pursue
difficult objectives. (It is very hard to build market democracy solely from the air or sea, to say
nothing of building it with nuclear weapons!) The range of flexibility and influence that ground
forces provide is a major asset for strategies requiring large amounts of power management.
Ground forces are also relatively difficult to remove with speed once stationed abroad, thereby
helping cement the bonds of alliance. Positive liberty will therefore look with favor upon ground
forces, though they will not reject other types of military power.
In sum, norms of positive liberty generate strategies with a greater number of
commitments, and which maximize control over policy. Adherents to a positive conception of
liberty will see more material threats, fear encroaching illiberalism, and will support robust
policies abroad to defend against such dangers. As importantly, they will seek to expand liberty
overseas by spreading the pre-conditions and baseline capacities for exercising freedom: they
will promote liberal democracy and open trading systems. American trading rights will also
come in for a vigorous defense. Positive liberty will see alliances and international organizations
as helpful tools to these ends, in part because of their potential to direct allied policy. Finally,
advocates of positive liberty will especially favor ground forces, which are seen as a flexible tool
for influencing a broad range of problems. Preferences for these tools reinforce the central
tendency of positive liberty: to spread liberty by increasing policy-maker influence over the
configuration of power abroad.
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OBJECTIONS TO THE LOG ICS OF LIBERALISM
It is worth addressing potential objections to the logic Just presented. The essence of
these objections is that philosophic beliefs about concepts of liberty at home do not logically
compel the foreign policy preferences I have specified. Positive liberals need not be filled with
evangelical fervor in international affairs; negative liberals need not be bound with an isolationist
straight jacket. Indeed, reflection finds counter-examples to TLFP's logic near at hand: dovish
positive liberals like George McGovern and hawkish negative liberals like Barry Goldwater.
Why, then, should the reader accept TLFP's theoretical elaboration as more compelling than
other possibilities? Here I examine the possibility of different combinations of strategic beliefs.
ANALYTIC ASSESSMENT AND REALIST BELIEFS. An analytic assessment of foreign policy
beliefs or a realist approach to national security are the most obvious routes towards a different
set of strategic preferences than those generated by TLFP. If arguments about American
capacity to promote liberal values abroad were assessed on the merits after thorough analysis,
then different liberal norms might not create central strategic tendencies. If such policies were
seen to be successful, even negative liberals would pay the state-building costs to reap the
benefits of global liberty; if they looked untenable, even positive liberals would draw back.
Similarly, if a realist understanding of national security were adopted by decision-makers,
different concepts of liberty might not matter much either. Positive and negative liberals could
pursue their differing goals at home, with both groups understanding that American security was
the highest value to be pursued in foreign policy. Ideological at home but cynical abroad,
American statesmen would adjust strategy to meet the international environment, pursuing
liberalism overseas only on the margins.
For better or worse, however, statesmen are not inculcated with scientific norms of belief
assessment.4 9 Like most people, they absorb their beliefs from their environment as they mature,
and evaluate the welter of ambiguous information from the world with heuristics, mental short-
cuts, stereotypes, and truncated searches for policy-and this under the best of conditions. In
most cases, we can expect statesmen to rely on far less "rational" methods of belief formation
and to be prone towards intuitive and motivated bias. These biases will inhibit them from
recognizing value clashes or from radically revising previous belief systems. Motivated biases,
in particular, will tend to adjust belief systems so that valued norms are paired with causal beliefs
about how they can be achieved, rather than reducing norm salience or adjusting policies that
embody normative values.
Furthermore, in American culture, some form of liberalism will be the widely shared pre-
existing belief system, and this tradition is pervasively anti-realist. It recognizes no fundamental
reason why domestic norms should not apply internationally, and attributes their absence to
illiberalism and power politics. Grafting realist beliefs about international politics onto such
system is exactly the radical type of change that is difficult to induce in cognitive structures.
This is not to say that American leaders do not care about national security, or that they cannot
act in "realist" ways. Indeed, the next section outlines some ways in which the international
system creates the high stakes and unambiguous information necessary to influence even liberal
beliefs. But it is to say that typical American statesman operates with a liberal belief structure
that changes only slowly and is likely to have major impact on his default strategic preferences.
TLFP predicts the central tendencies outlined above because motivated bias cuts
differently when competing primary norms try to reconcile themselves with liberalism's
international values and anti-realpolitik orientation. Negative liberty preserves its anti-statist
norm by setting a high standard for threats and by assuming that American help will only impede
the march of liberal values abroad. This allows negative liberals to maintain their commitment
to global liberalism; to see illiberalism abroad as unthreatening; and to avoid perception of a
49 It does seems likely, though, that those who have made a deep study of international politics and the scientific
method will affirm far more sophisticated value combinations than those outlined here.
need to engage in power politics for security-all without building an oppressive state. Positive
liberty has no threat inhibitions, and therefore takes threats from both geopolitics and global
illiberalism more seriously. But if these threats cannot be met, then America is permanently
stuck defending itself in an immoral power political world. Positive liberals are thus motivated
to believe that liberal values can be effectively spread abroad, expanding liberty and reducing
threats, in a manner directly analogous to how the state should act at home.
Table 2.3: Motivated Bias and the Reconciliation of Liberal Beliefs
Basic Liberal View Negative Liberty Positive Liberty
of World Politics Variant Variant
Liberal Values Peace, free trade, and Liberal values Liberal values must
democracy are advance best on their be vindicated for both
normative and natural. own power through American and global
U.S. example. welfare.
Response to Power War, economic American is generally America should solve
Politics closure, and security secure and need not the problem of power
threats are caused by involve itself in power politics by spreading
illiberalism and power politics. liberal values.
politics.
Means of Protecting No consensus. Lack of threats and Promoting American
Central Domestic U.S. inability to values abroad will aid
Liberal Norm spread liberalism security and global
means no need for a freedom, in a manner
powerful state. analogous to state
action at home.
Source of Motivated Differs according to Plays down threats Sees more threats and
Bias variant of liberalism. and effectiveness of plays up effectiveness
value promotion of value promotion
abroad. abroad to permanently
abolish power politics
POSITIVE LIBERTY AND GUNS VS. BUTTER. A counter-argument to
evangelical logic of positive liberty might focus on the economic tradeoffs
TLFP's proposed
associated with
foreign policy commitments. Specifically, there are limits to the resources the state can extract
from the economy, and resources spent spreading liberty overseas are not spent vindicating
positive rights at home. While in the abstract positive liberals may value the rights of all
individuals equally, in practice politicians will favor the interests of their national constituents.
So we ought to expect statesmen to favor some version of "positive liberty in one country:" they
will prefer to spend scare resources spreading domestic liberty, and avoid expensive
commitments designed to promote foreign liberty.
This argument has some merit in the abstract: when faced with an undeniable trade-off
between foreign and domestic priorities, American statesmen of all stripes will chose the
politically expedient path of favoring Americans. But there are several reasons this truth does
not go very far. Because positive liberals perceive more threats abroad, often of an ideological
nature, foreign commitments are perceived to be delivering goods to domestic constituents in the
form of greater security.
Moreover, the same economic theories that underpin state intervention in the domestic
economy help to deny the necessity of trade-offs between commitments at home and abroad:
Keynesian and other growth-oriented economic doctrines claim that in some circumstances
government spending can be economically efficient, including defense spending. In practice, the
United States is an enormously wealthy country in the period under study. Actual political trade-
offs between guns and butter have been little perceived and rarely made by positive liberals,
usually only in economic depression or wartime. For instance, a desire to trade guns for butter
might have gotten America out of Vietnam, but it could not stop her from getting in.50
In the end, nothing compels any individual to hold any two beliefs simultaneously: any
single positive liberal may be stridently isolationist, and particular negative liberals can be
uncompromising hawks. But there are sound theoretical reasons for expecting that the more
ideologically consistent preferences I have described will be dominant. Of course, the final
proof of the logic of the theory must be its historical accuracy, an empirical question explored in
great detail in the subsequent chapters.
Geopolitics, Liberalism, and Predictions for American Grand Strategy
Differing concepts of liberty are not enough to predict American grand strategy by
themselves. The international system often exerts a profound influence on grand strategy
liberalism can help statesmen to interpret the world but cannot let them create it anew. In order
to accurately predict American strategic behavior, liberal desires must be evaluated in
conjunction with objective constraints and incentives imposed by the structure of world politics.
In this section, I complete TLFP by combining liberal preferences with some insights
drawn from realist theory. Showing how the structure of the international system mediates the
influence of ideas, I make predictions for the central outcome of interest: American grand
strategy. In order to expand the ability to test the theory, I also make predictions for a number of
causal processes that we ought to observe if the theory is correct.
GEOPOLITICS AND FOREIGN POLICY
The conventional realist account of grand strategy stresses the deep impact of systemic
pressures on foreign policy. Living in an anarchic world without any higher authority to protect
them, states fear other concentrations of power. In order to survive, states are forced to take
measures to protect themselves and to seize opportunities to augment their own capabilities.
Realists often interpret these pressures as dominant. There is little room for ideological aims in
such a world.5
However, America's geopolitical position is relatively immune from these forces. By
virtue of its unique geography, America lives in a defense-dominant world. Holding an
50 Narizny, The Political Economy of Grand Strategy, p. 24, discusses how large economic disturbances can often
rein in strategic preferences of all kinds.
5 The paradigmatic realist works of modem "structural" realism are Waltz, Theory ofInternational Politics;
Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics. For an application to grand strategy along the lines in the text,
see Posen, The Sources of Military Doctrine.
unassailable power position among the states of the Western hemisphere, America is also
protected from extra-regional great powers by two gigantic moats conventionally referred to as
the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans. As Harvey Sapolsky puts it, "To the north and south are weak,
friendly neighbors; to the east and west are fish." Weak neighbors and the "stopping power of
water" mean that the fears for survival, sovereignty, territorial integrity, and power position that
have historically plagued great powers are radically diminished for the United States in most
circumstances.
American statesmen therefore feel the pressures of the geopolitical environment much
less keenly than their European counterparts. Great powers who share borders with other great
powers often feel the need to expand for security reasons, heeding the maxim that the "best
defense is a good offense." But for America, the best defense is almost always a good defense
and given the difficulty of crossing the water barrier, not necessarily even much of one at that.
The American strategic dilemma is much more fortuitous and is summed up well by Francis
Bacon: "he that commands the sea is at great liberty and can take as much or as little of the war
as he will." Indeed, American wars are almost always wars of choice.
In fact, there is only one kind of threat that acts as a propulsive force compelling
American commitments abroad: the rise of a state that could conceivably cross the water barrier
and make trouble in the Western hemisphere. John Mearsheimer refers to such states as
"potential hegemons," so named for the possibility that they might conquer all of the great
powers in their region. Potential hegemons are distinguished by their lopsided advantages in
aggregate power: demographic, economic, and industrial resources sufficient to produce a
military machine that could conquer an entire region of the globe. With all the resources of such
territory in tow, and no regional rivals nipping at its heels, a powerful state might find a way to
gain a foothold in the Western hemisphere: either by outright assault, subversion of weaker
powers, or a constricting economic blockade.
This nightmare scenario provides a strong systemic incentive for American statesmen to
make commitments abroad to contain potential hegemons. It is more prudent to stop a potential
hegemon before it has conquered its own neighborhood, while there are still great power allies to
help. The threat of a potential hegemon increases with two factors: the appearance of a state with
lopsided aggregate economic advantages and the rapid increase of its military might. Such
52 Quote in Eugene Gholz, Daryl G. Press, and Harvey M. Sapolsky, "Come Home, America: The Strategy of
Restraint in the Face of Temptation," International Security 21, no. 4 (Spring 1997): p. 8. On the debate about "the
stopping power of water", which might more accurately be termed "the stopping power of a hostile coastline," see
Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, pp. 114-128; Layne, The Peace of Illusions, pp. 15-23. For a
critique of the concept, see Barry R. Posen, "The Best Defense," National Interest (2002): 119-126.
5 Bacon quoted in Michael A. Palmer, Command at Sea: Naval Command and Control since the Sixteenth Century
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2005), p. 29. On the impact of geography on strategic incentives, see
the sources in the previous note.
5 This view follows Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, pp. 40-44, 140-143. It has also been
expressed, in one form or another, by practically every major American realist. See, George F. Kennan, Memoirs:
1925-1950 (New York: Pantheon, 1983); Nicholas Spykman, America's Strategy in World Politics: The United
States and the Balance of Power (New York: Harcourt Brace, 1942); Walter Lippman, U. S. Foreign Policy: Shield
of the Republic (New York: Little Brown & Co., 1943). For a contrary view see Robert J. Art, "The United States,
The Balance of Power, and World War Two: Was Spykman Right?," Security Studies 14, no. 3 (2005): 365-406.
threats are sufficiently unambiguous that they cannot be rationalized away by appeals to negative
liberty."
The international system also provides two kinds of objective constraints on American
grand strategy. First, strategies towards the right end of the power management continuum are
inherently more difficult to execute. The more directly and intensely a state seeks to manage the
constellation of international power, the more resistance it is likely to face, and the more
resources it will be likely have to expend. This systemic resistance can place a check on the
grand ambitions of positive liberty. As positive liberals make more commitments to manage the
balance of power, other actors will sometimes push back. Control is easy to pay for but harder to
actually obtain. Preponderance strategies, in particular, may simply be unobtainable, no matter
how hard statesmen push for them-they will require either a tremendous amount of power,
international acquiescence, or both.
A second type of systemic constraint is pressure towards greater strategic "integration."
As discussed above, psychological deviations from rationality will frequently allow leaders to
avoid making value-trade offs. But as the international environment becomes more dangerous,
or more generally, as the realities of the international situation become more unambiguous,
decision-makers will be forced to make tough choices that link their policy ends and means. For
instance, though grand strategy generally involves a trade-off between cost and control,
statesmen will be inclined to believe their preferred goals can be achieved at low costs. But as
systemic pressure pushes back on American policy, they will be forced to either ratchet up their
commitment or ratchet back their ambitions. That is, the international system will tend to push
states towards more consistent, coherent, ideal types of grand strategy, though they will seek to
avoid difficult choices for as long as feasible.
The international environment thus acts as a force pushing American grand strategy on
twin vectors inward from either extreme and towards the broad center of the power management
continuum. Potential hegemons give the United States strong incentives to engage in some kind
of commitment before they conquer Europe and must be faced alone. The resistance of other
powers to being dominated pushes against American attempts to exert predominant influence.
However, these forces do not fully determine American grand strategy: the presence of potential
hegemons does not tell diplomats whether to balance or to buckpass, and the difficulties of
preponderance does not mean it will not be attempted or that it cannot be successful. The system
also ultimately serves as a rationalizing and integrating force in American grand strategy,
providing unambiguous information that forces statesmen to face hard choices between cost and
control.
PREDICTIONS FOR AMERICAN GRAND STRATEGY
I argue that the dominant conception of liberty among American foreign policy elites
determines strategic choice within the parameters outlined for it by the international system.
" This account of systemic influence is a mdlange of different realist theories, but is probably most compatible with
a very narrow interpretation of the offense-defense balance. My view is that systemic threats are produced mostly
by aggregate power, but that geography heavily modifies the importance of power advantages; to a lesser extent this
can be true of technological change. See, Robert Jervis, "Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma," World Politics
30, no. 2 (January 1978): 167-214; Posen, The Sources of Military Doctrine, pp. 64-67. 1 also drawn on the debate
around the stopping power of water, which despite its association with John Mearsheimer, is probably best thought
of as a defensive realist analysis. See Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, pp. 114-128.
Negative liberty tends to produce preferences for lower costs at home and therefore fewer
commitments overseas, while positive liberty is biased towards creating more international
commitments for the purposes of securing more policy control, though at higher costs. Those
preferences, combined with the anti-hegemonic impulse dictated by the international system,
yield predictions about American grand strategy under four different conditions.
When negative liberty is dominant at home and geopolitical forces abroad look
unthreatening, we ought to observe an American grand strategy very similar to ideal-typical non-
entanglement: American statesmen will have few goals abroad, have little need of international
influence, and will rely on mechanisms of deterrence and non-interference to defend a detached
position from the constellation of power. The absence of any potential regional hegemon means
that systemic pressures will be felt very weakly thanks to America's secure geography. The
preferences dictated by negative liberty ought to have free reign, with few resulting
commitments abroad. Those commitments that are made will likely be symbolic or modest, and
this international detachment will produce no need for resource mobilization at home. The
resulting strategy should be cheap, and state coercion should be minimal, at least for foreign
policy's sake.
When the international system looks more threatening-when a potential hegemon looks
like it could emerge abroad-and negative liberty is dominant, the resulting grand strategy will
be buckpassing. American statesmen will seek to prevent a single unacceptable outcome on the
balance of power: its dominance by the potential hegemon. Statesmen will require some kind of
commitment in order to do so, but will try to rely on free-riding mechanisms. The rise in the
threat level generates a real need for mobilizing resources to underwrite commitments. But the
negative liberal preference for low costs will ensure that these commitments abroad are judicious
and relatively inexpensive, at least until statesmen are certain that heavy commitment is
essential. American statesmen will work very hard to build up other centers of power to contend
with the potential hegemon: as Mearsheimer notes, it often "makes sense for a buck-passer to
allow or even facilitate the growth in power of the intended buck-catcher. That burden-bearer
would then have a better chance of containing the aggressor state, which would increase the
buck-passer's prospects of remaining on the sidelines." In short, America will aim at getting
others to bear the burden of containing the potential hegemon, managing the balance of power by
free riding on the costs of others.56
When the threat abroad is high but positive liberty is dominant at home, America should
pursue a strategy of balancing. Multiple concerns about the international order will cause
statesmen to see a need for more control over the international environment and to depend on the
mechanism of forward commitments abroad to obtain it. Deep concern over the geopolitical
environment will not be counteracted by an anti-statist drag on policy, and so America should
pursue a more expansive understanding of security that incurs less risk. Moreover, positive
liberty will also evince concern for its other objectives abroad, seeking to defend and expand
democracy and open trading systems where possible, and may see threats from encroaching
illiberal institutions. Still, extra-security goals will be pursued only on the margin: the core anti-
hegemonic interest will be the main focus. This strategy will require more commitments, and
will be more costly, but leaders will also be able to mobilize more resources in the absence of the
anti-statist impulse.
16 Ibid., p. 159.
Finally, when threat is low and positive liberty dominant, extra-security aims will be
unleashed in an attempt at preponderance. Statesmen will have large liberal goals abroad and
will require extensive control to meet them. The perception of many threats to liberalism and of
opportunities to spread American values will cause statesmen to seek a dominant position as
manager of the balance of power. They will therefore turn to mechanisms of political expansion
and military supremacy to facilitate their strategy. There will be no looming threat causing
decision makers to keep their powder dry, while a positive conception of liberty will suggest all
manner of good America might do for liberty abroad. America will attempt to maintain pre-
eminence and control in security affairs, and use this position to promote free trade and
democracy. We should observe an increase in costly commitments, bought in an attempt to
control policies aimed at the spread of liberty in other regions.
However, other centers of power may well resist these attempts. If so, then achieving and
maintaining a preponderant position will require an enormous advantage in relative power,
possibly one so large that it encourages other states not even to think of resisting. Alternatively,
states might decide not to resist American preponderance for other reasons, perhaps seeing it as
an advantage. Thus, whether positive liberals achieve success for a preponderant strategy or
whether they are pressured by the system back into something more akin to balancing depends
upon the size of the American relative power advantage and the degree of international
quiescence.5 7
These predictions for strategic outcomes assume ceteris paribus conditions. Negative
liberty, positive liberty, and the international system operate as different directional vectors that
push American grand strategy along the power management continuum. In the long run, these
predictions just laid out are where American strategy should end up under the different values for
the independent variables. But all else is not always equal. In the short run, decision-makers
will cognitively strive to avoid value trade-offs between cost and control, and will often require
systemic pressure to integrate their political ends and means. Furthermore, though TLFP posits
that liberalism and the international system are the most powerful causes of American grand
strategy, it is surely true that other factors can matter. In certain eras, or for temporary periods,
other variables may exert influence on American foreign policy, pushing it one way or the other
on the power management continuum. The empirical world, alas, is always somewhat messier
than theoretical models suggest. Fortunately, TLFP makes several other predictions beyond
grand strategic outcomes that can aid in assessing its power.
Table 2.4: TLFP Predictions for Grand Strategic Outcomes
Negative Liberty Positive Liberty
No Potential Hegemon Non-entanglement Balancing/Preponderance
Potential Hegemon Buckpassing Balancing
57 On the circumstances in which states might have sufficient power to overcome this resistance, see Stephen G.
Brooks and William C. Wohlforth, World Out of Balance: International Relations and the Challenge ofAmerican
Primacy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2008). On reasons why other states might accept
preponderance, and the kinds of responses they might make, see Robert A. Pape, "Soft Balancing against the United
States," International Security 30, no. 1 (July 1, 2005): 7-45; T. V. Paul, "Soft Balancing in the Age of U.S.
Primacy," International Security 30, no. 1 (July 1, 2005): 46-71.
CAUSAL PROCESS PREDICTIONS
I argued in Chapter One that no extant theory of American foreign policy could explain
the variation in America's grand strategy towards the European great powers during the
twentieth century. If TLFP can explain the major American strategic choices of the last century,
it represents a major improvement in our understanding of American grand strategy. However,
grand strategy is a subject that can only be measured over long periods of time, which means
there are few observations on which to run empirical tests. Even if TLFP appears to explain the
small number of twentieth century strategic outcomes, it makes sense to search out grounds for
even stronger causal inference.
Fortunately, TLFP posits a very specific causal process: that the content of liberal belief
systems will impact American strategic decision-making across a variety of observable areas
relevant to strategy making. This process implies several additional observations beyond grand
strategic outcomes: we ought to be able to observe a distinctive set of rationales driving strategic
behavior in presidential administrations with different concepts of liberty. The more we observe
these rationales in the policy process, rather than some other set of reasons, the more TLFP is
confirmed. Indeed, the logic of process tracing is quite strong: if we observe liberal rationales
operating in the manner anticipated, it would be very unlikely that some other factor was actually
at work. To borrow one analogy, evidence of causal process mechanisms is like evidence at a
crime scene: if there are signs of a struggle, forced entry, and blood traces on a blunt instrument
nearby, it would be a hugely surprising if the cause of death were not murder. 58
The causal processes posited by TLFP are the links between liberal rationales and the
elements of American foreign policy: threat perceptions, interpretations of cost and control, and
preferences for different foreign policy tools. Ultimately, this process culminates in a pattern of
policy decisions that comprise the central dependent variable under study: American grand
strategy. Thus, the process observations are not the choice of policies. Individual policy
outcomes may be impacted by many variables, and their pattern is already being used to measure
the principal grand strategy prediction. Rather, the process observations are the presence of
liberal rationales, their impact on threat perceptions and cost/control preferences, and the
consequent support or "push" for certain kinds of policy tools. These should be observable
regardless of the outcome of any given policy decision.
When negative liberty is dominant, four distinctive liberal concerns should be observed
in the policy process: (1) anti-tax rationales and a general impetus towards minimizing economic
extraction, (2) arguments against bureaucracy and further state-building, (3) desires to defend the
free enterprise system and avoid economic management, to include macroeconomic concerns
about the effects of foreign policy commitments, and (4) desires to avoid conscription and
casualties. These concerns should be voiced as rationales for particular policies, and voiced
during and before decisions.
In turn, we should observe negative liberals willing to trade lowered costs, in the above
concerns, for less control in foreign policy. In general, we should observe concerns about the
5 On the logic of process-tracing see Alexander L. George and Andrew Bennett, Case Studies and Theory
Development in the Social Sciences (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2005), Ch. 10; Andrew Bennett, "Stirring the
Frequentist Pot with a Dash of Bayes," Political Analysis 14, no. 3 (2006): 339-344; James Mahoney, "After KKV:
The New Methodology of Qualitative Research," World Politics 62, no. 1 (January 2010). The last two articles
make use of the crime scene metaphor and explain the "folk Bayesian" logic of inference that underlies it.
costs of foreign policy. More specifically, we should see evidence that they desire to minimize
defense budgets, reduce or limit the number and size of military bureaucracies, and favor force
employment plans that prioritize non-ground force elements. In the diplomatic arena, negative
liberals should favor cooperation limited in time and scope, and focus on burden sharing to meet
common problems. Pre-commitments and opportunity costs should be minimized, and we
should see a willingness to yield control to allies. In interpreting threats, negative liberals should
focus on large concentrations of power and their threat to American geographic security. They
should act on fewer threats for more limited sets of reasons than their positive liberal
counterparts.
When positive liberty is dominant, three liberal concerns ought to be present in policy
decision-making: (1) support for American trading rights, (2) support for democracy overseas
and (3) support for open trading systems abroad, as a more general matter. These ends ought to
be stated as objects of concern and potential reasons for favoring one course of action over
another. In turn, positive liberals should be observed seeking more control over international
outcomes and the policy of others. Generally, we should observe worries that America might
lack the requisite influence to achieve its goals. Specifically, positive liberals should favor a
larger amount and wider array of military capabilities, as well as force employment doctrines
that maximize the number and intensity of tasks the military can carry out-likely to include a
focus on ground forces. In diplomatic policy, they should favor more cooperation of greater
scope and depth. Pre-commitments should be embraced for the potential leverage they give over
partners. When interpreting threats, positive liberals should see more problem areas, for a more
diverse set of rationales, than their negative liberal counterparts.
Geopolitical forces will also be evident in the causal process of grand strategy making.
The aggregation of large amounts of relative power abroad should attract the concern of policy-
makers of all stripes, and we should observe these concerns expressed. A rise in geopolitical
threat will generally elicit a shift towards greater costs and great attempts at control in grand
strategy. Ambitious strategies may incite resistance that causes leaders to ratchet back the
control they seek. We should also observe the relative success or failure of American policies
leading statesmen to make hard choices that better integrate strategic ends and means.
TLFP Causal Process Predictions
Negative Liberty Positive Liberty
Rationales driving policy Anti-state building concerns. Support for democracy and
open-trading systems.
Cost/Control preferences Avoid high costs Seek greater control.
Threat perception Respond only to large, Respond to material and
material threats. ideological threats of varying
types.
Diplomatic policy Skeptical of alliances; attempt Alliances and institutions
preferences to use them for burden valued; attempt to use them
sharing. for leverage and influence.
Military policy preferences Less military spending and an Greater military spending
emphasis on standoff military including an emphasis on
forces. ground forces.
Measuring the Independent Variables
Since TLFP produces different expectations for American grand strategy depending on
the value its variables take, a consistent and accurate measurement of each relevant variable is
essential to a persuasive argument. In this section I present standards for measuring the
independent variables of liberal ideas and geopolitical threat, with the goal of providing a
transparent rubric whose judgments the reader can independently evaluate.
MEASURING CONCEPTS OF LIBERTY
Ideas are not directly observable and are subject to diverse representation by human
beings. Any standard for measuring ideas must therefore answer three questions. First, whose
ideas matter? In order to know if concepts of liberty were present in theoretically meaningful
ways, the locus of those ideas must be specified. Second, what kind of evidence is required to
measure someone's ideas? Given the inability to observe concepts of liberty directly,
justification for the reliability of indirect observations must be made, and standards of evidence
set. Third, what substantive indicators denote the presence of particular ideas? Each concept of
liberty ought to generate a consistent standard of theoretically relevant markers. Moreover,
because human beings are not always bound by consistency across different beliefs, some
framework for weighing the preponderance of an individual's beliefs is important. I address
each issue in turn.
UNIT OF ANALYSIS. My unit of analysis for grand strategy is the foreign policy of a
presidential administration during one four-year term in office. I determine the concept of
liberty dominant in an administration by measuring the individual views of the president and his
top foreign policy advisors, usually cabinet members (but not limited to them). In most
administrations, the president's views will dominate the policy-making process, making his
ideological views the most important. Furthermore, the president's ability to chose his own staff
lets him reproduce his own viewpoint in other high-level decision making positions. However,
in some administrations, the president gives his lieutenants a free hand in driving strategy. In
such administrations, the liberty concept present among other top foreign policy-makers will
tend to be more important. To determine which administrations had a strong president, I record
the historiographical consensus and code accordingly. In administrations without a strong
president, I also code the Secretary of State and average their two concepts of liberty.
RELIABILITY OF EVIDENCE. To measure ideas, I rely on the written and speech evidence
of individuals on the subject of freedom or related questions germane to concepts of liberty. This
brings the measurement of ideas back as close to their source as one can get: rather than rely on a
proxy indicator, I look for the language the individuals themselves used and the ways they
expressed their own views.
The procedure faces a major objection: the contention that ideas are either epiphenomenal
or instrumental-that is, the notion that ideas are either the irrelevant by-product of other forces
and have no role in causation, or are strategically chosen with a view towards achieving goals
preferred for other reasons. Both claims amount to the classic charge of omitted variable bias:
the ideas observed and the policies implemented are both caused by a third factor not addressed
in the analysis. In the measurement context, the worry is usually that any observed ideas, even
consistent and repeated ideas, are just not representative of real beliefs.59
These are legitimate concerns. One can imagine, for example, American statesmen
justifying their foreign policies in terms of freedom, when in fact the policies were driven by
concerns about the international environment, the economic interests of their constituents, or
other less savory factors. In order to avoid this kind of measurement error, I restrict my
rhetorical assessment to the period before individuals held foreign policy-making power. It is
unlikely that the same forces causing policy decisions and rhetorical masks in the present also
caused the same ideological expressions in the past. Indeed, the public justification for foreign
policies adopted in office simply plays no role in coding the presence or absence of a particular
concept of liberty. 60
Ideas could also serve instrumental motives unrelated to their content. Many of the
individuals being coded were participants in practical politics, where the language of liberalism
can often be used to cloak diverse private and political interests. For this reason I distinguish
between three types of discourse in measuring ideas: private discourse, public discourse that is
likely non-instrumental, and public discourse more likely to be instrumental.
The foundation of my measurement is private discourse. Sentiments expressed outside of
the public eye and ear to other individuals are unlikely to be purely instrumental. In most cases
there is no motive at all for such deception. Moreover, the payoff for misrepresenting oneself
repeatedly in private is much lower than for deceiving the public, and the costs much higher. As
Andrew Moravesik puts it, "Misrepresentation and speculation in hard primary sources-for
example, staging a series of phony meetings,... generating false assessments,... keeping a phony
diary,... coordinating independent interview responses" is quite costly. In general, I expect that
ideas expressed privately, repeatedly, and consistently represent genuine views.61
Beyond private discourse, some kinds of public statements are not all that suspicious.
When the context of the public statements does not suggest an obvious ulterior motive, such as
election to public office or remuneration from some private interest, we can assume the beliefs
expressed are genuine. Public speeches by private figures are good examples of this kind of
rhetoric, if those figures are out of government and not angling for their own advancement. Such
evidence is even more persuasive when it has analogues in private rhetoric. Finally, some kinds
of public speeches, such as electioneering rhetoric, are prima facie suspicious, but can be used
with careful crosschecks against other facts and evidence. If such statements are repeated and
consistent, mesh well with known facts about the individual, and are not contradicted by private
discourse, they can serve as a more limited indicator.62
59 For good summary and rebuttal for the epiphenomenal objection, see Goldstein and Keohane, Ideas and Foreign
Policy: Beliefs, Institutions, and Political Change, pp. 3-8; Clifford Geertz, "Ideology as a Cultural System," in The
Interpretation of Cultures (New York: Basic Books, 1977), pp. 201-207. The strongest form of the objection was
probably put forward first in Karl Marx, "The German Ideology," in The Marx-Engels Reader, ed. Robert Tucker
(New York: WW Norton, 1978), pp. 154-155.
60 Saunders, "Wars of Choice: Leadership, Threat Perception, and Military Intervention," Ch. 2, pp. 42-46;
Saunders, "Transformative Choices," pp. 135-137; Sheri Berman, The Social Democratic Moment: Ideas and
Politics in the Making ofInterwar Europe (Cambridge, M.A.: Harvard University Press, 1998), pp. 22-24.
61 Andrew Moravcsik, The Choice for Europe: Social Purpose and State Power from Messina to Maastricht (Ithaca,
N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1998), p. 82.
62 This method is conservative: some research argues that public speech evidence generally dovetails with private
beliefs. See Jonathan Renshon, "When Public Statements Reveal Private Beliefs: Assessing Operational Codes at a
SUBSTANTIVE INDICATORS. Finally, the key to a measurement's persuasiveness will be
the substantive fidelity it has to the concepts of liberty I lay out above. Exactly what kinds of
statements count as evidence for each type of liberalism?
A consistent measurement of ideology requires a structured, focused comparison: asking
the same theoretically informed questions of every individual who is coded, thereby allowing
them to be assessed relative to each other and scored on a single scale. I formulate three
categories of questions that implicate liberal norms: These are (1) explicit philosophical
statements; (2) attitudes towards the centralization of political power; and (3) views about the
legitimate degree of interference with the market economy and the fiscal role of the state. These
categories are deductively and inductively chosen: they have been established as major issues of
political debate in the literature on American political development and the history of liberal
ideas, and they are implied by the concepts of liberty themselves.63
The most obvious type of expression is an explicit philosophical statement of an
individual's politics and his vision of freedom. Statements of negative liberty will center on the
individual. Classic anti-statist rhetoric features the central state as a tyrannical villain coercing
the individual and violating his rights. Such statements will include the fear of regimentation
and worries about "collectivism," and will place the state in opposition to traditional liberties.
When negative liberals praise democracy it will be as a way of keeping special interests from
hijacking the state and coercing individuals for their own ends.64
Statements about positive liberty will have many more references to the group or the
nation. This is not to say they will not employ the language of individualism-references to the
lack of effective freedoms of individuals, and state remedies for these conditions, should abound.
But advocates of positive liberty will also speak in the nationalist or group-based language: one
of the principal notions of positive liberty is that the exercise of real freedom can take place only
collectively. References to democracy will be in the vein of exercising these great collective
goals, promising a fulfillment of active participation rather than protecting against special
interests. 65
A second category of ideas relates to the centralization ofpower. Negative liberty
inherently distrusts all power, particularly the concentrated power of the state. Of great concern
will be the expansion of the federal government and its usurpation of state and local
responsibilities. Negative liberals will frequently defend the separation of powers laid out in the
constitution as essential to the American order. The executive branch of government should be
especially feared, and concern about the erosion of congressional and judicial authority is a
common trope among those who champion a negative concept of liberty. Moreover, the
Distance," Political Psychology 30, no. 4 (2009): 649-661. Nonetheless, I minimize the use of such evidence and
check it against other sources.
63 On "structured, focused comparison," see George and Bennett, Case Studies and Theory Development in the
Social Sciences, Ch. 3-6. The coding exercise I outline can also be thought of as a kind of process-tracing: the
"independent variable causal process observations" of James Mahoney, which verify the existence of speculated
causes. See Mahoney, "After KKV."
64 Berlin, "Two Concepts of Liberty," pp. 168-178.
6s Ibid., pp. 178-200. These rhetorical implications follow readily from the concept of positive liberty as
conventionally defined by students of liberalism. For historical literature confirming that rhetoric about collective
goals and the achievement of important goods is often employed, see Friedberg, In the Shadow of the Garrison
State, pp. 25-27; Ekirch, The Decline ofAmerican Liberalism, xvi-xxvii; Gordon Lloyd, ed., The Two Faces of
Liberalism: How the Hoover-Roosevelt Debate Shapes the 21st Century (Salem, M.A.: M & M Scrivener Press,
2006), pp. 1-23.
handmaiden of executive power, a complicated and alien bureaucracy led by oppressive and
petty officials, will be another frequent target of anti-statist liberals. 66
Positive liberty is much more inclined to support the power of the state and to direct it
against the power held by social actors and supported by social norms. Advocates of positive
freedom ought to stress the importance of efficiency and the need for effectively directing
collective resources-key aids in helping people exercise their freedom. This concern will lead
them to greater rhetorical support for the executive branch, less interest in the separation of
powers, more tolerance of bureaucracy, and a denigration of federalism. 67
A third kind of discourse will focus on the relationship of the state and the economy.
Negative liberty views economic activity as one of the primary arenas of personal freedom.
Classical anti-tax rhetoric is a common theme in this category, as is opposition to regulating
business. Indeed, any government interference in the market smacks of a controlled economy
and the threats to individual liberty therein. Some government control for the purpose of
providing public goods, reducing externalities, and enforcing property rights will be acceptable,
but economic functions beyond these will produce great skepticism. Moreover, advocates of
negative liberty see a limited fiscal role for the state. They will put primary emphasis on the
importance of a balanced budget. The increase in public debt and fears of inflation associated
with an unbalanced budget are both seen as eventual debits against individual liberty, as they are
delayed costs paid out of the fruits of labor. Generally, concerns about fiscal conservatism will
lead to rhetoric critical of government spending. But when the government must take on new
obligations, the concept of negative liberty indicates it should increase revenue extraction. 68
Negative liberals will also have a particular view of business corporations and organized
labor. Negative liberals will by no means give a free pass to corporations, often suspecting them
of trying to rig the political system in their favor. But they will, in general, be sympathetic
towards business as the vital force in market society, and will emphasize the benefits that
allowing corporate freedom has brought. They may be more or less tolerant of labor unions in
general, but will tend towards greater suspicion of them than their counterparts in management.
The violence, disorder, and illiberal politics that have often accompanied strikes and labor unrest
will be regarded as potentially harmful to the basic liberal order provided by the night-watchman
state. It will certainly not be government's job to facilitate their organization and success. 69
66 Concerns about the federal government, executive power, and bureaucracy are rife in American history, and well
documented in Friedberg, In the Shadow of the Garrison State, pp. 11-12, 15-18, 45-47; Barry D. Karl, The Uneasy
State: The United Statesfrom 1915 to 1945 (Chicago, I.L.: University of Chicago Press, 1985), passim; Huntington,
American Politics: The Promise ofDisharmony; Ekirch, The Decline of American Liberalism, esp. pp. 37-54.
67 For historical accounts of these rhetorical trends and political ideas in American discourse, which focus on their
emergence in the Progressive and New Deal eras, see Young, Reconsidering American Liberalism, pp. 137-180;
Ekirch, The Decline ofAmerican Liberalism, pp. 171-194. For a more radical perspective on the meaning of these
trends, see Hanson, The Democratic Imagination in America, pp. 223-292.
68 On negative liberal rhetoric pertaining to the economy, see Foner, The Story ofAmerican Freedom, pp. 115-123;
Young, Reconsidering American Liberalism, pp. 127-136; Higgs, Crisis and Leviathan, pp. 77-105; Hanson, The
Democratic Imagination in America, 183-222. For fiscal views and the negative liberal tradition see Michael J.
Hogan, A Cross of Iron: Harry S. Truman and the Origins of the National Security State (Cambridge, England:
Cambridge University Press, 1998), pp. 69-118, esp. 69-71; Friedberg, In the Shadow of the Garrison State, pp. 83-
97.
69 See, for example, the perspectives charted in Higgs, Crisis and Leviathan, Ch. 5; Foner, The Story ofAmerican
Freedom, Ch. 6.
Positive liberty views economic security as a pre-requisite to exercising freedom.
Positive liberal statements will stress basic re-distribution as an element of effective liberty. One
will also observe anti-power rhetoric directed at concentrations of economic power and wealth.
Regulating these interests, and even planning entire sectors of the economy, will be essential for
allowing Americans to individually and collectively exercise their freedom. Positive liberty will
thus naturally take a much more expansive view of the state's fiscal responsibilities.
Expansionary fiscal strategies will be embraced as part of a program to ensure economic security
and therefore the exercise of real freedom. The ideas of John Maynard Keynes, which
emphasize the utility of the government running a deficit in order to expand employment, will be
attractive. But so, too, will economic planning and ideas of "growthsmanship" that stress even
more active roles for the federal government.70
Positive liberals will be look much less favorably on business and much more favorably
on labor. Positive liberals will often perceive corporations as having accumulated an excessive
amount of power by virtue of their size and profitability, and will see this power as limiting the
effective freedom of the working man. After all, how can an individual possibly be free when
management holds all the cards and can set onerous terms of employment? Labor unions will
frequently be seen as an important counter-weight to corporate power, whose support by
government will further the cause of effective freedom.71
Having looked for individual expressions across these types of rhetoric, how are discreet
measurement judgments to be assigned? Each concept of liberty is best thought of as an ideal
type, and the different categories simply as structured ways of comparing individual adherence to
the set of typical views. Consider as an example the set of all liberal democracies. One might
stipulate that there are several characteristics of the ideal-typical liberal democracy-say,
competitive elections, protections of civil liberties, and market economies. Developing
indicators across these categories, the placement of a particular country within the set could then
be ascertained: Canada might rank highly on all three indicators, India reasonably on them,
Singapore high on some but low on others, and Albania low on all of them. One could then
develop a code for how far within the set of ideal typical democracies a particular country is.72
The indicators for liberal beliefs have been selected with these goals in mind. Each
category not only is deduced readily from the philosophic ideas, but also is documented in the
70 The trends in positive liberal rhetoric about economics are recounted in Higgs, Crisis and Leviathan, pp. 106-122;
Foner, The Story ofAmerican Freedom, pp. 124-162; Ekirch, The Decline ofAmerican Liberalism, pp. 268-287. On
the subject of fiscal views, Peter A. Hall, ed., The Power of Economic Ideas: Keynesianism across Nations
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1989) persuasively shows that the adoption of Keynesian economic ideas
in the twentieth century was contingent to a variety of other factors. See also, Legro, Rethinking the World,
Appendix 1. Given the prominent role of fiscal views in debates about American liberalism, and the pervasiveness
of liberal thought in American politics, I think it is not unreasonable to see changing concepts of liberty as one of
those contingent factors. This is especially true given the earlier argument I presented about how causal beliefs are
often driven by normative considerations. See the sources cites in note 17. The general importance of fiscal
considerations in the history of American liberalism is illustrated in Alan Brinkley, "The Late New Deal and the
Idea of the State," in Liberalism and its Discontents (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1998); Lloyd, The
Two Faces of Liberalism: How the Hoover-Roosevelt Debate Shapes the 21st Century, pp. 375-412. On the fiscal
views of the positive liberal tradition, Herbert Stein, Presidential Economics: The Making of Economic Policyfrom
Roosevelt to Reagan and Beyond (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute Press, 1988), esp. pp. 71-75;
Brinkley, "The Late New Deal and the Idea of the State"; Friedberg, In the Shadow of the Garrison State, pp. 83-97.
7' Higgs, Crisis and Leviathan, Ch. 6; Foner, The Story QfAmerican Freedom, Ch. 7.
72 Charles C. Ragin, Fuzzy-Set Social Science (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 2000), esp. pp. 149-180;
Mahoney, "After KKV."
historical literature as a major feature of political debate and of liberal intellectual concern. I
weigh the preponderance of an individual's statements across each category to decide whether an
individual is more a negative or positive liberal. I then weigh the categories together and decide
the measurement of an individual's sentiments. I use five rough codings: NL and PL medium,
(views more within each set than outside of it); NL and PL high (views fully within the set on all
categories); and mixed (equally within the set of NL and PL views).
Concepts of liberty are ideal types. Empirically, individual beliefs are not cut and dry:
they are fluid, malleable, mixed with other conceptual notions, and can be incoherent within the
same person. Indeed, as the non-rational cognitive models cited earlier all show, human beings
will ignore value-trade offs and potential inconsistencies for as long as possible before adjusting
their beliefs. So when measuring belief systems, we ought to expect to find tensions,
inconsistencies, occasional contradictions, and elements of both conceptual sets. Nonetheless,
the preponderance of an individual's expressions on different issues with relevance to liberal
thought is a still useful proxy for the central norms that shape his understanding.73
These kinds of standards are not meant to provide a false sense of precision, but rather to
acknowledge the inherent ambiguity in trying to measure ideas in the real world. The scheme
allows me to be honest about the complexity of the data and to probe for ideological consistency,
without accepting the notion that ideal-typical concepts are useless. It further sets clear
standards for making macro-comparisons across administrations separated by decades of
intervening time. My judgments are also entirely transparent-anyone who wants to contest my
aggregation or assessment of the data will have an easy time doing so, as the empirical chapters
will demonstrate. Sadly, ideas cannot be measured with the consistency of roll call votes. But
the method of structured focused comparison can nonetheless provide us with baseline
expectations.
MEASURING GEOPOLITICAL THREAT
By contrast, measuring systemic pressures is somewhat easier. I establish the presence or
absence of a potential hegemon in two ways. First, I examine several measures of latent
economic power. The purpose of these measures is to generate a rough gauge of the size and
technological sophistication of European economies. In a war of any length, the largest and most
sophisticated economies are likely to generate the most military power, and therefore to pose the
greatest threat. The presence of a clearly dominant economy would indicate a potential
hegemon.
Second, I survey extant military power during the period under study. I look at estimates
of the size and quality of readily mobilizeable military forces, which are the principal
determinants of military power in the near term. The importance of such a measurement lies in
the possibility of a short war: even if no state possesses a large advantage in latent power, a state
73 Skeptical readers might indulge in a thought experiment, presuming there exists a basic set of political values with
which they identify. Suppose a historian had access to a lifetime's worth of one's expressions on various political
issues--emails, letters, published writings, transcripts of bar conversations, etc. Plausibly, a historian would find
some contradictions, inconsistencies, and tensions in the set of these expressions. A historian would certainly find a
great deal of these in my own record. Skeptical readers should consider whether such an exercise would illustrate
that they have no political ideology, or that the entire concept is totally meaningless. I think the exercise shows,
rather, that one's basic views might nonetheless be expected to come through. The question of whether those views
had an impact on policy is, of course, a separate issue.
with a clear military advantage might well conquer the system before the superior wealth of
other states could be mobilized against it. In short, a major lead in either economic power or
military might offers the potential for winning a hegemonic war, so I survey both categories of
power. 74
I make use of three measurements in assessing economic potential, in order to generate a
robust assessment of potential hegemony over a range of indicators. I use the Correlates of War
(COW) index for levels of national wealth, which equally weights aggregate energy consumption
and steel production. Energy consumption is a gross measure of the relative size of national
industry that could potentially be mobilized for war. Steel production, which depends on the
mastery of a series of complex technologies and industrial processes, captures the broad level of
technology resident in national economies. In addition, I use economist Paul Bairoch's index for
relative industrial potential, which is a weighted measure of output from a variety of sectors,
including several high technology sectors. Finally, I use Angus Maddison's well-regarded series
for historical Gross Domestic Products (GDP). This series is calculated based on purchasing
parity concepts, measured in millions of 1990 International Geary-Khamis dollars.75
The COW index captures economic potential at the broadest level, distinguishing
between economies of equal size that are not equally suited for modern warfare. So, for
instance, a highly populated agricultural economy might generate as much economic value as a
smaller industrial economy, yet the former would have no chance of surviving a military
engagement with the latter. The COW index can be somewhat misleading, however, because
steel production can often be imported from other countries during peacetime. Trading states
may channel their energy production into other areas until such time as they need large quantities
of steel. For economies known to be on the same level of development, the Bairoch index and
the Maddison GDP series are better measures for comparing latent economic size.
In measuring the short-term military balance, I rely on a quantitative indicator: manpower
in European armies. This indicator is useful in a general sense, because a potentially hegemonic
military power will certainly have a large army. However, it needs to be taken with a grain of
salt as well; in modern war, armies can expand rapidly in size. I also note assessments from the
historical literature on the comparative effectiveness of armies. These are useful because they
allow me to take a cut at the quality of different military forces, which is important when
assessing how likely a powerful state is to win a short war.
Conclusion
This chapter has proposed a Theory of Liberal Foreign Policy (TLFP) in order to explain
variation in American grand strategy towards Europe in the twentieth century. In doing so, it has
made several arguments.
First, grand strategy should be thought of as a state's plan for managing the balance of
power. It is constituted by a state's vision of acceptable and unacceptable power configurations
74 On measuring the balance of power, in both latent economic terms and in military might, the best treatment is
Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, Chs. 3-4.
75 The COW data set is associated with J. David Singer, "Reconstructing the Correlates of War Dataset on Material
Capabilities of States, 1816-1985," International Interactions 14, no. 2 (1988): 115-132. Bairoch's index is
elaborated in Paul Bairoch, "International Industrialization Levels from 1750 to 1980," Journal of European
Economic History 11, no. 2 (1982): 269-333. The Maddison series is found at Angus Maddison, "World population,
GDP and per capita GDP, 1-2003 AD," data at http://www.ggdc.net/maddison/ (2007).
abroad and a mechanism for how different policy means will produce an acceptable power
configuration. Four ideal-typical grand strategies can be identified running along a continuum
from lesser to greater degree of power management: non-entanglement, buckpassing, balancing,
and preponderance. Grand strategic choices usually, but not universally, involve a trade-off
between lower costs and more control over the international environment.
Second, variation among these grand strategies can be primarily explained by two
variables: the character of American liberalism at home and the geopolitical threat from abroad.
Negative liberty acts as a leftward vector on the continuum, pushing American strategy towards
less management of the balance of power in order to preserve liberty at home from excessive
state building. Positive liberty acts as a rightward vector on the continuum, pushing American
grand strategy towards greater management, so that liberalism can be vindicated abroad.
The international system acts as twin vectors pushing American policy inward from the
extremes towards the middle sections of the continuum. When a potential hegemon arises in
Europe, America will have strong incentives to make some kind of commitment to contain it.
But ambitious commitments to preponderance will meet resistance from other actors under any
circumstances, and will make such a strategy difficult, though not impossible, to implement.
Geopolitical feedback will also lead to more coherent strategies with greater ends-means
integration, as resistance from the international system will cause policy-makers to make tough
choices between lower costs and greater influence.
Third, TLFP predicts a particular causal process of policy formation that, if observed,
ought to give great confidence in its efficacy and help show its influence even when other
variables are also at work. Negative and positive liberals ought to have different liberal
rationales for their policies, identify threats differently, and adopt different preferences for
alliances and military forces. In general, we ought to see negative liberals working to reduce
American costs and positive liberals reaching out for greater international leverage.
Finally, TLFP's variables can be consistently and coherently measured. Data on the
ideological beliefs of the president and other key decision-makers can be gathered from the
historical record in a consistent way that ensures the beliefs expressed were not epiphenomenal
or instrumental. Individuals themselves will likely not be fully consistent in their thought, but a
structured, focused comparison of their views across a range of indicators relevant to liberalism
allows broad differences to be seen. Economic and military data can provide a retrospective
picture of international power trends. Together, these indicators generate TLFP's expectations
for American strategic behavior in each case.
All that said, ideological variables are complex. In the final analysis, it is impossible to
observe ideology directly. Human beings can be inconsistent, incoherent, and slippery in their
normative expressions. And varying liberal inclinations, while providing a direction and an
impetus for behavior, do not literally constrain action. Any given decision might be influenced
by a wealth of contingent factors, and the impact of liberal thought can be overcome in particular
outcomes. None of the above arguments should be taken to imply that all individuals fit neatly
into ideological boxes, or that negative and positive liberty will always and everywhere drive
decisions towards the preferences I have outlined. Social science theories are probabilistic
statements because the world is a big place where many factors matter. As far as this theory
goes, Hamlet was right: there are more things in heaven and earth than are dreamt of in
philosophy.
Nonetheless, the purpose of social science is to simplify social reality in order to explain
it, and the theory I have proposed simplifies boldly. With the addition of geopolitical threat to
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variation in liberal ideology, TLFP requires only two variables in order to explain American
grand strategy. Moreover, both ideology and American grand strategy are aggregate variables:
ideological codings are built from the measurement of several categories of expression and often
from multiple individuals, just as grand strategy is compiled across a series of foreign policy
decisions. Over these large patterns of expression and behavior, idiosyncratic variation will
wash out, and identifiable trends should emerge. If TLFP can predict these trends, it will have
increased our knowledge of the social world. I now examine whether TLFP can do what it
promises, by testing it on American grand strategy towards Europe in the twentieth century.
Chapter Three
Progressives and Preponderance: American Grand Strategy under Wilson
The history of American grand strategy towards the great powers begins with an intensely
puzzling series of behaviors-American foreign policy during the period of the Great War.
Consider: for more than three years the United States disavowed any interest in the outcome of
the war in Europe, even attempting to maintain a superficially neutral posture for six weeks after
the advent of unrestricted submarine warfare against its shipping. Yet all the while, American
policy favored the Allied blockade of American commerce at its own expense, while provoking
German hostility with a series of juridically contrived and economically trivial objections to
submarine warfare.
Following the escalation of hostilities made inevitable by this favoritism, the Americans
chose neither to back down, nor to defend discrete interests in trade or geopolitical security with
limited naval and financial measures. Instead, the United States built an enormous and
independent army for the first time since the Civil War, deployed it abroad in an all-out struggle
against Germany, and did so while proclaiming a virtual crusade in favor of liberal values.
Having achieved victory, America imposed a harsh peace settlement that is widely criticized, on
the left, for being illiberal, and by realists, for failing to adequately guarantee its own execution.
Finally, after an intense domestic struggle, the United States rejected its own treaty,
disassembled its military forces, and retreated into non-entanglement during the inter-war years.
In short, American grand strategy shifted from buckpassing, to war, to non-entanglement
in a manner that defies an easy account. President Wilson might have been describing his own
foreign policy when he declared at the Paris peace conference "Logic! Logic! I don't give a
damn for logic!" How can these sudden changes in the American security strategy be explained?,
I argue that the Theory of Liberal Foreign Policy (TLFP) outlined in Chapter Two
provides a powerful lens for understanding Wilsonian grand strategy. Europe contained no
potential hegemon, giving America few geopolitical incentives for action. It was Wilson's
positive liberalism that provided the impetus for American policy. He envisioned a settlement to
the war emphasizing American values: a post-war League of Nations that would guarantee
international security while protecting and spreading liberal democracy abroad. This vision was
a unipolar power configuration: European power would be combined in a single preponderant
pole, led by a disinterested and beneficent America.
However, the failure of American foreign policy to realize the fullness of this vision
shows the power of the international system as an integrating force. American strategy during
the Great War is the story of Wilson's discovery that his grand liberal ambitions would require
deep American management of the balance of power and a correspondingly large set of political
and military commitments. American buckpassing from 1914-1917 stemmed from Wilson's
belief that the League of Nations could only be formed after an American mediated "peace
without victory." When it finally became clear that a non-belligerent America lacked the
influence to facilitate the liberal settlement, Wilson reversed course and adopted a strategy of
balancing, building a powerful land army and attempting to dictate the future of European
Wilson quoted in Thomas J. Knock, To End All Wars: Woodrow Wilson and the Questfor a New World Order
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1995), p. 248. The context of the quote is Wilson's willingness to
include the cost of allied pensions in the Versailles reparations settlement, contradicting his earlier view.
politics by intervening in the war on the ground. The international system also shaped Wilson's
peace diplomacy, where he agreed to potentially costly forward alliance and military
commitments in order to create the League.
The logic of positive liberty can be observed in Wilson's increasing search for influence
over the international power configuration on behalf of liberal aims. Wilson was motivated by
liberal goals from the very beginning of the war; he sought an institutional solution that would
protect and expand liberal values in Europe. The liberal critics of his peace conference
diplomacy overstate their case-at the peace conference, Wilson did in fact prioritize his liberal
aims and made several potentially costly commitments in order to build the League of Nations.
Wilson's realist critics are also importantly mistaken-regardless of the efficacy of the League,
the keeping of these commitments would have embroiled the United States in European politics
during the inter-war period. When confronted with a choice between further American
commitments and giving up his liberal vision, Wilson always chose to incur more costs in pursuit
of his ideological goals. It was only a series of idiosyncratic and highly contingent events that
led to the post-war reversal of American strategy: the outcome of the mid-term elections of 1918;
the institutional structure of American government; the fact that Wilson suffered a devastating
stroke; and the result of the Republican nominating convention of 1920.
In sum, Wilson's positive liberalism led him inexorably, and often against his will, to the
only strategies capable of securing his ambitious liberal goals: balancing and preponderance. It
is fair to say that America never achieved a preponderant posture in Europe, though it was
positioned as a balancer before the Treaty fight. Whether America could have ever achieved a
preponderant position in early twentieth century Europe is a question left open by history. But
Wilson's liberal goals surely led him to the more intense end of the strategic continuum.
This chapter aims to demonstrate the utility of TLFP for understanding changes in
American grand strategy during the First World War. I begin by measuring the independent
variables, showing that Wilson held strongly positive liberal views and that there was no
potential hegemon in Europe. The following two sections chart American grand strategy during
the neutrality period (1914-1917) and after belligerency (1917-1920). I conclude the chapter by
examining a set of alternate explanations for the foreign policy of both Wilson.
Coding the Independent Variables
I begin the analysis by examining the values of TLFP's two independent variables during
the First World War, in accordance with the procedure developed in Chapter Two. First, I code
the Wilson administration's concept of liberty. I do so by examining Wilson's extensive record
of publications before he entered politics, as well as records of his private statements and
personal views on matters of political philosophy. I chart Wilson's concept of liberty across the
three categories of liberal expression outlined earlier: explicit philosophical statements, attitudes
towards political centralization, and disposition towards fiscal and economic regulation. After
weighing the preponderance of evidence in each category, I code Wilson as "Positive Liberal:
High" in comparison with other leaders-that is, I place him nearly fully "within the set" of ideal
typical positive liberal views. 2
2 Omitted here for space reasons are the views of other important figures in the Wilson administration's foreign
policy. Wilson dominated the making of American foreign policy during the period, composing much of American
diplomatic correspondence on his own typewriter. The only figure to have a major influence on his decision-making
Second, I measure the balance of power in Europe from 1914-1917. 1 aim to determine
whether there was a potential hegemon on the European continent during the period, as captured
by the two indicators discussed in Chapter Two: latent economic power and military forces in
being. I show that while Imperial Germany maintained a lead in both latent and military power,
she could not be considered a potential hegemon as long as Britain had access to the continent,
since Britain was a close rival in economic strength. I conclude with a summary of the variables
and the expectations they generate for American grand strategy during the period of the Great
War.
WILSON'S CONCEPT OF LIBERTY
Woodrow Wilson is perhaps the quintessential example of a positive liberal, and his
presidency marked the beginning of positive liberty's long march to intellectual hegemony in
American government. We can observe his views in the unique record he left behind: as the only
academic to ever hold the presidency, Wilson authored a number of works on politics, history,
and administration. In matters of political philosophy, centralization of power, and economic
intervention, Wilson's writings reveal his vision of freedom as an exercise concept.
PHILOSOPHY. Woodrow Wilson's political thought was an extended attack on the
philosophy of the American founding. Wilson rejected the Founders' natural rights theory of
liberty as an empty abstraction divorced from the changing needs and values obvious in
historical progress. He sought to modernize American institutions and political concepts to meet
the needs of the contemporary historical epoch. Wilson therefore adopted understandings of
freedom, democracy, and the role of government that are textbook examples of the positive
concept of liberty.3
For Wilson, "political liberty is the right of those who are governed to adjust government
to their own needs and interests." Different times would call for different boundaries between
the government and the individual, and a "liberty fixed in unalterable law would be no liberty at
all." Indeed, one of the main arguments of Wilson's Constitutional Government is that the
American Constitution's view of liberty is "practical" and "adjustable:" there is "no abstract
setting forth of liberties" to remain inviolate against the state, but rather "a formulation of limits
and of methods" to government coercion. Wilson understood that the Framers felt differently-
"No doubt a great deal of nonsense has been talked about the inalienable rights of the individual,
and a great deal more that was mere vague sentiment and pleasing speculation has been put
forward as fundamental principle." But for Wilson "the whole spirit and manner" of the Bill of
was his friend and confidant Colonel Edward M. House, who mirrored Wilson's political views. On Wilson's
foreign policy pre-eminence see, for example, Ibid., p. 20; Arthur S. Link, Wilson, 1: The Road to the While House
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1947), p. 13-15.
3 Throughout this chapter, I have relied heavily on Arthur S. Link, ed., The Papers of Woodrow Wilson, 69 vols.
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1966). Hereafter abbreviated PWW, this compilation of Wilson's
writings, personal papers, and documentation from his presidency is without peer. The literature on Wilson's
background is relatively large in comparison with other Presidents. I have followed a recent secondary literature
completed with the benefit of PWW: Ronald J. Pestritto, Woodrow Wilson and the Roots of Modern Liberalism
(Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2005); Niels Aage Thorsen, The Political Thought of Woodrow
Wilson, 1875-1910 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1988); Kendrick A. Clements, The Presidency of
Woodrow Wilson (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 1992); Scot J. Zentner, "Liberalism and Executive
Power: Woodrow Wilson and the American Founders," Polity 26, no. 4 (July 1, 1994): 579-599. For some older
works see note 13.
Rights "is exhibited in their business-like phrases." How could its "quiet language" be read as a
fundamental charter of non-interference when it denied "to the government only unreasonable
powers arbitrarily exercised?" American liberty was not freedom from reasonable powers
exercised for good purpose.4
Wilson's liberty was teleological: freedom had a purpose, even if one could not specify
the same purpose for every day and age. He used the remarkable analogy of a boat, which when
well adjusted to the wind "runs free" but when poorly guided "is in irons." Political liberty was
likewise, argued Wilson: "There is nothing free in the sense of being unrestrained in a world of
innumerable forces, and each force moves best when best adjusted to the forces about it." An
individual could not be free from state interference anymore than a boat could move freely
without interference at the tiller and trimming the sails.
"Progress," Wilson argued in lectures on the development of modern politics, "lies in the
growth of man's ability to make more out of himself and to make more out nature." Politically,
these growing abilities led to the simultaneous development of individuals and societies to their
proper ends: "The goal of political development is identical with the goal of individual
development. Both singly and collectively man's nature draws him away from that which is
brutish and towards that which is human." Just a boat's purpose is to sail with the wind, Wilson
envisioned human development to a teleological goal: freedom was the liberty to exercise or
achieve peculiarly human ends.5
Moreover, the exercise of liberty included an essential feature of collective participation.
"Liberty consists in enlightened, authoritative public opinion," Wilson thought, "in the
realization of the purposes of active, directive popular thought. Liberty lives and moves and has
its being in self-government." He saw the progress of modern government as the steady increase
in participation and debate within society at large-"Discussion has been the mother and nurse
of all free governments." Wilson emphasized the organic unity of mass opinion in modem
states, which was brought about by participation, cooperation, and "common counsel" in daily
life. Like many positive liberal thinkers, he also underscored the personal virtues necessary for
self-rule: citizens "must have acquired adult self-reliance, self-knowledge, and self-control...
soberness and deliberateness of judgment and sagacity in self-government... vigilance of thought
and quickness of insight." Though not necessarily enamored of public participation in
administration itself-the tension between Wilson's professed love of democracy and his support
for an expert-run administrative state has often been noted-participation in the life of public
6
opinion was a critical part of exercising liberty for Wilson.
4 Woodrow Wilson, Constitutional Government in the United States (New York: Columbia University Press, 1908),
quotes pp. 4, 8, 9, 16.
' Ibid., p. 5.; Wilson's lecture notes on the study of history, c. September 24, 1885, PWW 5: 18-23, quote 18;
Wilson, "The Modem Democratic State," c. December, 1885, PWW 5: 61-92, quote 90. Other examples of
Wilson's focus on "self-development" and teleological thinking include Woodrow Wilson, The State: Elements of
Historical and Practical Politics (New York: D.C Heath and Co., 1889), pp. 658-662; Wilson, "Commemorative
Address," PWW 6: 180; Pestritto, Woodrow Wilson and the Roots of Modern Liberalism, pp. 53-58, 82-84; Zentner,
"Liberalism and Executive Power."
6 Wilson, "Notes on Administration," c. November 15, 1885, PWW 5: 49-50, quote 50 emphasis in original;
Wilson's lecture notes on the study of history, c. September 24, 1885, PWW 5: 18-23, quote 22; Wilson, "The
Modem Democratic State," c. December, 1885, PWW 5: 61-92, quote 71 and passim. For more on the importance
of unity, opinion, and participation in Wilson's writings, as well as a blistering critique of Wilson's democratic
credentials, see Pestritto, Woodrow Wilson and the Roots of Modern Liberalism, esp. pp. 33-40, 71-75, Ch. 6. Note
It is unsurprising, then, that Wilson adopted a view of democracy typical of positive
liberal thought. "Modem democracy," Wilson insisted, "is not the rule of the many but the rule
of the whole." Rather than merely a check against powerful interests, democracy was
intrinsically valuable, serving to bring about the collective exercise of freedom and common
development. With citizens thus acting together, "Democracy is the fullest form of state life: it is
the completest possible realization of corporate, cooperate state life for a whole people."
In fact, though he lauded democracy as a conservative and incremental regime in
practice, Wilson saw little difference in principal between democracy and socialism. Democracy
and socialism "both rest at bottom upon the absolute right of the community to determine its own
destiny and that of its members. Men as communities are supreme over men as individuals."
Wilson could therefore "understand, and even in a measure sympathize with" socialists, who,
like good democrats, aimed "to bring the individual with his special interests, personal to
himself, into complete harmony with Society and its general interests," and championed a "revolt
from selfish, misguided individualism." The focus on the primacy of the democratic community
as a critical part of freedom and self-rule marks Wilson as an ideal typical positive liberal.7
These views on the character of freedom and democracy led Wilson to an expansive
view of government's role in political life. His lengthy treatise The State explicitly attacked the
social contract view of government's origins and limits: "the earliest communities were not
individual men, as Locke and Locke's co-theorists would lead us to believe, but individual
families." Government's ancient past was that of the "absolute father-sovereign," and its natural
limits commensurately small. While modern regimes were sensibly oriented towards freedom
and democracy, that did not restrict their ambit: "Government does not stop with the protection
of life, liberty, and property, as some have supposed; it goes on to serve every convenience of
society."
Indeed, "government does now whatever experience permits or times demand," its
interference constituting "simply the principal of individual liberty extended." America's error
was to have "fallen into the habit of identifying [liberty] with a largefreedom of individual
action." Though the private sphere was important, "liberty, nevertheless, is not identical with
individual privilege. It is a thing of social organization.... It is not in being let alone by
government that my liberty consists, but in being assisted by government to maintain my equal
place among my fellows." Wilson therefore advocated a host of new roles for government so
that "individual self-development may be made at once to serve and to supplement social
development." His lecture notes provide the perfect positive liberal epigram: "Law is the
external organism of human freedom."8
CENTRALIZATION OF POWER. Wilson's orientation towards a greater role for the
that Pestritto does not deny the importance of democracy in Wilson's thought; he instead argues that Wilson
effectively privileged executive leadership over robust democratic participation in government.
7 Wilson, "The Modem Democratic State," c. December, 1885, PWW 5: 61-92, quotes 76, 82; Wilson, "Socialism
and Democracy," c. August 22, 1887, PWW 5: 559-562, quote 561; Wilson, The State, quote p. 659. See also
Pestritto, Woodrow Wilson and the Roots of Modern Liberalism, Ch. 2.
8 Wilson, The State, first four quotes and eighth quote, pp. 17, 7, 647, 651, 659; Wilson, Johns Hopkins lecture notes
on administration, January 23, 1892, PWW 7: 384-391, fifth quote 385; Wilson, Lecture on democracy, December
5, 1891, PWW 7: 345-371, sixth, seventh, and ninth quotes 363-364. All emphasis is in originals. Wilson wrote
extensively about his view of expanded government powers. Of special further interest is his comparative analysis
of world governments in Wilson, The State, esp. pp. 1-30, 575-668; and Wilson, Johns Hopkins lecture notes on
administration, January 26, 1891, PWW 7: 122-123, where he includes among the functions of government: "The
state... promotes health... stands economic guardian... stands spiritual god parent...."
government in social life made him hostile to the institutional limits of the American state.
Wilson spent much of his intellectual effort imagining a new constitutional structure that would
reflect a critical distinction: the difference between politics and administration. Though his ideas
went through several phases, Wilson maintained a basic philosophic opposition to the
constitutional cornerstones of separated powers and federalism. Conversely, he showed a great
affinity for executive power and the bureaucracy, which provided the concentrated power
essential for the liberty enhancing functions of the administrative state.
At the core of Wilson's political theory was the idea that the American nation was an
organic entity that had been increasing in unity of consciousness and opinion since the founding.
This national unity is what made real democracy, as described above, possible-it created a
general will that could be realized through state action. It also made politics less necessary:
modern democracies were of like mind about goals, but the particular means of obtaining them
were properly the province of experts. Unfortunately, American institutions were explicitly
designed to prevent such enlightened administration, comparing unfavorably with Britain's
unwritten constitution. As Wilson wrote in his diary on the centennial of American
independence, "How much happier [America] would be now if she had England's form of
government instead of the miserable delusion of a republic. A republic, too, founded upon the
notion of abstract liberty! I venture to say that this country will never celebrate another
centennial as a republic. The English form of government is the only true one."9
Separation of powers was the primary culprit holding back a less abstract, more
teleological notion of liberty. Wilson's Congressional Government attempted to refashion
Congress into a parliamentary system that would be more responsive and efficient. It was "a
manifestly radical defect in our federal system that it parcels out power and confuses
responsibility as it does.... Checks and balances have proved mischievous just to the extent
which they have succeeded in establishing themselves as realities.... The only fruit of dividing
power had been to make it irresponsible." Instead, the legislature should appoint the executive
branch from its own members. As Wilson sputtered in his marginalia in a history of England,
"The folly of America in taking away from the national assembly the reverent custom of
appointing the great officers of state." Wilson acknowledged that his remedies were "certainly
none other than those which were rejected by the Constitutional Convention." But America was
behind the times and its institutions needed to catch up: American's "bosoms swell against
George III, but they have no consciousness of the war for freedom that is going on today."' 0
Federalism came in for similar calumnies in Wilson's analysis. The devolution of power
and authority to the states "often seems sadly at war with any uniform administration of the laws
such as good government seems to demand." The modem world had produced matters "of such
vital and universal interest as to demand a uniform and somewhat inflexible policy," the lack of
9 Wilson diary, July 4, 1876, PWW 1: 148-149, quote both pages; I have added punctuation. Wilson's most famous
exposition of the distinction between politics and administration is "The Study of Administration," c. November 1,
1886, PWW 5: 359-380, which was published in the July 1887 issue of Political Science Quarterly. The basic
distinction pervades his thought. See esp. Pestritto, Woodrow Wilson and the Roots of Modern Liberalism, Ch. 4-7;
Thorsen, Political Thought of Woodrow Wilson, Ch. 6.
' Woodrow Wilson, Congressional Government: A Study in American Politics (New York: Meridian Books, 1956),
p. 187; Wilson, marginal notes on John Richard Green, c. July 27, 1878, PWW7: 387-393, quote 387; Wilson,
"Cabinet Government in the United States," August 1879, PWW 7: 493-510, quote 497; last quote in Pestritto,
Woodrow Wilson and the Roots of Modern Liberalism, p. 122. See also Ibid., Ch. 4 for an exposition of Wilson's
early parliamentary views.
which caused "evil that results to the nation at large." After all, Wilson noted, "Are there not
States where the privilege of divorce has been so extended that marriage has become an empty
mockery and every encouragement given to a licentiousness which threatens the entire
organization of society with destruction?"
Fortunately, the Civil War had been "a final contest between nationalism and
sectionalism," and the Union had been "confirmed in a new character and strength which it had
not at first possessed." The war had made "the questions of the future... questions of internal
national policy, of federal administration.... Our Constitution has had a great growth. It is now
neither in theory nor in fact what its framers are thought to have intended it to be." Though a
Southerner, Wilson's distaste for federalism made him unsympathetic to the Confederacy, which
he associated with a retrograde decentralism: "the South paid the inevitable penalty for lagging
behind the national development, stopping the normal growth of the national constitution.""'
Finally, especially in his later writings, Wilson favored a centralization of power in the
executive branch of the national government and in the bureaucracy. Wilson sadly recounted
that "some of our Presidents have deliberately held themselves off from using the full power they
might have legitimately used, because of conscientious scruples, because they were more
theorists than statesmen." But the President's job was to lead unified mass opinion and to
coordinate government through leadership of his party. In reality, "the President is at liberty, in
both law and in conscience, to be as big a man as he can. His capacity will set the limit; and if
Congress be overborne by him" it will be only because "the President has the nation behind him,
and Congress has not." Moreover, real power ought to be given to an expert bureaucracy, "an
organization that vitalizes" the body politic and "energizes the people by the measure of
assistance which it affords." When administration was properly separated from politics, it would
be insulated from corruption and self-interest and could efficiently manage the improvement of
social conditions.12
ECONOMIC AND FISCAL VIEWS. Wilson's economic opinions revolved around
government regulation of business for a greater public good. To be sure, like liberals of all
stripes, Wilson was basically friendly to private enterprise. Furthermore, the political
imperatives of Wilson's meteoric rise in Democratic Party politics and of the subsequent 1912
presidential campaign induced him adopt non-interventionist rhetoric at times. His campaign
theme, "New Freedom," was designed to contrast with Theodore Roosevelt's "New
Nationalism," which stole Wilson's ideological thunder by proposing to regulate business with
independent administrative boards. However, Wilson's writings leave little doubt as to his true
views. As he argued in The State, "It should be the end of government to accomplish the ends of
" Wilson, "Some Legal Needs," c. May 1, 1881, PWW 2: 60-63, quotes 60, 62-63; Wilson, "Government by
Debate," 1882, PWW 2: 228-233, quote 232; Wilson, "Bryce's American Commonwealth," January 31, 1889, PWW
6: 74; Wilson to Herman Eduard von Hoist, June 29, 1893, PWW 8: 271-272. For more on the important place of
the Civil War in Wilson's thought, see Ibid., Ch. 3; Thorsen, Political Thought of Woodrow Wilson, Ch. 7-8. Given
Wilson's sectional origin and his virulent racism, some writers have imagined Wilson as an old guard states rights
Democrat. Nothing could be further from the truth -- he was simply a racist.
12 Wilson, Constitutional Government, p. 70; Wilson, Johns Hopkins lecture notes on administration, January 26,
1891, PWW 7: 114-120, quote 116. To the extent that Wilson had an answer to the tension between his envisioned
powerful state and democracy, it lay in believing that executive leadership could channel popular will. Whatever
one might think of this intellectual solution, it is not an uncommon idea among positive liberals; Franklin Roosevelt
held similar concepts. Careful analysis of Wilson's views on the executive and the bureaucracy can be found in
Pestritto, Woodrow Wilson and the Roots of Modern Liberalism, Ch. 5-7; Thorsen, Political Thought of Woodrow
Wilson, Ch. 9; Zentner, "Liberalism and Executive Power."
organized society: there must be a constant adjustment of governmental assistance to the needs
of a changing social and industrial organization." 3
Wilson's early work as an academic did not express well-developed views on economics,
but it did show clear sympathy for economic theories that admitted a need for government
intervention. Wilson collaborated at Johns Hopkins with Richard T. Ely, the leader of an
intellectual assault on deductive economic theory, and who championed instead immersion in
empirical statistics for the purpose of directing the economy towards public ends. Perhaps as a
result, Wilson dismissed classical liberal economic theory as "mere library theories, mere fine-
spun threads of logic," in contrast to a more "practical" American approach. In an early
unpublished study, Wilson singled out Francis Amasa Walker as the pre-eminent American
economist, who argued that economic forces were not self-correcting and sought to protect labor.
Substantively, Wilson's major concerns appear to have been the support for the national scale of
the American economy and the dominance of scientific methods for its political management.
As he later described the dissenters from classical orthodoxy "a single step or two would then
bring [them] within full sight of the longed-for time when political economy is to dominate
legislation."14
These theoretical inclinations would lead Wilson to later advocate an economically and
fiscally interventionist state. "The modern industrial organization," Wilson asserted, "has so
distorted competition as to put it into the power of some to tyrannize over many, as to enable the
rich and the strong to combine against the weak and the poor." Government intervention in the
economy should permit individual freedom "yet guard that freedom against the competition that
kills, and reduce antagonism between self-development and social development to a minimum."
Wilson saw the primary economic tasks of the state as guarding against "natural monopoly" and
the "equalization of competition," and he employed expansive definitions of the same. As
Governor of New Jersey, Wilson acted on those views, passing a public utilities statute that
broadly defined utilities and gave an independent board the power to "fix just and reasonable
rates." On fiscal matters, he supported the passage of the Sixteenth Amendment to the
Constitution, allowing the federal government to directly tax individual income. "It is clearly
" Wilson, The State, pp. 660-661, emphasis in original. Along with Wilson's Southern heritage, the circumstances
of the 1912 campaign have caused controversy among historians, some of whom view him as a decentralist state's
rights Democrat that underwent a miraculous conversion to Roosevelt's progressive platform immediately upon
entering government. See Arthur S. Link, Wilson I; Arthur S. Link, Wilson, II: The New Freedom (Princeton, NJ:
Princeton University Press, 1956); William Diamond, The Economic Thought of Woodrow Wilson (Baltimore, MD:
Johns Hopkins University Press, 1943). However, close observers of the campaign have long noted Roosevelt and
Wilson had more similarities than differences. John Milton Cooper, The Warrior and the Priest: Woodrow Wilson
and Theodore Roosevelt (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1985), pp. 219; Clements, The Presidency of
Woodrow Wilson, pp. 27-28; Pestritto, Woodrow Wilson and the Roots of Modern Liberalism, pp. 253-259. Indeed,
when Roosevelt attacked Wilson as a Jeffersonian during the campaign, Wilson clarified that "While we are
followers of Jefferson, there is one principal of Jefferson's that can no longer obtain.... It was Jefferson who said
that the best government is that which does as little governing as possible.... But that time has past. America is not
now and cannot be in the future a place for unrestricted individual enterprise." He also noted in his speeches that
"freedom today is more than being let alone. The program of a government of freedom must in these days be
positive, not negative merely." Wilson, "Campaign Address in Scranton, Pennsylvania," September 23, 1912, in
PWW 25: 222; and Woodrow Wilson, The New Freedom: A Call For The Emancipation Of The Generous Energies
QfA People (New York: Doubleday Books, 1913), p. 2 84 .
"4 Wilson, "Report to the historical seminary," c. March 7, 1885, PWW 4: 422-424; Wilson, "The Study of Politics,"
c. November 25, 1886, PWW 5: 395-406, quote 404. On Wilson's economic education see Thorsen, Political
Thought of Woodrow Wilson, Ch. 4, esp. pp. 76-88.
within the interest of national life that the power," Wilson argued, "should be conceded. It will
free the government of the United States to put its fiscal policy on a much more enlightened, a
much more modem, a much more elastic basis than it now rests upon."15
COMPOSITE CODE. In some sense an intellectual godfather of positive liberty in the
United States, Wilson represented the leading edge of a conceptual shift in the meaning of
freedom within American government. He explicitly rejected the classical liberalism of the
founding fathers, holding instead that liberty changed throughout history, and championed
instead the development of valued human ends and their active exercise. Along the same lines,
democracy was to be valued as a collective form of development and active autonomy, rather
than as a check on faction. Wilson coupled these philosophic views with a corresponding assault
on American institutions as they were conventionally understood: the separation of powers and
federalism both inhibited active government, which needed to be facilitated by a strong executive
and an independent bureaucracy. Finally, Wilson aimed to advance positive liberty through the
economic and fiscal measures of the state. As such, I rate him as PL high, fully within the set of
ideal typical positive liberal views.16
Table 3.1: Wilson Administration's Concept of Liberty
Explicit Centralization Economic and Overall
Philosophy Fiscal Views
Wilson Liberty changes Anti-separation Supported a PL High: fully
by era; of powers; anti- fiscally and within the set.
understood it to federalism; pro- economically
be teleological executive, pro- interventionist
development; bureaucracy. state; attacked
democracy broadly defined
valued as a form "pnatural




In measuring the geopolitical threat environment, I look for the existence of a potential
hegemon in Europe, using two indicators. First, I examine several measures of latent economic
power. As the discussion in Chapter Two noted, the purpose of these measures is to generate a
rough gauge of the size and technological sophistication of European economies. In a war of any
length, the largest and most sophisticated economies are likely to generate the most military
power, and therefore pose the greatest threat. The presence of a clearly dominant economy
15 Wilson, The State, quotes pp. 659, 660, and see 659-668 generally. Final two quotes in Pestritto, Woodrow
Wilson and the Roots of Modern Liberalism, p. 258. Anti-trust language is common to liberals of all stripes, but
Wilson and other positive liberals tended to employ broad definitions of "monopoly," while supporting more
extensive government regulations. Note also that Wilson's utilities policy as Governor of New Jersey was precisely
the sort of policy for which he was forced to tactically express distaste during the campaign of 1912.
6 Wilson's commitment to positive liberalism should not be taken to suggest that he was some kind of radical. If
his views sound extreme, it Is only because they were the leading edge of a transformation in American liberal
thought. In the context of early twentieth century European thought, Wilson's views appear middle of the road.
Indeed, Wilson's horror of Bolshevism and revolution is well known.
would indicate a potential hegemon.
Second, I survey extant military power at the start of the war. I look at estimates of the
size and quality of readily mobilizable military forces, which are the principal determinants of
military power in the short term. The importance of such a measurement lies in the possibility of
a short war: even if no state possesses a large advantage in latent power, a state with a clear
military advantage might well conquer the system before superior wealth can be mobilized
against it. In short, a major lead in either economic power or military might offers the potential
for winning a hegemonic war, so I survey both categories of power.
These indicators show that there was no potential hegemon in Europe from 1914-1917, as
Germany and England were roughly equal in national wealth and military expenditures.
Germany did possess an advantage over its continental rivals in readily mobilizeable land forces,
though ultimately the size of the two coalitions netted out at equality in 1914. From the point of
view of the United States (as opposed to any state within the European system), the balance of
power appeared secure as long as Britain remained viable.
LATENT ECONOMIC POWER. In measuring latent power, figures for GDP are an
unreliable system-wide tool during this period, since the states of Europe were operating at
different levels of industrialization, particularly the Eastern great powers. I therefore use the
Correlates of War (COW) index for levels of national wealth, which equally weights aggregate
energy consumption and steel production. Energy consumption is a gross measure of the relative
size of national industry that could potentially be mobilized for war. Steel production, which
depends on the mastery of a series of complex technologies and industrial processes, captures the
broad level of technology resident in national economies. On the eve of the war Germany
dominated its continental opponents in latent power, but only exceeded British potential by a
more modest factor of 1.4."7
Table 3.2: Relative Percentage of European Industry (COW)
1913 1914 1915 1916 1917
Germany 40.9 39.9 38.6 40.9 42.4
Britain 29.6 33.1 36.5 35.6 36.3
France 11.9 8.8 5.8 6.8 7.5
Austria- 6.8 6.5 7.4 5.4 5.0
Hungary
Russia 10.8 11.7 11.6 11.2 8.8
Moreover, this measurement almost certainly overstates the German advantage vis-i-vis
Britain. The major element of the German edge stemmed from its advantages in steel
production. As a measure of industrial size, and therefore gross economic power, steel
production is somewhat misleading, since the Entente could devote a portion of its total wealth to
steel produced in other markets. Since Germany and Britain shared the same level of
industrialization and both had economies driven by a variety of high technology industries, other
" The rationale behind this simple index is discussed in John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics
(New York: Norton, 2001), pp. 60-75. Raw data is from the dataset associated with J. David Singer,
"Reconstructing the Correlates of War Dataset on Material Capabilities of States, 1816-1985," International
Interactions 14, no. 2 (1988): 115-132. My figures include only the five major powers; slightly different figures will
be arrived if Italy is included.
indicators of economic size are probably more accurate. In the two tables below, I include
comparisons for GDP and Paul Bairoch's index of total industrial potential, which is a weighted
measure of output from a variety of sectors, including several high technology sectors. These
figures suggest that the German advantage in latent power was more on the order of 1.1 before
the war, which was quickly undone by greater British production during the conflict. Note that
this conclusion is born out by the COW data over the course of the war, in which the German
power advantage over Britain quickly plummeted and then rebounded to only about half of its
pre-war size (table 3.2). This change occurred because Britain rapidly transferred resources to
iron and steel production while slightly increasing its energy consumption lead.'8
Table 3.3: British and German GDP, 1913-1917
1913 1914 1915 1916 1917
Germany 237,332 202,207 192,002 193,900 194,138
Britain 224,618 226,864 245,058 250,449 252,695
Ratio 1.06 .89 .78 .77 .77
Table 3.4: British and German Latent Power, 1913
Ratio Bairoch Ratio Steel% Ratio Energy% Ratio
Germany 1.13 137.7 1.08 46.8 2.26 35.2
Britain 127.2 20.7 38.4 1.09
MILITARY POWER. The situation was similar in terms of military power, although here
Germany maintained more of an advantage. Recalling the discussion from Chapter Two, the key
determinants of a state's ability to win a short war are the size and quality of its military forces.
In historical assessments of European militaries, Germany's army is generally acclaimed as the
highest quality fighting force in Europe. By contrast, the Russian Army was beset by problems
that made it slow to mobilize and much less effective in combat, meaning that Germany's
potential Eastern antagonist was not as strong as it looked.
The pure size of each military is easier to measure: The Germans dominated the other
continental powers save Russia, and outnumbered the combined British and French armies by a
factor of 1.4. In total forces the Central Powers achieved equality with the Entente in 1914.
Given the German size advantages and assessments of its quality, it is fair to conclude that
Germany possessed some kind of military advantage in a short war.' 9
Assessing the military balance during the war is much more difficult. In retrospect, there
are certainly signs that Entente armies were straining by 1917, in spite of the Entente's growing
economic superiority. However, Allied weakness was not widely perceived in Washington.
8 GDP is given in millions of 1990 international Geary-Kharnis dollars, an economic accounting convention based
on purchasing power parity concepts. Data are from Angus Maddison, "World population, GDP and per capita
GDP, 1-2003 AD," data at http://www.ggdc.net/maddison/(2007). For Bairoch's discussion of the state of the
German and British economies see Paul Bairoch, "International Industrialization Levels from 1750 to 1980,"
Journal of European Economic History 11, no. 2 (1982): 269-333. Bairoch's industrial potential index represents
Britain in 1900 as 100. For further discussion, see Ibid., pp. 313-333.
9 Army sizes are from Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, p. 303. On the quality of European
armed forces, see Paul M. Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and Military
Conflictfrom 1500 to 2000 (New York: Random House, 1987), pp. 202-249, which draws on a broad literature.
Most of the more obvious signals-mutinies on the Western Front and major defeats in the
East-occurred after America entered the war. Wilson himself never doubted eventual Allied
victory if the war was permitted to continue.
Table 3.5: European Wartime (1914) Army Size
Army Size after Ratios of Interest
Mobilization, 1914




Austria-Hungary 1,250,000 Central Powers/Entente=.99
Russia 1,800,000 Notoriously slow, ineffective
COMPOSITE CODE. These data illustrate that, from an American perspective, there was no
potential hegemon in Europe from 1914-1917. Although Germany looked very powerful to its
European neighbors, Britain's relatively close latent power meant American statesmen had every
reason to believe that the balance of power was stable. The only exception would be if Germany
could overwhelm France so quickly that Britain could not get its army on the continent and force
a long war. As it happened, the Entente did force a long war and out produced the Central
Powers economically by a considerable margin during its course. Furthermore, whatever relative
power gap might be invoked for potential hegemony, the balance of power in 1914 was
qualitatively different from that in 1940 and 1946, as Chapters Five and Six will discuss.
SUMMARY OF CODING
A primary source examination of Woodrow Wilson's extensive pre-presidential writings
shows him to be fully within the set of positive liberal ideals: he held an active and participatory
concept of freedom; advocated the centralization of power in the national government; and
supported fiscal and economic interventionism. Indicators for the balance of latent and military
power reveal that there was no potential hegemon in Europe from 1914-1917: Britain only
slightly lagged Germany in economic power; the Entente had greater combined resources than
the Central Powers; and Germany's military advantage gave it only limited opportunity to force a
short war. TLFP therefore predicts that the Wilson administration would pursue a grand strategy
of either balancing or preponderance, depending on the American power advantage and the
European reaction. The administration should have been deeply interested in defending
American liberal values overseas, and the roughly equal balance of power should have held little
prospect of inducing American restraint. All else equal, the Wilson administration ought to have
made forward commitments in Europe for the purpose of managing the international power
configuration on behalf of liberal values.
American Grand Strategy 1914-1917: Buckpassing
As predicted by TLFP, Wilson pursed a grand strategy aimed toward preponderance, a
negotiated liberal peace settlement based on a League of Nations. However, American grand
strategy developed slowly at first, relying on British efforts to establish the conditions for such a
peace. I therefore code Wilson's initial grand strategy as buckpassing. This variance from
TLFP's expected outcome was driven by Wilson's ideas about how to bring the League of
Nations about, which were intimately tied to his positive liberal beliefs.
The causal logic of TLFP is strongly confirmed by American diplomacy early in the war.
The demands that a Wilsonian peace placed on the future European balance of power were
enormous, and these needs made buckpassing an unstable strategy, poorly integrated with the
liberal ends it was designed to serve. The collective security system necessary to protect
democracy in Europe required, at a minimum, costly forward commitments of American
diplomatic and military power. Thus, American neutrality from 1914-1917 is the saga of
Wilson's struggle against systemic pressures indicating the need for greater influence over
international affairs in order to protect liberty abroad.
The American buckpassing strategy, and its positive liberal roots, can be seen in the
nature of the Wilson administration's response to European threats and in its diplomatic policy.
As the process predictions of TLFP lead us to expect, Wilson perceived an ideological threat
from the character of the German regime, rather than from the level of German power. To meet
this threat and to protect European liberty, Wilson devised an ambitious strategy of collective
security. In the short term, though, he believed this strategy could not succeed unless the war
ended in a stalemate and a non-belligerent America mediated the peace.
In this regard, American diplomatic policy implicitly favored the Allies over the Central
Powers, acquiescing in the British naval blockade of Germany while confronting Germany over
its submarine campaign. When it became clear that the British could not be relied upon to
facilitate the liberal peace, Wilson sought greater control over the international power
configuration: he employed coercive leverage against the Allies and waged an aggressive, public,
and largely impartial campaign for peace. Determined to preserve the neutrality he believed
necessary to end the war, Wilson persisted in his strategy of only modest American
commitments for six weeks after the advent of unrestricted submarine warfare.2 1
This section illustrates the buckpassing character of American strategy from 1914-1917
and its foundation in a long-term plan for single preponderant pole of power in Europe-the
League of Nations. It also confirms the process of policy formation predicted by TLFP:
Wilson's positive liberalism focused his threat perception on the German regime type, his goals
20 One common source of confusion in analyzing American grand strategy during the Great War was that it failed
spectacularly. But its flaws should not obscure the coding of America's actual foreign policy posture. The League
of Nations was design for preponderant power; there is simply no avoiding the fact that Wilson envisioned a
unipolar power structure in Europe. This is an important observation: it points to the strategic tendencies of positive
liberal values. However, his first mechanism for producing the League was to bring it about through British efforts.
In my judgment, this makes his initial strategy buckpassing. Had Wilson's mediation plans succeeded, and the
commitments he envisioned been made, the coding of American strategy would change. Had he drawn back from
further commitments in the face of buckpassing's failure, his preponderant vision would be irrelevant. History
being what it is, the nature of Wilson's plan is critical for understanding what American grand strategy was, what it
became, and the causes of the change.
21 A second source of confusion in analyzing Wilson's strategy is that it was premised on faulty beliefs. It posited
relationships between democracy, trade, and international organizations that are dubious in the abstract, and
certainly false as applied by Wilson. When confronted by international power realities, Wilson's strategy and the
beliefs that drove it were forced to undergo change. But the inconsistency of some of Wilson's ideas-for instance,
about how much democracy in Germany was needed to make League work, or how important American neutrality
was for bringing about the League-do not make them epiphenomenal or incoherent. In fact, the most remarkable
feature of American foreign policy under Wilson is just how much of his core belief set remained intact and drove
policy.
on the protection of American values in Europe, and his diplomacy on gaining more influence
over the policy of the Allied great powers. I proceed, first by examining Wilson's threat
perception and theories of the liberal peace, and then by observing their impact on American
diplomacy towards Europe.
RESPONSE TO EUROPEAN THREATS
Wilson perceived ideological threats and prioritized positive liberal goals. Here, I
examine three elements of Wilson's threat perception and its impact on American grand strategy.
First, Wilson and his advisors feared and mistrusted the character of the Imperial German
regime, rather than the threat of its power. Second, Wilson sought to protect European liberalism
by resolving the problem of the European balance of power-both its present cataclysm and its
future state. Collective security was a doctrine with positive liberal ends and power political
means. It would end the balance of power through the predominance of a single pole: a League
of Nations that would combine the might of the great powers, capped by American leadership
that would wield this power in the interests of democracy, free-trade, and peace. Finally, the
liberal content of Wilson's strategy led him to believe that it could only be achieved under
certain conditions: if the war ended in a stalemate and the peace was mediated by a powerful but
disinterested America.
AN IDEOLOGICAL THREAT. Wilson's fears about the European war were tied to the
character of the states that fought it. His later public speeches urging a war "against selfish and
autocratic power" and "to accept battle with this natural foe of liberty" were no mere rhetoric,
but reflected concerns that had been with Wilson for some time. Specifically, Wilson believed
that the domestic political regimes of states determined their international behavior. Wilson's
characteristic language for discussing these regime problems was the denunciation of "Prussian
militarism."
This epithet was not simply an expression of America's exalted self-image, or
"exceptional" character, though certainly these ideas colored American assessments of all
foreign regimes. Wilson believed that each European regime was politically suspect, with even
Britain and France containing "reactionary" elements and failing to measure up to the standards
of American democracy. But the aristocratic-military classes that ran the Central Powers were
particularly worrisome. "Junkers" and other analogous groups were seen as an oligarchy
managing a cartelized politics on behalf of their own interests; such regimes were inherently
dangerous if they could not be changed.
In early September 1914, Wilson laid bare his fundamental Allied sympathies to the
British ambassador Cecil Spring-Rice, agreeing that "Prussian militarism is the question at issue
22 1 address Wilson's military policy from 1914-1917 in the following section, both to reduce disruption to the
narrative and because American military posture was largely disconnected from its diplomacy before belligerency.
23 Wilson's War Address to a Joint Session of Congress, April 2, 1917, PWW 41: 519-527, quotes 523, 525. On
Wilson's doubt about all European Regimes, see Lloyd E. Ambrosius, Wilsonianism: Woodrow Wilson and His
Legacy in American Foreign Relations (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002), pp. 21-29. Other treatments of
Wilson's ideological threat perception are Ross A. Kennedy, The Will to Believe: Woodrow Wilson, World War I,
andAmerica's Strategyfor Peace and Security (Kent, OH: Kent State University Press, 2009), pp. I1-15, 30-34, 47-
49, 52-53; G. John Ikenberry, After Victory: Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Rebuilding of Order After
Major Wars (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2001), pp. 123-128; Tony Smith, America's Mission: The
United States and the Worldwide Struggle for Democracy in the Twentieth Century (Princeton, NJ: Princeton
University Press, 1994), Ch. 4.
and that if it triumphs in Europe America will have to defend itself." In a rationale redolent with
concern for liberalism abroad, he alluded (apparently while crying) to Wordsworth's sonnet on
British freedom, especially the lines "we must be free or die/who speak the tongue that
Shakespeare spake." In 1915, as Germany sought to wriggle out of the friction caused by its
submarine campaign against British shipping (in this case the sinking of the British passenger
liner Arabic), Wilson underscored his hard line policy to his closest advisor, self-styled Colonel
Edward House, by noting that "he had never been sure we ought not to take part in the conflict
and if it seemed evident that Germany and her militaristic ideas were to win, the obligation upon
us was greater than ever."
In his December 1914 meditation on the Great War, Wilson argued that if the war were
to end in a decisive victory, "I cannot see now that it would hurt greatly the interests of the
United States if either France or Russia or Great Britain should finally dictate the settlement."
Britain, though engaged in disreputable imperial activities, "has got more than she wants" and
primarily "wishes to be let alone." In the East, "Russia's ambitions are legitimate" and she
would likely liberalize as her trade boomed. The Central Powers, on the other hand, had regimes
that were likely to be much more dangerous in victory: "the Government of Germany must be
profoundly changed, and... Austria-Hungary will go to pieces altogether-ought to go to pieces
for the welfare of Europe."24
Importantly, this fear of the German regime was not connected to the possibility that it
might be powerful enough to threaten American interests. In November 1914, Wilson argued to
House that "no matter how the Great War ended there would be complete exhaustion, and, even
if Germany won, she would not be in a condition to seriously menace our country for many years
to come." He nonetheless accepted that there were nefarious "designs the military party
evidently had in mind" and went on to express a number of paranoid fantasies about the Germans
laying the foundations for artillery across the United States and constructing wireless espionage
from the Maine tree-tops.
The President agreed with House in 1915 that "we had no intention of permitting a
military autocracy to dominate the world if our strength could prevent it. We believed in
democracy and autocracy and we would stand with democracy." But he also refused to take
House's advice to implement this policy, and "seemed to think we would be able to keep out of
war. His general idea was that if the allies were not able to defeat Germany alone, they could
scarcely do so with the help of the United States because it would take too long for us to get in a
state of preparedness." The obvious implication is that America was not at military risk from a
24 Spring-Rice to Grey, September 8, 1914, PWW 31: 13-14, quotes 14; House Diary, September 22, 1915, PWW
34: 506-508, quote 506; and Herbert Brougham Memorandum of Interview with the President, December 14, 1914,
PWW 31: 458-60, quotes 459. The Brougham interview was off the record, and its contents were not published
until 1931. See Knock, To End All Wars, Ch. 3, n8.
25 House Diary, November 4, 1914, PWW 31: 263-266, first two quotes 265. Such expressions were clearly not to
be taken as the hope for a kind of preponderance by subtraction, since Wilson was shortly expressing the opinion
quoted in the previous paragraph that an Entente dictated peace, though not "an ideal solution," was perfectly
reasonable from the vantage point of American interests. After all, the Entente had flawed but non-threatening
regimes that were likely liberalizing. The German regime was a threat to peace and European liberalism, but did not
have the reach to threaten American security in the short term. The ideal solution-the one Wilson was pursuing in
earnest by 1915-was a preponderant League. For the quote, see Herbert Brougham Memorandum of Interview
with the President, December 14, 1914, PWW 31: 458-60, quote 459.
German victory, but would rather have to contend with the malign intentions of an ideologically
hostile power.2 6
The dominance of positive liberal ideological threats over realist security concerns is best
seen in the Wilson administration's attitude towards possible German involvement in the
Western hemisphere. The administration did take several precautionary steps in this regard, such
as buying the Danish West Indies, and some, such as Secretary of State Robert Lansing, held to
the traditional realist defense of the Monroe Doctrine. But the main line of thought linked the
threat of encroachment into the American sphere of influence to malign regime type.
Ambassador to Great Britain Walter Hines Page mentioned the Monroe Doctrine only in the
context of the "world-clash of systems of government, a struggle to the extermination of English
civilization or of Prussian military autocracy." On one of his trips to Europe to mediate the
conflict, House suggested to a German minister that Germany should violate the Monroe
Doctrine and colonize Brazil! This would be splendid for all involved as long Germany "had no
ulterior designs on the governments of the countries" involved. Wilson thought in much the
same way, agreeing with House that "Germany today would be innocuous and a satisfactory
member of the society of nations if she were a republic, and there were no objections whatever to
the Germans going to South America in great numbers and getting peaceful control of the
governments, and in continuing them under Republican forms of government." In short, the
positive liberals in the Wilson administration were concerned with ideological hostility, not bare
capability.27
VISION OF A LIBERAL PEACE. Wilson crafted an ambitious solution to European war,
designed to protect and expand liberalism overseas. Collective security, as the set of ideas would
come to be known, was premised on the idea that the balance of power in Europe was
fundamentally unstable, and in combination with illiberal regimes caused war. Liberal regimes
and open trade, on the other hand, were not only good in of themselves, but were also causes of
peace. The trick was to start a virtuous circle: a pact of states could end the balance of power
system by pledging to mobilize the power of a liberal system against aggressors, which would
free up space for the unmolested development of liberal values. Liberal regimes and free trade
would, in turn, reinforce the collective security system by adding responsible good actors and
removing the causes of disputes. Thomas Knock puts it well: Wilson's aim was "a lasting peace
that would accommodate change and advance democratic institutions and social and economic
justice; and a just peace was dependent on the synchronous proliferation of political democracy
and social and economic justice around the world." 2 8
26 House Diary, November 28, 1915, PWW 35: 258-262, quote 258-259; House Diary, December 15, 1915, PWW
35: 355-361, quote 356. House despaired that he could not get Wilson "up to the point where is willing to take
action," by which he meant simply telling the Allies that America would not permit a German victory. Ibid., 356.
For other examples of Wilson's dismissal of a security threat, see his response to the Kaiser's bluster in Ibid., 359;
Woodrow Wilson, Unpublished Prolegomenon to a Peace Note, November 25, 1916, PWW 40: 67-70, esp. 69;
Frank Lane to George Lane, February 16, 1917, PWW 41: 239-240. For Wilson's paranoid fears of German
militarist preparations, see Wilson to House, August 4, 1915, PWW 34: 79-80.
27 Page to Bryan, October 15, 1914, PWW 31: 159-160, quote 159; House to Wilson, April 11, 1915, PWW 32: 504-
507, quote 505; House Diary, October 15, 1915 PWW 35: 69-71, quote 70. Lansing makes the realist case in Ibid.
For the acquisition of the Danish West Indies and other precautionary measures in the Caribbean, see Arthur S.
Link, Wilson, V: Campaignsfor Progressivism and Peace, 1916-1917 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press,
1965), pp. 80-83.
28 Knock, To End All Wars, p. 57. While promoting international openness was a major part of Wilson's thought, I
have only treated it in passing here. Politically, Wilson 'was more interested in democracy than free trade, though
Even before the war started, Wilson sought a militarily peaceful, economically open, and
politically democratic Europe. In a 1911 address, he had urged American foreign policy to
"vindicate spiritual conceptions," by force if necessary. "For liberty is a spiritual conception,"
Wilson hauntingly forecast, "and when men take up arms to set other men free, there is
something sacred and holy in the warfare." On the eve of the Great War, House urged Wilson to
approve a diplomatic trip to Europe to reduce tensions on the basis of Wilson's policies in Latin
America-whose stated aim was "the development of constitutional liberty in the world." Once
in Europe, House made a series of proposals for more open trade, financial cooperation, and a
disarmament conference; House felt that "a long stride has been made in the direction of
international amity." Not simply concerned with peace per se, Wilson valued international
cooperation because it fostered liberal values abroad. 2 9
After the war began, Wilson's adopted a strategy for protecting liberal values with three
essential parts. First, the post-war order had to feature an international organization that would
use coercion to keep the peace. As early as August 1914, Wilson suggested to his brother-in-law
a program for a league of nations that contained the following points: "No nation shall ever again
be permitted to acquire an inch of land by conquest," and "there must be an association of
nations, all bound together for the protection of the integrity of each, so that any one nation
breaking this bond will bring upon herself war; that is to say, punishment, automatically."
Wilson put the point bluntly to a group of pacifists in 1916, arguing that "in the last analysis, the
peace of society is obtained by force.... And if you say we shall not have any war, you have got
to have the force to make that 'shall' bite." In short, collective security would not do away with
power, but would rather concentrate a preponderance of power in one organization.3
Second, collective security would both protect and be buttressed by democracy and open
trade. In December 1914, House and Wilson decided to move ahead with a Pan-American pact
in the Western hemisphere, designed to "serve as a model for the European Nations when peace
is at last brought about." The heart of the pact was a "mutual guarantee of political
independence under Republican forms of government and mutual guarantees of territorial
integrity." The pact was pursued simultaneously with Wilson's European diplomacy, and
Wilson often publically emphasized the role liberalism in the Western hemisphere was to play in
the old world: "by this commerce of minds with one another, as well as commerce in goods, we
may show the world in part the path to peace."
The centrality of liberal values in the peace settlement persisted throughout Wilson's
mediation attempts. For instance, in late 1916, Lansing wrote a memo entitled "Americanism"
the latter goal certainly influenced his foreign economic policy. In general, good treatments of Wilson's vision of
collective security include Ross A. Kennedy, The Will to Believe, Ch. 3; Colin Dueck, Reluctant Crusaders: Power,
Culture, and Change in American Grand Strategy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2006), p. 47-48, 55-
61.
29 Arthur A. Ekirch, Ideas, Ideals, and American Diplomacy: A History of Their Growth and Interaction (New York:
Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1966), p.1 10; Lloyd E. Ambrosius, Woodrow Wilson and the American Diplomatic
Tradition: The Treaty Fight in Perspective (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1990), p. 16; Knock,
To End All Wars, pp. 22-23.
N There is some dispute about the exact date of Wilson's conversation with his brother-in-law, but it occurred no
later than February of 1915. See Knock, p. 35 n. 12; second quote in "A Colloquy with a Group of Anti-
preparedness Leaders," May 8, 1916, PWW 36: 634-648, quote 645. For other indications of Wilson's early
acceptance of a coercive single pole of power, see Wilson's correspondence on the ideas of G. Lowes Dickinson and
Raleigh Colston Minor: Wilson to Dabney, January 4, 1915; Baker to Wilson, January 6, 1914; Wilson to Baker,
January 11, 1915; all in PWW 32: 10-11, 24, 53, respectively.
which posited the existence of a democratic peace and urged that autocratic powers be kept out
of a future league. Wilson, who was anxious to get German agreement to conclude the war,
replied, "This is so interesting a paper, and is so true that it distresses me to suggest that its
utterance at this particular time would be unwise. But I must frankly say that I think the
considerations it urges, and the policy, are what we ought to have in mind... but ought not to
make explicit before the event and before the necessity to do so." Clearly, positive liberal values
played a central role in Wilson's strategy.3'
Finally, the strategy would require a great deal of influence over the international power
constellation-and this meant American commitments overseas. Very early on Wilson
recognized that the war would give America a position of tremendous influence, arguing
publically that "our resources our untouched, we are more and more becoming, by force of
circumstances, the mediating nation of the world with respect to its finance." By the fall of 1915
he understood that American military power would have to be added to its financial might. In
response to repeated entreaties by Britain's foreign minister Edward Grey, House urged Wilson
to back an American commitment to the post-war league: "it seems to me that we must throw the
influence of this nation in behalf of a plan by which international obligations must be kept, and
in behalf of some plan by which the peace of the world may be maintained." Wilson's response
was enthusiastic: "message approved. You might even omit" the qualifications in the pledge
House had suggested. From that point onward, Wilson's pursuit of international leverage
through American commitments was consistent. As he put it in a draft peace note of December
1916, "We are ready to join a league of nations that will pledge itself to the accomplishment of
these objects and definitely unite in an organization, not only of purpose, but of force as well,
that will be adequate to their realization. We are ready to lend our every resource, whether of
men or money or substance, to such a combination so proposed and organized."32
In sum, Wilson's plan for a peace had positive liberal ends but power political means.
Collective security was a strategy for a preponderance of power in Europe capped by American
leadership and a commitment of American power. It required tremendous American influence
over the other actors in the system, but also promised a substantial payoff in terms of liberal
values. It was, in the abstract, a strategy of preponderance. Moreover, Wilson was actively,
albeit ineffectively, working towards a peace through negotiations. He was not simply waiting
for the belligerents to wear themselves out, leaving America in control by default. But two
beliefs stemming from the liberal content of the strategy caused Wilson to first pursue his goals
through more indirect means.
INDIRECT APPROACH. Most significantly, Wilson believed that the war needed to end in
a deadlock for the liberal peace to have a chance. "The chance of a just and equitable peace, and
3House Diary, December 16, 1914, PWW 31: 468-470 quotes 469-470; see also A Draft Pan-American Treaty,
December 16, 1914, PWW 31: 471-472; A Welcome to the Pan-American Financial Conference, May 24, 1915,
PWW 33: 245-247, quote 245; Wilson to Lansing, December 19, 1916, PWW 40: 276-277, quote both pages.
Moreover, the hypothetical about the Germans colonizing South America quoted above occurred as Wilson
defended the "Republican government" provision of the pan-American pact as essential to its purposes.
32 Wilson Remarks to the Associated Press in New York, April 20, 1915, PWW 33: 37-41 quote 38; House to
Wilson, November 10, 1915, and Wilson to House, November 11, 1915; both in PWW 35: quotes 186-187, 187,
respectively; Wilson to Lansing, December 9, 1916, PWW 40: 197-200, quote 199. For more on the need for
American influence, see House to Wilson, December 22, 1915, and Wilson to House, December 24, 1915; both in
PWW 35: 381-382, 387-388, respectively. Earlier in the war, House had been reluctant to commit America to the
post-war peace when acting as Wilson's emissary. See House to Wilson, February 9 and February 1H, 1915; both in
PWW 32: 204-207, 220-221, respectively.
of the only possible peace that will be lasting, will be happiest if no nation gets a decision by
arms," he argued in late 1914. Wilson reasoned similarly in 1916 that victory would lead "to the
complete crushing of' the defeated powers, while the victors "would then be more concerned as
to the division of the spoils than they would for any far reaching agreement that might be
brought about looking to the maintenance of peace in the future and the amelioration of the
horrors of war." The defeated powers, on the other hand, would never accept an unjust peace,
but would smolder with revanchism and seek to overturn the system. 3
Instead, "the aim of far-sighted statesmen should be to make of this mightiest of conflicts
an object lesson for the future by bringing it to a close with the objects of each belligerent still
unaccomplished and all the mightiest sacrifices on both sides gone for naught." Each side had to
be made "weary of the apparently hopeless task of bringing the conflict to an end by force of
arms... the victor suffers hardly less than the vanquished." If the conflict were to end in a
hurting stalemate, a future system where a preponderant League defended the status quo and
preserved peace would have tremendous appeal.
American neutrality was almost as important to bringing about the liberal peace. Again
and again, Wilson expressed his fear that "the worst thing that could possibly happen to the
world would be for the United States to be drawn actively into this contest-to become one of
the belligerents and lose all chance of moderating the results of the war by her counsel as an
outsider." During the Sussex crisis of 1916, caused by another sensational German U-boat attack
on a British passenger liner, Wilson "was afraid if we broke off relations [with Germany] the war
would go on indefinitely and there would be no one to lead the way out." America's
disinterested offices were what would move the war from deadlock to peace. "We have rolling
between us and those bitter days across the water three thousand miles of cool and silent ocean,"
Wilson argued in 1915, and "therefore, is it not likely that the nations of the world will someday
turn to us for cooler assessment of the elements engaged?"
To Wilson, the liberal peace, American influence over the balance of power, and
neutrality were all intimately linked. As he prophetically put it, "My interest in neutrality is not
the petty desire to keep out of trouble.... If any man wants a scrap that is an interesting scrap and
worthwhile, I am his man.... If he is searching for trouble that is the trouble of men in general,
and I can help a little, why then, I am for it. But I am interested in neutrality because there is
something so much greater to do than fight." 35
DIPLOMATIC POLICY
Wilson's ideological views about how to make the liberal peace drove America's
diplomatic approach prior to belligerency. Here I detail four areas of diplomatic policy to
3 Herbert Brougham Memorandum of Interview with the President, December 14, 1914, PWW 31: 458-460, quote
459; second quote House to Grey, May 11, 1916, PWW 37: 21, approved by Wilson in Wilson to House, May 12,
1916, PWW 37: 24.
3 Woodrow Wilson, Unpublished Prolegomenon to a Peace Note, November 25, 1916, PWW 40: 67-70, quotes 70
and 69. The memorandum, which Wilson wrote to himself before his final mediation attempt, is an excellent
summary of his views on the liberal stakes of the war and his theory of the peace. For other examples of Wilson's
theory of deadlock, see House Diary, September 28, 1914, PWW 31: 91-96, esp. 94; Page to Wilson, January 15,
1915, PWW 32: 81-82; and Wilson to House, January 16 and January 17, 1915, PWW 32: 81, 83, respectively.
3 Wilson to Edith Boiling Gait, August 19, 1915, PWW 34: 258-261, quote 261, emphasis in the original; House
Diary, March 30, 1916, PWW 36: 387-390, quote 388; Wilson Remarks to the Associated Press in New York, April
20, 1915, PWW 33: 37-41, quotes 38, 39-40.
illustrate how American efforts to mediate the conflict dominated other concerns. I begin with
Wilson's early mediation efforts, showing how Wilson's vision of the peace implied that accord
with Britain was the best way to bring the war from deadlock to collective security: British
victory was perceived as inevitable and British opinion was sympathetic to a liberal peace.
I then examine policy toward British and German violations of American neutrality. The
need to secure British support for a liberal peace was primarily responsible for the pro-British
bias on the critical issues of the neutrality period. America essentially abetted Britain's
starvation blockade, contrary to both international law and American economic interests, while
challenging Berlin over a set of fictitious neutral rights.
Finally, I describe Wilson's last effort for peace before American entry into the war.
This effort amply demonstrates Wilson's liberal objectives and his need for more leverage over
European politics to achieve them. In the end, though driven by Wilson's vision of liberal
preponderance, American diplomatic policy during this period amounted to non-belligerent aid
to the Allies and is best classified as a strategy of buckpassing.
MEDIATION. Wilson twice sent House to Europe to try and mediate an end to the war and
a beginning to a new international system. The first attempt, in early 1915, was based on a
proposal for simultaneous peace conferences. At the first conference, the belligerents would
settle the war, while at the second, America and other neutrals would collaborate with the
belligerents to form a new international system. The second peace attempt was a more overtly
pro-Allied plan that culminated in the House-Grey memorandum of February 1916. This
agreement specified that, at an opportune time, Britain would signal for Wilson to call a peace
conference to conclude the war. If Germany either refused to attend the conference or was
unreasonable in her demands, America would "probably" leave the conference as a belligerent
on the side of the Allies. In neither case did the mediation attempts ever really amount to much:
Britain was focused on total victory and never wanted the peace that Wilson proposed. Wilson's
mediation attempts are interesting principally for what they reveal about his theory for ending the
war and their impact on other areas of American policy. 36
Wilson's peace feelers were premised on the idea that German defeat was inevitable-
after her armies had been defeated on the Marne and the lines of the Western front stabilized, it
was only a matter of time before the superior economic might of the Entente ground the Germans
down. "The proper attitude to assume was one of absolute confidence in the ultimate defeat of
Germany," House argued on Wilson's behalf, because the German leadership "knew that the war
was already a failure and did not dare take the risk involved, provided they could get out whole
now." As Wilson put it, "I think that [the war] is going to be a great endurance test and that the
Allies are on the whole more likely-being open to the rest of the world, to survive that test than
the Teutonic monarchies are." For these reasons, Wilson assumed that the war would end with a
German evacuation of France and Belgium, an indemnity for damage caused, and German
territorial concessions in both the East and the West. As German Foreign Minister Arthur
Zimmerman responded to House's 1915 overture, "you are taking as a basis a more or less
defeated Germany or one nearly at the end of her resources."37
36 On Wilson's mediation attempts see Ross A. Kennedy, The Will to Believe, Ch. 4-5; Ernest R May, The World
War and American Isolation, 1914-1917 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1959), Ch. 4, 16, 17.
3 House Diary, December 23, 1914, PWW 31: 517-520, quotes 518, 519; Wilson to Edith Bolling Gait, August 18,
1915, PWW 34: 240-244, quote 242-243, emphasis in original; Zimmerman to House, March 9, 1915, PWW 32:
351. For other examples of the administration's poor assessment of Germrany's prospects, see House Diary,
September 28, 1914, PWW 31: 91-96; Diary of Chandler Parsons Anderson, January 9, 1915, PWW 32: 44-50; Page
Britain, on the other hand, was not only likely to win, but was the power most
sympathetic to a liberal peace settlement. "There is no desire whatever," House reported from
London, "for anything out of the war excepting a permanent settlement and evacuation and
indemnity to Belgium." Time after time, Wilson based his policy on the ultimately fallacious
belief that the liberal element in Britain was as eager as he to conclude a peace without victory.
As he prepared to take his support for American involvement in a post-war league public, Wilson
coordinated his speech with House "to make the proposal as nearly what you deem [liberal
Foreign Minster] Grey and his colleagues have agreed upon in principle." 38
The trick to instituting American plans, then, was to help the liberal element in Britain
negotiate a peace while convincing the Germans that their best hope was the good offices of the
United States. Practically, this meant Wilson's hopes were tied to Allied military success.
America had to avoid peace overtures when they might be perceived as "an unfriendly act." It
was only when "Germany was pushed back within her own borders" that a strong American
proposal could be made "to England with some hope of success." Conversely, the Germans had
evidently failed to understand the situation: "Reasonableness had not yet been burned into them,
and what they are thinking of is, not the peace and prosperity of Europe, but their own
aggrandizement." Grey's summary to House in 1916 encapsulated Wilsonian assumptions:
"there must be more German failure and some Allied success before anything but an
inconclusive peace could be obtained." It was the need to bring about this outcome, without
direct American involvement that would endanger the liberal peace, which drove the rest of
American policy. 39
BRITISH BLOCKADE. Over the first nine months of the war the British Navy drew an
ever-tightening stranglehold on neutral trade with Germany. The blockade was a blow to
American economic interests: it devastated American exports to the Central Powers, reducing
them from $163 million to $1.8 million, and occurred as the United States was just recovering
from recession. The blockade's relationship to international law became ever more fictitious as
time went on, culminating in a complete denial of neutral rights in March 1915 when the British
declared that they would seize all cargo suspected of being bound for Germany.
In the long term, British naval policy resulted in a booming trade with American
business, effectively making America the economic backstop of the British war effort while
denying these resources to Germany-by 1916, forty percent of the British war expenditure was
being spent on North American supplies. The detrimental effect of the blockade on the German
economy is less certain, but it certainly constituted massive interference in the German war
scheme, and some estimates give it responsibility for half a million civilian deaths in Germany.
American policy was to aid and abet the British. Combined with Wilson's attempt to mediate
to Wilson, February 10, 1915, PWW 32: 211-215; House to Wilson, April 18, 1915, PWW 33: 12-13. On Wilson's
prospective peace terms, see Ross A. Kennedy, The Will to Believe, pp. 133-134.
38 House to Wilson, February 15, 1915, PWW 32: 237-238, quote 237; see also House to Wilson, March 7, 1915,
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1915, PWW 32: 338-339. Wilson to House, May 18, 1916, PWW 37: 68-69, second quote 68.
39 House Diary, December 3, 1914, PWW 31: 384-387, quotes 385; Wilson to Bryan, April 27, 1915, PWW 33: 81-
82, quote both pages; Grey to House, April 7, 1916, PWW 36: 511-512, quote 512. For other references about the
need for limited British military gains, see Page to Wilson, February 10, 1915, PWW 32: 211-215; House to Wilson,
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the war through the efforts of other states, this non-belligerent support for the Allied war effort
constitutes a grand strategy of buckpassing.40
To be sure, Wilson made several half-hearted attempts to assert American rights,
resulting in a series of pro-forma protests. But the tenor of Wilson's diplomacy made clear that
he supported the British policy. Wilson's first idea was that the British publically endorse the
neutral rights enshrined in the Declaration of London, but then adopt supplementary regulations
that vitiated those rights. Wilson urged Page to show "how completely all the British
government seeks can be accomplished without the least friction with this Government and
without touching opinion on this side of the water on an exceedingly tender spot." Wilson's only
interest was to put American accommodation "in unimpeachable form." Wilson ultimately
decided to protest British violations of American rights on a case-by-case basis and to put the
matter in the hands of his Anglophile ambassador Page. He helped the British implement their
blockade by publishing the manifests of ships leaving American ports. He sabotaged a series of
diplomatic notes protesting British outrages and refused to take any measures stronger than
threats of post-war litigation. As the President argued after the British issued their final edict
announcing a total blockade, "we are face to face with something they are going to do, and they
are going to do it no matter what representations we make."41
The origins of the American buckpassing approach lie in Wilson's concern for the liberal
peace. American public opinion was the only reason he bothered to protest the blockade at all.
He told the Spring-Rice that "the methods of the Germans here were having an exasperating
effect upon American public opinion.... For this reason the United States Government will no
doubt have to make some strong ex-parte statement as to their action in the matter of
contraband." Nevertheless, Wilson assured the British that "sentiment inside and outside the
administration was sympathetic.... But he hoped nothing would be said about the 'destruction' of
Germany as the object was not the destruction of any one power but the preservation of all."
British aims were being supported, but only in the service of a larger liberal good.
Wilson was even more explicit in a conversation with State Department Counselor
Chandler Anderson in January 1915. He agreed that failure to aid the British system meant
America "would lose not merely its extraordinary opportunity for usefulness as a peacemaker
when that time comes, but also the opportunity of working in close friendship and harmony with
Great Britain in the reorganization of world influences which will follow this war." Wilson
40 My interpretation of American blockade policy is rooted in John W. Coogan, The End ofNeutrality: The United
States, Britain, and Maritime Rights, 1899-1915 (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1981), Ch. 8-11; Ross A.
Kennedy, The Will to Believe, Ch. 4-5. For a different interpretation emphasizing Wilson's moral distinctions
between submarine warfare and the blockade, see Arthur S. Link, Wilson, III: The Strugglefor Neutrality, 1914-
1915 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1960). Figures on Gennan and British trade are cited in Kevin
Narizny, The Political Economy of Grand Strategy (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2007), pp. 132, 136. On
the effects of the blockade, see Robert W. Tucker, Woodrow Wilson and the Great War: Reconsidering America's
Neutrality, 1914-1917 (Charlottesville, VA: University of Virginia Press, 2007), p. 134, n. 7.
4' Wilson to Page, October 16, 1914, PWW 31: quotes 166; Wilson to William Jennings Bryan, March 24, 1915,
PWW 32: 424-425, quote both pages, emphasis in original. For Wilson's proposal on the Declaration of London,
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admitted to not following the details of American policy on the blockade, but agreed that a
quarrel with Britain "would have very important consequences after the war" and that "there
were no very important questions of principle" being disputed with the British anyway. Or put
more bluntly, it was in America's national interest to actively facilitate the starvation of
Germany in the hopes of buying British support for a liberal peace.43
GERMAN SUBMARINE WARFARE. Germany's response to the British blockade was to use
submarines, or U-boats, to attack British trade. The nature of early submarines meant they could
not comply with traditional maritime law, which required merchant vessels to be visited and
searched for contraband and did not allow them to be sunk unless the crew's safety could be
ensured. Submarines were only lightly armed and armored, making them highly vulnerable if
they surfaced to conduct visit and search, and they could only ensure the safety of merchant
crews under highly favorable conditions of weather and geography. Owing to a small supply of
U-boats and friction with the American government, German use of the submarine was
intermittent until 1917, employing them only in modest numbers against Allied merchant vessels
and those passenger liners carrying contraband. When Germany finally unleashed the submarine
in February 1917, it proved to be a powerful weapon: the U-boat campaign sunk more than six
million tons of allied shipping in 1917, well in excess of the amount Germany had calculated
necessary to starve Britain.44
American policy was to deny Germany the use of this weapon, further exacerbating the
British economic advantage-an additional element of Wilson's buckpassing grand strategy. As
soon as the Germans announced their intention to target British trade, Wilson denounced any
attacks on American lives as "an indefensible violation of neutral rights" that would be "very
hard indeed to reconcile" with continued amity in German-American relations. He further
promised "to hold the Imperial German Government to a strict accountability" and to "take any
steps it might be necessary to take to safeguard American lives and property and to secure to
American citizens the full enjoyment" of their neutral rights.4 5
The tenuous nature of these stylized "rights" was illustrated in a series of increasingly
tense crises centered on the sinking of the British passenger liners Lusitania, Arabic, and Sussex.
Although not one of these ships was a neutral vessel, and although all of them carried munitions
and other contraband, Wilson confronted Germany on the grounds that American citizens must
be permitted to travel unmolested on belligerent ships. This claim was entirely novel with regard
to contemporary international law. Nonetheless, Wilson coerced Germany into a series of
escalating promises culminating in the Sussex pledge of May 1916, wherein Germany promised
to abide by the rules of commercial warfare used by surface ships. In other words, Wilson used
4 Diary of Chandler Parsons Anderson, January 9, 1915, PWW 32: 44-50, quotes 48 n.2 (reproducing a
memorandum of October 21, 1914), 49, 47. In this extraordinary meeting, Anderson justifies a long train of British
outrages and recommends that America actively facilitate the British blockade. Wilson agrees. For other examples
of Wilson's concern for British opinion influencing his policy on the blockade, see House Diary, September 28,
1914, PWW 31: 91-96; House to Wilson, October 8, 1914, PWW 31: 137; Bryce to Wilson, September 24, 1914,
PWW 31: 81-82; Wilson to Bryce, October 9, 1914, PWW 31: 138; House to Wilson, March 9, 1915, PWW 32:
349-350.
4 U-boat statistics cited in David F. Trask, Captains & Cabinets: Anglo-American Naval Relations, 1917-1918
(Columbia, MO: University of Missouri Press, 1972), p. 128. On the nature of the submarine campaign and the
American response from 1917 forward see Ibid; and for the earlier period Tucker, Woodrow Wilson and the Great
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45 Wilson to Gerard, February 10, 1915, PWW 32: 207-210, quotes 209. See also Wilson to House, February 13,
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American diplomatic might to neuter one of Germany's most powerful weapons in order to
46
dispute a specious legal claim.
Wilson's aggressive diplomacy with Germany was the mirror image of his compliant
attitude towards Britain and was motivated by the same logic: the need to curry favor in England
on behalf of the liberal peace. In response to Page's hysterical warnings that without a firm
response to the Lusitania "the United States will have no voice or influence in settling the war
nor in what follows for a long time to come," Wilson worried that "It is a very serious thing to
have such things thought, because everything that affects the influence of the world regarding us
affects our influence for good." In rejecting Secretary of State William Jennings Bryan's plea
for a policy of actual neutrality, Wilson argued that "we cannot afford even to seem to be trying
to make it easier for Germany to accede to our demands by turning in a similar fashion against
England concerning matters which we have already told Germany are none of her business. It
would be so evident a case of uneasiness and hedging that I think it would weaken our whole
position fatally." 47
The Sussex crisis, which occurred just as Wilson was trying to force British action on the
House-Grey memorandum, further underscored the administration's basic liberal concerns. "I
tried to impress upon him," House wrote, "that he would lose the confidence of the American
people, and also of the Allies, and would fail to have any influence at the peace conference. I
tried to make him see that we would lose the respect of the world unless he lived up to the
demands he has made of Germany." Page reported from London that the British believed "the
Germans have caused us to submit to delay so long that delay is equivalent to surrender" and that
"we can be of no use for any virile action-the bringing of peace, or the maintaining of it....
When action is required we do not even keep our own pledge, made of our own volition." Faced
with these concerns, Wilson ultimately took strong action, making a public ultimatum in front of
a joint session of Congress. American policy was well summed up by the American ambassador
to Germany, James Gerard: "I am very careful to impress on everybody that in return for any
concessions from Germany there could be no agreement by the U.S. to enforce the law against
England."4 8
THE LAST CHANCE AT PEACE. By the summer of 1916, international resistance had made
the disparity between the Wilson's liberal goals and his diplomatic impotence clear. Diplomatic
dithering and naval outrages made it evident to the President that the British were intent on
winning a military victory. Wilson railed privately at "the stupidity of English opinion" and told
Page that "when the war began he and all his men were in hearty sympathy with the Allies; but
that now the sentiment towards England had greatly changed." At the same time, a renewed
clash with Germany over the submarine seemed imminent. The Germans were issuing veiled
threats that they would re-start the submarine campaign if peace negotiations did not bear fruit-
46 Blow by blow accounts of the various submarine crises are well depicted in Arthur S. Link, Wilson III; Arthur S.
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the German interpretation of the Sussex pledge had been contingent on the Allies also stopping
their violations of international law.
No European pole was responding correctly to Wilson's strategy. As Wilson put it to
House in November, unless the British were to suddenly accept his overtures, "we must
inevitably drift into war with Germany upon the submarine issue." Wilson's expedient, in
December 1916, was to adjust his diplomatic commitment upward to match his ambitious goals:
he sent all the belligerents a peace note asking them to state their terms for ending the war. The
note implied that American action was near at hand, alleged that all of the warring parties wanted
merely their own security and a peace of justice, and promised that people of the United States
"would cooperate in the accomplishment of these ends when the war is over with every influence
and resource at their command." 49
Wilson's new approach sought greater influence through greater involvement and
impartiality in the politics of war termination. He reversed the diplomatic tactics of the past
three years: rather than courting the British, Wilson sought more control over the peace
settlement by putting the screws on them. Rejecting House's advise that his renewed peace
campaign might bring America into the war on the wrong side, Wilson countered that "if the
Allies wanted war with us we would not shrink from it... they could do this country no serious
hurt."
Meanwhile, Wilson used the leverage of the tacit Anglo-American alliance to try and set
the course of British policy. Having learned that the Allies would be in severe financial distress
by early spring 1917, Wilson worked to deny them the short-term loans they needed to avoid an
exchange crisis. Wilson instructed the Federal Reserve Board to issue "explicit advice against
these investments, as against the whole policy and purpose of the Federal Reserve Act, rather
than convey a mere caution." The final statement of the Board advised both banks and investors
to steer clear of Allied short-term securities, putting intense financial pressure on the British war
effort to complement Wilson's diplomatic pressure. Germany, on the other hand, Wilson
begged, pleaded, and cajoled to come to the peace table. "If Germany really wants peace she can
get it," he wrote, "and get it soon, ifshe will but confide in me and let me have a chance."50
Wilson's positive liberalism was behind the new peace campaign as surely as it had
driven his past efforts at mediation. In January 1917, Wilson stated liberal aims clearly in his
famous "peace without victory" speech, which was forwarded to the belligerent governments as
a diplomatic document several days before it was given to Congress. "No peace can last, or
ought to last," Wilson argued, "which does not recognize and accept the principle that
49 Wilson to House, July 2, 1916, PWW 37: 345-346, quote 345; second quote in Arthur S. Link, Wilson V, pp. 72-
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governments derive all their just powers from the consent of the governed... and that henceforth
inviolable security of life, of worship, and of industrial and social development should be
guaranteed to all peoples." American policy would add its "power to the authority and force of
other nations to guarantee peace and justice" so that "it might in all that it was and did show
mankind the way to liberty."
But America would not, could not, participate in a peace that was "a victor's terms
imposed upon the vanquished." Such a peace would not last long and would only lead to a new
balance of power; but "mankind is looking now for freedom of life, not equipoises of power."
Furthermore, the tendency of positive liberal goals to drive Wilson towards a strategy of
preponderance was also clear in the new peace initiative. It was "absolutely necessary that a
force be created as a guarantor of the permanency of the settlement so much greater than the
force of any nation now engaged or any alliance hitherto formed or projected that no nation, nor
probable combination of nations could face or withstand it." This kind of arrangement would
end the calamities of the unstable balance of power: "there must be, not a balance of power, but a
community of power; not organized rivalries, but an organized common peace."5'
Wilson refused to abandon the new diplomatic approach even after Germany unleashed
unrestricted submarine warfare on January 31, 1917. Wilson hoped that by delaying hostilities
he could coax Germany back to the negotiating table. He publically stated his belief that
Germany would not actually follow through on its pledge and would commit no "actual overt
acts" that would require American belligerency. Privately, he engaged in a series of overtures to
the Central Powers. Through the Swiss minister in Washington, the administration implied that
it would permit submarine warfare against belligerent merchantmen if neutral ships were spared.
Wilson also attempted to use Austria-Hungary as a route to the liberal peace by promising that
she would not be dismembered after the war if she would help bring Berlin around "to peace
upon terms... of his recent address to the Senate." Finally, the administration refused numerous
requests by the British to begin "a general scheme of co-ordination and organization of all
industries for common defense, or of submarine measures for the protection of life and property
at sea." Cooperation of any kind was not on the table; Spring-Rice reported to London that "it is
the evident desire of the President to avoid any appearance of preparation in view of a war with
Germany, especially of a war conducted in co-operation with the Allies."52
Wilson also pursued an interim policy of "armed neutrality" that aimed to maintain
America's position as an impartial mediator as he tried to lead the way back to negotiations. The
thrust of the policy was that American merchant ships would be armed, and perhaps convoyed in
conjunction with other neutral powers. They would fight off submarine attacks but would not
otherwise engage in hostilities. Though not announced until February 26, and never really
implemented, the administration's thinking on the policy is instructive. A memorandum on
armed neutrality by Columbia Professor Carlton Hayes was forwarded to Wilson by several of
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his progressive allies and seems to have made a distinct impression on him, as he sent it to
Lansing for "the most careful consideration."53
The memo listed among armed neutrality's advantages that "it will not throw 100 million
[Americans] into the world war, and so wipe out... the world's last reservoir of goodwill and
resources for the generous purposes of reconstruction." Moreover, such a position would "not
involve us in accepting the views of the Entente Allies... or in agreeing to make peace only in
concert with belligerent allies." It would not relinquish America's position as "the one strong
neutral from which conceivably great mediatory steps can be taken in bringing in peace without
victory" but would instead "make us first and foremost among a group of neutral nations rather
than last and least of the belligerents in the day of settlement."5 4
Indeed, armed neutrality and diplomatic outreach to Germany were consistent with
Wilson's dogged adherence to his theory of the liberal peace-a "peace without victory"
produced by American mediation. While debating the break in relations with Germany, he
argued against Lansing and others that "if he believed it was for the good of the world for the
United States to keep out of war in the present circumstances, he would be willing to bear all
criticism and abuse.... Contempt was nothing unless it impaired future usefulness." The ability
to rebuild the liberal order of "white civilization" would be dependent on America staying out of
the war. At a cabinet meeting on February 2, "In answer to a question as to which side he
wished to see win, the President said that he didn't wish to see either side win," and "he then
went on to argue that probably greater justice would be done if the conflict ended in a draw."
Secretary of the Navy Josephus Daniels reported that the Chief of Naval Operations agreed: "he
had the same abhorrence of becoming enlisted with either side of the combatants that you
expressed. His view is that if we lose our equipoise the world will be in darkness." In short, a
more committed but more impartial diplomacy represented the last best chance at the liberal
peace.
SUMMARY OF AMERICAN GRAND STRATEGY, 1914-1917
As TLFP predicts, Wilson's positive liberal views led him to envision a preponderant
pole of power in Europe, in the form of an American led League of Nations. These same views,
however, were connected to the idea that the League could only be formed through American
neutrality. Thus, Wilson initially opted for a strategy of buckpassing.
Nevertheless, there is considerable evidence that the causal process expected by TLFP
were at work. The international system pushed American grand strategy towards greater
integration of its diplomatic means and ends: European recalcitrance ultimately forced Wilson to
acknowledge buckpassing could not produce the League. Moreover, ideology shaped American
5 Wilson to Tumulty, February 9, 1917, PWW 41: 167, n. 1. For the announcement of armed neutrality see Address
to a Joint Session of Congress, February 26, 1917, PWW 41: 283-287, and on the policy more generally, Arthur S.
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100
diplomacy: positive liberal rationales motivated Wilson's policy; his threat perception was
focused on regime type, while showing remarkably little concern for German power; and his
ambitious plans required more influence, which he sought through greater leverage over
America's tacit British ally. In short, Wilson's positive liberalism drove him to craft a long-term
strategy of liberal preponderance through the League of Nations, while the international system
incentivized him to make more intense commitments abroad to bring the League about.
In this regard, four pieces are especially compelling. First, Wilson displayed a clear and
consistent concern for the promotion of liberal values abroad and conceived the League as the
means towards that end. He repeatedly linked the liberal peace settlement to the preservation
and expansion of democracy and free trade, especially through his Latin America policy, which
was designed to influence European politics.
Second, Wilson's threat perception was colored by his positive liberal ideology, which
made his focus the malign regime of "Prussian militarism." He often doubted whether Germany
actually posed a security threat to America and used this to buttress the case for American
neutrality. Furthermore, the classic defense of the Monroe Doctrine was of little importance to
Wilson if Germany could be made a democratic regime.
Third, the critical decisions of Wilson's buckpassing strategy-the toleration of the
British blockade and the confrontation of the German submarine threat-were all directly
connected to his theory of how to institute the liberal peace. The decisive considerations were
influence with the British and a corresponding ability to shape the peace settlement.
Fourth, and perhaps most important, after the buckpassing strategy foundered on
international resistance, Wilson sought to reorient the posture of the European poles through
greater commitments. Just as TLFP predicts, the desire for control manifested itself in Wilson's
treatment of his tacit alliance with Great Britain. When the British refused to toe his policy line,
he began to bring coercive leverage to bear on them through financial measures and a refusal to
cooperate against the submarine. By contrast, even after the Germans launched unrestricted
submarine warfare, Wilson went to great lengths to bring them back to the negotiating table.
Wilson's ambitious ends required greater and more impartial diplomatic engagement, and when
confronted with a trade-off, he opted to seek more diplomatic control.
It is worth noting that, although the beliefs that led Wilson to buckpassing were
erroneous, they were not completely crazy. As the outcome of the war demonstrated, a victory
for one coalition was not likely to lead to a new liberal system all parties could accept. This fact
meant that a hurting stalemate probably did offer the best route to the League, and a neutral
America willing to make a serious power commitment did represent a reasonable theory of how
to get from the hurting stalemate to a liberal negotiated peace. Of all the great powers, Britain
probably was indeed the most liberal in the abstract, so trying to rally British liberalism did have
a certain appeal. Wilson's theory of why the Entente would be victorious-their superior wealth
would ultimately break Germany-was by no means silly. Once the liberal premises of Wilson's
preponderant solution are accepted, the buckpassing strategy makes a certain amount of sense.
Wilson was wrong because he greatly overestimated the European desire for peace on
liberal terms and because the Entente could not translate superior wealth into military advantage.
Faulty causal beliefs, like many factors that sometimes influence international politics, can
perturb the predictions of the most comprehensive theory. However, the perturbing beliefs in
question were intimately tied to Wilson's positive liberal ideology and would have likely exerted
zero influence in its absence. And as the next section shows, once Wilson understood that his
beliefs about neutrality could not produce the League, he abandoned them for enormously costly
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balancing commitments. In addition, there is little reason to believe alternate explanations better
explain American buckpassing, as discussed in the final section of the chapter. Ultimately,
Wilson could not resist the logic of TLFP.
American Grand Strategy 1917-1920: Balancing
On March 20, 1917, Wilson decided on a major ground force intervention in the Great
War, shifting American foreign policy to a grand strategy of balancing. Forward commitments
had long been implicit in Wilson's thinking on the League of Nations: collective security
envisioned European power concentrated in a single pole, capped by the commitment of
America's own might. But the advent of unrestricted submarine warfare and international
resistance to Wilson's subsequent diplomacy revealed the bankruptcy of a buckpassing grand
strategy. Wilson simply could not gain sufficient influence over the European system to build an
American-led League from a position of neutrality. Rather than abandon his positive liberal
ideals, the President chose to change his strategy. The United States built up a massive army and
intervened directly in the ground war, in an effort to position itself to dictate the peace
settlement. The strategy paid dividends, allowing Wilson to importantly reorient the foreign
policies of the major powers after the war. Though failing to achieve either its ambitious liberal
ends or an effectively preponderant League, Wilson's balancing strategy briefly made America
the geopolitical pivot in Europe, the de-facto manager of European politics.
Wilson's new strategy of balancing is evident in the forward commitments of American
military and diplomatic policy from 1917-1920. The United States undertook large increases in
military power, with a particular emphasis on ground forces-Wilson believed that the size and
independence of the American Army would be especially important for achieving and
implementing his peace objectives. Diplomatically, he worked to shape the post-war posture of
the great powers and the character of the future German regime. At the Paris peace conference,
Wilson staked everything on the creation of the League of Nations, while also seeking additional
provisions to force German power and French ambitions in line with the new League system.
Systemic resistance forced Wilson to pay large costs to secure this kind of international control:
radical departures in the size of the American military and firm commitments to European
security. In short, the incoherence of Wilson's initial League scheme gradually gave way to
more serious balancing commitments under international pressure.
This section elucidates the content of Wilson's balancing strategy and its positive liberal
origins. TLFP accurately predicts both the character of the strategy and the process that brought
it about: Wilson's strategy was motivated by the preservation of European liberty, displayed
positive liberal preferences for using diplomatic entanglements and ground forces as tools for
political control, and bought these preferences at the price of potentially costly international
commitments. I chart the new American strategy by investigating Wilson's initiatives in military
and diplomatic policy from 1917 forward. I conclude the section with a discussion of the strange
death of Wilsonian grand strategy in American domestic politics. 56
MILITARY POLICY
16 Having addressed threat perception in the previous section, I omit further analysis of it here. Wilson remained
focused on ideological threats and positive liberal goals. For further discussion of this issue during the 1917-1920
period, see N. Gordon Levin, Woodrow Wilson and World Politics: America's Response to War and Revolution
(Oxford, England: Oxford University Press, 1970), Ch. 1; Ross A. Kennedy, The Will to Believe, Ch. 7.
102
The Wilson administration's military policy underscores that its ambitious goals required
greater weight in international councils. I treat five important examples of Wilson's military
policy, focusing on the use of the military to arrange and implement Wilson's envisioned post-
war structure of power. First, I chart Wilson's response to the pre-belligerency campaign for
preparedness, which resulted in large spending increases and a departure from American military
tradition. Second, I examine the military aspects of Wilson's decision for war. He made the
decision for war only after it became clear that "armed neutrality" could not be "neutral" in any
real sense; it was merely a strategy of undeclared naval war on Germany. Wilson opted for a
costly ground force commitment over a strategy with a more limited approach because of the
greater influence it would provide on the peace settlement. Third, while Wilson's conduct of
the naval war was largely cooperative, he seriously hampered ground operations by insisting on
the creation of an independent American Army-another policy designed to maximize American
influence over the peace settlement. Fourth, Wilson used the presence of this army to
manipulate the armistice negotiations, setting terms for the post-war German regime and the
priorities of the peace settlement. Finally, Wilson's post-war military plans were consistent with
the expanded military forces necessary to implement his expansive grand strategy. 57
PRE-WAR PREPAREDNESS. The fact that the United States entered the Great War
thoroughly unprepared for the massive campaign it would fight does not owe to a Wilsonian
disinterest in military policy. In fact, some scholars argue that during the neutrality era, "The
single most divisive issue in American politics was... the state of the nation's military
preparedness." Though the outcome of this controversy was heavily dependent on the whims of
domestic politics, Wilson took a historically strong stand: he advocated large increases to the
Army and Navy, as well as organizational changes that would make them effective instruments
of policy. Wilson's connection between increased armaments-especially ground forces-and
greater international influence is characteristic of his positive liberal views, as he came to
recognize that such political impact comes with a higher price tag.58
The Wilson administration drafted and supported the Naval Act of 1916, responding to
the preparedness controversy by promising a "Navy second to none." The Act approved a three-
year building program designed to make American forces the naval equal of Great Britain's by
1919. In addition to numerous destroyers, submarines, and miscellaneous small craft, the
5 A caveat is in order here: a great many influences acted to shape American military policy in addition to Wilson's
positive liberal views. A long-standing anti-militarist tradition held American rearmament on land down; domestic
political contests pulled military policy back and forth; organizational and systemic incentives helped push the
character of American policy before, during, and after the Great War. But despite anti-militarism and domestic
politics, Wilson championed raising American land armament to historic highs before and after the war, and of
course, chose a ground intervention over a purely naval policy. He dictated a naval policy that contravened
organizational incentives, while he facilitated an Arrny policy that ran up against systemic pressures. Though many
factors played a role in setting each policy, Wilson often pushed military policy towards positive liberal preferences
against the grain of other forces.
58 Knock, To EndAll Wars, p. 58. It is true that this Army in no way measured up to the massive forces being
employed in Europe. The force was designed not for military dominance but for political effect. It represented a
small but potentially effective nucleus of armed power and a willingness to expand it if necessary. This is a major
departure from the ramshackle ghost of a force then in existence, and from the traditions that had produced that
force. Promises and threats backed by the new force would at least have to be entertained rather than dismissed.
Detailed accounts of the preparedness controversy are John Patrick Finnegan, Against the Specter of a Dragon: The
Campaign for American Military Preparedness, 1914-1917 (Greenwood Press, 1975); John Whitclay Chambers, To
Raise an Army: The Draft Comes to Modern America (New York: Free Press, 1987), Ch. 3-4.
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program included ten dreadnought class battleships and six battle cruisers. The President's
ground force policy was even more remarkable, given the entrenched American distaste for
armies. In 1914, the American Army numbered about 100,000 regulars and about as many
"ready reservists" in the National Guard, a force that was haphazardly organized, trained, and
equipped.
Wilson proposed increasing the regular Army by a third and forming a new reserve force
of 400,000, called the "Continental Army," which would serve as the nucleus of a mass army in
time of war. The National Defense Act of 1916 eventually scrapped the Continental Army in
favor of more than quadrupling the National Guard to 450,000 and allowing the Federal
government to draft it into service in wartime. The remodeled Guard now took a dual oath to
both its state government and the national government, and was supervised, trained, and
equipped under federal authority. An obscure provision of the legislation allowed the president to
draft citizens into the National Guard during wartime, effectively instituting a draft in an
emergency. The regular Army would be nearly doubled over the five-year period of the Act, to
175,000, and the military budget-then the dominant source of Federal expenditures-increased
by twenty percent from these organizational changes alone. Wilson was in the center of
domestic opinion on preparedness, but the changes nonetheless amounted to a significant change
in American military policy. Not since the Civil War had America possessed an Army so large,
with the potential to be quickly and coercively raised.5 9
Wilson's military plans reflected his realization that the power political prominence his
strategy required came at the cost of a military expansion. Though initially rejecting the
preparedness movement, Wilson became interested in naval expansion as soon as trouble with
Germany began, backing increases after the 1915 announcement of the initial U-boat campaign
and the sinking of the Lusitania. Though the proposed force naval force bore "little or no
relation" to the ongoing war, Wilson seems to have envisaged the program primarily as a way to
put pressure on Great Britain and to reinforce his proposals for the League. Wilson agreed with
House's contentions that "if we are to join with other great powers in a world movement to
maintain peace, we ought to immediately inaugurate a big naval program. We have the money
and if we have the will, the world will realize that we are to be reckoned with. Its effect will be
far-reaching and it will give us the influence desired in the settlement of European affairs." 60
Wilson's decisions on the Army bill were similarly motivated. The orders to draw up
legislation came after he was advised by House that "If war comes with Germany, it will be
because of our unpreparedness and her belief that we are more or less impotent to do her harm"
and by the State Department that "nothing short of fear of war with the United States will induce
Germany to yield" to American demands. As Wilson would later bluntly put it to his anti-
preparedness political allies, America was "a nation which, by the standards of other nations... is
regarded as helpless, is apt in general counsel to be regarded as negligible. And when you go
into a conference to establish foundations for the peace of the world, you have got to go in on a
59 Trask, Captains & Cabinets, p. 285; Chambers, To Raise an Army, pp. 73-75, 103-107, 112-118, 121-122; Daniel
R. Beaver, Newton D. Baker and the American War Effort, 1917-1919 (Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press,
1966), pp. 11-15; Marvin A. Kreidberg and Merton G. Henry, History ofMilitary Mobilization in the United States
Army, 1775-1945 (Washington, D.C.: Department of the Army Pamphlet 20-212, 1955), pp. 189-195. For an
alternate perspective stressing the limits of Wilson's policy, see Ross A. Kennedy, The Wi/i to Believe, pp. 3-5.
60 Quoted in Trask, Captains & Cabinets, p. 285; House to Wilson, May 17, 1916, PWW 37: 64-65, quote 64;
Wilson to House, May 18, 1916, PWW 37: 68-69. On coercive threats against the British, see Wilson to House,
February 12, 1916, PWW 36: 173; House to Wilson, February 15, 1916, PWW 36: 180, esp. n. 2.
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basis intelligible to the people you are conferring with." If positive liberal goals were to be
achieved, then America would need more influence negotiate a collective security system, and
that meant more military options. 61
THE DECISION FOR WAR: MILITARY ASPECTS. Military considerations were perhaps the
decisive factor in the American abandonment of buckpassing in favor of forward balancing
commitments and war. Wilson came to understand that "armed neutrality" would be in practice
indistinguishable from undeclared naval warfare against the Germans and in cooperation with the
Allies. From the beginning of February, Wilson strove for an impartial naval policy, refusing aid
to the British and delaying asking Congress for funds to arm merchant ships until it became clear
that private interests could not do so. But the effectiveness of ship armament would turn
crucially on convoying merchants, which could not be done without the cooperation of the
British. As Secretary of the Navy Josephus Daniels put it, "Such cooperation would be easy if
we were at war with Germany, but as we are not at war, would not such cooperation make us
regarded as an ally of the entente powers?" Wilson mooted absurd solutions to avoid this
problem, including arming American ships with small motorboats for submarine hunting, only to
have naval authorities reiterate the importance of the convoy. Armed neutrality meant little less
than undeclared naval war.62
On March 19, 1917, after learning of recent German attacks on American merchants,
Wilson asked Daniels to have "everything possible done in addition to Armed Guards [i.e. the
arming of merchant ships] to protect American shipping, hoping this would meet the ends we
have in view." Daniels reported back on March 20th that "there is no effective method" other
than "cooperation with the Allies and like suggestions," an argument he had made before and
had likely repeated the previous evening. That same day, Wilson held a war council where his
cabinet recommended unanimously for war. Daniels argued for war on the grounds that "our
present attempt by Armed Guard could not be wholly effective & if it succeeded we must
cooperate with the English & let them convoy our ships while we patrolled this coast." Only on
March 24, after the decision for war, did Wilson order naval cooperation with the British. In
short, Wilson became convinced America could not retain the impartial role necessary for the
buckpassing strategy.63
On the other side of the scale, the slow death of a peace without victory made TLFP's
logic of greater forward commitments more plausible. Since the fall of 1916, Wilson had been
considering whether American belligerency might actually provide the control necessary to
produce the liberal settlement. Norman Angell wrote a memorandum in late 1916, which Wilson
kept in his personal file, arguing that American belligerency was "the position alone by which an
international arrangement will become dependable." Only "common action by the non-German
world" could "furnish a means of controlling German action throughout the world and leverage
61 House to Wilson, July 14, 1915, in Edward Mandell House, The Intimate Papers of Colonel House, ed. Charles
Seymor (Cambridge, MA: Riverside Press, 1926), 2: 19; Chandler Parson Anderson memo, July 13, 1915, PWW 33:
501-504, quote 504; "A Colloquy with a Group of Anti-preparedness Leaders," May 8, 1916, PWW 36: 634-648,
quote 644.
6' Daniels to Wilson, March 9, 1917, PWW 41: 369-372, quote 372. On Wilson's attitude towards armed neutrality
in February see Link, Wilson V, pp. 306-313. On Wilson's naval suggestions see Daniels Diary, March 6, 1917,
PWW 41: 346 and Daniels to Wilson, March 9, 1917, PWW 41: 376-379.
63 Daniels Diary, March 19, 1917 PWW 41: 430-43 1, quote 430; Daniels to Wilson, March 20, 1917 PWW 41: 432-
433, quote 432 and see esp. n.1 433; Daniels Diary, March 20, 1917, PWW 41: 444-445, quote 445, ampersands in
original. For the final cooperation order, see Wilson to Daniels, March 24, 1917, PWW 41: 460-461.
105
wherewith to bargain" about the peace settlement. Conversely, Lansing urged him that going to
war would "give this country a prominent place in the peace negotiations which will prevent
unjust treatment of the Central Powers... [and] give tremendous moral weight to the cause of
human liberty and the suppression of Absolutism." British Prime Minister David Lloyd George
claimed that Wilson must "make peace if the peace made at the conference is to be worth
keeping. American participation in the war" would shorten the conflict and secure the liberal
peace against selfish Entente interests. A system of collective security appeared to require
influence over the peace that only full belligerency could provide.64
Indeed, Wilson adopted this very argument with his left-wing political allies. Based on
the revelations of the Zimmerman telegram, he rejected proposals for a peaceful settlement with
Germany, but spoke "as to fellow pacifists to whom he was forced to confess that war had
become inevitable." Wilson's primary argument was that "as head of a nation participating in
the war, the President of the United States would have seat at the Peace Table, but that if he
remained the representative of a neutral country he could at best only 'call through a crack in the
door'.... The foreign policy we so extravagantly admired could have a chance if he were there to
push and to defend it, but not otherwise."'
In line with his positive liberal priors, Wilson interpreted the need for more influence
over the post-war power configuration in terms of large ground forces. Cognizant of the
possibility of war if he could not turn the German situation around, Wilson received "a letter so
pertinent to the inquiries now being made" about war preparations that "I am taking the liberty of
sending it" to Secretary of War Newton Baker. The memorandum was from "a very experienced
man" named Herbert Hoover, who made a series of recommendations aimed at securing more
influence over the peace in the event of war. Most pertinent was Hoover's suggestion that "we
should have a force in being when peace approaches. As our terms of peace will probably run
counter to most of the European proposals, our weight in the accomplishment of our ideals will
be greatly in proportion to the strength which can be thrown into the scale." Wilson would take
this idea far beyond Hoover's more modest suggestions.66
In fact, Wilson had been preparing for the possible failure of his buckpassing strategy by
planning for a large ground force intervention. After the break of diplomatic relations with
Germany, the War Department submitted, at the administration's request, a plan advocating
"raising troops in sufficient numbers to exert a substantial influence in the later stage of the
war... an army of one million five hundred thousand men." These plans were substantially
approved four days later on February 7, with the exception that Wilson and Secretary of War
Baker preferred to rely initially on volunteers rather than the conscription advocated by the
Army.
But Wilson was by no means ideologically opposed to conscription: as Wilson wrote to
Walter Lippmann the same day about the New Republic's proposals for conscription, "I find
64 A Memorandum by Norman Angell, circa November 20, 1916, PWW 40: 10-19, quotes 19, 15; Lansing to
Wilson, February 2, 1917, PWW 41: 99-100, quote 100; Lansing to Wilson, February 13, 1917, PWW 41: 210-214,
esp. 213, quote 214. Wilson heard, and likely absorbed, numerous similar arguments about the liberal impact of
American belligerency throughout early 1917: see, inter alia, Page to Wilson, March 9, 1917, PWW 41: 372-373,
quote 373; Lansing to Wilson, February 2, 1917, PWW 41: 96-99; and especially Lipmann to Wilson, March 11,
1917, PWW 41: 388-390.
65 A News Report, circa February 28, 1917, PWW 41: 302-305, quotes n. 3, 305; 1 have fixed subject verb
agreement in the last quote. The Zimmerman telegram is addressed below.
6 House to Wilson, February 13, 1917, PWW 41: 226-229, quotes n.1, 226, 228.
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myself in general agreement with you... I shall certainly try to work something out in that spirit
at any rate." The President was sympathetic to conscription as the most economically efficient
way to raise large military forces, being less concerned with its costs to liberty and more
concerned with the politics of such a measure. As he would later put it, the draft "was in no
sense conscription of the unwilling" only a "selection from a nation that has volunteered in
mass." Such a specious remark encapsulates the low priority Wilson gave to freedom from
67
coercion.
Wilson's understanding of the potential need for forward commitments drove planning
activity that would serve as the basis of the eventual American Expeditionary Force (AEF). On
February 22, in anticipation of announcing his armed neutrality address, Wilson asked Baker to
prepare to raise an army of one million men in case war with Germany came while Congress was
out of session. Although never put before Congress, this measure would have relied on
provisions in the National Defense Act of 1916 to draft citizens into the Army via the National
Guard. As the author of the proposal put it, the force would become "a Volunteer Army in name
only." In the event, a flurry of activity occurred in the week after the March 20 war cabinet
meeting that laid the foundation for a 1.5 million man expeditionary force, to be raised by
conscription. Wilson's alternative to a neutral policy was a large ground force commitment
aimed at shaping the post-war peace. It amounted to a historically unprecedented American
willingness to accept the costs associated with large-scale state coercion. 68
CONDUCT OF THE WAR. Wilson conducted the war in a manner consistent with positive
liberal preferences, prioritizing the importance of American ground forces and their contribution
to influencing an eventual peace settlement. The Allies faced two potential military catastrophes
during American belligerency. In 1917, the success of German submarine warfare threatened to
strangle the Allies before American power could make a difference: German U-boats far
exceeded their tonnage targets for the first six months of the campaign. On land, the Bolshevik
revolution in Russia and the Italian collapse at Caporetto effectively ended the war in the East,
allowing the Central Powers to mass all their might for a final offensive in the spring of 1918.
American cooperation with the British admiralty stimulated the adoption of convoy tactics that
solved the submarine problem. But Wilson and the commander of the AEF, General John
Pershing, both insisted on maintaining an independent American Army in order to better support
American designs at the peace conference. Consequently, the German spring offensive of 1918
was met essentially without American support and the result was a near thing.
The Wilson administration was quite cooperative with Allied war plans at sea, even if
friction was not entirely absent. Wilson shunned the ideas of his Chief of Naval Operations, who
favored a large build-up of American Dreadnaughts and attempts at a close blockade of German
ports-ideas made ludicrous by the course of naval combat in the previous three years. Instead,
67 Kreidberg and Henry, Military Mobilization in the United States Army, p. 293; Lippmann to Wilson, February 6,
1917, PWW 41: 134-135; Wilson to Lippmann, February 7, 1917, PWW 41: 146; Beaver, Newton D. Baker, p. 33.
On the administration's early preparations for a large Army, see Baker to Wilson, February 7, 1917, PWW 41: 151-
152; Baker to Wilson, Taft to Baker, Baker to Taft, February 7, 6, 7, all in PWW 41: 153-156; Chambers, To Raise
an Army, pp. 130-132; Beaver, Newton D. Baker, pp. 22-27.
68 Chambers, To Raise an Army, p. 132. On the March Army decisions see Josephus Daniels Diary, March 24,
1917, in Josephus Daniels, The Cabinet Diaries ofJosephus Daniels, 1913-1921, ed. E. David Cronin (Lincoln, NE:
University of Nebraska Press, 1963), pp. 120-121; Baker to Wilson, March 29, 1917, PWW 41: 500-501; Chambers,
To Raise an Army, pp. 130-151; Beaver, Newton D. Baker, pp. 28-49. The decision for conscription probably
ultimately owed to Theodore Roosevelt's attempt to lead a volunteer division. The exact form, size, and departure
date of the AEF evolved over the summer of 1917.
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Wilson pushed early and often for a convoy system, contributing to the British Admiralty's
belated adoption of this dominant tactic. Moreover, the American Navy took two important
steps that undermined its organizational preferences and post-war strength.
First, American planners completely postponed the American capital ship building
program approved in 1916, and instead authorized two hundred more destroyers for anti-
submarine operations. Second, American forces did not operate as an independent fleet, but
rather acted "on the assumption that Allied and U.S. services are one and the same service."
American forces served primarily as an adjunct to the British Grand Fleet, integrating with the
British Navy and serving as transports and escorts under British direction. As the American
theater commander Admiral Sims put it, the American mission was "to treat our Service and our
facilities and material as 'reserves' and to throw them in wherever we could bolster up in any
way a weak spot.... It meant nothing else but the disintegration of our fleet." 69
Wilson's positive liberal goals produced a different approach to strategy on land. His
desire to exert decisive influence over the post-war balance of power led him to insist on an
independent American Army. Wilson approved General Pershing's orders upon leaving for
Europe, which stipulated "an underlying idea" that "the forces of the United States are a separate
and distinct component... the identity of which must be preserved. This fundamental rule is
subject" only to "minor exceptions in particular circumstances." This approach fit with Wilson's
general strategy that by "remaining unfettered," he "might exercise powerful and valuable
influence" over the Allies after the war.
It also undermined Allied hopes for an immediate and critical contribution of American
manpower to the war effort: Central Power victories causing the collapse of Russia and Italy had
seriously damaged the Allied cause in 1917, and Germany was known to be re-grouping its
forces for a push to end the war in the spring of 1918. Under the plan for an independently
operating AEF training in France, American forces would not be ready until 1919, perhaps even
1920. In contrast, the Allies begged, pleaded, pestered, and cajoled the administration to accept
"amalgamation:" placing small American units directly in Allied armies as soon as possible.70
But the Wilson administration steadfastly resisted amalgamation. As Pershing put it,
"when the war ends, our position will be much stronger if our Army acting as such shall have
played a distinct and definite part." After the war, he noted that "any sort of permanent
amalgamation would irrevocably commit America's fortunes to the hands of the Allies." These
kinds of reasons contributed to the nearly unconditional support given Pershing by Wilson. Even
when urging Pershing to be cooperative, Secretary of War Baker wrote that "the President...
69 Both quotes from Admiral Sims in Trask, Captains & Cabinets, pp. 83, 363. On the preferences of the American
Navy, see Ibid., pp. 47-49, 66-68, 77-91; on the administration's decisions-and Wilson's personal views- on
convoys, capital ships, and fleet disintegration, see Ibid., 91-101, 115-120, 360-365 and Daniels Diary, February 25,
1917, Daniels, The Cabinet Diaries ofJosephus Daniels, 1913-1921, p. 105. American-British naval relations did
experience some tension. For some of the more competitive aspects, see Edward B. Parsons, Wilsonian Diplomacy:
Allied American Rivalries in War and Peace (St. Louis, MO: Forum Press, 1978), pp. 33-52. For instance, Sims
made his remarks in the text about the use of the American fleet while complaining that the American Navy could
have been even more cooperative.
70 Baker to Pershing, May 26, 1917, PWW 42: 404-405, quote 405; Balfour to Lloyd George, April 26, 1917 PWW
42: 140-141, quote 141. For similar remarks about influence and control, see John Whitehouse memo, April 14,
1917, PWW 42: 65-69. On the American plans to make Europe wait for an independent force, see Bliss to Baker,
May 25th, 1917, PWW 42: 408-410; David F. Trask, The United States in the Supreme War Council: American War
Aims and Inter-Allied Strategy, 1917-1918 (Middletown, CT: Wesleyian University Press, 1961), Ch. 1; David F.
Trask, The AEF and Coalition Warmaking, 1917-1918 (Lawrence, KS: University Press Of Kansas, 1993), Ch. 1-2.
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wishes you to have full authority to use the troops at your command as you deem wise."
Pershing should "act with entire freedom in making the best disposition and use of your forces
possible." This kind of political support turned back challenge after challenge from the Allies
seeking American support against the great German offensives of 1918. In the end, only very
limited amalgamation of American troops occurred, mostly for training purposes. The American
Army saw only limited combat until it could operate independently in the final months of the
war. The AEF was only a minor factor on the battlefield. It could best serve the purposes of
preponderance at the peace conference. 71
NEGOTIATING THE ARMISTICE. The war's end would put the test to Wilson's strategic
vision and integrate its more incoherent parts into a tighter framework. On October 5, 1918, a
new German government under Prince Maximilian von Baden sued for peace on the basis of
Wilson's Fourteen Points, petitioning the United States separately from its European allies.
Wilson engaged in a month of correspondence with the Germans in pursuit of armistice terms.
For Wilson, the overture represented an opportunity to end the war and build the liberal peace,
but also underscored the value of forward military commitments in producing such an ambitious
outcome. A Wilsonian peace would require America to exert a great deal of control over
European politics: to create a successful League of Nations, Germany's regime would have to be
democratized, its power reduced, and the policy of the Allies moderated. The independent AEF
gave Wilson the leverage to pursue these ambitious peace requirements, by providing a plausible
exit threat that could ruin Allied military plans, and a valuable bargaining chip for securing
policy concessions.
The construction of a League of Nations required two changes of Germany: its power had
to be reduced and its regime democratized. On the former count, Wilson insisted that any
armistice maintain "the present supremacy of the armies of the United States and of the Allies in
the field" and the French ambassador told Wilson the terms contemplated "would in fact amount
to the very capitulation we want." But Wilson's positive liberalism led him to be equally
concerned with the character of the German regime. His first peace note demanded to know
whether the new German government was "speaking merely for the constituted authorities of the
Empire who have so far conducted the war," while a second reminded that America had
promised "the destruction of every arbitrary power anywhere" such as that which "has hitherto
controlled the German nation." Wilson wrote that "it is indispensable that the governments
associated against Germany should know peradventure with whom they are dealing."
Throughout the process, Wilson and his cabinet expressed great interest in the character
of constitutional reforms to the Reich, going so far as to debate the manner in which Reichstag
districts should be drawn. They also had considerable skepticism and fear that democratization
was not genuine. Wilson's final note acknowledged ongoing changes, but warned that "it does
not appear that the principle of a government responsible to the German people has been fully
worked out" or that "the alterations of principle and of practice now partially agreed upon will be
permanent." The consolidation of a democratic polity was essential for Wilson, as America
would only deal with "representatives of the German people who have been assured of genuine
constitutional standing as the real rulers of Germany." Without a truly new regime, even a
71 Pershing and Baker quoted in Trask, The AEF and Coalition Warmaking, 1917-1918, pp. 39, 38. On the long and
largely consistent political opposition to amalgamation see Trask, The United Slates in the Supreme War Council,
Ch. 5; Trask, The AEF and Coalition Warmaking, 1917-1918, Ch. 2. This is not to say that American strength was
inconsequential; hordes of America doughboys gave the British and French armies the margin of strength to break
the Germans through an attrition strategy in the fall of 1918.
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defanged Germany could not be trusted in a preponderant League. German autocracy threatened
72the liberal peace as surely as German armies.
Wilson's liberal goals led him to apply this pressure for regime change because he feared
the alternatives. Many voices at home and abroad were pounding the table for unconditional
surrender and externally imposing a regime. But such solution posed ideological and strategic
problems. As Wilson noted about his decision to start the negotiations, "only one thing troubled
him. How could he have correspondence with Germany under autocracy? Then we must go into
Germany and set up a government ourselves, something unthinkable. Unless some sort of
Government offers medium for communication, we might witness Bolshevikism worse than in
Russia." The example of Germany's revolutionary incitement in Russia terrified Wilson and he
was determined not to set off forces he could not control. "If we humiliate the German people
and drive them too far," he warned the British liaison, "we shall destroy all form of government,
and Bolshevism will take its place. We ought not to ground them to powder, or there will be
nothing left to build up from."
Conquering Berlin would lead not to liberalism, but to communism or renewed
autocracy. Wilson therefore favored armistice over conquest, and on terms as generous as
possible: the armistice "should be rigid enough to secure us against renewal of hostilities by
Germany but not humiliating beyond that necessity, as such terms would throw the advantage to
the military party in Germany." Positive liberal goals dictated American diplomacy: reform had
to come from within Germany itself, or both the League and German democracy would both be
lost.73
Equally important, the destruction of German power would undermine America's hold on
Allied policy and its ability to construct a liberal peace. Wilson's war cabinet noted that "Today
America can have more influence in peace meetings than in the future.... If we continue to win,
their [Allied] selfish aims will be asserted." The total destruction of German power would leave
the Europeans free to pursue their own hegemonic projects: "As the collapse of Germany
becomes more certain, the demands of some of the allies, particularly France, will become more
unreasonable.... In the interest of world peace, they will have to be held in check."
In order to build the liberal peace, the grand strategy of the European great powers would
have to be subordinated to the League. Wilson knew there would be Allied "jealousy" of his
position as "arbiter mundi," but he was willing to accept the burdens of preponderance: he felt
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the Allies "needed to be coerced, that they were getting to a point where they were reaching out
for more than they should have in justice." A liberal solution required a liberal Germany,
defanged but not helpless before Allied power. Wilson summed up his strategy well in his
response to British requests for naval and industrial aid in early November: "I wish no ships and
nothing done until peace. I intend to carry as many weapons to the peace table as I can conceal
on my person and I will be cold and firm. Great Britain is selfish."74
The negotiations with the Allies over armistice terms put the military requirements of
Wilson's liberal goals in bold relief. Wilson sent House to Paris in order to, as the Colonel had
earlier put it, "compel the [Allied] reactionaries in authority to yield at the Peace conference to
American aims." House's major goals were to get Allied assent to a settlement based on the
Fourteen Points and an armistice that preserved German power-as Wilson cabled from
Washington, "It is certain that too much success or security on the part of the Allies will make a
genuine peace settlement exceedingly difficult if not impossible." But the Allies balked: they
wanted stringent military terms on land and sea, while objecting to Wilson's points about
"freedom of the seas" and reparations. 75
The Americans responded with pressure made possible by their autonomous army: House
threatened numerous times that America would make a separate peace, remove the AEF from the
center of allied lines, and depart Europe post-haste. Wilson cabled that British recalcitrance
would mean "the certainty of our using our present great equipment to build up the strongest
navy our resources permit, as our people have long desired." In the end, both sides
compromised. The allies agreed to the American peace program, prioritizing the League of
Nations and a liberal settlement, with two reservations about the meaning of freedom of the seas
and the scope of reparations. Wilson agreed to a harsher than desired armistice: the surrender of
the German fleet, the evacuation of the German Army behind the Rhine, and an occupation of
the left bank of the Rhine and its major bridgeheads. Importantly, last concession committed
200,000 American troops to stay in Europe during the peace conference, underscoring the
commitment required to manage the international power configuration. 76
On November 11, 1919, the Germans signed the armistice and the guns fell silent.
American power remained, committed to managing European politics in the name of liberal
purposes. Despite the need to take on commitments in order to facilitate his grand strategy,
Wilson had cause for optimism: American ground forces had provided the political influence to
build the foundations of the League. A liberalizing revolution had begun to sweep Germany, and
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though worried about its permanence, Wilson believed his pressure had led to clear steps towards
democratization. As he enthused after the Kehl mutinies of the Germany Navy, a newly liberal
Germany might "ultimately be a bulwark of peace in Europe" now that it had "shaken off... the
military autocracy." Furthermore, he had received commitments from the Allies to build a
liberal peace: the peace would be based on the fourteen points and the League would be the first
order of business. As Wilson consoled a Senator following the Democratic Party's defeat in the
1918 election, "America is the leader of the liberal thought of the world, and nobody from any
quarter ought to be allowed to interfere with or impair that leadership without giving an account
of himself, which can be made very difficult." 77
POST-WAR MILITARY POLICY. Wilsonian defense measures after the war were
commensurate with the collective security apparatus constructed at Versailles. "Navies must be
the principal supports of a League of Nations," leading American admirals argued, "and the
United States, from its influence and power, will be called upon to contribute a very large share
of the international police force which will have to be created." This position much vexed the
British, who hoped to remain the leading naval power and eschewed the principal of the
"freedom of the seas." A British representative reported with horror that Wilson interpreted the
principal to mean "that no one Power in the League of Nations shall exercise its Naval strength
to crush a belligerent power without the consent of the League, leaving until the occasion arises
any decision as to the nationality of the police force." America would seek a fleet to rival Great
Britain's, both to contribute to the League and to co-opt and control Britain's Navy in the
League's service.
It was towards this goal that Wilson in 1919 reapproved the delayed building program of
1916. When Lloyd George attempted to blackmail Wilson over the issue by refusing to approve
amendments to the League of Nations Covenant that Wilson needed, the President refused to
back down: "The President declared he would rather take the chances with the Senate without
putting in a clause on the Monroe Doctrine" rather than come to "a complete understanding...
concerning the Navy building program." Britain was forced to settle for a joint memorandum
expressing a mutual desire to avoid competition and to hold a naval disarmament conference at
an unspecified date. The American "Navy second to none" remained on track.78
Wilson's plans for the Army remained focused on the capabilities it could provide the
League. The War Department secretly planned for a large post-war Army from 1918 forward,
with the administration introducing its proposals in August 1919 at the height of the domestic
debate about the League. The plans provided for a large standing Army of 510,000 regulars,
backed by a 750,000-man reserve force composed of the National Guard and skeleton formations
of veterans. During peacetime both the regulars and the Guard would be raised by economic
inducements, though there would be a short three-month program of Universal Military Training
(UMT) for 19-year old men. This force would be sufficient for aiding the League in minor
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contingencies and also for rapidly mobilizing a mass army. It also represented a dramatic break
from American traditions and went far beyond even the National Defense Act of 1916.'9
After this plan came under attack during the League controversy, Wilson supported a
modified plan for a 300,000-man standing Army, supplemented in war by a national citizen-
reservist force produced by four months of UMT. Though he urged his party to be flexible, this
alternative bill was also defeated. In 1920, Congress ultimately approved a 280,000-man
standing Army backed by the National Guard and skeleton divisions of reservists. Wilson nearly
vetoed this measure over its abolition of both UMT and conscription, which Wilson viewed as
"sound in principle, effective in operation, and just in distribution of military duty,... an
indispensable part of any fundamental military policy." He decided to relent in order that "the
pending political campaign" not be prevented "from centering on the League of Nations and
Treaty questions." It also seems likely that the proposed force was adequate to the needs of
Wilson's commitments, since Army planners estimated it could generate an Army of 2.3 million
men after sixty days of mobilization. Wilson's positive liberal ambitions required ground forces
of a scope unprecedented in American history.80
DIPLOMATIC POLICY
In diplomatic policy, the influence needed to build the League required Wilson to adopt
greater alliance commitments and other entanglements abroad. At heart, these commitments
were the necessary adjunct to Wilson's expansive strategy for defending democracy in Europe.
In this section I probe four areas of the Wilson administration's wartime diplomacy. I initially
consider the diplomatic aspects of the decision for war, showing the potential for liberal gains
abroad to have been an important motivating factor in the switch from buckpassing to balancing.
I then review three aspects of American peace conference diplomacy: the creation of the
League of Nations, the commitments to French security, and the restraint of German power.
Wilson's League diplomacy reveals both a devotion to European liberalism and a willingness to
absorb the costs of managing European politics. Indeed, Wilson's concessions to the French and
restraint of the Germans demonstrate the positive liberal preference of trading higher costs for
more control, and the ability of the international system to force the trade-off. In trying to
overcome European resistance to collective security, Wilson sought limits for both French and
German policy, embroiling America in both an alliance and a military occupation in order to do
so.
THE DECISION FOR WAR: DIPLOMATIC ASPECTS. Two diplomatic considerations deflated
Wilson's hope for a peace without victory based on American impartial mediation. First, the
Zimmerman telegram strongly implied that Germany could not be walked back to a negotiated
peace. German Foreign Minister Arthur Zimmerman sent the telegram on January 19, 1917
whereupon it was intercepted by British intelligence and relayed to the Americans on February
24. The note proposed a Mexican-German alliance in the event of American entry into the Great
War and promised that Mexico could have back the territory it had lost in the Mexican-American
81
war.
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As a political or military proposal the offer was laughable, but as an indicator of German
obstinacy it had a powerful effect on the Wilson administration. It revealed that the Germans
had been playing Wilson for a dupe during his recent peace diplomacy and that they were willing
to accept war with the United States rather than make a peace without victory. Wilson displayed
"'much indignation and was disposed to make the text public without delay," leaking the
information to the press in order to "get the greatest result in influencing legislation regarding the
arming of merchant vessels." Combined with the first unannounced German attacks on
American shipping on March 17 and 18, the Zimmerman telegram probably vitiated Wilson's
hope in a negotiated peace. 82
Second, the Russian Revolution of March 1917 appeared to be a liberalizing force to the
Wilson administration. Lansing pleaded with Wilson to go to war in part because "it would
encourage and strengthen the new democratic government of Russia" and "would put heart in the
democratic element in Germany." American belligerency on behalf of liberalism would
critically strengthen American "future influence in world affairs" on behalf of a liberal peace.
Worryingly, "the longer we delay in declaring against the military absolutism which menaces the
rule of liberty and justice in the world, so much less will be our influence in the days when
Germany will need a merciful and unselfish foe." In sum, "The revolution in Russia," Lansing
averred, "had removed the one objection to affirming that the European War was a war between
Democracy and Absolutism.... In going to war at this time we could do more to advance the
cause of Democracy" than continued neutrality. The absolutist menace in Germany threatened
America and "all other countries with liberal systems of government. Such an arrangement
would appeal to every-liberty loving man the world over."83
Unsurprisingly, Wilson apparently agreed with these positive liberal aims, doubting only
that the war could be justified to Congress in liberal terms. In the cabinet meeting of March 20,
he stated that the principal changes in the past month were "the Russian Revolution, the talk of
more liberal institutions in Germany, and the continued reluctance of our ships to sail. If our
entering the war would hasten and fix movements in Russia and Germany, it would be a marked
gain for the world and would tend to give additional justification for the whole struggle." Wilson
would later brag that America was the first country to recognize the new Russian government.
He also noted that the revolution "ought to be good... because it had a professor at its head."
With liberalism on the march everywhere, House told the British, Wilson "was going into this
war to fight against Junkerism in every country." And despite his earlier doubts, Wilson accepted
spreading liberalism wholesale in his war address to Congress, contrasting German autocracy
with Russian liberalism: "Here is a fit partner for a league of honor."8 4
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Indeed, Wilson's war address is a fitting capstone to his strategic evolution. He declared
that the old buckpassing strategy "is practically certain to draw us into the war without either the
rights or effectiveness of belligerents." America's aim was "to set up amongst the really free and
self-governed peoples of the world such a concert of purpose and of action" that it could change
the nature of international affairs: "neutrality is no longer feasible or desirable" where such
ambitious goals are at stake. Instead, America would "accept gauge of battle with this natural
foe of liberty and shall, if necessary, spend the whole force of the nation to check and nullify its
pretensions and its power." In the end, "The world must be made safe for democracy. Its peace
must be planted upon the tested foundations of political liberty." Spreading positive liberal aims
abroad required a strategy of preponderance. 85
THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS. The meaning of Wilson's League of Nations diplomacy
remains controversial. Part of the problem stems from the fundamental flaws of collective
security: states do not share a universal interest in such a system; are unlikely to cede
sovereignty, power, and resources to a third party in the absence of such an interest; and a system
without such a cession would prove useless. Realists have long argued that a system of
collective security was unworkable as such and that therefore Wilson's diplomacy was largely
meaningless. These critics are right on the first point but wrong on the second. Wilson's League
was workable to the extent that it represented American forward commitments in an effort to
shape the international power constellation-even if the institutional apparatus of the League
proved superfluous. It is meaningful, from the point of view of the argument here, to the extent
that such commitments were driven by Wilson's positive liberal ambitions. 86
As we have seen from the neutrality period, there is little doubt that, for Wilson, the
League represented the apogee of liberal accomplishment. His views did not change with
American belligerency. One of the great questions of the war, Wilson maintained, was whether
nations would "be ruled and dominated, even in their own internal affairs, by arbitrary and
irresponsible force or by their own will and choice." Cheap talk about freedom would not be
enough to answer the question: Wilson argued that "Ever since the history of liberty began, men
have talked about their rights," but "unless a man performs his full duty he is entitled to no
right."
The League would fulfill American duties by protecting these rights and building the
trust that would sustain and deepen liberal polities. As he put it to the industrial workers of
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Manchester, England, "You cannot trade with men who suspect you. You cannot establish
commercial and industrial relations with those who do not trust you." In turn, a democratizing
world would strengthen the promises of the League of Nations. Wilson insisted on placing a
self-government requirement in the League Covenant: "We have said that this war was carried
on for a vindication of democracy," he argued in Paris, and "if we were ready to fight for this, we
should be ready to write it into the covenant." In sum, the League was a distinctly positive
liberal vision of America's world role: the policy "of a free people, of a people, because free,
desiring to see other peoples free and to share their liberty with the people of the world."8 7
Moreover, Wilson emphasized the preponderant nature of power under the League: it
would work through binding commitments backed by collective force. Though for political
reasons he was deliberately ambiguous about the prospective covenant's contents, Wilson's
private sentiments from 1917 forward mirrored his earlier views. Critiquing the British position
of a purely advisory league, Wilson insisted that the League "must be virile, a reality, not a paper
league." The British Phillimore Report-an early British attempt to neuter collective security
proposals-"has no teeth... I read it to the last page hoping to find something definite, but I
could not." In drafting his own preliminary ideas for the League, Wilson emphasized binding
arbitration, a positive guarantee of territorial integrity, and aggressive sanctions in defense of
these obligations. Violators would be completely cut off from economic and diplomatic
relations, and their frontiers would be closed through "any force necessary to accomplish that
object."8 8
Wilson fought hard to ensure Allied participation in his version of the League and to keep
the Covenant as the first item on the agenda at the peace conference. He did so against the
intermittent opposition of the British, who supported a much weaker structure: a negative
promise not to violate political sovereignty or territorial integrity rather than Wilson's positive
guarantee. As Lloyd George put it as late as January 31, 1919, "the attempt to impose
obligations of this kind will either end in their being nugatory or in the destruction of the League
itself." As such, the British attempted to derail the League on several occasions by delaying its
negotiation until after the peace conference or by separating it from the main treaty. Wilson
defeated these attempts and further British initiatives to weaken the collective security apparatus
of the League. In return for concessions on colonial issues, the League was front and center in
the Peace Treaty with full British participation.89
The League of Nations ultimately negotiated at Versailles consisted of two basic
mechanisms to ensure peace and security. First, there was a series of articles on the arbitration
of international disputes. Depending on the nature of the dispute, states were required to submit
grievances either to an arbitration panel, a newly created international court, or the League's
executive council. Dispute resolution was expected to take several months, which would provide
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a cooling-off period and add public transparency to the diplomatic process. The arbitration
provisions stipulated that violators "shall ipso facto be deemed to have committed an act of war
against all other Members of the League, which hereby undertake immediately to subject it" to
complete commercial, financial, and diplomatic isolation, and on the recommendation of the
Council, military sanctions. Second, the famous Article X held that "The Members of the
League undertake to respect and preserve as against external aggression the territorial integrity
and existing political independence of all Members of the League." Even for a treaty, Wilson's
commitments were not exactly weak tea. 90
Nor did he consider them to be so-Wilson clearly believed that America was
undertaking a radical international commitment that might require resort to war. He privately
argued that the lack of automatic guarantees in the covenant did not mean "that any members of
the League would remain isolated if attacked.... We are ready to fly to the assistance of those
who are attacked, but we cannot give more than the condition of the world enables us to give."
Again and again he reassured the French about American commitment: "all that we can promise,
and we do promise it, is to maintain our military forces in such a condition that the world will
feel itself in safety. When danger comes, we too will come, and we will help you, but you must
trust us." As the conference reached its critical point in April, Wilson reiterated "that if the
United States signs this document it is solemnly obliged to render aid in European troubles."
For Wilson, House, and their positive liberal confederates at home, American
commitments under the League were large, real, and of great significance. Combined with other
commitments to managing European politics after the war, Wilson's pursuit of the League
constituted at least grand strategy of balancing. He clearly hoped to create a pole of
preponderant power, with America as the dominant force in an international concert acting to
ensure security, and thus, the space for liberal values to flourish. 9
However, in many respects the League's guarantees were weak. The Council could only
recommend action unanimously, and even then its proclamations were only recommendations to
national governments. Moreover, Germany would initially be excluded from the League,
therefore undercutting its universal character. Arbitration was not binding, serving only as a
method of delaying hostilities. Wilson consented to or actively supported all of these features as
"what the condition of the world enables us to give." He hoped to gain international and
domestic assent to the League in the short term, while evolving the League's structure into full
collective security over time.
Domestically, Wilson had long been aware of the enormous political hurdles that lay
between him and the realization of the League. These potential problems informed his organic
perspective of how collective security would ultimately come about. "The administrative
constitution of the League must grow and not be made," Wilson wrote to House in early 1918,
because "The United States Senate would never ratify any treaty which put the force of the
United States at the disposal of any such group or body. Why begin at the impossible end when
there is a possible end and it is feasible to plant a system that will slowly but surely ripen into
fruition?"
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Wilson argued similarly when urging William Howard Taft and other members of the
League to Enforce Peace not to publish specific plans: "He said he knew [an organic approach]
would be slow, but that the common law was built up that way. He gave it as his opinion that the
Senate" would not accept anything that appeared an automatic commitment. The initially
weaker approach taken at Versailles later allowed Wilson to parry isolationist opposition by
casting the League's guarantee as a "moral, not a legal obligation.... It is binding in conscience
only, not in law." At the same time, he argued that "a moral obligation is of course superior to a
legal obligation, and if I may say so, has greater binding force." This position was intellectually
dishonest but politically adroit. In sum, though personally determined to put teeth in the League,
Wilson accepted that he could not initially support too definite an apparatus. 92
Wilson also engineered a weaker League because he understood that Europe would not
yield sovereignty easily: "We must make a distinction between what is possible and what is not.
No nation will consent to control." Allied resistance during the armistice negotiations had
demonstrated that he could not be too demanding; the great powers would all have to agree to
join some kind of League in order for it to work. They would also have to be prevented from
turning it into a vehicle for their individual schemes. If the League were formed too soon "it
would inevitably be regarded as some sort of Holy Alliance aimed at Germany." If Wilson
proposed too detailed a constitution, he would "have incurred the resentment of the European
powers."
Especially dangerous was the possibility of strong French provisions to the covenant that
"would present insuperable difficulty." The League's initial weaknesses were partially intended
to subordinate French policy to Wilson's vision. The French were generally skeptical of the
League and the purpose of their many amendments strengthening its enforcement provisions was
to turn it into a military alliance against Germany. Wilson believed this would be "substituting
international militarism for national militarism," and he was determined to ensure French
participation without turning the League into an instrument of German containment. In the short
term, therefore, Wilson believed "only the essential lines could be immediately traced and that
the rest will be the fruit of long labor and repeated experiences." Wilson adjusted American
diplomatic ambitions to what the system would bear; in the long term, they would transform the
system itself.93
RESTRAINING FRANCE. The integrating role of the international system becomes most
clear when considering Wilson's peace conference concessions on issues of French security.
French Premier Georges Clemenceau's major goal at Versailles was to secure "a physical
guarantee" against "the recurrence of what we have undergone twice in fifty years." With barely
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half the population and industrial potential of Germany, and lacking a great power ally in the
East, France had "to deprive Germany of her essential means" of attack. The French aimed at an
indefinite occupation of Germany from the Rhine to the French frontier, the establishment of an
independent Rhenish buffer state in the region, control of a fifty kilometer de-militarized zone on
the east bank of the Rhine, and if possible, the eventual absorption of the Rhineland into France
proper.94
However, these aggressive goals contradicted Wilson's plan for the eventual reintegration
of Germany into the League concert. In his view, French policy was "stupid, petty, insane."
Annexations like those proposed would "stir up the same bad feeling there was after the
Annexation of Alsace and Lorraine." Wilson sensed "that his colleagues did not realize that the
whole object is not only to settle the immediate question but to establish a condition that will
make for a permanent peace. All that Clemenceau wanted to do, it appeared, was to put a barrier
between France and Germany-he did not seem to have any vision for the rest of the world." In
order to realign French policy in line with his own liberal vision for the rest of the world, Wilson
took advantage of the leverage provided by potential American commitments. The French
desperately needed allies; as Clemenceau had put it to the Chamber of Deputies, "nothing must
happen which might separate after the war the four Powers that were united during it. To this
unity, I will make every sacrifice."95
Over the critical six weeks of the conference in March and April, Wilson grudgingly
made two major American commitments in defense of France. The first was a tripartite alliance
between Britain, France, and the United States guaranteeing France against aggression. This
compact was independent of the supposedly efficacious League of Nations, though Wilson
intended to gloss over this contradiction by having the League Council approve it as "an
engagement consistent with the Covenant." The second was a tripwire American force in
Germany, as part of a broader French occupation of the Rhineland. Although Wilson's
acceptance of such costly political burdens highlighted the incoherence of his collective security
vision, it added consistency to American strategy: ambitious liberal ends were supported by
greater diplomatic and military commitments.
The alliance terms to which Wilson was willing to consent promised a major American
commitment. Any violation of the Rhineland provisions of the treaty would be considered by the
signatories "an act of hostility against them and as calculated to disturb the peace of the world."
Germany would be required to "cooperate in any inquiry" from the League Council-"acting as
need be by majority"-alleging such violations. The military "plans of action" required to
enforce the guarantee "could even be studied in advance," along the lines of the Anglo-French
military cooperation in the last years before the Great War. And the pledge would remain in
effect until "it is agreed by the contracting powers that the League provides sufficient
protection," effectively giving the French a veto over any changes. In the hopes of moderating
French policy, Wilson initiated the first American attempt at extended deterrence in Europe-a
94 Clemenceau to Wilson, March 17, 1919, PWW 56: 9-14, quotes 10. For other examples of French proposals about
the Rhine, even late into the conference, see Foch Memorandum, March 31, 1919; Council of Four Meeting, March
31, 1919; both in PWW 56: 445-448, 453-64, respectively. A thorough exposition of French aims at the peace
conference is David Stevenson, French War Aims against Germany, 1914-1919 (Oxford, England: Oxford
University Press, 1982), pp. 133-197.
95 Rappard to Sulzer, February 13, 1919, PWW 55: 151-154 , quote 153; Benham Diary, March 22, 1919, PWW 56:
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promise backed with the possibility of real operational planning and aimed at holding the
demilitarized Rhine sacrosanct. 96
Wilson's second commitment was to accede to an international occupation of the
Rhineland for fifteen years "as a guarantee for the execution of the present treaty." In order to
put an end to the French dreams of a Rhenish state and cement their acceptance of the League,
Wilson agreed to terms that were quite stringent. The occupation would be withdrawn in three
five year phases, running from the north to the south of the Rhineland, with the French
maintaining the longest hold on the territory most useful for an invasion of Germany and most
easily absorbed into France. If Germany did not maintain its commitments, or if the inter-allied
reparations commission found that Germany was delinquent on its payments either during or
after the fifteen years, the area would be re-occupied immediately. Moreover, if at the end of the
fifteen years "guarantees against unprovoked aggression are not considered sufficient by the
Allied and Associated Governments," then the occupation could remain in force "for the purpose
of obtaining the required guarantees." Finally, Wilson agreed to Clemenceau's demand that he
contribute at least "a battalion and a flag"-a tripwire force. America actually stationed a
division of nearly 20,000 men in Germany during the Wilson years, which occupied the middle
of the three occupation zones.97
Thus, America was forced to make serious commitments in order to orient French policy
away from dominating Germany and towards the liberal League solution. These commitments
would have embroiled the United States in the epicenter of European conflict during the 1920s,
the Rhineland controversies. Through treaty promises, an occupying force, and the activities of
the League, Wilson would have both the opportunity and the obligation to manage European
politics. When an isolationist Senator asked him incredulously "Will we be maintaining
American troops upon the Rhine for the next fifteen years?" Wilson replied, "That is entirely
within our choice Senator; but I suppose we will." Though understandably reluctant to absorb
these liabilities, Wilson needed the political influence necessary to create the liberal peace more
than he wanted to avoid American costs. Pursuing positive liberal ends required alliance
commitments and ground force deployments. 98
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RESTRAINING GERMANY. Perhaps the most difficult part of forging the liberal peace
settlement was the question of Germany's future power and foreign policy. The key issue for
Wilson remained the character of the future German regime. Would the nascent revolution he
had encouraged during the conclusion of the war stick, or would Germany succumb to either
Bolshevik revolution or a rebirth of militarism? Wilson was skeptical that the German regime
could be trusted so quickly: "Germany will have to redeem her character, not by what happens at
the peace table, but by what follows," he publically proclaimed before the armistice. Similarly,
on his ocean liner to Europe, Wilson speculated that "Germany's present chaotic state will
undoubtedly make it necessary to put her on probation" until such time as she could prove her
democratic character.
The international system underscored the inherent uncertainty of future German regime
type; it also highlighted a need to secure present French cooperation. These pressures led Wilson
to agree to a temporary exclusion of Germany from the League of Nations. "I think it is
necessary that we should know that the change in government and the governmental method in
Germany is genuine and permanent," he argued at the end of the conference. "We don't know
either of them yet." But he fought hard for early German entry into the League, once it had
demonstrated good faith in executing the Treaty of Versailles and fulfilled the self-government
clauses of the League covenant. Wilson's balancing reasoning was blunt about the need to
diplomatically control German power: "we will restrain the Germans better when they are in the
League of Nations than when they are outside." 99
In two other areas, Wilson also leaned towards placing firm controls on a German regime
whose future was dubious: disarmament and territory. Wilson "felt that until we knew what the
German Government was going to be, and how the German people were going to behave, the
world had a moral right to disarm Germany, and to subject her to a generation of
thoughtfulness." He therefore supported stringent disarmament conditions: an Army limited to
100,000 men; with no air force; with few heavy weapons, submarines, and warships; with the
German General Staff abolished; forbidden from taking any measures of mobilization; and
banned from the production or importation of munitions. "Our principal safety," Wilson
proclaimed, "will be obtained by the obligation which we shall lay on Germany to effect
complete disarmament."' 00
In territorial negotiations, Wilson often favored strategic considerations over the principal
of self-determination when the two conflicted. He approved the transfer of more than 300,000
Sudeten Germans to the new Czech state and at first supported maximal Polish demands for
territory and access to the sea. Though backing down over Danzig and Silesia, Wilson still
supported the transfer to Poland of some two million Germans in the famous "Polish corridor"
that cut East Prussia off from the rest of Germany. The reasoning behind these decisions was
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often explicitly about weakening German power: "it must be realized the Allies were creating a
new and weak state," he argued about Poland, and it was "therefore necessary to consider not
only the economic but the strategic needs of this state, which would have to cope with Germany
on both sides of it, the Eastern fragment of Germany being one of a most aggressive
character." 0"
Similarly, Wilson's positive liberal threat perceptions meant that self-determination could
not apply immediately to a union of Germany and German-Austria, which would create "the
most powerful country on the continent-and a great Roman-Catholic power," implying a
reactionary non-democratic regime. Anschluss would have to be delayed until approved by the
League, after the new regimes "have proved themselves in the eyes of the world." Though
adamant about self-determination in the West, Wilson was aware "Germany's ambitions had
always leant towards the South and the East" and worried about "ensuring the safety of those
regions against future German aggression" if a non-democratic regime emerged.
In the end, these terms were fairly drastic. By the time the territorial transfers were
complete, Germany had lost nearly ten percent of its pre-war population, eighty percent of its
iron ore output, and thirty-six percent of its steel making capacity. If the League system was to
work, German power had to be placed within manageable limits and an autocratic resurgence
hedged against. If these measures did not correspond to Wilson's pre-war international vision, it
is due to that vision's close encounter with geopolitical realities. 0 2
THE STRANGE DEATH OF LIBERAL PREPONDERANCE. Yet it was not German power, or
French pretension, or even the dubious efficacy of collective security that doomed Wilson's
grand strategy. America retreated from balancing because, at first, the Senate would not ratify
the Versailles treaty, and finally, because Warren Harding was elected president. The history of
the treaty fight reveals that the vast majority of the Senate supported some form of the League of
Nations and that the French Alliance commanded broad support. Only a perfect storm of
contingent factors allowed a small group of "irreconcilable" Senators to defeat the treaty: the
institutional structure of American government; the 1918 election's change in the Senate balance
of power; and the fact that Wilson suffered a debilitating stroke. This defeat assumed
permanency only with Harding's election.
The mechanics of the treaty fight were relatively simple. Ratifying the treaty required
sixty-four votes in the Senate. The Democratic Party controlled forty-seven seats, most of which
were loyal to Wilson before it became apparent the Treaty was doomed. The Republican Party
controlled forty-nine seats, but was fractured. The majority of Republicans eventually united
around Henry Cabot Lodge's plan to ratify the Versailles treaty after attaching reservations. The
purpose of the reservations was to underscore American sovereignty and independence,
especially by affirming that America would not feel itself bound by the League's Article X
guarantee unless Congress approved action in each case. A small group of around fifteen
Senators were "irreconcilably opposed" to the treaty in any form. A third group of between ten
'0' Council of Ten meeting, March 20, 1919, FRUS, PPC IV: 404-422, quote 418; on Wilson's decisions about
Eastern European boundaries see Harold 1. Nelson, Land and Power, Ch. 6-7; Schwabe, Woodrow Wilson,
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and eighteen Republicans, depending on the issue, wanted to ratify a version of the covenant
somewhere between Lodge's vision and Wilson's.
The treaty failed because, in the final analysis, neither side would compromise. In three
separate votes from November 1919 to March 1920, the Senate failed to find a two-thirds
majority for any option. The Democrats by and large followed Wilson and refused to support a
treaty with reservations, while the Irreconcilables voted against every proposal. 0 3
To the modern observer, the debates surrounding the treaty sometimes appear semantic.
Wilson was willing, in principal, to support the ratification of reservations apart from the treaty
document itself. On the substance of Article X, he noted that Congress already retained the
power to accept or reject particular actions recommended by the League Council, which could in
turn only recommend action with the consent of the American representative. For Wilson, the
obligation was moral, not legal, and he opposed reservations because he felt they tore the heart
out of the moral promise America had made.
As for the Republicans, they supported Wilson's basic commitments to Europe and
strongly supported the separate security treaty with France. Indeed, the Senate failed to act on
the alliance only because Wilson made it clear he would not permit the Democrats to vote for it
without a prior ratification of the Versailles Treaty. In essence, the vast majority of Senators
were agreed on the key issues of substance: membership some form the League, the
corresponding management of the Versailles settlement membership would bring, and a
guarantee of French security. Understanding America's retreat into non-entanglement requires
understanding the sources of gridlock despite much substantive agreement.10 4
From the Republican point of view, the interesting question is not so much Lodge's
unwillingness to compromise as his capability to avoid it. The Republicans had strong electoral
and partisan incentives not to negotiate. The Republican Party dominated the country after the
Civil War, and Wilson owed his presidency to Theodore Roosevelt's third party candidacy in
1912. Incumbency advantages then helped squeak Wilson to reelection in 1916. The
Republicans were sick of losing to Wilson and feared he or a similar Democrat might win the
1920 election. As Senator Albert Beveridge argued, ratifying the treaty would allow Wilson to
tote "the greatest constructive world reform in history" in the 1920 campaign.
To be sure, there were real disagreements between the two sides, and these gave
additional incentive for opposing compromise. As Republican elder statesmen Elihu Root aptly
summarized, "If it is necessary for the security of Western Europe that we should agree to go to
the support, say, of France if attacked, let us agree to do that particular thing plainly.... But let us
not wrap up such a purpose in a vague universal obligation, under the impression that it really
does not mean anything is likely to happen." Opposition to Wilson's political power and distaste
for his universalist purposes gave Lodge no incentive to compromise.
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More interesting is Lodge's ability to unite the diverse opinions of his party around his
set of reservations. After all, there was a sizeable group of "mild reservationists" who wanted
very much to compromise with the President. Public opinion also seemed to want the treaty
ratified in some form; after the initial rejection of the treaty in November 1919, public outcry
forced Lodge to modify his reservations and bring the treaty back up for a vote in March 1920.
Lodge was able to hold together the Republican coalition in large measure due to the election of
1918. The Republicans had gained seven seats in that election, several of them by close margins,
which pushed them into a majority by two seats. Had the Democrats retained their previous
strength, Wilson would have been very close to a two-thirds majority if he peeled off the
Republicans closest to his view; there would have certainly been large incentives to negotiate a
deal.
As importantly, the Republican majority allowed Lodge to set the agenda. He first
delayed the process of ratification for several weeks by having the Treaty read in its entirety on
the floor of the Senate. He then controlled the debate in the Committee on Foreign Relations,
bringing in hostile testimony from a variety of interest groups and from administration officials
who doubted the wisdom of the League-including Secretary of State Robert Lansing. Lodge's
control of the agenda allowed him to puncture the broad but shallow support for the League and
rally a core of support around an alternative, both doubtful propositions in a Democratic
Senate.106
But most impressive of all was the President's own unwillingness to compromise. He
had every incentive to do so. By his own account, the structures of the League, once in place,
would evolve over time towards a stronger form of collective security. And he had already
written the substance of the most important reservations into the League Covenant itself, by
making the Council's decisions purely advisory at first. His own obstinacy made it much easier
for the Republican coalition to hold together. Wilson's refusal to negotiate drove the mild
reservationists towards Lodge, who was receptive to their concerns.
A variety of explanations have been offered for Wilson's all or nothing approach.
Perhaps the most compelling was the rapid deterioration of his health. In an effort to rally
support for the League, Wilson went on a frenzied public speaking tour that broke his body,
suffering a massive stroke in October 1919. He was, by all accounts, a changed man afterwards,
showing none of the acuity and political pragmatism that marked his early career. Instead, he
became completely inflexible and insisted that voting down the Lodge reservations was the key
to clearing the way for ratification. He took his own strategy down to defeat, insisting that the
voters would vindicate his policies in the election of 1920.'0'
Instead, the voters elected Warren Harding, which sealed the end of Wilson's strategy.
The Republican Party elite in Washington was dominated by the heirs of Theodore Roosevelt,
many of whom shared a less intense form of Wilson's positive liberalism, supporting American
106 On the power of Lodge to set the agenda and maintain his coalition see Ibid., pp. 73-75; Ambrosius, Woodrow
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management of European politics abroad and more modest domestic measures to manage social
life at home. But party leaders were desperately concerned that the progressives who split the
party in 1912 would do so again, led by the Irreconcilables from the Western states who were
opposed to any European commitment. The expedient of the Republican leadership was to
support Warren Harding for the nomination-a candidate perceived to be acceptable to the
Irreconcilables but open to some kind of internationalism once in office. As Lodge put it to
Root, "I am much more interested in getting the whole party together against Wilson and the
League than I am in myself or anything else." But, though astutely straddling the issue in the
campaign, Harding was not really open to anything other than non-entanglement. He said as
much in the waning days of the campaign when he said of the League: "I do not want to clarify
these obligations. I want to turn my back on them." 08
SUMMARY OF AMERICAN GRAND STRATEGY, 1917-1920
In line with the expectations of TLFP, the United States pursued a balancing grand
strategy from 1917-1920, with the eventual aim of creating a preponderant pole of power in the
League of Nations. Both the content of the American strategy and the policy preferences driving
its formation give confirmation to the theory. America adopted commitments abroad designed to
concentrate power in a single pole, a strategy that required intense management of the policies of
other states. International pressures integrated the ends and means of American strategy:
preponderance was never achieved, but America's forward commitments on the League's behalf
did briefly make it a balancer in European politics. Woodrow Wilson made these commitments
to protect and promote liberal values overseas. In pursuing positive liberal ends, he was drawn
to seek more international influence over Europe's power configuration through ground force
deployments and diplomatic engagements. Only an odd sequence of events and the supplanting
of Wilson's values with their negative liberal rivals prevented Wilsonian commitments from
becoming a reality.
It is worth highlighting four pieces of evidence from the forgoing section. First, Wilson's
commitments were substantial and aimed at a great deal of international control. He could have
opted to fight a limited naval war, but preferred to wage a ground war instead. He understood
the League to represent a potentially serious American liability in the event of war, which he
supported with an expansive set of post-war military plans. In order to give the League a chance
to work, Wilson was willing to undertake an alliance and an occupation he preferred to avoid,
commitments that would have put American power in the center of 1920s European politics.
The overarching structure of all these commitments was to reconstruct European power into a
single pole, though international resistance limited America to forward commitments that
managed the power constellation. The war, the League, and the other forward commitments of
the Versailles treaty all represented a balancing strategy, one that hoped for future American
preponderance in Europe as the dominant leader of an international concert.
Second, Wilson's positive liberal values were a core driver of this ambitious strategy.
The potential for liberalization in Russia helped push him into a war for democracy. He
continued to view the League as the protector of European democracy and free trade. He
continued to emphasize the importance of the German regime and strove mightily to democratize
Germany during the armistice negotiations. Wilson remained committed to the mutually
1"8 Quotes in Dueck, Reluctant Crusaders, pp. 77, 78.
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reinforcing quality of political democracy and collective security, insisting on placing a self-
government clause in the Covenant. Expanding the international reach of liberal values was both
an object and a means of Wilson's strategy.
Third, Wilson's need for international influence expressed itself in an expanded military
policy that placed a special importance on ground forces. As TLFP predicts, Wilson came to
understand the importance a large army would have on an international settlement, and
conducted the war more towards influencing the peace than blunting the German offensives. At
the peace conference, he placed a trip-wire American force in the Rhineland, exploiting the
ability of land power to shape the policy of allies.
Fourth, Wilson's need for international control shaped his diplomatic engagements. As
expected by TLFP, the international system forced Wilson to trim his ambitions and increase his
commitments if he wanted to avoid failure. But Wilson was willing to absorb such costs in order
to gain leverage over the policy of other states. Curbing French ambition meant an independent
security treaty. Curbing German power meant a peace settlement unfavorable to the Germans
but executed by an American led League. Diplomatically, Wilson put America in a position
where it would have to manage European politics.
It is worth noting that the common critiques of Wilson's commitments miss the mark.
While it is true that the League's institutional structures were weak, the collective security
apparatus itself was always a fantasy. What mattered were America's preponderant aspirations
and forward commitments existing through the League, in whatever institutional form.
Moreover, Wilson understood that the League's structure would have to evolve, and his
concessions on this point are more the mark of a shrewd domestic and international politician
than of a failure to commit. Similarly, it was the loss of these political abilities after a massive
stroke, along with other idiosyncratic events, that best explain the League's domestic
disintegration. The fact that the majority of the Senate supported a European commitment, and
that the League remained a potent domestic political issue until Harding, illustrates the odd
nature of the Great War's American d6nouement. In the end, it was the replacement of Wilson's
positive liberal views with the negative liberal ideology of Harding that ended America's
forward posture.' 09
Counter-Arguments
Against the argument made here, two important alternative explanations might be
proposed. First, a realist approach might explain American strategy simply with reference to the
balance of power: the critical decisions to pass the buck, go to war, and retreat from Europe were
driven by variation in the possibility that Germany would dominate the continent. Second, one
109 TLFP is agnostic on whether a Wilsonian strategy could have ever led to American preponderance in Europe; the
answer depends on the desire of the European poles to resist American power and their relative capability and will to
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presence in Europe today persists because American power provides a collective good of immense value to free-
riding European states. There is no reason, in principle, why the same tacit bargain could not have been made
ninety-years earlier. In any event, the point is of conceptual, not empirical importance: America obviously could
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might attribute the inconsistencies in the American strategy to "traditional isolationism," loosely
conceived. Such an analysis would not articulate a coherent theoretical explanation, but could
point to a variety of mechanisms that served as a "drag" on Wilson's policy. I address these
claims below.
BALANCE OF POWER. A realist argument could contend that, whatever standards are
invoked for potential hegemony, Germany's massive power advantage made buckpassing a
prudent policy: the Allies would do the bulk of the work containing the Kaiserreich, but America
would ensure their open sea lines of supply and facilitate the application of British sea power by
accepting the blockade. It was only the slow military collapse of the Entente that drove America
to war. As John Mearsheimer puts it, "The United States entered World War I in good part
because it thought that Germany was gaining the upper hand on the Triple Entente and was likely
to win the war and become a European hegemon." Having defeated Germany and re-created a
multi-polar Europe, the United States returned home. Though somewhat ambiguous on exactly
what power conditions trigger American intervention abroad, a rough balance of power narrative
is plausible enough." 0
There are features of the historical record that support such a view. Perhaps the best
evidence is that several high-level policy makers in the Wilson administration did hold some
balance of power concepts. Robert Lansing, in particular, believed that a German victory in
Europe would pose a vital threat to American security: "Germany must not be permitted to win
this war and to break even," he wrote to himself during the Lusitania controversy, "though to
prevent it this country is forced to take an active part." He had little use for Wilson's idealism,
writing before the war that "force is the great underlying actuality in all history, which,
regardless of the higher intellectual and spiritual impulses affecting human conduct, must be
recognized and reckoned with in international and national relationships." Lansing pushed hard
for war after 1916, and he was joined by several members in the American peace delegation in
his skepticism of Wilson's Versailles diplomacy. Colonel House, for his part, occasionally
expressed concern for the balance of power in Europe, though these were more often linked to
fear of autocratic structures in Germany and Russia. Given the presence of such views in the
Wilson administration, it would be wrong to dismiss the influence of balance of power concerns
out of hand."'
Nonetheless, the influence of this balance of power thinking on American strategy is
open to serious question. To begin with, Lansing was actually an early advocate of real
neutrality, supporting vigorous measures against the blockade. Wilson overruled his approach in
favor of buckpassing, since for Wilson toleration of the blockade was connected with peace
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World Matters: Latin America and United States Grand Strategy (Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University
Press, 1993), Ch. 2. Historians who might be loosely grouped with some of these arguments include Edward Henry
Buehrig, Woodrow Wilson and the Balance of Power (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1955); May, The
World War and American Isolation; Daniel M. Smith, Robert Lansing and American Neutrality (Berkeley, CA:
University of California Press, 1958).
1 Lansing quoted in Daniel M. Smith, Robert Lansing and American Neutrality., pp. 60, 7, and see Ibid., passim
for Lansing's views during the neutrality period. As Smith demonstrates, Lansing held liberal views on democracy
and free trade that make him difficult to classify as a pure "realist." On the views of House and others, see Robert
Endicott Osgood, Ideals and Self-Interest in America 's Foreign Relations (Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago
Press, 1965), Ch. 8.
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diplomacy. Though Lansing did receive Wilson's support in clashes over the submarine, his
repeated attempts to bring America to war over the issue all came to naught. In the winter of
1916-1917 he strongly opposed Wilson's more impartial peace diplomacy because it was
"imperative that we draw nearer to rather than farther from the Allies." He even went so far as to
attempt diplomatic sabotage by implying publically that America was on the verge of joining the
Allies. As he put it to a friend, "I must bear the blame of having made an unpardonable blunder,
and I do so with perfect equanimity, knowing that my action accomplished what it intended to
accomplish."
It did not, however, stop Wilson's peace diplomacy-only the German submarine assault
could accomplish that. Nor did inveighing for war over the ensuing six weeks stop the President
from struggling to get back to the peace table. Lansing put it best himself: "On no account must
we range ourselves even indirectly on the side of Germany.... The amazing thing to me is that
the President does not see this. In fact, he does not seem to grasp the full significance of this
war, or the principles at issue. I have talked it over with him, but the violation of American
rights by both sides seem to interest him more than the vital interests as I see them." Wilson
could not be moved to support a mere balance of power-what he sought was a preponderance
of liberal power. 2
More importantly, a balance of power explanation cannot predict either the timing or the
content of Wilson's decision for war. Realist thinkers often point to the deteriorating Allied
position in early 1917, mentioning the respective mutinies of the Russian and French armies in
March and May, as well as the submarine threat to Britain. But there is virtually no evidence
that Wilson believed the Allies were losing the war-in fact, his view was quite the opposite.
Wilson argued on February 15 that "he was not in sympathy with any great preparedness-that
Europe would be man and money poor at the end of the war." As noted above, he continually
vowed during this period that he preferred the war to end in a stalemate. Wilson's
correspondence during the winter of 1917 is filled with assertions that the Allies are on the verge
of victory and that the Central powers are suffering serious difficulties. Typical were Wilson's
February remarks to French envoy Henri Bergson that "the Germans are weary of Prussian
militarism and perhaps of the imperial regime" and that they were on the verge of quitting the
war-"They have their bellies full." Bergson wryly commented that "I fear I did not succeed in
disabusing him of this idea."m 11
Furthermore, a balance of power explanation cannot predict the massive American
ground force intervention. Recall that the logic of the theory dictates a prudent buckpassing
commitment in order to hedge against German victory while reducing American costs to a
12 Daniel M. Smith, Robert Lansing and American Neutrality, quotes pp. 147, 150, 146. On Lansing's early views
of the blockade, see Coogan, The End ofNeutrality, pp. 173-180. On Wilson's dominance of foreign policy
generally, and the lack of influence his realist aides exerted, see Osgood, ideals and Self-interest, pp. 172-174.
113 Frank Lane to George Lane, February 16, 1917, PWW 41: 239-240, quote 239; Bergson to Briand, March 3,
1917, PWW 41: 315-317, quotes 316-317. On realist arguments about the course of the war, see Mearsheimer, The
Tragedy of Great Power Politics, pp. 253-254; Desch, When the Third World Matters, pp. 39-40. For other
examples of pro-Allied reports to Wilson, see Courtland to Lansing, January 22, 1917, PWW 41: 300-301;
Lippmann to Wilson, January 31, 1917, PWW 41: 83; House to Wilson February 10, 1917, PWW 41: 190-192;
Lansing to Wilson, March 19, 1917 PWW 41: 425-427; House to Wilson, March 19, 1917, PWW 41: 428-429.
General Tasker Bliss makes it clear that Americans "did not assume that the Entente Allies were in such a
condition" as to require immediate reinforcement and that "our knowledge of what seems to be the real situation
began to clarify shortly after the arrival of the English and the French missions" in April and May. Bliss to Baker,
May 25th, 1917, PWW 42: 408-410, quotes 408.
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minimum. The same cost saving logic implies that, should greater efforts be required, a naval
and financial commitment to protect British sea power would be more appropriate. After all,
from a balance of power perspective, the real threat to the Western hemisphere would be the
removal of the British fleet and the disappearance of a regional rival to Germany. Combining
American naval forces with their British counterpart to meet the submarine threat and tapping the
American financial juggernaut would both be low cost ways to keep passing the buck while
fending off British defeat. 14
The American ground force commitment was by no means a forgone conclusion. House
urged Wilson to "constitute ourselves a huge reservoir to supply the Allies with the things they
most need. No one looks with favor upon our raising a large army at the moment...." At the
President's war council on March 20, 1917, he was advised by several cabinet members that "we
could best aid the Allies by standing back of their credit, by underwriting their loans" and that
America should not "plan to do more than to use our navy and to give financial aid." Voices
outside the administration were similarly ambivalent. As Senator Thomas Martin said when told
the Army needed money for operations in France, "Good Lord! You're not going to send soldiers
over there, are you?" But a large overseas commitment was precisely what Wilson intended. As
I argue above, Wilson had been planning since early February for a sizeable ground force
deployment if his peace diplomacy failed. Once it became clear that military factors meant
armed neutrality was nothing more than a naval war on behalf of the British, Wilson opted for
building a large expeditionary force. Such a force was not needed to maintain a balance in
Europe, but was the only tool that offered Wilson's liberal strategy the hope of success.
Finally, the balance of power offers little in the way of explaining Wilson's peace
conference diplomacy. Whatever Wilson achieved or failed to achieve, he actively sought to
build a system based on collective security. To build this system, he made political and military
commitments that would have put America at the heart of European politics in the 1920s. And
as we have seen, the downfall of his strategy at home was not caused by a mass movement
against overseas commitments. The French guarantee treaty was extremely popular, and fully
eighty percent of the Senate was willing to accept some form of commitment to Europe.
Although it was surely the case that European security conditions permitted the eventual
American withdrawal, it was only the active choices of the Harding administration that made it a
reality. Absent the wholly peculiar constellation of personalities and interests present during the
League fight, an American balancing commitment of some kind would have likely been ratified,
multipolar Europe or not.
In sum, a balance of power explanation for American grand strategy under Wilson is only
superficially attractive. The major elements of American strategy-the decision to favor the
British, to wage a land war, and to base the peace around the League-were made by Wilson.
He made these decisions without being much influenced by traditional realist fears of state
power: he perceived the Allies to be winning throughout the neutrality period and mostly feared
the autocratic nature of the German regime. These policies were principally driven by a strategy
of preponderance designed to serve positive liberal ends. As an impetus for variation in
"4 This is the logic of Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics.
"5 House to Wilson, March 19, 1917, PWW 41: 428-429, quote 429; Lansing memorandum on cabinet meeting,
March 20, 1917, PWW 41: 436-444, quotes 438, 439; Martin quoted in Ronald Spector, "'You're Not Going To
Send Soldiers Over There Are You!': The American Search For an Alternative To the Western Front 1916-1917,"
Military Affairs 36, no. 1 (February 1, 1972): p. 1.
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American foreign policy during the Great War, the balance of power has remarkably little to tell
us.
TRADITIONAL AMERICAN ISOLATIONISM. A second alternative explanation might invoke
the concept of "traditional American isolationism" in order to explain the "drag" on American
strategy during the neutrality period and after the armistice. This alternative is not very
theoretically coherent, but it does offer answers to some empirical inconsistencies in American
diplomacy. An isolationist argument would assert that some source of the traditional American
aversion to foreign commitments-either ideological opposition or simple cost aversion-was
powerfully felt through some mechanism: either through Wilson's own beliefs or through his
concern for public opinion. The result was the dilatory American buckpassing policy and a less
than full-throated design for League of Nations. 1 6
As an ad-hoc addition to other explanations, this alternative has value. As Ross
Kennedy has shown, Wilson clearly demonstrated anti-militarist sentiments during his
presidency. He sometimes expressed concern that a large standing army would destroy
American democracy, but might be necessitated by a German victory: "we shall be forced to take
such measures of defense here as would be fatal to our form of Government and American
ideals," he told the British ambassador. On the eve of his decision for war, he confided to
journalist Frank Cobb that "to fight you must be brutal and ruthless, and the spirit of ruthless
brutality will enter into the very fiber of our national life." Domestically, "illiberalism" would
reign supreme and "the Constitution would not survive it." Such sentiments may help explain
Wilson's extreme reluctance to enter the war.' 17
Along the same lines, as a politician, Wilson was naturally sensitive to public opinion and
may have feared a lack of support for a more vigorous strategy. He sometimes argued that "we
definitely have to be neutral, since otherwise our mixed populations would wage war on each
other." But at the same time, he worried that he might not politically survive to weak a response
to violations of American rights. As he summed up his dilemma after the Lusitania debacle, "I
wish with all my heart that I saw a way to carry out the double wish of our people, to maintain a
firm front in respect of what we demand of Germany and yet do nothing that might by any
possibility involve us in the war." 118
Nonetheless, evidence is mixed on the strength of isolationist currents inside and outside
the administration. Even if Wilson did express anti-militarist views on some occasions, they
were not strong enough to prevent him from a historically strong stand on the size and structure
of the Army both before American belligerency and after the peace. Indeed, Wilson seemed
adept at talking out of both sides of his mouth on the issue of the military, assuring anti-militarist
supporters that he agreed with their concerns about a build-up but that his build-up wouldn't
"lock people into a military organization and make it subject to military use." Wilson claimed to
support "widespread training" but "with no authority over the man in training; he merely
116 Several scholars make some version of the "drag" argument. Dueck, Reluctant Crusaders, argues that an
aversion to costs is a part of American strategic culture and finds this constraint a major part of the treaty fight.
Ambrosius, Wilsonianism; Ross A. Kennedy, The Wil/ to Believe; Ambrosius, Woodrow Wilson and the American
Diplomatic Tradition all stress that Wilson had elements of either ideological opposition or cost concerns when
contemplating American commitments. J. A. Thompson, "Woodrow Wilson and World War I: A Reappraisal,"
Journal ofAmerican Studies 19, no. 3 (December 1985): 325-348, argues that public opinion is responsible for the
sometimes contorted nature of Wilsonian foreign policy.
117 Ross A. Kennedy, The Will to Believe, pp. 27, 129.
118 Thompson, "Woodrow Wilson and World War I," pp. 331, 334.
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volunteers." This universal voluntary service made little sense, but then the logic of the proposal
was probably not central to its purpose-as Wilson noted in the same meeting, "I haven't the
least regard for logic." Evidently, Wilson's ideological opposition was not strong enough to get
in the way of several important strategic decisions. 19
Wilson was also just as willing to spurn or shape public opinion as he was to yield to it.
After the British refused to give Wilson an inch on even cosmetically modifying their blockade
for the consumption of the American public, he backed down despite public outrage. Wilson
often expressed contempt for public opinion while debating the merits of policy, in the sense that
he was unwilling to abandon his inclinations simply because the public might demand it.
Lansing, for instance, was worried that the President's opposition to "the idea of being forced to
do anything by popular opinion" was so great as to disadvantage arguments that invoked such
considerations. Furthermore, Wilson was quite skilled at manipulating public opinion when he
felt it was important, most notably over the Zimmerman telegram. Wilson "was disposed to
make the text public without delay," instructing Lansing to find "the best way to use it to get the
greatest result in influencing legislation regarding the arming of merchant vessels." So while
public aversion to commitments may have helped hold Wilson back at times, it was rarely
decisive."2
Most obviously, traditional isolationism cannot account for the "great departure:"
American entrance into the war. Soon after the break in relations with Germany, Wilson was
already planning for the creation of a mass army in contravention of American tradition and his
supposed ideals, built if necessary by conscription. And after the Zimmerman telegram, it was
the "isolationist" public that was chomping at the bit, with Wilson still trying to hold back for
several weeks. The forces driving American entrance into the First World War overwhelmed the
resistance of public opinion, cost aversion, and ideological opposition, none of which much
influenced policy during the critical seven weeks leading up to the war decision. Ultimately,
Wilson embarked upon a fantastically costly intervention that fulfilled the worst anti-militarist
prophecies, including his own. Other factors must explain this critical change.m
Traditional isolationism is a useful supplement for explaining several elements of
American policy. But traditional isolationism as a concept has no core theoretical structure, and
it fares poorly when applied in more than an impressionistic way. Although they may have
impacted a few decisions, isolationist currents of whatever kind were hardly relevant in the run-
up to American belligerency, and are of secondary importance in other periods. The shape of
American strategy was caused by American ideas, but of a distinctly non-traditional sort.
Conclusion
America's faltering first steps in great power politics during the First World War are
enigmatic: interim buckpassing, seven weeks of evading belligerency, aggressive balancing, a
liberal crusade, and then retreat represent wildly disparate approaches to the constant problem of
'' "A Colloquy with a Group of Anti-preparedness Leaders," May 8, 1916, PWW 36: 634-648, quotes 647, 645.
The reader may notice a pattern regarding Wilson's contempt for logic.
120 Lansing memorandum on cabinet meeting, March 20, 1917, PWW 41: 436-444, quote 443; Lansing
memorandum on the Zimmerman telegram, March 4, 1917, PWW 41: 321-327, quotes 322, 323.
12 On the public's reaction after Wilson released the Zimmerman telegram, see Arthur S. Link, Wilson V, pp. 353-
359.
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European disorder. Humility compels the analyst admit that American grand strategy, like most
social phenomena, does not admit of a fully satisfactory scientific explanation.
Nevertheless, this chapter has sought to demonstrate that TLFP predicts strategic
outcomes with surprising accuracy and powerfully anticipates the underlying logic of American
decision-making. The lack of a potential hegemon in Europe is reflected in the absence of
geopolitical incentives for American policy choices. The Wilson administration did not help the
British or join the war because of traditional security fears nor did the multipolar system in
Europe prevent Wilson's ambitious attempt to create a unipolar structure of power. Instead,
Wilson's strongly positive liberal ideology acted as a propulsive force pushing American posture
outward, seeking greater management of international politics in the service of liberal values.
And the international system eventually integrated the ends and means of American strategy,
albeit after considerable time and pressure.
From 1914-1917, the United States engaged in a strategy of buckpassing: it favored the
British blockade while confronting the German submarine campaign. But far from an attempt to
contain a security threat on the cheap, buckpassing was chosen as a first step to liberal
preponderance. Wilson was motivated by his desire to build a collective security system that
would end the balance of power and protect democracy and free-trade abroad. A series of
fallacious but not unfathomable beliefs led him to hope for British gains as the quickest route to
an American mediated liberal peace. As international realities undermined these beliefs,
Wilson's policies changed, and American strategy began to take on more commitments to
achieve his ambitious ends. The logic of Wilson's positive liberal goals caused him to leverage
his tacit alliance with the Entente, even as he strove to maintain American neutrality in the hopes
of bringing Germany to the peace table.
After 1917, America shifted to a grand strategy of balancing. When it finally became
clear American neutrality could not be maintained, Wilson chose a full-scale ground war against
Germany over less costly naval and financial alternatives. He understood that only such a costly
commitment had any hope of providing the influence to negotiate a preponderant League of
Nations. Wilson waged the war and negotiated the peace with the need for such political
leverage in mind: he insisted on an independent American Army; acquiesced in the French
security alliance and Rhineland occupation; and sought to shape the future German regime and
its foreign policy. All of these decisions were made in the service of the League of Nations, an
institution that, despite its flawed structure, would have entangled American power as the
manager of European politics. Wilson's concessions once in Europe were a bow to geopolitical
realities, while still constituting forward commitments of considerable importance. Wilson's
liberal goals overseas created an American balancing posture, embodied in the League and its
accompanying military and diplomatic commitments.
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Chapter Four
The New Era and Non-entanglement: American Grand Strategy under the Interwar
Republicans
After the Great War, the United States and its erstwhile European allies faced a trade-off that
could be managed but not avoided. Simply put: Europe could be rich or Germany could be
weak. The great power politics of the 1920s is the history of the effort to evade facing the choice
squarely.
The choice between Allied wealth and German weakness stemmed from a continent
economically shattered by war and politically abandoned by America. France and Britain had
placed a large reparations burden on Germany at the Paris Peace Conference and subsequent
negotiations, effectively conscripting German resources to fund the reconstruction of Europe.
The budgetary impact of German wealth transfers would also be useful in paying European war
debts to America. But the ultimate source of these funds could only be a revitalized German
industry-the mechanics of the economic transfer aside, any movement of real wealth would be
in the form of German products or German resources. A Germany strong enough to provide
reparations would also have enormous latent power.
The most effective possible constraint on such power was a political system balanced
with American participation, as had been constructed at Paris. But after the American rejection
of the League of Nations and President Harding's election, this key premise of the Versailles
system was undermined. The tension between a continent unbalanced by German potential
power but in need of German economic vitality characterized the shifting attempts to manage
interwar politics.
Considering this choice from across the Atlantic, American policymakers during the
"New Era," from 1921-1932, had a clear preference for increasing European wealth. They
hoped a booming European economy would profit American industry and believed that the
pursuit of riches would render negligible the German threat by transforming the European
system along more liberal lines. But this preference was weakly held, and left the United States
engaged just enough in Europe to facilitate Allied evasion and incoherence, but not nearly
committed enough to bring lasting stability to the continent.
The Theory of Liberal Foreign Policy (TLFP) outlined in Chapter Two explains this
outcome. American diplomats saw few threats and were willing to tolerate a variety of power
configurations outside their preferred outcome. Politically, American leaders pursued ad-hoc
cooperation when it was costless while avoiding major commitments to shape the balance of
power. Militarily, they cut defense spending and focused on disarmament. American security
was to be protected by mechanisms of deterrence in the Western hemisphere and non-
interference abroad. In short, interwar America pursued a classic example of strategic non-
entanglement.
As TLFP expects, it was the combination of negative liberal priorities and a benign threat
environment that yielded a grand strategy of non-entanglement. Following the war, there was no
potential hegemon in Europe, as Britain and Germany remained economic equals while the latter
was reduced to a military pygmy. The three interwar Republican administrations were
dominated by negative liberal ideals. When faced with little impetus or constraint to action from
the international system, they chose a strategy that minimized domestic state-building and
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resource extraction. Though recognizing potential American interests in European stability, the
Harding, Coolidge, and Hoover administrations were unwilling to pay the domestic costs to
liberty associated with the active management of European politics.
Moreover, the logic of TLFP is confirmed by evidence from the policy formation
process. The chief concern of interwar Republicans was that European politics might interfere
with American liberty at home. Such values are reflected in the common rationales given for
collecting European war debts and pursuing disarmament, policies which American leaders
viewed as protecting the rights of taxpayers. And as TLFP predicts for negative liberals,
interwar Republicans perceived few threats to American security from either material or
ideological sources. Thus, they felt America could afford detachment from European affairs.
Finally, there is evidence of characteristic negative liberal priorities in diplomatic and military
policy. American policy-makers drew back from anything that even hinted at an alliance or a
political commitment and favored the Navy over the Army within an environment of overall
spending reductions.
The international system did play an integrating role in American policy, but only a
modest one-the Republican non-entanglement strategy already had fairly well matched means
and ends. New Era decision-makers were willing to make some limited commitments abroad on
behalf of European stability. But when European disorder indicated further costs were needed to
maintain the preferred American power configuration, American leaders were inclined to
abandon their less important goals in favor of maintaining a non-entanglement posture.
This chapter seeks to demonstrate that American strategy was guided and constrained by
negative liberal ideals throughout the 1920s. I begin, as before, by measuring the values of
TLFP's independent variables, demonstrating that the major American policy-makers of the era
held solidly negative liberal views and that there was no potential hegemon in Europe. Next, I
detail American foreign policy from the election of President Harding to the end of President
Hoover's term in office, showing that America pursued a grand strategy of non-entanglement
heavily influenced by the logic of negative liberty. Finally, I examine alternate explanations for
the strategic outcome observed in the case.
Coding the Independent Variables
This section establishes the values of TLFP's two independent variables from 1921-1932:
the dominant concept of liberty in the executive branch and the balance of power in Europe.
Following the procedures set out earlier, I code each administration's understanding of liberalism
by examining its president's general philosophical orientation, view on the centralization of
government power, and attitudes towards economic interventionism. After compiling this
evidence, I judge how far each individual resembles the ideal-type views of negative or positive
liberalism. I find that Harding and Coolidge were both fully within the set of negative liberal
ideas, while Hoover was solidly, but not completely, within that set. That is, I code Harding and
Coolidge as "Negative Liberal: High" and Hoover as "Negative Liberal: Medium." These
measurements give ample justification for assigning at least solidly negative liberal influences to
each administration during the "New Era." TLFP's grand strategic expectations are generated
for negative liberal values on the first independent variable.
I also measure the balance of power in Europe during the New Era. I do so by examining
the two indicators of relative power-potential economic strength and extant military might-
outlined in Chapter Two. I look for the presence of a potential hegemon, a state scoring high
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enough on one or both of these measurements that it could plausibly conquer the European
system. Economic data reveal that Britain and Germany remained the leading great powers of
Europe, but that neither was obviously preponderant at any point during the period. Similarly,
military measures show that the French military was the major force on the continent during the
period, though France was much inferior to Germany in economic terms and Britain dominated
the seas. Thus, I judge that the balance of power had no potential hegemon and generate TLFP's
expectations on that basis. A summary of the coding and an explicit rendering of TLFP's
predictions conclude the section.
HARDING'S CONCEPT OF LIBERTY
Warren Harding was a consummate politician and party man, never one to let principle
stand in the way of electoral success. The son of a soldier in the Union Army, Harding's
birthright Republicanism was reinforced by his successful career as a publisher and journalist in
the growing town of Marion, Ohio. Although not prone to deep meditations on the nature of
American liberty, Harding nonetheless absorbed a reasonably consistent political philosophy
from his Ohio background: the "stand pat" negative liberalism of the nineteenth century
Republican Party. I examine his views on issues of general philosophy, centralization of power,
and the role of government in the economy. I find that, while his commitment to particular
policy positions was politically malleable, his fundamental orientation was uncompromising. I
code him as "Negative Liberal: High."'
PHILOSOPHY. In an era of rapid social, economic, and political change, Harding favored
a return to a traditional understanding of American government. A fierce opponent of the
Progressive movement in Ohio politics, he was a consistent skeptic of reform measures of all
types. Editorializing in one of his newspapers, the Marion Star, he wrote in 1911 that "the force
of moral law has been ignored in seeking cure-alls in statutory laws enacted by men. There has
been more concentration on civic correction than moral redemption.... The latter must come first
and must have its beginnings in the individual heart." His distaste for government intervention
on behalf of moral ends made him personally skeptical of Prohibition, though he would later
abandon that position for political reasons. "Restraint, people will submit to," Harding thought,
"But absolute interdiction-that is felt to be destructive of personal liberty." He saw an essential
opposition between liberty and state coercion, urging that "we need vastly more freedom than we
do regulation." His negative liberal views of state and society were summed up nicely in the title
of an article he wrote in 1920: "Less government in business and more business in government."2
Harding also took a dim view of the Progressive faith in direct democracy, preferring the
"representative democracy" he thought characteristic of America. He attacked the direct
primary, popular initiative proposals, and referenda and recall provisions as inconsistent with the
Founder's concerns about tyranny of the majority. After changes were made to the Ohio
1The literature on Harding is very thin. In addition to those cited below, the following works are helpful: John W.
Dean, Warren G. Harding (New York: Times Books, 2004); Francis Russell, The Shadow of Blooming Grove:
Warren G. Harding in His Times (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1968); Eugene P. Trani and David L. Wilson, The
Presidency of Warren G. Harding (Lawrence, KS: University Press Of Kansas, 1977); Robert K. Murray, The
Politics of Normalcy: Governmental Theory and Practice in the Harding-Coolidge Era (New York: W. W. Norton
& Company, Inc., 1973).
2 Randolph Chandler Downes, The Rise of Warren Gamaliel Harding, 1865-1920 (Columbus, OH: Ohio State
University Press, 1970), p. 42; see also pp. 38-45; Robert K. Murray, The Harding Era: Warren G. Harding and his
Administration (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 1969), p. 171.
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constitution following the Republican defeat in 1912, Harding thundered against them that that
"The unrestricted power of municipalities, the provisions for public ownership, the initiative and
referendum in law making and constitutional changes-these are the avenues for socialistic
advance." Progressive democracy made lawmaking "subject to the momentary whims of the
people," while representative democracy permitted "conference, comparison of notes and
exchange of opinion." It was "upon this principal that we have made orderly progress and
unequaled advancement," not least because factions could be checked from hijacking the
government and wrecking business. Harding's was the negative liberal faith of "representative
democracy as adopted in the Federal Constitution." 3
CENTRALIZATION OF POWER. Harding resolutely opposed further concentration of power
in the hands of government, defending traditional constitutional forms. No doubt these opinions
were more strongly held when the Republican Party was in opposition; nevertheless, Harding
attacked centralizing tendencies over several decades at all levels of government. For instance,
the Ohio Constitutional revisions of 1912 were damned not just for their reliance on direct
democracy, but also for their tendency to centralize power in the hands of government and
undercut the separation of powers. "The revolution is on," Harding wrote. "A crowd of selfish
schemers and socialistic dreamers... have opened the floodgates for every form of government
experiment and folly; they have swept away the legal safeguards of a century.... The judiciary
has been revolutionized and no man can henceforth be said to have a certain knowledge of the
law." 4
Similarly, once in the U.S. Senate, Harding became an (unsurprising, perhaps) opponent
of executive power. Opposing the Overman Act, which gave President Wilson the authority to
reorganize government as he saw fit during the war, Harding claimed that Congress might as
well "complete the program by delegating the taxing and appropriating power, adjourn, and go
home." He defended his opposition with the argument that rather than "create a smoke screen
for a retreat from our boasted popular government to the establishment of a complete dictatorship
I think I would rather fight a bit." Throughout his six-year Senate career Harding was a reliable
opponent of increasing government power or centralizing American institutions. He would later
explain his opposition to extra-legally ousting socialists from public life during the Red Scare as
a defense of existing institutions. As he summed up his defense of government structure then:
"if one who sometimes elects to go back to an old and efficient method and retain it is a
standpatter, then I am going to chose to be one." 5
ECONOMIC AND FISCAL VIEWS. Harding's negative liberal attitudes are evident most
clearly in his virulent opposition to govemment regulation of the economy. He was a dyed-in-
the-wool fiscal conservative, favoring a balanced budget and tight money, the latter preference
dating back to his strong opposition to free silver at the turn of the century. He saw most
government attempts at economic regulation as little less than tyrannical attempts to subvert
negative liberal rights. The income tax was "the socialistic drift of the day. One man has talent
and industry, and saves and acquires; he must be penalized for these because the man who
spends his all, or lacks talent and industry, demands the unnatural equalization." Progressive
victories in Ohio meant "Property has been stripped of its rights, and provision made to plunder
3 Downes, The Rise of Warren Gamaliel Harding, pp. 192, 177, 178, 220.
4 Ibid., pp. 192-193.
5 Ibid., p. 271; Ellis G. Boatmon, "Evolution of a President: The Political Apprenticeship of Warren G. Harding"
(Ph.D. Dissertation, University of South Carolina, 1966), p. 70.
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it in the interest of the idle and improvident." The sad result was that "Burdens have been placed
upon enterprise which will drive capital into other and saner states." 6
Harding naturally looked very favorably upon business. To him, businessmen had always
been the real "progressives," and he frequently called for government to "strike the shackles off
of industry." He defended the laissez-faire economic system in classical liberal terms:
"Reasonably left alone, business will adjust itself to the small competitor, because we cannot
abolish mediocrity nor eliminate failure. The survival of the fit will obtain as long as
competition endures.... Cheapened output means larger production attended by lowered
percentage of profit, and the pinch of competition will ever remain until paternalism or
socialism, or both, abolish the rewards of merit." Speaking in opposition to the public
production of naval armaments, he argued that it would kill the spirit of private enterprise,
"which made us what we are." It was "the wizards of iron and steel" that had made America
great. Free-enterprise had made America such a going concern: "our capital is uncounted and
our credit unlimited and our stockholders, the American people." Harding was committed to
preserving the capitalist system from government encroachment.
Conversely, Harding had a typical negative liberal opposition to the labor movement. He
began his career by opposing the eight-hour day, though he later relented as the idea became
more popular. After all, "the more a man works the more he will earn and save, and few men
working for themselves will stop at eight hours a day." Labor agitation for such measures would
only harm the market system: "with the reduction in hours will come that struggle between
capital and labor... which will further unsettle the business interests of the country." Harding
strongly favored a right to work, arguing that "It is more tyrannical than [anything that] has yet
been charged against capital to deny any man the right to earn an honest living." Strikes were an
anarchist plot where "The most essential of personal rights was violated. Every man had the
right to seek employment as he chose;" strike-breakers were to be lionized for standing up to the
"Czars of labor." Harding praised Ohio laborers for "paying for homes and for their families"
rather than "spending their time and money in studying how to control their employers." Labor
in the publishing industry, by contrast, was by and large "a drunken worthless set, the majority of
whom are supported by and sail under the prestige of typographical unions."8
COMPOSITE CODE. Though by no means a deep thinker, Warren Harding still expounded
a reasonably consistent worldview. It was the negative liberal outlook of nineteenth century
America, which Harding refused to abandon in the face of the challenges of the twentieth
century. He viewed government as the enemy of liberty and associated unrestrained capitalism
with freedom and progress. Democracy as instituted by the Founders' constitutional design was
to be praised, but the positive liberal vision of democratic political control was anathema.
Harding defended a variety of negative liberal rights and worried that they would be trampled if
power were centralized in the federal government and free reign given to the executive branch.
Most of all, Harding detested interference in the market economy. His views of business and
labor seem almost a caricature to the contemporary observer. In short, Harding was fully within
the set of negative liberal opinion.
COOLIDGE'S CONCEPT OF LIBERTY
6 Murray, The Harding Era, p. 171; Downes, The Rise of Warren Gamaliel Harding, pp. 194, 193, see also pp. 39-
41.
7 Murray, The Harding Era, p. 171; Downes, The Rise of Warren Gamaliel Harding, pp. 222, 240.
8 Downes, The Rise of Warren Gamaliel Harding, pp. 82, 83, 90, 86, 80, 8 1.
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Calvin Coolidge's upbringing was in the backcountry of rural Vermont, his education
received at small town Amherst College, and his political career largely spent on Beacon Hill in
big city Boston. Coolidge's political philosophy was shaped by all three experiences, ending up
a consistent example of negative liberal thought. I investigate Coolidge's views across the
categories of basic philosophy, attitudes towards political centralization, and ideas about
government intervention in the economy. I find that, although his political constituency at times
shaped his public behavior, his private views were a vintage example of negative liberalism. I
code him as "Negative Liberal: High."
PHILOSOPHY. Calvin Coolidge's political philosophy was textbook classical liberalism.
He saw liberty in terms of natural rights whose protection was the central legitimate purpose of
government. Democracy was interpreted as a system of restraints that prevented the abuse of
government power. The role of government was correspondingly small, although Coolidge did
recognize a duty to collectively care for those who could not care for themselves.9
Coolidge usually spoke about freedom in terms of Lockean natural rights, particularly
mimicking Locke's broad definition of property. Man "has a right that is founded upon the
constitution of the universe to have property that is his own," Coolidge contended, and
"Ultimately, property rights and personal rights are the same thing. The one cannot be preserved
if the other be violated. Each man is entitled to his rights and the rewards of his service be they
never so large or never so small." These rights were to be protected by government, but were not
the kind of things that were exercised in tandem with government. Coolidge thought state efforts
to improve the condition of life were often misguided, since the ultimate source of human
improvement was in the individual. "Real reform does not begin with a law," he chided, "it ends
with a law. The attempt to dragoon the body when the need is to convince the soul will only end
in revolt."10
Coolidge saw democracy as an institutional means of protecting individual liberty. In his
traditional natural law thinking, laws coordinated individual actions so that rights could be
protected; they were not a collective expression of freedom. Coolidge therefore insisted that
"Men do not make laws. They do but discover them. Laws must be justified by something more
than the will of the majority." Like Harding, Coolidge championed representative democracy
over direct democracy, which could result in the tyranny of fleeting majorities. "We have done
too much legislating by clamor, by tumult, by pressure," he thought. Coolidge contended that
"This does not mean that the opinion of constituents is to be ignored. It is to be weighed most
carefully, for the representative must represent." But, "Opinions and instructions do not
outmatch the Constitution. Against it they are void." In the end, democracy fulfilled its roll as a
check on arbitrary power best through constitutional forms: "The latest, most modern, and
9 Coolidge is also an understudied figure in American life. In addition to those cited below, useful treatments
include: William Allen White, A Puritan in Babylon: The Story of Calvin Coolidge (New York: MacMillan, 1938);
Thomas B. Silver, Coolidge and the Historians (Durham, NC: Carolina Academic Press, 1986); Robert A. Woods,
The Preparation of Calvin Coolidge (New York: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1924).
' Claude M. Fuess, Calvin Coolidge: The Man Fron Vermont (Boston, MA: Little, Brown and Company, 1940), p.
118; Donald R. McCoy, Calvin Coolidge: The Quiet President (New York: MacMillan, 1967), p. 54; Robert Sobel,
Coolidge: An American Enigma (Washington, D.C.: Regnery Publishing, 1998), p. 120.
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nearest perfect system that statesmanship has devised is representative government.... No nation
has discarded it and retained liberty.""
Unsurprisingly, Coolidge admitted only a relatively limited role for the federal
government in social life. "The people cannot look to legislation for success," he thought,
because social progress would come mostly from the private sphere: "We shall search in vain in
legislative halls, executive mansions, and the chamber of the judiciary for the greatness of the
government of our country. We shall behold there but a reflection, not a reality, successful in
proportion to its accuracy." The best way to preserve freedom was to slow down the tendency to
government interference. Coolidge admonished politicians not "to build up the weak by pulling
down the strong. Don't hurry to legislate. Give administration a chance to catch up with
legislation." Such intervention would be useful only in limited cases: "Government cannot
relieve from toil.... It can, of course, care for the defective and recognize distinguished merit."
Coolidge's belief in government support for "the defective" was real, and led in part to his
support for some progressive social legislation in Massachusetts. But ultimately, "The normal
must care for themselves. Self-government means self-support." 2
CENTRALIZATION OF POWER. Coolidge feared the increasing centralization of power in
government hands, believing it would lead to an abridgement of fundamental rights. He abjured
the "autocratic method of government" Wilson exercised during the war, seeking to return
control to "the people of their government and their property." Coolidge had actually begun to
adopt these views almost as soon as he entered public service, even though he represented
progressive working class constituents in Western Massachusetts. As he later put it while
Governor, "When I first went to the legislature I was a very young man. I suppose that those
who voted for me considered me a Radical or a Liberal. I had only been a member of the
legislature a few months when I made up my mind that Massachusetts at any rate was legislating
faster than it could administer and that the sane thing was to call halt for the time being." As
Governor, he also attacked inefficient administration, reducing the number of Massachusetts's
agencies down to twenty from one hundred. Coolidge sought to reduce state power and
concentrate its efforts on key legitimate functions. He summed up his attitudes well when he
declared that "In general, it is time to conserve, to retrench rather than reform; a time to stabilize
the administration of present laws rather than seek new legislation." 3
Reinstituting the separation of powers and federalism was key to this mission. America
had forgotten that "the three coordinate branches, executive, legislative, judicial, are separate and
distinct and neither one directly or indirectly exercises any of the function of either of the
others." Similarly, Coolidge championed local autonomy, arguing that "The functions of city
hall ought not be performed by the state house." He held firm to these views even during the
Boston police strike that made him famous, refusing to intervene until local authorities confessed
their inability to handle the situation. More generally, while the Union was "the source from
which the States derive their chief title to fame," Coolidge believed that "we must also recognize
that the national administration is not and cannot be adjusted to the needs of local government. It
is too far away to be informed of local needs, too inaccessible to be responsive to local needs."
" First and fourth quotes in McCoy, Calvin Coolidge, p. 55; Paul Johnson, "Calvin Coolidge and the Last Arcadia,"
in Calvin Coolidge and the Coolidge Era: Essays on the History of the 1920s, ed. John Earl Haynes (Washington,
D.C.: Library of Congress, 1998), p. 4.
2 McCoy, Calvin Coolidge, pp. 55, 126.
" Ibid., p. 124; Fuess, Calvin Coolidge, p. 119; Sobel, Coolidge: An American Enigma, pp. 86-87. On the reduction
of government in Massachusetts, see David Greenberg, Calvin Coolidge (New York: Times Books, 2006), p. 28.
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Federalism and the separation of powers together formed the constitutional bulwark without
which "all liberty, all security is at an end, and force alone will prevail."' 4
ECONOMIC AND FISCAL VIEWS. Coolidge lionized the free-market and advocated non-
interference. He strongly favored balanced budgets and tight money, was generally friendly to
business, and had a mixed view of the labor movement. To be sure, as a Massachusetts office
holder, Coolidge did support a number of progressive economic measures, both for political
reasons and out of conviction. Still, the core of his economic position was a laissez-faire faith in
individual action and against government interference, which increased with time and is evident
in his privately expressed sentiments.
Coolidge gave the characteristic negative liberal defense of market society: individuals
who sought their own benefit also brought about the good of all. "All true Americans are
working for each other," he asserted, "exchanging the results of the efforts of hand and brain
wrought through unconsumed efforts of yesterday, which we call capital, all paying and being
paid by each other, serving and being served." While the market order brought about
inequalities, these differences were something of an illusion: "We are reaching and maintaining
the position... where the property class and the employed class are not separate, but identical.
There is a relationship of interdependence which makes their interests the same in the long
run.... This is the ideal economic condition." Extensive state intervention could only disturb this
condition and undermine the capacity of the market to produce wealth.' 5
Coolidge therefore supported a traditional negative liberal political economy. He was an
ardent budget balancer, cutting spending and reducing debt both as Mayor of Northampton and
Governor of Massachusetts. He worried about the corrosive effects of inflation and favored tight
money. As a young man, he viciously attacked the bimetallism of the populists as "financial
heresy" and "an attempt to debauch the monetary system of America"; William Jennings Bryant
was accused of harboring a desire "to pollute the sacred shrine of the public credit." Coolidge
was much less concerned about unemployment, and opposed government action to forestall the
problem. "The state is not warranted in furnishing employment for anybody so that that person
may have work," he argued, and "anybody who is not capable of supporting himself is not fit for
self-government." He once bluntly remarked that "If a man is out of a job, its his own fault."
Finally, revenue extraction was bordering on excessive, and in an effort to hold down
Massachusetts taxes he advanced an early version of supply-side economics: "There is a limit to
the taxing power of a State beyond which increased rates produce decreased revenues.... There
is before us a danger that our resources may be taxed out of existence and our prosperity
destroyed."'16
Given his views of the market, Coolidge was naturally friendly towards business
interests. Though his later remark as President that "the chief business of the American people is
business" is often used to paint a straw-man portrait of his views, it does reflect an important
truth: Coolidge gave the benefit of the doubt to market concerns. He frequently argued along
these lines: "It may be that the fostering and protection of large aggregations of wealth are the
only foundation on which to build the prosperity of the whole people. Large profits mean large
payrolls." Coolidge's attitudes about labor were more nuanced. He represented a working class
" McCoy, Calvin Coolidge, p. 125; Greenberg, Calvin Coolidge, p. 28; Sobel, Coolidge: An American Enigma, p.
14; Johnson, "Calvin Coolidge and the Last Arcadia," p. 5.
15 McCoy, Calvin Coolidge, pp. 125, 156.
16 Sobel, Coolidge: An American Enigma, pp. 50, 97, 13.
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community early in his career, was sympathetic to the individual laborer, and sometimes tried to
mediate labor disputes as Governor. However, he feared labor radicalism and disliked strikes,
which marred the business climate. Following the Boston police strike, Coolidge called out the
National Guard, imposed a kind of martial law, and fired all the striking police officers. His
famous response to Samuel Gompers is a pithy summary of his views: "There is no right to strike
against the public safety by anybody, anywhere, any time."17
In contrast, it should be recognized that Coolidge supported many of the economic
ambitions of Massachusetts' progressives as an office-holder. He supported workman's
compensation legislation, a reduction to a forty-eight hour workweek, public health measures,
and improved compensation for public servants. His rhetoric could be pitched to match these
policies. Part of his response to the post-war inflation was to take on "price-gouging," arguing
publically that "Government fails as an administrator of justice if it permits to go unchallenged
an exorbitant charge upon the public." When defending public teachers he declaimed that "We
compensate liberally the manufacturer and merchant; but we fail to appreciate those who guard
the minds of our youth." Coolidge definitely had a public record, particularly in his early career,
at variance with some of his personal views.' 8
Some of this variance was due to personal conviction: Coolidge firmly believed that the
government needed to provide for the sick and the poor. Defending hospital construction, he
argued that "the time has come when the people must assert themselves and show that they will
tolerate no delay and no parsimony in the care of our unfortunates." Much of his mixed record
was due to political considerations. Coolidge represented a working class community in Western
Massachusetts and then won statewide office just as elections in the Bay State came to be
dominated by Democratic voting immigrant populations. Early in his career Coolidge bragged
that he could get Democratic votes because "They knew I had done things for them, bless their
honest Irish hearts." Later he would complain that he was considered hostile to labor even
though "I have signed every bill which had the backing of the workers, with the exception of the
bill to increase the salaries of members of the legislature." When one of his major backers in the
business community criticized him as Lieutenant Governor for standing too strongly with the
Progressive Governor, Coolidge replied that "my duty is perfectly clear-to back up the
Administration to the limit, whether I like it or do not like it.... If any protests are to be made,
they must be made by the rest of you."' 9
COMPOSITE CODE. Calvin Coolidge adopted political ideals that place him strongly
within the set of negative liberalism. He defended individual rights and sought to limit the
government to protecting those rights. He understood democracy as a check against the potential
of government excess, not an expression of collective freedom. Coolidge opposed the
centralization of government power and sought to defend the ideas of separation of powers and
federalism. Economically, he praised the market economy for creating prosperity and opposed
extensive government intervention in its workings. He adopted typical negative liberal views on
balanced budgets and tight money. While he did sometimes support economically
interventionist measures in Massachusetts, political necessities and humanitarian convictions
plausibly consistent with the negative liberal worldview provide much of the explanation.
17 McCoy, Calvin Coolidge, p. 55; Greenberg, Calvin Coolidge, p. 31. On Coolidge's fiscal conservatism as Mayor
and Governor, see Robert E. Gilbert, The Tormented President: Calvin Coolidge, Death, and Clinical Depression
(Westport, CT: Praeger, 2003), pp. 66-68; Fuess, Calvin Coolidge, pp. 186-187.
'8 Sobel, Coolidge: An American Enigma, pp. 119, 117.
19 Third quote in Ibid., p. 118. Others found in Gilbert, The Tormented President, pp. 78, 66, 79.
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Because of his consistent non-interventionism over a range of areas, I code Coolidge as
"Negative Liberal: High."
HOOVER'S CONCEPT OF LIBERTY
Herbert Hoover's political ideology has often been caricatured, by friends and enemies
alike, as emblematic of the old "laissez-faire" liberal order. In truth, his political vision was both
more complex and inconsistent than is generally acknowledged. Hoover's political thought-
which among Presidents is exceeded in substance and depth only by Wilson's-sought to
reconcile the twentieth century American economy with nineteenth century American values. I
trace these tensions through an examination of Hoover's philosophic ideals, attitudes towards
government centralization, and views on fiscal and economic matters. I conclude that Hoover is
solidly, but not completely, within the set of negative liberal ideas exemplified by Harding and
Coolidge, coding him as "Negative Liberal: Medium."
PHILOSOPHY. Hoover's political thought attempted to preserve America's traditional
anti-statist ideals in an economic environment that he perceived as tending towards centralization
and control. Hoover's commitment to individualism, distaste for government bureaucracy, and
distrust of state coercion place him within the negative liberal camp. But these baseline political
values co-existed with an appreciation of the problems stemming from modem economies and a
concerted effort to ameliorate them. He therefore leavened traditional negative liberal concepts
of liberty, democracy, and limited government with a broader notion of the legitimate role for the
state: promoting equality of opportunity. 0
Hoover's pre-eminent political value was individualism, and his understanding of liberty
focused on the progress of the individual in contrast to the group. The great human goods of
"individual self-expression" and "personal achievement," Hoover believed, "can only thrive in a
society where the individual has liberty." He therefore defended individual liberties against
those who, through the force of law, "hope to regulate free speech, or free representation, who
hope to reestablish control of the government for profit and privilege." And as went the
individual, so went society. The exertions of the Great War had developed an insidious group
consciousness among Americans: "many men came to believe that salvation lay in the mass and
group action.... They have forgotten that permanent spiritual progress lies with the individual."
Indeed, group rights were antithetical to social advances and threatened to undermine American
values: "Progress of the nation is the sum of progress in its individuals.... The crowd only feels:
it has no mind of its own which it can plan. The crowd is credulous, it destroys, it consumes, it
hates, and it dreams-but it never builds." Hoover was explicit in his rejection of the collective
interpretation of freedom sometimes seen among positive liberals, insisting instead that "A free
20 There is no shortage of literature on Herbert Hoover. Perhaps the best place for insight into his political thought is
his own short tract, Herbert Hoover, American Individualism (New York: Doubleday, Page & Company, 1922). In
addition to those cited below, in coding Hoover I relied upon: George H. Nash, The Life ofHerbert Hoover: The
Engineer 1874-1914 (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1983); George H. Nash, The Life ofHerbert Hoover:
The Humanitarian, 1914-1917 (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1988); George H. Nash, The Life of Herbert
Hoover: Master ofEmergencies, 1917-1918 (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1996); Joan Hoff Wilson,
Herbert Hoover: Forgotten Progressive (Boston, MA: Little, Brown and Company, 1975); Mark M. Dodge, ed.,
Herbert Hoover and the Historians (West Branch, IA: Herbert Hoover Presidential Library Association, 1989); Lee
Nash, ed., Understanding Herbert Hoover: Ten Perspectives (Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press, 1988).
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society maintains as many potential centers of enterprise, leadership, and intellectual and
spiritual progress as there are individuals."
In the same vein, Hoover offered the traditional negative liberal defense of democracy: as
a protection against the capture of the government by self-interested factions. Hoover argued
that "Democracy is merely the mechanism which individualism invented as a device that would
carry on the necessary political work of its social organization." It was only "where dominant
private property is assembled in the hands of the groups who control the state that the individual
begins to feel capital as an oppression." Thus, democracy was a valuable as check against
concentrated power, against which it could mobilize the diffuse interests of individuals who
made the American system work: "The unit of American life is the family and the home.... It is
the economic unit as well as the moral and spiritual unit.... It is the beginning of self-
government." These deep roots in diffuse interests combined with individual freedoms led the
America towards progress. As Hoover summarized American social philosophy, "its inspiration
is individual initiative. Its stimulus is competition. Its safeguard is education. Its greatest
mentor is free speech and voluntary organization for public good.... It is the essence of this
democracy that the progress of the mass must arise from the progress of the individual."2 2
Negative liberal anti-statism followed naturally from Hoover's focus on individualism
and his emphasis of the prophylactic benefits of democracy. He advanced the common argument
that the state should be at most a neutral arbiter of clashing individuals, praising it as "the umpire
in our social system" which had chief among its virtues the preservation of "an equality before
the law and a development of legal justice." Hoover believed that government should involve
itself in an activity only when that activity is "beyond the capacity of individuals or groups,"
giving as an example the building of the Panama Canal. He contrasted this position with a
vigorous attack on socialism, which "contains only destruction of the forces that make progress
in our social system." Hoover saw "many fundamental objections to continuation of government
experiments in socialism necessitated by the war. They lie chiefly in their destruction of
initiative in our people and the dangers of political domination that can grow from governmental
operation." In his view economic coercion would not preserve American liberty, "Nor does
salvation come by any device for the concentration of power, whether political or economic."
Government's monopoly on coercion was a danger, and should only be used sparingly.2 3
However, Hoover was also quick to argue against the standard laissez-faire vision of the
minimal state. While he affirmed that in America "we build our society upon the attainment of
the individual," social progress entailed a bargain: "we shall safeguard to every individual an
equality of opportunity... while he in turn must stand up to the emery wheel of competition."
Equality of opportunity was what made the individualist system run; without it "individualism
run riot" would lead to Europe's "careful reservations of castes and classes." Hoover attacked
what he called the eighteenth century ideal that "it is every man for himself and the devil take the
2 First, third, and fourth quotes in Hoover, American Individualism, pp. 21-22, 31, 24; Kendrick A. Clements, The
Life ofHerbert Hoover: imperfect Visionary, 1918-1928 (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), p. 53; George W.
Carey, "Hoover's Concept of Individualism Revisited," in Herbert Hoover As Secretary of Commerce: Studies in
New Era Thought and Practice, ed. Ellis W. Hawley (Iowa City, IA: University of Iowa Press, 1982), p. 228.
22 Hoover, American Individualism, pp. 48, 38; Carey, "Hoover's Concept of Individualism Revisited," p. 228; Gary
Dean Best, The Politics of American Individualism: Herbert Hoover in Transition, 1918-1921 (Westport, CT:
Greenwood Press, 1975), p. 93.
23 First, second, fourth, and sixth quotes in Hoover, American Individualism, pp. 50, 66; Best, The Politics of
American Individualism, p. 95.
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hindmost." America had "confirmed its abandonment" of such a system, "in terms of legislation,
of social and economic justice-in part because we have learned that it is the hindmost who
throw bricks at our social edifice." Hoover affirmed that there was a role for the positive state to
play, seeing some progressive era regulations as fundamentally compatible with an essentially
24
negative liberal account of government.
Nonetheless, Hoover cautioned against too strong a doctrine of equality of opportunity:
"Out of fear we sometimes even go too far and stifle the reproductive use of capital by crushing
the initiative that makes for its creation." He criticized those who "would assume that all reform
and human advance must come through government." Government restrictions could be highly
beneficial towards leveling the playing field, but "they need tuning to our social system if they
would not take us into great dangers." Hoover was careful to distinguish between equality of
opportunity and equality of outcome: "We in America have had too much experience of life to
fool ourselves into pretending that all men are equal in ability, in character, in intelligence, in
ambition. That was part of the clap-trap of the French revolution." In the end, the state could
only help on the margins-"all we can hope to ensure the individual through government is
liberty, justice, intellectual welfare, equality of opportunity, and stimulation to service." 25
ECONOMIC AND FISCAL VIEWS. Herbert Hoover held heterodox economic views but
mostly adhered to orthodox negative liberal shibboleths about government intervention in the
economy. Fiscally, Hoover was a conservative budget balancer. These attitudes, and the
delicate intellectual edifice that held them together, have often perplexed those who would
evaluate Hoover's ideology. Given his operational aversion to more than minimal government
coercion on behalf of his economic vision, I argue that Hoover is found more within than without
the typical negative liberal set of opinions.
Hoover believed in an American form of corporatist economics, one with a much lighter
government touch than its fascist counterparts in Europe and its American successor under the
New Deal. Hoover saw stable and continuous economic growth as the key to preserving
American society from the dysfunctional social structure of Europe. "That high and increasing
standards of living and comfort should be the first of considerations in public mind and in
government needs no apology," he argued. Judging from the European experience, "failures of
equitable sharing of the product" of the market economy led to destructive clashes over "the
division to each of his share of the comforts and luxuries." Hoover argued for economic growth
rather than major redistribution by the state, and such growth meant "greater invention, greater
elimination of waste, greater production and better distribution of commodities and services." 26
Fortunately, technical expertise, industrial coordination, and rational planning could
facilitate the conditions of growth. If information could be disseminated and best practices
coordinated, "wasteful" and "irrational" outcomes could be eliminated. The business cycle could
be tamed, industrial-labor relations harmonized, and economic productivity increased. Hoover
believed the government had a role to play in "eliminating the frictions from a basically superior
economic order." He liked to argue that the beginnings of economic regulation in the twentieth
24 Hoover, American Individualism, pp. 9-10, 8, 4, 10.
21 Ibid., pp. 34, 67, 58, 19.
26 Ibid., pp. 32, 33. For a long train of Hoover's abuses against orthodox liberal economics, see Murray N.
Rothbard, "Herbert Hoover and the Myth of Laissez-Faire," in A New History ofLeviathan: Essays on the Rise of
the American Corporate State, ed. Ronald Radosh and Murray N. Rothbard (New York: E. P. Dutton & Co., Inc.,
1972), 111-145.
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century were "proof that we had gone a long way to abandoning the 'capitalism' of Adam
Smith."27
But Hoover also held many traditional liberal economic views, on both practical and
theoretical matters. Abstractly, he believed that economic growth was "dependent upon the
creative minds of those individuals with imaginative and administrative intelligence who create
or carry discoveries to widespread application." He worried that government intervention would
stifle these talented individuals, arguing that "They must be free to rise from the mass; they must
be given the attraction to premiums for effort." Hoover therefore employed the time-honored
tactic of viewing policies with which he disagreed as socialist, summarizing broadly that he was
against "any form of socialism, whether it be nationalization of industry, or other destruction of
individual initiative." 28
More practically, he shared typical negative liberal concerns about inflation, balanced
budgets, and excessive taxes. He favored tight money in the aftermath of the 1922 recession,
fearing inflation levels of 6 percent or more, and wanted to replace incentive-destroying income
and corporate taxes with an equality of opportunity-favoring inheritance tax. He was also in part
responsible for the advent of the modern Federal government budget process, attacking the ad
hoc "hit-or-miss" system in place before the war. "The budget system," he argued, "is so
universal among civilized governments and competently conducted business enterprises... that
its absence in our Federal government is most extraordinary." He would continue to vigorously
press for balanced budgets, lower taxes, and tight money throughout his political career.29
Hoover reconciled these sometimes-conflicting views through an ideology of voluntary
cooperation. He sought to rationalize the economy through cooperation within trade
associations, professional societies, and collective bodies of farmers and workers. These
voluntary societies would exchange information on supply and demand and best practices within
industry, while also promulgating codes of business ethics and standardizing production along
certain lines. The idea was that by eliminating waste and destructive competition, voluntary
business decisions could stabilize the macro-economy and steadily increase standards of living.
The state would assist in this process by helping to publicize and organize industrial conferences
and new trade organizations; collecting and disseminating statistical data; and encouraging
cooperation with the recommendations of the various associations. Rather than a night-
watchmen state or a welfare state, America would be governed by the "associative state." As
Ellis Hawley encapsulates the idea, "The state would act only as a clearing house, inspirational
force, and protector of international rights, not as a trader, investor, or detailed regulator." 30
Though Hoover's model was of dubious economic validity, he by and large stuck to it
during his time as Secretary of Commerce. For instance, during the recession of 1921-1922,
Hoover pressed for voluntary methods to end unemployment-essentially a series of loosely
coordinated programs of business investment and state and local public works. He noted "With
the vast unemployment there came a great demand that the Government should... give out doles
27 Peri E. Arnold, "Ambivalent Leviathan: Herbert Hoover and the Positive State," in Public Values and Private
Power in American Politics, ed. J. David Greenstone (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1984), p. 115;
Clements, The Life of Herbert Hoover, p. 198; Hoover, American Individualism, p. 53.
28 Hoover, American Individualism, pp. 22, 23; Clements, The Life ofHerbert Hoover, p. 53.
29 Best, The Politics ofAmerican Individualism, p. 100. For examples of Hoover's traditional fiscal and monetary
concerns see Clements, The Life ofHerbert Hoover, pp. 227, 239-240, 367-368.
30 Ellis W. Hawley, "Herbert Hoover, the Commerce Secretariat, and the Vision of an 'Associative State,' 1921-
1928," The Journal ofAmerican History 61, no. 1 (June 1, 1974): p. 124 and passim.
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to our unemployed from the public treasury." But such "direct doles to individuals" were one of
the "most vicious of solutions" to unemployment, which would lead to an "ultimate paternalism"
and "undermine our whole political system." Instead, the Harding administration "drew up a
plan for handling the unemployed through voluntary action... without resort to any pauperizing
or wasteful expenditure of public money." Though Hoover's Commerce Department did
occasionally "establish some measure of legal coercion" in matters of "unquestioned federal
jurisdiction," in general it focused on liaising with industry, organizing new trade associations,
and distributing all-important statistical data.3 1
In the end, Hoover's fiscal and economic views lie substantially within the set of negative
liberal ideals, despite his corporatist theories. He saw the associative state as a way of avoiding
more interventionist government on behalf of special interests pleading their "suffering from
some kind of injustice, and that something ought to be done to save them from difficulties of
some sort or the other." In the absence of voluntary cooperation, he foresaw "no other situation
than the constant pressure in Washington for further and further expansion of Federal activities."
He hoped that over time, the associative state, like its Marxist counter-part, would wither away.
Hoover understood that the cooperation he advocated might be turned towards the
cartelization of industry, and he opposed anything that smelled of "trade conspiracy" and warned
that prosecutions would "properly and inevitably follow such conduct." Government power
ought to be legitimately employed to prevent collusion. But that did not mean all trade
associations were therefore collusive; he believed that even though bricks "can be used to
commit murder, it is not necessary to prohibit the construction of brick houses in order to prevent
it." On the whole, the Commerce Department was active but not activist, avoiding coercion
through force of law or regulation. Hoover even had his first clash with Franklin Roosevelt over
using government power on behalf trade associations, when he "absolutely rejected [Roosevelt's]
suggestion that he apply coercion in support of' an association's programs. While no libertarian
economist, Hoover maintained a large-part of the traditional negative liberal anti-statism
regarding government intervention. 33
CENTRALIZATION OF POWER. Hoover combined a conventional negative liberal fear of
centralized power with efforts to make government more efficient. Like most negative liberals
he favored federalism, the separation of powers, and the privileges of the legislative and judicial
branches of government. He also displayed a model negative liberal distaste for bureaucracy,
which led him to several attempts to streamline the government organizations. These efforts
were unsuccessful, and occasionally even counter-productive, but detract little from Hoover's
overall decentralist tendencies.
Hoover shared the classical liberal aversion to power, dreading its effects on freedom.
"The domain of liberty can be defined by virtue, reason, the common will, and by law," he
argued, but "It cannot be defined by arbitrary power." He therefore attacked what he saw as
31 Clements, The Life of Herbert Hoover, pp. 142, 134, 142, 138-143; Hawley, "Herbert Hoover, the Commerce
Secretariat, and the Vision of an 'Associative State,' 1921-1928," p. 127. For in depth assessments of Hoover's
associative approach as Secretary of Commerce in a number of economic areas, see the essays in Ellis W. Hawley,
ed., Herbert Hoover As Secretary of Commerce: Studies in New Era Thought and Practice (Iowa City, IA:
University of Iowa Press, 1982).
32 Clements, The Life of Herbert Hoover, p. 197. On the ultimate fate of the associative state, and on its role in
preventing interventionist government, see Ibid., p. 201; Hawley, "Herbert Hoover, the Commerce Secretariat, and
the Vision of an 'Associative State,' 1921-1928," p. 119; Hoover, American Individualism, pp. 10-17, 41-45, 53-56.
3 Clements, The Life of Herbert Hoover, pp. 203, 206; Arnold, "Ambivalent Leviathan," p. 122.
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socialistic tendencies, which would undermine "the election of an independent legislative body
or any other independent official" in favor of delegating legislative "authority to a dictator." By
contrast, it was the separation of powers between the federal branches of government that made
for a "government of laws, not men." Hoover also defended traditional state prerogatives against
the federal government: "The whole process of Regimentation with its enormous extension of
authority and its centralization in the Federal Government grievously undermines the State
jurisdiction over its citizens; State responsibility, and in the end State's Rights. It thereby
undermines one of the primary safeguards of Liberty."34
Hoover was particularly hard on the ills of the federal bureaucracy. Socialist
interventionism in the economy was to be avoided, because it "necessitates a bureaucracy of the
entire population which, having obliterated the economic stimulation of each member" requires
"A Tammany Hall... or some other form of tyranny." The existing federal government, though
not yet captured by a "Bolshevik Party," was "woefully inefficient as the result of a hundred
years of accumulation of poor administrative organism." For this reason, Hoover asserted that he
was "not a believer in extending the bureaucratic functions of the Government," preferring
instead his corporatist approach of intervening only "to induce active cooperation in the
community itself." As Secretary of Commerce, he devoted himself to reorganizing government.
The Harding administration had saved money by "slashing federal expenditures" and eliminating
"extravagance and unnecessary personnel," Hoover bragged. But these were just the first steps
in draining "the swamp of bad organization" such as the "200 different bureaus, boards and
commissions," that had been "thrown hodge-podge into ten different executive departments." 35
Hoover's attempts to reorganize government were a failure, and made him decry an
unholy alliance of "vested officials" and "paid propagandists" who had produced a "confusing
fog of opposition" to his efficiency schemes. Hoover's response was a self-interested exception
to his general proclivities: he sought to expand the jurisdiction of the Commerce Department,
where he could reorganize and rationalize to his heart's content. Of course, Commerce's
bureaucracy was "different," bringing high returns on "invested" tax dollars, "responsive" to the
needs of the economy, and "cooperated" with its clients instead of "meddling." These
transparent inconsistencies aside, the aims of Hoover in reorganizing government were
recognizably negative liberal in origin, seeking to increase executive power over its departments
and accountability for their actions.36
COMPOSITE CODE. Herbert Hoover's ideological impulses were unique, but retain the
core views associated with negative liberal thinking. A devoted individualist, he associated
freedom with limited interference from government and emphasized that liberty was a concept
providing opportunities for action, while insisting that there should be a baseline equality of
opportunity for all. Democracy's primary value was in preventing an otherwise limited
government by being hijacked and expanded by special interests. Hoover's economic thought
was heterodox by negative liberal standards, as he held a corporatist vision of market order. But
he nonetheless limited the role of the "associative state" in this vision, preferring to focus on
voluntary cooperation. He similarly maintained a distrust of centralized power and bureaucracy,
defending instead America's traditional separation of powers and federalism. Given his interest
34 Carey, "Hoover's Concept of Individualism Revisited," pp. 231, 232, 230, 233.
" Hoover, American Individualism, pp. 17-18; Best, The Politics ofAmerican Individualism, pp. 100, 94; Clements,
The Life of Herbert Hoover, p. 332.
36 Hawley, "Herbert Hoover, the Commerce Secretariat, and the Vision of an 'Associative State,' 1921-1928," pp.
123, 126.
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in a somewhat more active state and corporatist aims, Hoover is certainly not the ideal typical
negative liberal. Nonetheless, his general ideological orientation and operational anti-statism
place him solidly within the negative liberal camp. I code him as Negative Liberal: Medium.
Table 4.1: Repu lican Concepts of Liberty in the New Era
Explicit Centralization Economic and Overall
Philosophy Fiscal Views
Harding Liberty opposed Opposed Defender of NL: High, fully
to regulation; institutional property rights; within the set
against direct change; against loved business;
democracy; executive power; hated labor
limited role for defended
government constitutional
institutions
Coolidge Defender of Anti-executive Strong defender NL: High, fully
natural rights; expansion; anti- of market within the set
championed institutional economy; fiscal
representative reform; pro- conservative;
democracy as a federalism; pro- pro-business; did




Hoover Highly Pro-federalism; Corporatist NL: Medium,
individualist; Anti- economics based solidly within the
democracy as a bureaucracy; on an set
check against feared socialism "associative
faction; and the state"; fiscally
government can concentration of conservative;






In this subsection,, I measure the balance of power in Europe during the 1 920s. To do so,
I look to two benchmarks: the relative distributions of latent economic potential and extant
military might. A state that could dominate either or both of these indicators could plausibly
conquer of all of Europe's wealth and turn it against the Western hemisphere. That is, such a
state would be perceived as a potential hegemon by the United States and would shape TLFP's
strategic expectations as such.
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First, I look at three gauges of relative economic power: an index of steel production and
energy consumption drawn from the Correlates of War (COW) project on national capabilities, a
simple measure of GDP, and an index of industrial capacity developed by economic historian
Paul Bairoch. The idea is to facilitate comparisons of raw economic size and technological
capability, both of which are required to generate large-scale military power. The COW index is
a rough but useful way of generating a composite measurement of these latent power qualities
among states at different levels of industrialization. Among the most advanced states, GDP and
Bairoch's assessment probably represent more accurate measures of relative strength.
Second, I judge the relative levels of rapidly mobilizeable military power in the European
system. This measure is necessary because a weaker state could potentially overwhelm a state
with greater latent power if the former could win a short war before the latter could mobilize.
The possibility of such a situation might draw the attention of American decision-makers. I
record measures of standing military size and investment, as well as historical assessments of
relative quality.
Based on these indicators, I conclude that there was no potential hegemon in Europe from
1920-1932. Great Britain and Germany remained the leading economic powers in Europe,
rivaling each other in strength throughout the period. The French were militarily preponderant
on land for most of the period, although the Soviets were spending a great deal of money in the
East. Britain ruled the waves. Germany continued to be hobbled by Versailles Treaty
restrictions until Hitler came to power, so that its military strength was artificially deflated. In
short, European power was fractured and systemic pressures were minimal.
LATENT POWER. Table 4.2 records the relative economic potential of the four major
European great powers in several years according to the COW index; it also displays the 1928
figure for Bairoch's index, which is his representative year for the 1920s. The COW data are
expressed as percentages of total of great power energy and steel production; energy
consumption and steel production are given equal weights. Bairoch's index is expressed relative
to the industrial level of Great Britain in 1900, which is scored as 100. The index is a weighted
output of cutting edge industries in each country, including a number of high technology
industries reflective of the ability to wage modem war. The data show that by the mid-1920s,
Germany had recovered to become Europe's premier economic power. However, Britain was
close behind; the ratio between different power levels hovers around 1.15 over the course of the
decade. 37
Table 4.2: Relative European Industrial Power, 1920-1930
1920 1925 1930 1928 (Bairoch)
Germany 38.1 39.2 34.2 158
Britain 46.7 34.2 29.5 135
37 The rationale behind the simple COW index is discussed in John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power
Politics (New York: Norton, 2001), pp. 60-75. Raw data is from the "National Military Capabilities" dataset
associated with J. David Singer, "Reconstructing the Correlates of War Dataset on Material Capabilities of States,
1816 -1985," International Interactions 14, no. 2 (1988): 115-132. My figures include only the four major powers;
slightly different figures will be arrived if Italy is included.
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France 13.2 20.9 20.2 82
Soviet Union 2.0 5.8 14.1 72
Ger/Br .82 1.15 1.16 1.17
Table 4.3 compares German and British GDP at five-year intervals. This comparison is
apt for assessing economic potential between two states at similar levels of industrialization. The
data come from Angus Maddison's well regarded series and indicate millions of 1990
International Geary-Khamis dollars. They show an even closer competition, with Germany and
Britain at about parity throughout the 1920s. Clearly, there was no dominant economic power on
the continent for the times under study.38
Table 4.3: German and British GDP, 1920-1930
1920 1925 1930
Germany 170,235 223,082 258,602
Britain 212,938 231,806 249,551
Ratio .8 .96 1.04
MILITARY POWER. Table 4.4, drawn from work by John Mearsheimer, shows the relative
size of European armies. The size of standing armies in the modem era can be a misleading
measure of military power, since states can often rapidly mobilize reserves for battle.
Nonetheless, the data show that there was no clear candidate for a potential hegemon purely from
the expansion of standing armies. As the system draws down from the war in 1920, France
becomes the preponderant land power. By the end of the decade, the Soviet Union has started to
rival French strength. Both powers were economically distressed during this period, making it
unlikely they would challenge a single great power, let alone the whole system. 39
Table 4.4: Manpower in European Armies, 1920-1930
1920 1925 1930
Germany 100,000 99,086 99,191
Britain 485,000 216,121 208,573
France 660,000 684,039 522,643
3 Angus Maddison, "World population, GDP and per capita GDP, 1-2003 AD," data at
http://www.ggdc.net/maddison/ (2007). The "Geary-Khamis" dollar is a hypothetical international currency used to
compare economies across time. It is based on purchasing power parity concepts.
39 Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, p. 305. The Soviet Union is still fighting against the
Mensheviks and the Poles in 1920, explaining its high figure.
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Soviet Union 3,050,000 260,000 562,000
Qualitative assessments give the most accurate story of the European military balance
during the 1920s. Put bluntly, the militaries of Europe were in bad shape during the decade
following the First World War. The Soviet Union did not return to its pre-war level of industrial
production until 1928 and spent much of the interval violently reordering its society. Although
tremendous sums were invested in the military during this period, the fighting effectiveness of
the resulting force is in serious doubt: the Soviets mass produced obsolete equipment, manned
their regiments with uneducated and poorly trained forces, and purged talented leadership.
France had reduced its term of conscription and built a defensively oriented Army based around
the idea of holding off defeat while French society and its European allies mobilized. As Posen
puts it, the French Army during the 1920s was "unsuited for offensive action and barely adequate
for defense.AO
Great Britain placed most of its efforts into thinly stretched naval power; ineffective and
offensively minded airpower; and a near non-existent ground force capability outside the empire.
Finally, the German Army had been stripped of its heavy weapons and manpower by the
Versailles Treaty. Though cheating around the edges of these constraints, German power was
still very limited, and the Reichswehr leadership was focused on rebuilding a devastated and
demoralized organization. Given the large constraints facing all the European militaries, there is
little justification for finding the seeds of European hegemony during the 1920s. 4 1
SUMMARY OF CODING
A detailed analysis of New Era presidents reveals the dominant influence of negative
liberty in the executive during the 1920s. All three presidents surveyed affirmed negative liberal
concepts philosophically, sought to halt the further centralization of government power, and were
unwilling to intervene heavily in the marketplace. Hoover moderated these views somewhat by
emphasizing limited government intervention for the purposes of equality of opportunity and
countenancing somewhat more intervention in the economy. Together, these attitudes indicate
that negative liberty was solidly or highly present in each administration.
Indicators of the European balance of power show relative quiescence: Germany and
Britain remained the leading economic powers but easily rivaled each other; France was the
leading land power but an economic lightweight; Britain ruled the oceans but had limited
strength on land; the Soviet Union was an economic and political basket-case, albeit one that had
a large standing Army. There was nothing resembling a potential hegemon in Europe from
1921-1932.
Given these values on the independent variables, TLFP predicts that America would
pursue a grand strategy of non-entanglement during the period. No administration should have
had any systemic incentive to make commitments abroad, and each administration should have
had strong negative liberal incentives to cut costs and restrain commitments. All else equal, New
* Barry R. Posen, The Sources of Military Doctrine: France, Britain, and Germany Between the World Wars
(Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1984), p. 108; Paul M. Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers:
Economic Change and Military Conflictfrom 1500 to 2000 (New York: Random House, 1987), pp. 320-327.
4' Posen, The Sources of Military Doctrine, Chs. 5-6.
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Era Republicans ought to have been willing to tolerate a number of outcomes in the shape of
Europe's power constellation, preferring instead to protect American liberty at home through
limited liability in foreign policy.
American Grand Strategy, 1921-1932: Non-entanglement
TLFP's expectations are confirmed by American foreign policy under the Harding,
Coolidge, and Hoover administrations: the United States pursued a grand strategy of non-
entanglement. The basic premise of this strategy was that America's preferred European power
configuration was not worth the costs of engagement. The best route to American security was
to build defenses adequate to preserving the Western hemisphere and to avoid costly
commitments associated with European quarrels. To be sure, Republican policy-makers
recognized a non-vital economic and ideological interest in European prosperity and were
willing to engage in limited efforts to protect that interest. Ultimately, though, America was so
cost sensitive that it was willing to tolerate a wide variety of power configurations in Europe if
American commitment could be avoided.
The character of this strategy can be inferred from its component policies. American
decision-makers did not perceive many threats, believing America to be geographically secure,
economically powerful, and safe from emerging illiberalism in Europe. Diplomatically,
American policy abjured alliances, made few political commitments of any type, and only
engaged economically in the most optimal circumstances. Its principal interest was the
collection of war debts owed by its former allies. Militarily, America focused on defending the
continental United States and the Western hemisphere, refusing to take on any security
commitments outside these traditional domains. Republican leaders dismembered the remains of
Wilsonian military policy and focused on disarmament, underscoring their distaste for the
vagaries of power politics.
Furthermore, the logic of negative liberty is clearly present in the historical record
detailing America's interwar grand strategy. Policy-makers across three administrations were
ideologically exercised about European war debts, insisting that cancellation would deprive
American taxpayers of their rights. Defense cuts and disarmament initiatives further reflected
negative liberal hostility towards resource extraction and economic management. Negative
liberal priorities for cost and control are also clear in American diplomatic and military policy.
America's European diplomacy during the 1920s was characterized by a strong distaste for the
burdens of alliances and political entanglements, favoring engagement only where American
liability could be limited by superficially "apolitical" methods. Military policy was minimized
across the board, but favored the offshore power of the Navy, which could defend key interests
without getting tied down.
Geopolitical threat also served as an integrating force, although on a strategy whose ends
and means were already reasonably well adjusted. American statesmen disassembled the
Rhineland occupation less swiftly than they preferred and did eventually make a limited
diplomatic intervention on behalf of European stability in the Dawes Plan and Locarno Accords.
The Hoover administration was not without a response to the Great Depression, and it did offer
to make some concessions to buttress the disintegrating political order in Europe. European
reactions demonstrated that American efforts were needed if the preferred American power
constellation was to be achieved, and those the New Era statesmen made represented relatively
narrow commitments commensurate with the second order aims they served. But negative
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liberal ideology was highly restrictive of available means. Beyond a certain point, America
refused to bear further burdens, preferring non-entanglement to European order.
This section details the Republican non-entanglement strategy and its negative liberal
logic. I proceed in familiar fashion, analyzing American grand strategy across three policy areas
relevant to the causal process of TLFP: America's response to European threats, its diplomatic
policy towards allies, and its military posture at home and abroad.
RESPONSE TO EUROPEAN THREATS
American policy in the 1920s was largely indifferent to the structure of power in Europe
because American leaders perceived no threats worthy of costly commitments to domestic
liberty. Here I outline four aspects of the American threat perception and response. First, I
review several possible power structures for Europe after the Great War, linking them to the
fundamental tensions in reparations politics and briefly summarizing the relevant history.
Second, I survey the preferences of American diplomats for the European power constellation.
America sought an economically prosperous Europe with a strong Germany at its center, but
gave this outcome low priority vis-A-vis their negative liberal objectives of reducing costs.
Third, I assay the impact of European ideological developments on American threat perception,
showing they caused little response. Finally, I analyze the American perception of material
threats. Policy-makers considered America to be naturally secure and were therefore willing to
tolerate several European power configurations that deviated from their preferences.
POSSIBILITIES FOR A EUROPEAN POWER STRUCTURE. The structure of European power
during the 1920s depended on the outcome of reparations politics. If Britain and France
prioritized shifting the costs of war debts and post-war reconstruction to Germany, they would
have to accept the return of German power and the deconstruction of the Versailles political
system. If they sought instead to contain German capabilities, they would never see any
reparations payments. Though this trade-off had several potentially stable equilibria, efforts to
avoid it charted the course of interwar Europe through conflict, intermittent stability, and
42depression.
Europe's choice between wealth and security arose because the payment of reparations
depended crucially on German cooperation. The use of force might well solve the political
problem of German power, but it could not deliver reparations from a people who would not
work. In order to fund a large wealth transfer, Germany would have to make serious economic
sacrifices, cutting domestic consumption and investment. The most plausible way to gain
German consent for the undertaking was to offer political inducements: to disassemble the
remaining constraints of the Versailles system. Absent the liquidation of the Rhineland
occupation, the return of the Saar, territorial revisions in the East, and the removal of Versailles
disarmament provisions, even the most liberal of German governments was unlikely to cooperate
42 For thorough treatments of reparations politics in the 1920s, see Bruce Kent, The Spoils of War: The Politics,
Economics, and Diplomacy ofReparations 1918-1932 (Oxford, England: Oxford University Press, 1992); Marc
Trachtenberg, Reparation in World Politics: France and European Economic Diplomacy, 1916-1923 (New York:
Columbia University Press, 1980); Leonard Gomes, German Reparations, 1919 - 1932: A Historical Survey (New
York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010); Walter A McDougall, France's Rhineland Diplomacy, 1914-1924: The Last Bid
for a Balance ofPower in Europe (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1978); Stephen A. Schuker, The End
of French Predominance in Europe: The Financial Crisis of 1924 and the Adoption of the Dawes Plan (Chapel Hill,
NC: The University of North Carolina Press, 1976).
153
in the payment of large sums. Alternatively, if reparations were reduced or eliminated and the
political constraints maintained, the Europeans would face the budgetary crisis of repaying their
war debts to the United States. An intermediate political system might also have developed, with
some measure of German political reintegration exchanged for some measure of economic
cooperation. But the basic tension remained in all scenarios: a wealthy Europe or a weak
Germany, but not both.4 3
Attempts to avoid facing this trade-off sent European politics through three phases. First,
a period of political uncertainty and economic decline followed the ratification of the Versailles
Treaty, as the Allies sought to assess and collect large German liabilities and the French sought
to enforce harsh Versailles constraints. This period saw a series of conferences concerning
reparations and economic reconstruction at London (1920), Spa (1921), and Genoa (1922). The
lack of any Allied concessions meant that the Weimar Republic, though protesting the sincerity
of their efforts all the while, made no real attempt to pay reparations. The attempts at evasion
helped produce a hyperinflation of the Reichsmark and helped send the European economy into a
tailspin. The conclusion of this drama was the French occupation of the industrial Ruhr Valley
in 1923, an attempt to take reparations by force with the potential to undermine German unity.4
There followed a brief period of stabilization and growth after the American intervention
on behalf of the Dawes plan and Locarno accords of 1924 and 1925. These modest efforts by the
Coolidge administration succeeded in over-throwing the major part of the post-Versailles power
structure. Under the Dawes Plan, German payments were rescheduled and France was deprived
of her artificial hegemony under the Versailles Treaty-though importantly, a final reparations
settlement was postponed. The Locarno accords created a nascent European security system,
where all the western great powers pledged to guarantee the Franco-German border. American
private loans flowed into Europe, continental economies took off, and France and Germany
briefly pursued a process of political negotiation and accommodation.
Finally, Europe saw a calamitous descent into economic deprivation and political turmoil
following the onset of the Great Depression and the rise of Hitler. Economic pressure brought
the contradictions of the Dawes plan to the fore, but further American intervention appeared too
costly to Republican leaders. Political and economic chaos ensued. War debtors defaulted,
reparations were dispensed with, and the remains of the Versailles constraints disassembled.
Faced with a choice between wealth and security, Europe ended up with the worst of both
worlds: economic weakness and an unconstrained Third Reich.
43 Was it even possible for Germany to pay large reparations? The high end of various different reparations
proposals amounted to a yearly annuity of, roughly, about 7% of Weimar Germany's interwar GDP after its
economy had recovered. Economically, there are several examples of unilateral transfers on such a scale since the
industrial revolution, including Britain's capital export during the first globalization, France's first year of
reparations to Germany after the war of 1870, and perhaps the American capital transfer during the First World War.
See Trachtenberg, Reparation in World Politics: France and European Economic Diplomacy, 1916-1923, pp. 66-
68; Stephen A. Schuker, American Reparations to Germany, 1919-33: Implications for the Third World Debt Crisis
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1988), pp. 17-19. Politically, this is an enormous sum, equivalent to the
cost of two Marshall Plans a year for a generation, and would have required substantial austerity measures in
Germany. Additionally, the political will among the European Allies to take the money was dubious: a
reinvigorated German economy would have caused adjustment difficulties in their own industries.
44 For the basic history recounted in the next three paragraphs see the works cited earlier in this subsection and Sally
Marks, The Illusion of Peace: International Relations in Europe, 1918-1933 (New York: Palgrave Macmillan,
1976).
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REPUBLICAN VISIONS FOR EUROPE. American decision-makers had a vision for how the
tensions in European politics were to be managed: interwar Republicans were basically pro-
German revisionists. They imagined a Germany economically rehabilitated, politically
integrated into the European system, democratically governed, and economically cooperative
with all of Europe. Such an outcome would turn Europe from a battleground into a marketplace,
benefiting American trade, European prosperity, and world peace-the conventional liberal
vision of international politics. However, the preference for this idealized political order was
weak. American diplomats were, in fact, willing to tolerate a range of political configurations,
so long as they did not require the involvement of the American pole. The American grand
strategy was one of non-entanglement.4 5
America's interest in Europe stemmed from its economic goals, which required a
settlement of the reparations dispute. As Hoover argued in a memo to Harding that Europe's
problems lay "in the economic relationships of France and Germany alone." He thought that "In
the last analysis the rebuilding of economic life among [western and central Europeans] is of
daily importance to every worker or farmer in our country and the whole world." Harding's
Secretary of State Charles Evans Hughes agreed, and told the French ambassador he "would not
disclaim the intense interest that the American Government felt in the settlement of the matter of
reparations; that this lay at the foundation of the economic recuperation of Europe which was of
concern to the whole world and in a very important degree to the United States."46
Washington foresaw a business-like renegotiation of the European order. A reparations
settlement did not mean France had to abandon any hope of payments. "No one desired to see
Germany escape her just obligations," Hughes claimed, and "No one desired to see France
sacrifice a Sou of what she was entitled to obtain." But "the fact remained that France could not
get any more than Germany could pay." France would have to adjust its claims on an
economically reasonable basis-there was no "pot of gold in the Ruhr that the French could go
and pick up... The only pot of gold there was a net balance that would remain after expenses as a
result of production and trade." Implicitly, assuring even reduced reparations terms would
require French political concessions.4 7
Politically, American policy-makers hoped for a process of peaceful change in
Germany's favor. All three Republican administrations had at least a modest preference for the
evacuation of the Rhineland and the termination of military controls on Germany. As Henry
Stimson, Secretary of State under Hoover, put it, the "occupation of the Rhineland" was a policy
"this Government was not interested for its own sake, but was acting on the requests of its
associates." American statesmen also favored revisions in Germany's favor to the eastern border
disputes in Danzig, Upper Silesia, and the Polish Corridor. That all of these changes would
threaten French security was acknowledged by Washington, but did not elicit serious concern.
45 In addition to the works cited in this section, scholars stressing the disengaged nature of American strategy during
the 1920s include Margot Lounia, Triumph and Downfall: America's Pursuit of Peace and Prosperity, 1921-1933
(Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers, 2000); Arnold A. Offner, The Origins of the Second World War: American
Foreign Policy and World Politics 1917-1941 (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1975); Benjamin D. Rhodes, United
States Foreign Policy in the Interwar Period, 1918-1941: The Golden Age ofAmerican Diplomatic and Military
Complacency (Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers, 2001).
46 Melvyn P. Leffler, The Elusive Quest: America's Pursuit of European Stability and French Security, 1919-1933
(Chapel Hill, N.C. University of North Carolina Press, 1979), pp. 40, 54-55; Hughes to Jusserand, December 14,
1922, FRUS, 1922,11: 187-192, quote 188.
47 Hughes to Jusserand, December 14, 1922, FRUS, 1922,11: 187-192, quotes 189, 191.
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The whole tenor American policy was well summed up in a 1929 State Department conference
on French security: "the rub came down to the definition of the word 'security.' If the French
meant the perpetual freezing of the postwar status quo, including the maintenance of unjust and
bitterly resented treaty provisions, and a preponderant military force to guarantee it, then we
could not agree with them. Our idea was a tranquilized Europe, which meant the solution, one
by one, and by peaceful means, of the problems that were preventing it from settling down."48
But policy on behalf of this yearned for reordering of the balance of power was subject to
fundamental ideological limits. Negative liberal views dominated each administration, which
meant that any overseas engagement was subjected to a rigorous test of cost. To begin with,
Washington believed the costs of disengagement were low. Hoover argued that America could
"reestablish its material prosperity and comfort without European trade," a view he continued to
hold even at the height of the Great Depression. Similarly, even the generally pro-export
Treasury Department noted that "this country may enjoy a great deal of prosperity even when
very unsatisfactory conditions prevail abroad." Diplomats felt America could be made more
prosperous by European stability, but saw the home market as an essentially economically self-
contained system: the world's biggest free trade area. They therefore believed American
interests were engaged by the political imbroglio surrounding reparations, but were not willing to
make major sacrifices for its resolution. As Leffler aptly summarizes, Washington simply "did
not consider these interests to be of sufficient importance to justify the involvement of the United
States government in the political matters attendant to the indemnity issue."49
Political action on behalf of any proposed European power constellation risked tying
America down on behalf of commitments that could be costly. In particular, European political
maneuvering triggered the negative liberal suspicion of alliances. The United States "does not
believe that the peace of the world or of Europe depends upon or can be assured by treaties of
military alliance," Kellogg argued. American diplomats instead emphasized the beneficent
influence they could exercise with a free hand. Hughes defined America's twin foreign policy
principles as "Independence-that does not mean and has never meant isolation. Cooperation-
that does not mean and has never meant alliances or political entanglements." America would
help where it could, but would not become enmeshed in quarrels that were not its own.
The Republican administrations also shared a similar negative liberal reticence towards
military power and its potential drain on American freedoms. To be sure, the Republican Party
of the 1920s stood for preparedness and a strong defense, and no administration sought to
economize on protecting American interests in the Western hemisphere. But each administration
feared the burden on the taxpayer from armaments. Harding thought military budgets the "first
and primary obstruction" to prosperity at home and stability abroad. Coolidge warned that "the
necessity of lifting the burden of taxation" from Americans and their European confederates "by
48 Stimson to Armour, May 11, 1929, FRUS, 1929, 11: 1068-1070, quote 1069; Melvyn P. Leffler, "Political
Isolationism, Economic Expansionism or Diplomatic Realism? American Policy Toward Western Europe, 1921-
1933," Perspectives in American History 8 (1974): p. 438. On American revisionist sympathies see Patrick 0.
Cohrs, The Unfinished Peace after World War 1: America, Britain and the Stabilisation of Europe, 1919-1932
(Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 2008), inter alia, pp. 226, 317-320.
4 Melvyn P. Leffler, "American Policy Making and European Stability, 1921 - 1933," Pacific Historical Review 46,
no. 2 (May 1977): p. 213; Leffler, "Political Isolationism, Economic Expansionism or Diplomatic Realism?," p. 4 2 9;
Leffler, The Elusive Quest, pp. 78-79.
50 Leffler, "Political Isolationism, Economic Expansionism or Diplomatic Realism?," p. 418; Cohrs, The Unfinished
Peace after World War I, p. 86.
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limiting armaments is becoming daily more imperative." Stimson stressed that America favored
a "commercial and non-military stabilization of the world," and the State Department justified its
pursuit because "general international peace prevents the economic waste of war and precludes
the necessity for piling up economically wasteful armaments." For these characteristic negative
liberal reasons, the interwar Republicans eschewed military commitment and pursued
disarmament, not least so that American citizens could relieve their own burdens.
In short, though America hoped for a favorable European balance of power, its most
important concern was to remain detached from the system. American leaders resisted alliances
and other political commitments, cut the military and reduced its role in foreign policy, and
generally pursued an ideal negative liberal grand strategy: non-entanglement.
NO IDEOLOGICAL THREAT. The Republican priority for limited liability is reflected in
American threat perception throughout the 1920s. Like most Americans, interwar Republican
policymakers favored European democracy and felt a serious distaste for illiberal politics of all
stripes, especially Bolshevism. But although it was generally conceded that illiberalism in
Europe was bad for American interests, these views were inconsistently held and rarely acted on.
American decision-makers sometimes thought illiberalism inconsequential, occasionally even
encouraging, and never worth costly opposition.
The economic unrest on the continent did cause American diplomats to worry about the
potential for illiberal regime change. "Already the Bolshevist tide is beating against the barriers
of European civilization," Ambassador Houghton warned from Berlin in late 1922. Absent
American intervention to stop German hyperinflation, "That tide will sweep resistlessly to the
Atlantic. This is not mere rhetoric." Despite these warnings to top policy-makers, American
intervention was not forthcoming until the crisis had bottomed out a year later. And even after
limited American efforts had helped stabilize the situation somewhat in the mid 1920s, the top
State Department official for Western Europe, William Castle, believed that the Briand
government in France would be followed by "attempt at fascism, with a dictator... [or] perhaps
communism:" His resulting conclusion, though, was that America should stay clear of European
entanglements.
Americans also sometimes perceived European illiberalism as potentially beneficial.
During the Ruhr crisis, German industrialists approached American diplomats in Germany about
a potential right-wing coup establishing "a dictator and the abolition of parliamentary
government." Such a maneuver, one industrialist outlined, would be "a purely fascist
movement... to restore law and order." Houghton and Castle feared that a coup attempt would
ultimately lead to a "Red Republic," but found the attack on democracy plausible. After all, a
dictatorship "might easily be to Germany's advantage," as "parliamentary government in
Germany has not succeeded." Houghton would applaud Reichswehr general Hans von Seeckt's
assumption of temporary emergency powers in October 1923. Similarly, American diplomats
refused to facilitate the economic recovery of Poland until Josef Pilsudski's coup of May 1926.
"The net result of the revolution," the Ambassador to Poland argued, will be "a strong honest
government which will lean towards America and American ideals rather than towards France,"
si Leffler, "Political Isolationism, Economic Expansionism or Diplomatic Realism?," quotes pp. 434, 419, 421.;
Coolidge Address to Congress, January 4, 1926, FRUS, 1926 1: 42-44, second quote 44;
12 Houghton to Hughes, October 23, 1922, FRUS 1922,11: 171-175, quotes 173; Cohrs, The Unfinished Peace qfter
World War I, p. 315. For the administration's response to Houghton, see Hughes to Houghton, November 14, 1922,
FRUS, 1922, 11: 181-182.
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and its eastern alliance. The negative liberals running American policy did not usually see a
threat from illiberalism.53
Even as the Great Depression and the Nazis began to tear through European politics,
American non-entanglement trumped the importance of ideological threats. American officials
in Germany described Hitler's increasing electoral success as "a body blow to the Republican
form of government" and a sign of a "dangerous mentality at present possessed by a large
proportion of the population." But there had been "so many occasions" when "republican
institutions have been brought to a precarious pass" that "developments may still be appraised
with less alarm than if they constituted an entirely new phenomenon. The body-blow is not
necessarily a knock-out blow...." Stimson argued that "it was easy to find in any nation...
elements that are disturbing or wrong" but that he "was not going to judge Germany until I saw
how she reacted after the election."54
In 1932, the American embassy in Berlin criticized the belief "that there is no limit to
future Nazi gains and that they will continue in geometric progression" as "undoubtedly
erroneous." One of the last dispatches from America's German ambassador, just two months
before Hitler seized power, concluded that "The Nazi movement... is now on the decline." No
doubt some of these views reflect the persistent under-estimation of Hitler common to many
observers of his rise, but they also show an ideological indifference characteristic of negative
liberal threat perception. In any event, none of the America's limited efforts to stabilize
European politics during the Depression were driven by fears of illiberalism.55
NO MATERIAL THREAT. The negative liberal statesmen of the interwar years also failed
to perceive any material threat from the European balance of power. The United States was
regarded as secure in its hemispheric fortress, immune from the vagaries of power politics.
Thus, despite clear preferences for a European order that integrated Germany on equal terms,
American leaders were willing to accept a wide range of power constellations in Europe. French
political predominance was viewed with distaste, but was not thought worthy of the costs of
prevention. Similarly, the resurgence of German power produced occasional worries but
infrequent action.
Interwar politics did not produce many occasions for considering American security
requirements, but when it did Republican policy-makers adopted a restrictive view of potential
threats. Hoover's opinion was that American defenses needed to be strong enough such that "no
foreign soldier will land on American soil" but which also "must not exceed the barest necessity
for defense" lest they become "a threat of aggression against others and thus a cause of fear and
animosity in the world." He was therefore willing to sacrifice American possessions in the
Pacific in the event of war, preferring to only defend the Western hemisphere. Decision-makers
more generally were impressed with American geographic advantages. William Castle argued
5 Frank Costigliola, "The United States and the Reconstruction of Germany in the 1920s," The Business History
Review 50, no. 4 (Winter 1976): p. 482; Frank Costigliola, "American Foreign Policy in the 'Nut Cracker': The
United States and Poland in the 1920s," Pacific Historical Review 48, no. 1 (February 1979): p. 94. For an excellent
treatment of the American response to European illiberal ideologies see Frank Costigliola, Awkward Dominion:
American Political, Economic and Cultural Relations With Europe, 1919-1933 (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University
Press, 1988), pp. 87-96.
54 Gordon to Stimson, September 17, 1930, FRUS, 1930, III: 77-79, quotes 79; Stimson meeting with French
ambassador, October 23, 1930, FRUS, 1930, III: 89-90, quotes 89.
ss American embassy memo, January 5, 1932, FRUS, 1932, II: 278-281, quote 278; Sackett to Stimson, December
14, 1932, FRUS, 1932,11: 321-323, quote 323.
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that it was "nonsensical to try to ignore the necessarily regional character of the world" in arms
negotiations, since America shared no common security threat with Europe. And Coolidge's
Secretary of State Frank Kellogg summed up American policy well when he noted that "our
detached position and our geographic isolation from those areas of the world where conflicting
territorial or political issues have led to the maintenance of large standing armies" was the
driving factor allowing American land armament to be "voluntarily reduced to the minimum."
In essence, the interwar negative liberals accepted "fortress America" as a tacit or explicit
assumption in their grand strategy. 56
With the Western hemisphere a strategic bedrock, American statesmen were reticent to
invest heavily in their preferred constellation of power in Europe. As noted above, the Harding
administration clearly feared the consequences of reparations policy on the politics and economic
health of Europe, arguing in 1922 as Weimar hyperinflation began that "unless something is
done immediately, there is no possibility of saving Germany." Indeed, the British were
threatening to remove their troops from the Rhineland to avoid the ensuing trouble. But the
same dispatch concluded that "While such a situation is deplorable, we regard such [British]
withdrawal as better than further compromise because German disaster is certain unless bold and
comprehensive action is taken immediately and it is better to come quickly than to drag along."
Houghton summarized the emerging course of politics with characteristic vigor: "having
destroyed any balance of power in Europe and left France for the moment all powerful, we have
simply let loose a great elemental force... It can only be dealt with as a force. And unless it is
met by armed force in the shape of armies, it must be met by economic forces in the shape of
threatened ruin. That is the whole story. France must be met by force. One might as well try to
reason with the law of gravitation." Yet the Harding administration refused to consent to any
intervention whatsoever, content to let France's Ruhr policy develop rather than step in to
preserve a European order. 57
Moreover, the Harding administration understood French policy during the Ruhr
occupation as a malign attempt to re-cast the structure of power. Hughes believed "the futility of
expecting an economic return from such an occupation was quite clear and that the dangerous
consequences which might ensue were fairly obvious." As a result, "The conclusion was that in
occupying the Ruhr the object was not to get reparations but to dominate German industry and
prostrate Germany." Indeed, the State Department feared that France intended to break up
Germany into several states, which "would jeopardize seriously not only American interests but
those of the whole of Europe." As Hughes implored the French, "if Germany was to pay
reparations there must be a Germany to pay them... The French would be left with the Ruhr in
their hands and from this they might obtain some political security... and even the matter of
political security might be impermanent, for Germany might in time reunite."58
16 John Richard Wilson, "Herbert Hoover and the Armed Forces: A Study of Presidential Attitudes and Policy"
(Evanston, Illinois: Northwestern University, 1971), p. 9; see also, p. 32; Cohrs, The Unfinished Peace after World
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Still, the disintegration of the biggest power in Central Europe was a result America was
willing to risk. "The American government did not desire to dictate in any way," Hughes
lectured, "it did not care to make any uninvited suggestions... the desire abroad was more that it
should become a partisan than that it should be an impartial adviser." Calls for action sounded
suspiciously like calls to infringe on American liberties, and America would not "countenance an
arrangement which would be in effect the placing upon our people of the burden of the German
indemnity." Even after the Coolidge administration decided there was a case for limited
financial intervention on behalf of the Dawes plan, it refused to act until the French agreed to
every last American term. Absent such deference, "each side would probably have to 'enjoy its
own bit of chaos' until the disposition to create a fair settlement had been created." America was
just too secure to risk the high costs of departing from the strategy of non-entanglement. 59
Other potentially malign power constellations were equally incapable of disturbing
American strategy. After the financial stabilization of the early 1920s, a European balance
dominated by a resurgent Germany took on a renewed relevance, and American policy-makers
were aware of the problem. Castle thought Germany was "certainly getting enormous strength in
all but the military sense," while the American military believed that "Germany is like a young
giant in chains whose growing... powers cause him to expand in one direction as rapidly as
constrictions are applied in another." Despite a strong distaste for the words "balance of power,"
Americans understood the structural problems of an unrestrained Germany: "Rome had put the
civilized world order under one overlordship. We have broken it to bits [at Versailles] and
erected thereby innumerable centers of unrest. And against communism we have fascism, which
certainly does not add to the chances of peace."60
Even so, American statesmen felt that there was no solution to German potential power.
During disarmament negotiations Castle argued America "could hardly ask the Krupp factories
to go out of the business of making ploughs because, in war, they might make guns." Similarly,
provisions for limiting total defense spending or adjusting arms limits based on war potential
were "an artificial effort to equalize that which is not and cannot be made equal." Later, as the
Depression tore the European system apart and Germany's potential power skyrocketed in
importance, the Hoover administration understood that "The first part of the problem is to ease
the political frictions which exist between France and Germany." However, "Except for using
our good offices in conciliation we can take no part in this." Dealing with German strength
might require serious commitments, and though it might render moot any attempt to save the
system from crashing, "We could not be a party to the political or semi-political demands on
Germany that the French have outlined." The problems of power in Europe were somebody
else's problem. The ensuing disintegration of Europe only underscores the Republican strategy
61
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DIPLOMATIC POLICY
American diplomacy during the 1920s was largely aloof from European concerns,
concentrating on the interests of the American taxpayer. In this section, I survey three policy
periods. First, I summarize the orientation of the Harding administration to war debts and
reparations politics, stressing its unwillingness to assist European stabilization for fear of
absorbing large costs. Second, I give an account of the American role in Europe's mid-decade
stabilization. With minimal commitment, Coolidge administration's support for the Dawes plan
and Locarno accords helped re-structure the European balance of power. Last, I analyze
American economic diplomacy from Locarno until the election of Roosevelt, showing a basic
posture of detachment even in the face of the Great Depression.
ECONOMIC DIPLOMACY, 1921-1923. America's new grand strategy of non-entanglement
was most evident in the crosscutting pressures surrounding post-war European economic
stabilization. As noted earlier, the Harding administration was not unconcerned about the
economic and political calamities facing the Old World. Hughes knew that "there can be no
economic recuperation in Europe unless Germany recuperates. There will be no permanent
peace unless economic satisfactions are enjoyed." The advance of American trade and European
liberalism were tied to a prosperous Europe. The Harding administration was eager to support
European re-construction and financial stabilization.
Moreover, Harding and his advisors were well aware-whatever their rhetoric-that
economic concerns also had a distinctly political dimension. European recovery had to be
founded on a stable balance of power, one that reintegrated a defeated Germany on acceptable
terms. Harding and Hughes both agreed that the "only way for France to obtain real security is
by taking Germany into camp." As the economic situation deteriorated in 1923, its political
causes became more acute: the situation was "near breakdown," Hoover argued, and France must
either chose "to support democratic government in Germany or to face implacable hate and
constant danger." American economic and ideological goals were incompatible with a European
politics run at German expense. 62
But the Harding administration also understood that policies inducing European stability
would come at a cost. Economic concessions concerning the thicket of war debts, loans, and
reparations threatened American liberty-their costs would be paid through taxation, further
public debt, and inflation. These were ideologically unacceptable burdens. Harding felt that it
was "unthinkable to expect a business revival and the resumption of the normal ways of peace
while maintaining the excessive taxes of war." Europe's war had been financed "by taxation and
internal loans," Hughes stressed, and American citizens expected to be repaid. And as Hoover
noted, it was "the most unlikely event on the economic earth," given Europe's reluctance to pay
its debts, that "the United States, as a government, [would] again engage in any governmental
loans." European reconstruction would have to be financed by private initiative rather than
provide for its own solution to power problems, see Castle to Mellon and Stimson, July 19, 1931, FRUS, 1931 1:
280-282.
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government coercion. In short, though hoping to assist Europe where they could, interwar
Republicans placed strict limits on their policy: the trick was, in Harding's words, "how to fully
assert a helpful influence abroad without sacrificing anything of importance to our own
people." 63
These negative liberal sentiments limited debt forgiveness towards Europe, producing a
posture of non-entanglement. The Harding administration asked Congress for broad authority to
negotiate debt settlements with European countries, but this request was rejected in favor of
giving negotiating power to an independent War Debt Commission (WDC) with a highly
restrictive mandate. This outcome was probably only of modest importance, since, as Melvin
Leffler points out, the Harding administration "was not considering cancellation or even partial
cancellation" as it was "too pre-occupied with converting the short-term floating debt, reducing
the public debt, and lowering taxes to be generous to former Allies."
Where the rights of the American taxpayer could be protected, Republican policy-makers
aimed for leniency, ultimately negotiating European settlements that deferred and considerably
reduced interest payments to all comers. For instance, in 1923, Hoover and Treasury Secretary
Mellon negotiated the British settlement over a period nearly three times as long, and an interest
rate only two-thirds as much, as the law required-though still generating a sizeable return on
the American investment. But liberal fiscal considerations meant that debt accords were
"adjusted in relation to long term interest rates," a fair standard for the taxpayer, "rather than
attuned to the performance" of European economies. The economic pressure of the debt was
reduced, but not nearly enough to ease Europe's dire economic straits.64
The desire to limit financial liabilities led the Harding administration to resist anything
that resembled a political commitment. Most importantly, American diplomats steadfastly
refused to acknowledge the link between reparations, war debts, and the European economic
morass. "It is idle to propose any course leading to the discussion of Inter-allied debts, and
especially of debts due the United States," Hughes forcefully said, as "This Government's
position has always been that the question of debts is irrelevant to the question of German
reparations."
It was not that the administration did not understand the mechanics of balance sheets or
the severe problems facing central Europe. American consular officials sent dire warnings
during the German hyperinflation of 1922/1923 that Germans "live, literally, from hand to
63 Melvyn Leffler, "The Origins of Republican War Debt Policy, 1921-1923: A Case Study in the Applicability of
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mouth." The influential American ambassador to Germany, Alanson Houghton, proposed that if
"our debt were cancelled against other debts, a large part of the burden would be lifted. The
situation would instantly become better. Despair would give way to hope, and with hope
economic prosperity would quickly follow." But Hughes and Harding decided "that it would not
be at all possible to authorize you to make such a statement as you suggest." Financial
commitments would entangle American power, and "This Government, while wishing to assist
in every possible way, does not desire to become a dictator or arbitrator in the reparations
problem."65
As Europe fell to economic pieces in 1922-1923, the Harding administration only became
more committed to non-entanglement. Harding was deeply suspicious that "the nations of the
Old World [would] put upon our shoulders the main burden of finding a way out of the present
deplorable state of affairs." European proposals, such as Lloyd George's attempt to stabilize
Europe at the 1922 Genoa financial conference, were likely political quicksand. For this reason,
Hughes declined participation at Genoa because it was "a conference of a political character in
which the Government of the United States could not helpfully participate. This Government
cannot be unmindful of the clear conviction of the American people... that they should not
unnecessarily become involved in European political questions."
Similarly, when Germany proposed a treaty that would abjure European war without
national plebiscites, Hughes would only pursue it as a paper promise. When the French
ambassador "asked whether that meant that the Government of the United States would
guarantee such an agreement. The Secretary said that it would not; that he did not think any such
guarantee could be looked for." The Germans might "welcome any arrangement by which the
Government of the United States would in a sense be a 'trustee"' of European security; the
French might change "their disposition... even to amend their constitution" if "the United States
were brought into the matter." But the Americans would not be tied down. 66
What the United States was willing to offer was "apolitical" financial mediation. After
earlier secret diplomacy failed, Hughes publically suggested that European governments "invite
men of the highest authority in finance" to form a private committee that would suggest a plan
for working out the reparations tangle. The basic idea, replete with negative liberal shibboleths
about the tyranny of the majority, was that French and German statesmen were being recalcitrant
for domestic political reasons. "There is gravest necessity of prompt action," Hughes
acknowledged, "but I can see no prospect of an agreement unless Governments can arrange to
interpose between themselves and their public the findings of an impartial committee." Once the
clear heads of the private sector had worked out reparations on "a business basis," governments
could stand behind their impartial report, and the United States might choose to bring its
financial weight to bear in implementing the bankers' plan. 67
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But this proposal was the absolute limit of commitment the Harding administration could
tolerate: "nothing could be done without the voluntary action of the Powers entitled to
reparations, and that if they were unwilling to consent to the suggestions that had been made
nothing further could be done about them." After the French rejected the overture, Hughes
washed his hands of them. "The United States feels that it has done all that it now can do to
contribute to solution of the situation, the real control of which rests with other nations." Four
days later, on January 10, 1923, France implemented its own plan for the collection of German
reparations-it invaded the Ruhr valley. 68
THE DAWES PLAN AND LOCARNO ACCORDS. It was following the of the Ruhr occupation
that American grand strategy reached the apex of its interwar engagement with Europe.
Appalled by the economic and political disorder, American statesmen pressed for European
financial and political stabilization under the Dawes Plan and the Locarno Accords. In the short
term, the results were impressive. The Dawes plan and Locamo accords re-ordered the European
balance of power by undoing the basic terms of Versailles: France could no longer unilaterally
sanction Germany for its failure to deliver reparations; Germany was integrated into the
European order as a diplomatic equal and agreed to pursue only peaceful change; Britain
guaranteed the sanctity of the Western territorial settlement; and private American capital was
deployed to stabilize currencies and under-write reconstruction. However, the modest American
support that produced these gains was not sufficient to sustain them. The American concern with
negative liberty did not permit the kind of engagement to deepen the European peace during
prosperity or to save it in depression. 69
The Coolidge administration (Harding having died in 1923) engaged with European
stabilization only after Europe acceded to terms of American non-entanglement. The Ruhr
invasion had caused serious financial distress in France and near starvation in Germany. By the
end of 1923, after British prodding, the French were willing to accept Hughes' original proposal
for a committee of financial luminaries to propose a new plan for the payment of German
reparations. Although Hughes urged "the formulation of an adequate financial plan" without
"the interjection of questions of a political character," the Dawes approach was supremely
political. The State Department picked American industrialists Charles Dawes and Owen Young
to direct the plan, decided on an American treasury official to oversee the plan as agent-general,
and even instructed these supposedly unofficial representatives that their mandate amounted to
"just remember you are Americans." Most importantly, the plan embodied the preferred
American vision for the European balance of power: a rehabilitated Germany and an end to
French containment.70
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The genius of the Dawes approach was to superficially promise payment of the extant
reparations schedule, but undermine it in practice. The plan instituted a special tax in Germany
that would be paid into a reparations account. At the end of each year, the American agent-
general, Parker Gilbert, would decide whether the German balance of payments permitted direct
transfers to the Allies. It was expected that German foreign exchange would be insufficient for
direct payments. The balances would instead be available for the Allied purchase of German
goods, the financing of large development projects, or low-interest rate loans within Germany.
The process would be jump started with a large loan floated primarily in the American financial
market. In short, the Dawes system would use reparations monies to reconstruct the German
economy and revive European trade, while demonstrating the infeasibility of the reparations
system that had driven Europe into chaos. As Chairman of the Federal Reserve Bank of New
York (FRBNY) Benjamin Strong put it, the plan "promises impossible things and sets up
alternatives to employ when the impossibility has been demonstrated."7 1
American representatives coupled these financial measures with political conditions that
further re-oriented the European balance of power. At the London Conference of 1924, France
was forced to give up her abilities under Versailles to decide upon German default and impose
sanctions. The ability to declare or impede default under the Dawes regime now effectively lay
with Gilbert and other unofficial American representatives in charge of overseeing the plan.
Similarly, Hughes insisted that the result of the conference be something the Germans "would be
willing to sign," agreeing with the British that "if we impose on Germany a signature... byforce
majeure... the agreement thus obtained will have little value." The terms of the agreement were
still difficult for the Germans-France was allowed to maintain its occupation of the Ruhr for
another year and the overall reparations burden remained theoretically the same. But Berlin's
leaders basically understood the political shifts taking place. As Foreign Minister Stresemann
argued, "what is now taking place, in this report, is... the initiation of Anglo-American world-
economic tendencies against French imperialism." In effect, in return for a system that would
rebuild European economies and produced the prospect of some reparations payments, France
was forced to give up its artificial predominance and accept Germany on more equal terms.
Though publically and privately protesting its non-involvement, America judiciously
applied financial power to coerce the Europeans. "It is obvious that the plan cannot become
operative except with the accord of the United States," Hughes ominously instructed the
expenditures." Hughes-Laboulaye meeting, October 21, 1923, FRUS, 1923, 11: 87-89, quote 88; Herrick to Hughes,
December 6, 1923, FRUS, 1923, 11: 102-104, quote 103. On the collapse of the French negotiating position, see the
documents cited in note 59.
71 Leffler, The Elusive Quest, p. 103. For succinct analysis of the plan's mechanics see Costigliola, "The United
States and the Reconstruction of Germany in the 1920s," pp. 485-491; Leffler, The Elusive Quest, pp. 90-100. The
question of insufficient foreign exchange was an important part of the argument for why reparations were
impossible. Popularized by John Maynard Keynes, this "transfer approach" assumed that Germany's ability to
transfer wealth (through foreign exchange) was based on an autonomous balance of trade, independent of attempts
to manipulate the terms of trade. The Dawes plan was a diplomatic subterfuge based on politically leveraging this
supposed truth. But "transfer" reasoning was faulty, since both the currency market and state intervention can
change the terms of trade, making transfers possible. These mechanisms partially explain the failure of the Dawes
plan. The transfer approach nonetheless dominated governmental thinking about the reparations problem. See
Trachtenberg, Reparation in World Politics: France and European Economic Diplomacy, 1916-1923, pp. 77-84.
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reparations negotiations.
72 Cohrs, The Unfinished Peace after World War I, pp. 161, 149, 138-139. For thorough accounts of the London
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ambassador to France, "of special importance being the friendly interest of this Government in
the proposed loan." Kellogg, then ambassador to Great Britain, was to strive at the London
Conference to ensure that "measures of [French] compulsion which may not flow from the plan
and from its spirit may be avoided." These included the proposed "retention of measures which
would amount to economic interference in the occupied [Ruhr] territory" to which Kellogg
should reply "that under those conditions the loan could not be floated in the United States."
Germany also received its share of pressure: Hughes told Berlin that the Dawes plan was
"the American policy. If you turn this down, America is through." Ambassador Houghton
intimated that a rejection of the Dawes plan would "render either private or public loans
impossible or difficult," and that "it might be a hundred years" before America "extended her
hand to Germany" again. On the other hand, should Germany accept the plan, the initial Dawes
floatation would probably draw additional "private loans in considerable amounts." The
meaning of the administration's diplomacy was blunt: America would abandon Europe to its
financial fate if it did not change its political structure.7 3
Still, the Coolidge administration's non-entanglement strategy is most notable for how
much it achieved with so little investment. Hughes steadfastly insisted that with regard to the
Dawes loans, "the Government of the United States is not in a position to guarantee this
financing or to assume any responsibility in regard to it." The administration had "no right to
pledge" guarantees for the loans, "either legally or morally." Such an action would force the
taxpayer to "liquidate" the consequences of the Great War. American investors would have to
bear the risk of the plan by their own individual choice, and indeed, when the loans went bad in
1934, it was J.P Morgan that wrote down the loss.
Bankers acknowledged that public support for the loans was "as good as we could get"
from the Coolidge administration. Coolidge then pumped the Dawes plan enthusiastically to
encourage capital markets, arguing in negative liberal style that "Sound business reasons exist
why we should participate in the financing of works of peace in Europe." Coolidge emphasized
that "We have determined to maintain, and can maintain, our own political independence, but
our economic independence will be strengthened and increased when the economic stability of
Europe is restored." Diplomat Joseph Grew probably provides the best coda for the America's
Dawes plan diplomacy: "we are going as far as we can in every manner without entering into
European entanglements." American would give neither political commitments nor financial
guarantees.74
American economic diplomacy was buttressed with political support for the Locarno
accords, although American non-entanglement was made even more explicit in matters of
73 Hughes to Logan; June 14, 1924, FRUS, 1924, 1: 18-22, quote 22; Hughes to Kellogg, June 27, 1924, FRUS,
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the French and German opposition parties that, if they didn't support the Dawes plan, a financial terror was in the
offing. Leffler notes that "Hughes warned [former prime minister] Poincare that if Herriot were toppled on the issue
of the Dawes plan, American interest in European problems would end." Moreover, France was able to get the
loans to support its currency entirely at American sufferance. As Houghton concluded, "England and America have
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security. The Locarno treaties have been justly referred to as "the political expression of the
Dawes plan." They embodied the European attempt to reach a stable territorial settlement that
would remove the political uncertainty and fear of war inhibiting financial investment. The basic
premises of Locarno were that Germany would recognize the sanctity of its Western borders and
renounce the use of force for changing its borders in the East. Britain and Italy would then
guarantee the western part of the pact, promising to resist any aggressor, including any French
attempt to unilaterally sanction Germany over reparations. Germany would enter the League of
Nations the following year, on the understanding that it would become a member of the League's
council, and France would withdraw from the first of its three occupation zones in the Rhineland.
The pact was in part an attempt to signal to politicians and financial elites alike that Europe was
75filled with highly resolved status-quo powers, more interested in trade than war.
American diplomats provided a critical measure of support for negotiations once they got
off the ground. In May 1925, Houghton delivered a speech published under the title "America's
peace ultimatum to Europe." He stressed that American investors were contributing their
savings to Europe in order to "rebuild markets" where there could be a "permanent peace." They
were not "interested in speculative advances." Coolidge and Kellogg sent word through the
diplomatic corps that "Americans would not lend their money unless they thought peace firmly
established and the safety of their investments thus ensured." Benjamin Strong decamped to
Berlin from the FRBNY to tell politicians that there would be no central bank cooperation until a
security pact was signed, and that breakdown in the talks "sent a chill over the financial
community" on Wall Street. Once again, American financial pressure delivered. As one
American diplomat in France put it: "The fact that America is the creditor nation and is trusted in
all Europe even where she is despised, is a tremendous factor in our favor and also gives us a
potential power to straighten out affairs over here." 76
As TLFP predicts, though, the Coolidge administration was adamantly against any actual
American participation in European security affairs. Washington categorically rejected two pre-
Locarno measures, the Treaty of Mutual Assistance and the Geneva Protocol, which were
designed to turn the League of Nations into an effective collective security organization.
Kellogg suspected that these were the beginnings of a "new holy alliance" and reiterated that
America was "not bound by any obligations to maintain the political integrity and independence
of all the turbulent nations of Europe." Hughes emphasized that any attempt to "provide
guarantees of mutual assistance and to establish the competency of the Council of the League of
Nations" was inconsistent with "the constitutional organization of this Government." Even after
the more acceptable Locarno ideas began to gain steam, Americans were adamant that they
would not become the "guardian of European peace" by acting as the pact's "trustee." America
simply had "nothing to offer as an inducement" in the security field. Houghton pithily
summarized the American strategy of non-entanglement: security "was a work Europe must do
for itself."77
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In the final analysis, America's successful financial engagement on behalf of the Dawes
plan and Locarno accords illustrates its non-entanglement policy and the negative liberal views
that drove it. "How much more influence will we have if we maintain our freedom of action,"
Kellogg rhetorically asked, positing that America could not "have accomplished so much in the
Dawes Plan settlement if we had been parties to the League, the sanctions, and tied up in
European politics." Hoover argued that American diplomacy "necessarily leaves to private
enterprise many things which other nations" left to the state, which accounted for American
success. European politics simply required "much more concentrated power and responsibility
than we have ever been willing to grant to our Government." The British foreign minister
Austen Chamberlin plainly understood the bottom line about Europe's balance of power: "With
America withdrawn, or taking part only where her interests are directly concerned in the
collection of money, Great Britain is the only possible influence for peace and stabilization."7 8
ECONOMIC DIPLOMACY, 1926-1932. With a modicum of political and economic stability
returned to Europe, Republican diplomacy fell back on its core negative liberal concern: the
collection of war debts. But these priorities now worked to impede rather than advance
European political progress. Unfortunately, the Dawes plan had worked too well. The
stabilization of Europe had drawn a flood of capital into Germany. Rather than demonstrating
the impossibility of reparations, easy money allowed the Weimar government to engage in fiscal
profligacy while still making the small initial reparations payments stipulated by the Dawes
settlement. The negative liberal insistence on protecting the American taxpayer impeded
Europe's choice between reparations payments and a strong Germany. British and French
policymakers were incentivized to avoid making a final settlement with Germany in the hopes of
getting a better deal from the Americans on war debts. And when they did make attempts to
trade political concessions for German economic cooperation, American policy-makers neutered
any plan that appeared to impinge on the full collection of already negotiated payment schedules.
When prosperity was replaced with depression, the minimal American engagement on offer was
not enough to save the system from collapse.79
American diplomats redoubled their efforts to negotiate debt settlements after the Dawes
plan went into operation. The Coolidge administration relied on its informal influence to close
the American money market to any country that had not negotiated a debt settlement. This
quickly brought most of Europe to terms acceptably solicitous of negative liberal rights. The
WDC argued agreements struck "a true balance... between the duty of the debt commission to
the American taxpayer and fairness to those nations to which was extended aid during and after
the war." Settlements were amortized over the now standard sixty-two year period, most with
small initial payments and reductions of interest even greater than those the British had received.
As the administration liked to stress, the present value of most agreements fell below fifty
percent of the nominal value of the debt and often amounted to "forgiving" all loans made before
the armistice. Still, American diplomacy featured a basic intransigence that prevented more
generosity. Delaying the agreements meant that "we have taken from our taxpayers eight
the Reconstruction of Germany in the 1920s," p. 498. See also Kellogg-Maltzan meeting, March 16, 1925, FRUS,
1925,1: 20-21.
78 Cohrs, The Unfinished Peace after World War I, pp. 220, 191ff, 218-219. 1 have edited the last quote to reflect
American spelling.
79 On the effects of the Dawes Plan and American economic diplomacy during this period, see Kent, The Spoils of
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hundred million dollars" that should have been paid by others. Or as Coolidge bluntly put it in
response to French protests, "they hired the money, didn't they?"80
American non-entanglement doctrine grated most seriously on France and Britain, who
still hoped to reduce or eliminate their debt in a final reparations settlement. Even after France
reluctantly negotiated an agreement with the WDC and began making initial payments, French
leaders would not ratify the accord, fearing in part that it would lock them into a position they
hoped to liquidate. But a swap of war debt cancellation for reparations cancellation was totally
unacceptable to Republican policy-makers. Hoover harbored "a personal resentment" against
France for failing to ratify its debt settlement, and argued that "further cancellation" was both
"inequitable and impolitic." The Coolidge administration's negative liberal prejudices saw war
debts as "loans from individual American citizens rather than contributions from the Treasury of
the United States." They only took the form of inter-governmental debts because a generous
America had allowed Europeans "to borrow on the credit of the United States rather than their
own." The burden of these debts "must be borne either by foreign taxpayers or by our own" and
therefore further cancellation was "to do an injustice to our own taxpayers." They could be no
link between war debts and reparations, which would "transfer the burden of reparation
payments from the shoulders of the German taxpayer to those of the American taxpayer."8
The American desire to collect its debts and remain politically aloof also led it to quash
several potentially productive attempts to improve European economics and security. Desperate
to reconstruct their finances and rebuild their country, French statesmen offered to trade political
concessions for German financial assistance. The Briand government's 1926 Thoiry initiative
proposed an early French evacuation from the Rhineland, an accelerated schedule for returning
the Saar, and the prospect of a German "buy-back" of the Eupen-Malmedy region given to
Belgium at Versailles. In return for these much-desired territorial adjustments, Germany would
agree to commercialize a sizeable chunk of railroad bonds tied up in the Dawes regime and give
the proceeds to France. But American policy-makers refused to permit the commercialization of
the railway debt in the New York money market, despite the willingness of a major Wall Street
firm to underwrite the bond issue. The Coolidge administration understood that Thoiry had the
makings of a final European settlement, as it disassembled the major remaining irritants of
Versailles in Western Europe and revised the Dawes regime. But America wanted such a
settlement to occur on its own terms: after French ratification of the war debt agreement and at a
time of its own choosing. 82
When the time did come to negotiate a final settlement, during the Young Plan process of
1928-29, the American non-entanglement strategy was even more entrenched. The Young Plan
originally arose because the American reparations agent, Parker Gilbert, believed that the capital
influx into Germany under the Dawes regime had only encouraged German fiscal
irresponsibility. He proposed a final settlement that would fix German obligations for good, at
80 Rhodes, United States Foreign Policy in the Interwar Period, 1918-1941, pp. 65-68, first and third quotes 68, 65;
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reduced rates, and remove all the Dawes controls on the German economy in an effort to force
fiscal rectitude onto the Weimar government. Importantly, the plan would be linked to a general
reduction in war debts across creditors. As the plan was negotiated, French and German
moderates tied it to parallel negotiations on an early French withdrawal from the Rhineland.
Unsurprisingly, this approach was rejected by the Coolidge and Hoover administrations. Instead,
the Republicans forced Gilbert to back an alternate plan promising close to the full annuities
envisioned under the Dawes scheme, in return for French ratification of the debt agreement.83
Indeed, the United States would only allow private businessmen to be appointed to the
Young committee on the condition that "war debts were to be entirely excluded and not brought
up as a subject for discussion." Gilbert warned the reluctant British and French that the "mere
existence" of US "investments" in Europe would "not suffice to keep alive any beneficent
interest in European affairs." Their "loss" in the event of a crisis "would only affect a couple of
hundred thousand bond-holders." The "broad mass" of Americans was more interested in "the
regular collection" of war debts.
If the Allies wanted to ease their fiscal situations, the best move was to negotiate an
agreement now that could cover their obligations to America at the economic expense of the
Germans. This result is precisely what happened. American diplomats, reversing their role
during the Dawes negotiations, stayed completely aloof from the Young negotiations, including
ignoring negotiations for the essential quidpro quo of a French Rhineland withdrawal. The
Hoover administration also distanced America from the Bank of International Settlements, the
reparations clearing mechanism under the Young Plan, ensuring it would never become the
international financial system stabilizer some had hoped it would be. In every respect, American
diplomacy was detached and indifferent to the European settlement, once debt reduction had
been taken off the table. 84
American non-entanglement was even more evident in security affairs. The Coolidge
and Hoover administrations had zero interest in buttressing the Locarno process that American
diplomacy had helped create. Kellogg stressed that America would make no "regional
guarantees" and "must decline to become involved in such questions as those relating to the
application of European security pacts." Similarly, American diplomats re-cast France's bid to
gain tacit support for her European alliance system into the harmless, and laughable, Kellogg-
Briand pact to outlaw war. The Coolidge administration rejected the French offer to bilaterally
renounce war as "a kind of perpetual alliance between the United States and France, which
would seriously disturb the other great powers" and allow France to "take what action she liked
in Europe."
But, considering its domestic attractiveness to the peace movement, a multilateral pact
praising peace but promising nothing had a certain appeal. Aggression would have to be left
undefined by the Pact, as Kellogg agreed with British realists that such specifics would be only
"a trap for the innocent and a signpost for the guilty." And naturally, there would be no
repercussions for violators of the agreement. Stripped of any diplomatic meaning, the pact could
improve America's European image "without involving the United States affirmatively in purely
83 On the Young Plan negotiations, see Costigliola, Awkward Dominion, pp. 205-217; Kent, The Spoils of War, Ch.
8. For reference to Gilbert's original proposals, subsequent correction by American leaders, and the resulting
Franco-American deal, see Kent, The Spoils of War, pp. 273-286; Cohrs, The Unfinished Peace after World War I,
pp. 482-485, 511-513, 521-530.
84 Cohrs, The Unfinished Peace after World War I, pp. 499, 496. On American aloofness more broadly during the
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170
European problems" or incurring the costs "latent in the doctrine of military sanctions." The
negative liberal distaste for alliances could only be overcome by neutering them.85
The denouement of Republican non-entanglement strategy was Hoover's international
response to the Great Depression. As the European banking system collapsed in 1930-31,
Hoover was faced with a choice between sustained political and financial intervention to save the
European system or a complete retreat. At first, he delayed the choice. If Germany could survive
another three or four months, administration officials thought, "the question of [war debt]
revision [might] be postponed three or four years" and the need to "impose correspondingly
heavier taxes on Americans" avoided. But in the summer of 1931, Hoover finally took several
measures that he hoped would arrest the financial collapse of Europe: private financial
coordination to forestall the flight of extant loans; Federal Reserve credits to save the German
central bank; and most importantly, a proposal for a one year moratorium on all inter-
governmental debts. 8 6
However, even these substantial departures from previous American policy were made
half-heartedly. Although advised that the debt moratorium should be for two years and be
preceded by consultation with Europe, Hoover was moved to brevity of term and a unilateral
announcement by his desire to protect the taxpayer. He believed that Germany would soon
suspend its reparations payments, which would lead to international financial negotiations
damaging "to the interests of our own people, for at such a conference we should stand alone."
Better to stave off European demands for permanent debt cancellation "by the announcement
before the situation arises of an American policy consistent with that followed in the past."87
For the same reason, the Hoover administration refused to participate in the Lausanne
Conference of 1932 where inter-governmental debts were defacto abolished. Secretary of State
Henry Stimson declared publically American participation "impossible and undesirable," while
the administration privately sought to influence the results so that "the integrity of international
agreements [might] be maintained and that... we [did not need too] forego all expectations of
substantial payments in the future." The conference adjourned with a deal effectively cancelling
reparations and a "gentlemen's agreement" to get corresponding concessions from the United
States. Such concessions were not forthcoming and default was only a matter of time. Hoover's
devotion to protecting the freedom of American taxpayers led to the decisive disentanglement of
American and European affairs-though not in the manner he had imagined.88
In sum, America was willing to make modest commitments on behalf of its second order
goals when large benefits could be reaped at low costs. When the international system presented
American statesmen with such an opportunity after the Ruhr disaster, they seized it. But when
systemic pressures indicated that economic and ideological goals in Europe were outrunning
American political and diplomatic means, the New Era negative liberals adjusted their goals
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rather than absorb additional costs. American policy under Hoover ended as a pure form of non-
entanglement.
MILITARY POLICY
American military policy in the 1920s emphasized deterrence in the Western hemisphere
and non-interference abroad. Three aspects of that policy are considered here. I begin by
depicting the general American military posture on land and at sea, which featured large
reductions to the forces envisioned by the Wilson administration. The following subsection
discusses the Harding administration's withdrawal from the occupation of Germany. I finish
with an investigation of American disarmament policy.
GENERAL MILITARY POSTURE. American military posture in the 1920s epitomized a
strategy of non-entanglement. The Army faced drastic reductions that in many respects left it
dangerously unequipped for its responsibilities. Fortunately, American strategists made the
Army's primary responsibility defending the American homeland against attack, an unlikely
scenario. Naval forces were considerably larger and more advanced than their land counterparts,
in part due to negative liberal preferences, and in part due to the natural outcome of politics in a
geographically isolated power. The Navy pursued a much more aggressive and demanding set of
tasks than the Army, focusing its war plans on an offensive against Japan in the Western Pacific.
But even these greater resources and a more expansive doctrine existed within a context of
negative liberal budgetary economies and arms limitation.
The Republican vision for the Army was radically different from the Wilsonian approach.
The Wilson administration had left military policy in limbo. Having settled for an Army of
280,000 and a revamped reserve system in order to focus on the 1920 campaign, Wilson refused
to yield to congressional pressure for further defense economies, leaving office in a flurry of
vetoes and veto-overrides. Questions about the future of the Army remained until President-elect
Harding sent word to Congress that the Army should be reduced "to 175,000 at the earliest
possible time, and that a little later another reduction, bringing it down to 150,000 should be
made." In fact, Harding oversaw an even more drastic reduction, with authorized end strength
for most of the 1920s settling to 118,750 enlisted men and actual average forces sizes of around
110,000.89
These cost cutting priorities left the ground forces in a dilapidated state. Appropriations
during the mid-1920s averaged around $260 million a year, perhaps one-quarter of what a high-
end Wilsonian force with Universal Military Training would have cost. Cuts were made across
the board; the physical plant of the Army ran down; purchases of materiel were postponed; and
only low quality recruits could be attracted before the Depression. Such new money as there was
went to the Air Corps, though usually at the expense of the regular forces. As Coolidge
contended, "If more men are to be taken into the air service, why then... more men could be
dispensed with in some other branch of the service." New expenses must be met "by a reduction
of expenditures in some other direction, especially so on account of the present condition of the
89 Robert K. Griffith, Men Wanted for the U.S. Army: America's Experience with an All-Volunteer Army Between
the World Wars (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1982), p. 59. For figures on Wilson and Harding's Army end
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American National Policy, 1904-1940," The American Historical Review 66, no. 2 (January 1, 1961): pp. 357-360;
Allan R. Millett and Peter Maslowski, For the Common Defense: A Military History of the United States (New
York: Free Press, 1994), pp. 384-386.
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Treasury." Economies took their toll: by the end of the decade, the emergency field Army that
could be assembled on short notice numbered only 54,000 men, and the reserve system had
fallen apart. The American Army of the 1920s was not a force that could do very much. 90
On the other hand, negative liberal statesmen did not ask it to do very much. Military
planners after the war understood that planning for continued "American support in [French]
European policies... might involve us in an embarrassing situation." Instead, the Army focused
on continental defense, planning potential wars of maximum national effort premised on defense
from foreign invasion and potentially the protection of the Western hemisphere. Small roles
were given to ground forces in the Navy's more offensive minded plans for the Western Pacific,
but these were strongly opposed by Army officials as the decade wore on-the Army recognized
America's precarious position in the Pacific, and generally thought the defense of American
possessions there a major over-extension. Army planners explicitly foreswore the possibility of
another intervention in Europe, and noted in one report that "We have no plans for the invasion
of any of these [great power] countries." Army doctrine was defensively oriented, envisioned
very limited circumstances for the use of force, and was averse to commitments overseas.91
Negative liberal thinking permeated the construction of this military posture. Coolidge
and others dismissed military complaints as the typical product of bureaucratic self-interest: "It is
one of the characteristics of reports that purport to emanate from [the General Staff] that they
always represent the Army as just on the point of dissolution... I suppose as long as we continue
to spend $300,000,000 that the General Staff would be able to provide the nation with a fair
degree of defense." And, unsurprisingly, interwar Republicans were quick to look to the Army
for taxpayer relief. Early in his term, Hoover ordered the creation of a commission "to
reconsider the whole of our army program" in search of potential savings, since "the hope of a
tax reduction lies very largely in the ability to economize military expenditure and still maintain
an adequate defense." His personal "pocket budget," created to explain government spending to
the "man on the street," emphasized the point by arguing that seventy-two cents of every tax
dollar "was devoted to past wars and those that may occur in the future." Ground forces looked
like dangerous drains on individual resources.9 2
American leaders viewed the Navy somewhat differently. Despite a strong desire to cut
defense spending, the Naval Act of 1916-Wilson's "Navy Second to None"-remained official
government policy before the Washington Naval Conference of 1922. Harding was of two
minds about the Navy, alternating between rhetorical support for unilateral disarmament and
pushing for a "Big Navy" as a bargaining chip in arms limitation talks. Eventually, the
difference was split. Naval appropriations in the 1920s fluctuated around $400 million, or
almost twice what was generally spent on the Army. Thirty-one warships were authorized
during interwar Republican administrations, and the United States matched its Pacific rival Japan
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in building larger classes of ships. Even though the negative liberal search for budgetary savings
put the brakes on much naval spending, the fleet was modernized from coal to oil powered over
the course of the decade, and America was at the forefront of carrier aviation. Disarmament
efforts did not prevent the creation of a Navy that was, literally, second to none-America
maintained parity with the British and over-all superiority against the Japanese. 93
But the tasks envisioned for this force outstripped its capabilities. The Navy's major
concern was protecting American possessions in the Pacific from Japan. Naval doctrine was
embodied by War Plan ORANGE, preparations to fight a "short, spasmodic, decisive encounter"
with the Imperial Japanese Navy in the Western Pacific. The plan emphasized Mahanian
concepts: it featured a fighting advance across the Pacific Ocean to relieve the thinly garrisoned
Philippine Islands, the establishment of naval bases capable of supporting a sustained offensive,
and the subsequent engagement of the Imperial Navy in a Jutland style encounter of capital
ships. Given the distances involved and the attrition expected during the transoceanic advance,
the U.S. Navy would have almost certainly found the Philippines occupied and faced a
substantially larger force in any fleet action. Lengthy operations would have been difficult, since
the Philippines would be enemy occupied and the Washington Treaty had ruled out the
fortification of further bases in the Pacific. Still, the offensive bias of military organizations
meant the ORANGE scenario was the primary device by which the Navy judged procurement
and doctrine. 94
Civilian decision-makers largely ignored the Navy's plans. Hoover explicitly intended to
abandon American interests in the Pacific if it came to a fight, and most statesmen viewed the
Navy as part of hemispheric defense and the protection of trade. So while naval forces
performed useful functions that let America keep a free hand internationally, they did not need to
be so large as to bust the budget. Interwar naval policy is best understood in this context. The
United States had only begun to lay down keels for ten of its thirty-one warships by Hoover's
presidency and no further ships were authorized after that point. America failed to build up to its
mandates under the Washington and London treaties, and was completely out-built by the other
major naval powers in the destroyers, submarines, and smaller vessels uncovered by the treaties.
As the final sub-section on disarmament shows, negative liberal budgetary concerns had much to
do with this outcome. 95
THE RHINELAND OCCUPATION. The first step in pursuing a grand strategy of non-
entanglement was to disentangle America from the residue of commitments left behind by the
Wilson administration. Chief among these was the Army's division strength tripwire force
stationed in Coblentz, Germany. When asked about American troops in the Rhineland on the
campaign trail, Harding's blunt reply was that "they haven't any business there, and just as soon
as they have a formal peace we can be sure they will be coming home, as they ought to come."
His policy once in office was somewhat more complex. Harding appreciated that American
forces performed a stabilizing function and that removing them would exacerbate the difficulties
9 Robert Gordon Kaufman, Arms Control During the Pre-Nuclear Era: The United States and Naval Limitation
Between the Two World Wars (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994), pp. 23-30, 73-92, 205; Millett and
Maslowski, For the Common Defense: A Military History of the United States, pp. 382-384.
94 Kaufman, Arms Control During the Pre-Nuclear Era, p. 75; Louis Morton, "War Plan Orange: Evolution of a
Strategy," World Politics 11, no. 2 (January 1, 1959): 221-250.
95 Kaufman, Arms Control During the Pre-Nuclear Era, pp. 79, 149, 206; John R. M. Wilson, "The Quaker and the
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of European politics while impeding other American goals. In this respect, systemic pressures
slowed the American withdraw. Even so, Harding believed the leverage American troops
provided was not worth the costs and risks associated with the turmoil of the Rhineland. Within
a year of taking office, American strength had been reduced to a skeleton force of fewer than
2,000 men, and the troops were completely withdrawn in January 1923, after the French
occupation of the Ruhr.96
Several factors inhibited an immediate removal of the American ground force
commitment to Europe. The basic issue was the Harding administration's desire to shape a
grand strategy that would limit American liability without eliminating all hope of obtaining the
administration's preferred power arrangement in Europe. As Hughes put it, the main error of the
Versailles treaty was that it "departed from the original idea of the League of Nations by making
it not only an instrument for conference and conciliation, with a view to preserving the peace of
the world, but also by charging it with certain definite duties in connection with the enforcement
of the terms of the Treaty." As long as American engagement was limited to "conference and
conciliation" rather than "enforcement," Republican leaders thought it might be profitable for the
Old and New World alike. In this respect, a politically neutral deployment in Europe could be
temporarily useful. Speaking in part of the occupation, Harding boasted in the summer of 1921
that "there would be a bad mess all the time in Europe if it were not for the mollifying and
harmonizing influences which are wielded by the spokesmen for this Republic." 97
Moreover, the benefits of a quick withdrawal were impeded by other negative liberal
concerns. With the rejection of the Versailles Treaty, certain American rights negotiated by
Wilson were open to question, including the important priority of recouping taxpayer outlays for
the occupation. The Harding administration's method for obtaining repayment was the Treaty of
Berlin, which made peace with Germany and secured American privileges under Versailles
without corresponding responsibilities. But for both domestic and international reasons, ending
the occupation was likely to remove American leverage in passing the treaty and negotiating
repayment. As Hughes later put it, America was being "told to whistle for our money." He
argued that "In view of the unsettled question as to the payment of our Army costs, it seems to
me prudent that we should do nothing which might have the effect of postponing an early and
satisfactory adjustment." Similarly, the administration desired French cooperation in reducing
armaments at the ongoing Washington conference, and the French desired American forces to
remain in Germany. These considerations meant a temporarily extended troop occupation: "a
little temporizing in this matter might give us an opportunity which we could turn to our
advantage. "98
96 Keith L. Nelson, Victors Divided: America and the Allies in Germany, 1918-23 (Berkeley, CA: University of
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Ultimately, though, the administration desired to eliminate the occupation and with it
vestiges of Wilsonian primacy. The occupation was reduced from 15,000 men to less than 6,000
in the fall of 1921 and to 2,000 in February 1922. In the interim, the administration ordered
American forces not to inhibit Allied military action against the Germans in various reparations
crises, but otherwise to remain aloof. Following the conclusion of the Washington Naval
Conference, Harding decided in March to end the occupation completely, but was persuaded by
Hughes to leave a 1,000 man contingent as bargaining leverage over occupation costs.
Even this small outpost worried Harding. "I think perhaps we had the right hunch when
the original order was made to withdraw," he wrote, "[since] it is very clear that their presence
might involve us [in violence],... we are watching very closely and are prepared to withdraw on
very short notice." He agreed with the statement of an advisor that "no direct national interest is
served [by the occupation] aside from our deep concern in the recovery and re-establishment of
Europe." By September of 1922 he was pressing "to arrange to withdraw... as soon as the
Secretary of State... can pave the way for doing so without our action being given unusual
significance." After the French, defying an American ultimatum, occupied the Ruhr, the
administration followed through on its threats and brought the remaining troops home. Primacy
had been replaced by non-entanglement. 99
DISARMAMENT. Perhaps the most distinctive feature of American interwar military
policy was its aggressive and sustained pursuit of great power disarmament. Each Republican
administration launched a naval conference aimed at reducing the number of fighting ships: the
1921-22 Washington Conference, the Geneva Conference of 1927, and the 1930 London
Conference. By the end of the Hoover administration, American policy-makers were also
pushing radical proposals for land disarmament. Disarmament policy had multiple roots, varied
degrees of success, and its retrospective merits are debatable. Nevertheless, it reflected the
American grand strategy of non-entanglement, stressing America's distaste in playing power
politics. Moreover, as TLFP predicts, disarmament policy was motivated in large part by the
negative liberal views of the interwar Republicans. The desire to reduce burdens on the taxpayer
drove arms control efforts, while the negative liberal emphasis on naval forces and distaste for
alliances shaped the character of disarmament initiatives.
American disarmament policy had two major successes. The first and most impressive
was the 1921-22 Washington Conference, which blunted major naval building programs in the
United States and Europe. The Washington Conference Treaties limited the number and total
tonnage of all capital ships over 10,000 tons, limited the size and armament of all such ships, and
established a 5:5:3:1.67:1.67 ratio of relative strength between the United States, Britain, Japan,
France, and Italy, respectively. It also scrapped millions of tons of existing ships and planned
construction, while instituting a ten-year building holiday in all categories controlled by the
treaty. Second, the 1930 London Conference largely extended the strength ratios and numerical
limits to fighting ships less than 10,000 tons (often imprecisely referred to as cruisers), though it
admitted substantial variation in relative strength across different classes of such ships. It also
and later with agreement at the Washington Conference. On these matters, and on the issue of occupation costs, see
Nelson, Victors Divided, pp. 189-191, 192-197, respectively.
99 Ibid., p. 234; Ch. 8-10, generally. On the tacit assumptions of American non-involvement see Phillips to Hughes,
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reduced the number of battleships further and extended the capital ship building holiday until
1936.100
Two American disarmament efforts went for naught. The Coolidge administration's
1927 attempt to limit cruisers at Geneva was boycotted by the French and the Italians.
Agreement by the major naval powers then foundered on the unwillingness of the British and
American navies to concede parity in the types of ship that would be most useful to them in the
event of a blockade. Similarly, Hoover's ambitious 1932 attempt to reduce land armaments and
limit offensive weapon types petered out as the Great Depression gave states other priorities and
the rise of Hitler made disarmament on land impossible.' 0'
Republican disarmament policy had multiple motivations. Naval arms limitation
impinged most directly on international politics in the Pacific Ocean, and it is no accident that
the Washington Conference's Five-power treaty establishing capital ship ratios was accompanied
by treaties that guaranteed the "Open Door" in China and broke up the Anglo-Japanese alliance.
It is also true that domestic politics in Anglophone countries played an important role in
motivating negotiations. In the United States, disarmament was popular across the political
spectrum. The Harding administration pursued the Washington Naval Conference when it did in
part to steal a march on Senator William Borah, an interparty rival who championed
disarmament.10 2
Even so, disarmament played an important part in European politics did so in consonance
with the expectations of TLFP. Disarmament embodied the mechanism of non-interference
characteristic of a non-entanglement grand strategy. As importantly, the negative liberal ideals
held by the interwar Republicans propelled and shaped disarmament initiatives. American
statesmen pursued disarmament largely because they abhorred the costs that foreign policy
imposed on the individual taxpayer. Furthermore, those costs were interpreted in a way more
favorable to naval spending than ground forces, while particular initiatives were crafted with a
view to avoiding potential political commitments.
Negative liberal rationales were of primary importance in making Republican
disarmament policy. Hughes exemplified the individualism driving American initiatives in his
invitation to the Washington Conference:
Productive labor is staggering under an economic burden too heavy to be borne unless the present vast
public expenditures are greatly reduced. It is idle to look for stability, or the assurance of social justice, or
the security of peace, while wasteful and unproductive outlays deprive effort of its just reward and defeat
the reasonable expectation of progress. The enormous disbursements in the rivalries of armaments
manifestly constitute the greater part of the encumbrance upon enterprise and national prosperity; and
1 This account relies on Kaufman, Arms Control During the Pre-Nuclear Era, pp. 43-72, 113-145; Richard
Fanning, Peace and Disarmament: Naval Rivalry and A rms Control, 1922-1933 (Lexington, KY: The University
Press of Kentucky, 1994), pp. 3-11, 106-132. The 1930 London agreement adjusted the ratio to 10:7 in favor of the
Japanese. The technical details of all the agreements are more complex than there is room to detail here. Each
treaty contained exceptions and side-deals necessary to satisfy the various navies involved.
"0' Christopher Hall, Britain, America, and Arms Control, 1921-37 (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1987), Ch. 2;
Leffler, The Elusive Quest, pp. 159-162, 277-288. The 1927 conference ran aground on the differences between
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imposing blockades; the latter, favored by the United States, were useful for protecting commerce from blockades.
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avoidable or extravagant expense of this nature is not only without economic justification but is a constant
menace to the peace of the world rather than an assurance of its preservation.
Hoover concurred in such analysis, arguing during his presidency that "The American people
should understand that current expenditure on strictly military activities of the Army and Navy
constitutes the largest military budget of any nation in the world today, and at a time when there
is less real danger of extensive disturbance to the peace than at any time in more than half a
century."103
Negotiating arms limitation had two advantages from the perspective of negative liberty.
Not only could the burden on the American taxpayer be reduced directly through disarmament,
agreements would allow European resources to be directed at paying off war debts. As Coolidge
remarked in an off-the-record session with journalists, "They have staggering expenses abroad. I
don't like to refer to it too often-they owe us money over there. I should very much prefer that
they take their money and pay us, than on any account of any action we took over here feel that
they should take their money and build battleships." In the same vein, Hoover felt that the 1930
naval agreement was a $2.5 billion "stimulus to world prosperity." He prefaced his 1932
proposals by noting that "The world is spending $5,000,000,000 a year on armament, a large part
of which is unnecessary for the maintenance of internal order." If an agreement to reduce
armament on land could be reached, "the governmental debt of the world could be discharged in
20 years from these savings alone." Reduced costs would end up in the pocket of the American
taxpayer from multiple sources.
Negative liberal emphasis on cutting costs molded the character of the American
negotiating position as well as providing its impetus. The Coolidge administration opposed an
agreement based on extending the service life of existing vessels since it "merely puts off
expenditures and in the long run does not reduce" them. Americans were also conscious of the
increased costs born by their own military establishment vis-A-vis its international competitors.
"While the reduction of expenditures for national defense purposes is highly desirable," absolute
levels of expenditures could not be the basis for comparison, since America was likely to spend
more money on any given capability. Costs could only be cut by focusing on the ships
themselves. For similar reasons, "The United States has no more than an academic interest" in
land disarmament, which was inevitably caught up in the problem of European conscription.
Despite its relatively pathetic comparative strength, the American Army was still quite expensive
because it was raised entirely through the market mechanism. While proposals "placing all
peace time military forces on a voluntary basis" should be encouraged, Kellogg and others
thought it unlikely that America could usefully participate in ground force negotiations.10 5
In part, the emphasis on naval reduction reflected the broader negative liberal priority for
favoring standoff forces. As noted above, the Republican approach to land forces was relatively
simple: cut them to the bone. The Navy was a different matter. Naval forces and their newly
developing air wings could be useful for numerous tasks that didn't tie America down: coastal
defense, protecting trade routes and Pacific possessions, and defending the Panama Canal,
103 Hughes to Wheeler, August 11, 1921, FRUS, 1921, 1: 56-57, quote 56; Arthur A. Ekirch, The Civilian and the
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among others. "To meet these responsibilities we need a very substantial sea armament,"
Coolidge argued to Congress. America had "put away the Old World policy of competitive
armaments," but it could "never be relieved of the responsibility of adequate national defense."
So when the 1927 Geneva conference failed, the Coolidge administration funded a substantial
cruiser building program. As he put it, the results of the conference "were mostly of a negative
character. We know now that no agreement can be reached which will be inconsistent with a
considerable building program on our part." American leaders felt it regrettable that further
economies could not be achieved, but they were unwilling to simply rely on the good will of
others in naval affairs. 106
Finally, American disarmament policy was shaped by the negative liberal aversion to
political commitments. In general, American leaders saw their contribution to European security
through arms control as important but limited. "It would be useless to have any thought over
there that there must be a constant reliance on us," Coolidge believed, since "we couldn't help
people very much until they showed a disposition to help themselves." One of the main causes
of the American disinterest in land disarmament was the perception that such talks would lead to
requests for security guarantees, which were out of the question. As such, interwar Republicans
saw land disarmament as "peculiarly European in its practical aspects" making detachment from
the process "in accordance with our policy of not intervening" in the politics of the Old World.
Along the same lines, the American negotiating position was always based on voluntary
compliance. Kellogg stressed that "the United States will not be a party to any sanctions of any
kind for the enforcement of a treaty... nor will it agree that such treaties to which it may be a
party shall come under the supervision of any international body." Arms control couldn't be a
policy that required actual commitments: international treaties "so far as we are concerned, must
depend upon the good faith of nations."10 7
SUMMARY OF AMERICAN GRAND STRATEGY, 1921-1932
The United States pursued a grand strategy of non-entanglement during the New Era,
fulfilling the expectations of TLFP. Both the content of American strategy and evidence from
the process of its formation verify the theory. Although possessed of a clear vision for their ideal
balance of power in Europe, American leaders were in fact willing to tolerate several potential
power constellations in exchange for limited liabilities overseas. This detached posture was
driven by a high cost-sensitivity, stemming from an ideological desire to lower resource
extraction by the American state and minimize its effect on the private economy. As TLFP
predicts, the need to avoid costs expressed itself in three ways: few threats were perceived;
alliances and diplomatic commitments of all kinds were avoided; and military expenditures were
reduced while favoring the Navy over the Army. The negative liberals who controlled the
politics of the New Era evaluated a range of policy options but came to a single conclusion-
greater commitments in Europe threatened liberty at home.
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I would draw attention to three particularly compelling pieces of evidence. First,
American diplomats were well aware of the power political stakes in Europe. They saw, and
detested, the possibility of France breaking up Germany or otherwise maintaining an artificial
hegemony on the continent. Statesmen later anticipated the potential resurgence of German
power and a corresponding aggressive revisionism in German foreign policy. They also kept a
close watch on the growing ideological turmoil of European politics. Yet America was rarely
moved to make a commitment forestalling these disfavored outcomes. American leaders felt
secure in their hemispheric fortress and were not inclined to pay the costs of managing European
politics-even if it meant their vision of European prosperity and peace had to be sacrificed.
Second, American statesmen had an ideological fixation with reducing government
resource extraction and its impact on the private economy: they insisted on large tax cuts, an
aggressive policy of paying down the national debt, and a monetary regime of low inflation.
These goals had implications for American strategy towards Europe, since they implied that
European war debts to America were sacrosanct. American diplomats repeatedly ignored
opportunities to cut the Gordian knot of reparations and inter-governmental debts, and in several
cases actively quashed attempts at political stabilization that might have threatened European
payments. The American support for the Dawes Plan and Locarno Accords was timed to
maximize American leverage, imposed no costs on the treasury, and compelled the banking
community to bear risk instead of the taxpayer. These negative liberal priorities not only
prevented American alliances, but also worked against any sort of commitment to buttress
European political stability.
Third, ideological concerns dictated the course of American military policy. Reducing
taxes and debts meant cutting military spending, and the New Era Republicans reduced it across
the board. But they were far harder on the Army than the Navy, cutting the former to the bone
since they saw little role for ground forces in American strategy. Furthermore, the Harding
administration expressed its disinclination to make ground commitments by withdrawing
American forces from Europe as soon as it was politic. Last, the impulse to conserve costs was
also a central motivation for, and shaped the character of, American disarmament policy.
Counter-Arguments
Although there is no explicit variation in America's grand strategy from 1921-1932, there
are two prominent alternative accounts of American foreign policy during the period that deserve
to be addressed. Most explicit are a loose family of explanations grouped around the economic
interests of different domestic groups. Though these explanations differ from each other, they
are organized around a common theme: American foreign policy was shaped to the economic
benefit of those interests who controlled the government. A second, less theoretical, account of
the 1920s, emphasizes the fractured nature of the American state. The interwar Republicans
might have committed more to Europe, so the story goes, but for intense Congressional
pressures, the penetration of private interests, and the difficulty of mobilizing the sclerotic
American bureaucracy. This explanation thus posits a kind of "drag" on American foreign
policy-American non-entanglement is more the result of institutional inertia than anything else.
I evaluate the strength of these claims below.
ECONOMIC INTERESTS. Among political scientists, there has been a recent renewal of
interest in sectoral economic theories of American foreign policy. These theories have two parts.
First, the American party system is posited to be composed of competing economic sectors
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aiming to shape public policy to their benefit. Each political party represents a coalition of such
groups. Second, foreign policy is assumed to economically impact sectoral interests. Therefore,
just as each coalition pursues domestic policies that will line its pockets, so too will they chose
the foreign policy that benefits them the most. As Narizny puts it, "(1) all states must make
trade-offs in their security policy, (2) these trade-offs often have distributional implications, and
(3) almost all state leaders are selected by, or rely on the support of, groups that are affected by
these trade-offs." Grand strategy therefore reflects the primacy of innenpolitik at its most basic
material level. 08
Distinct sets of interests yield different grand strategies. In Narizny's formulation,
economic sectors that depend heavily on Europe will favor intense engagement aimed at "stable,
peaceful diplomatic relations among states in the core of the international system." These "core
interests" are especially inclined towards internationalist legal commitments, and are
traditionally represented in the Democratic Party. Those sectors that depend on developing
markets will seek a strategy aimed at ensuring that their "ambitions in the periphery" do not
"bring [America] into conflict with other great powers." These "peripheral interests," which
reside primarily in the Republican Party, will favor a realpolitik approach to Europe, engaging
only as much as is necessary to "ensure that American trade and investment in Latin America
and East Asia would not suffer from the imperial depredations of other great powers." 109
As applied to Republican foreign policy in the 1920s, Narizny predicts that in order "To
support their interventionist interests in the periphery, [Republicans] should have continued to
favor a realpolitik strategy toward the great powers." American war debts early in the period
should further limit engagement with Europe, and "Only when American trade with the
periphery was directly threatened by events in the core should Republican presidents have
considered intervention in European affairs." Narizny claims vindication for these predictions,
citing debt and Depression driven disarmament negotiations, a distaste for legal commitments,
and non-intervention in the Manchurian crisis of 1931 -an important test for the world legal
order. More generally, the American grand strategy detailed above shows the economic theory's
appeal: America did indeed maintain a posture of non-entanglement and minimal commitment to
Europe during the 1920s, which is consistent with a strategy driven by economic interests in the
developing world. 10
However, a closer examination reveals important inconsistencies in Narizny's account,
and the difficulties with a theoretical reliance on peripheral economic interests more generally.
To begin with, Narizny's treatment of American disarmament policy is problematic. Narizny
expects the Republican Party to favor "the acquisition of a global network of naval bases and a
108 Kevin Narizny, The Political Economy of Grand Strategy (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2007), p. 32.
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battleship fleet." Such a "Big Navy" would fulfill the "Republican leaders' strategic
imperative... to defend peripheral markets from the encroachment of other great powers."
Republican naval disarmament is thus an anomaly from a sectoral perspective, one that Narizny
attempts to explain away through financial constraints: Harding and Coolidge are said to favor
disarmament to defray the cost of debt payments, while Hoover supposedly did so to fend off the
Depression.m
But the financial constraints Narizny references were mostly self-imposed. By 1925 the
Federal Budget was showing a $1 billion surplus on expenditures of just over $3 billion, and the
national debt had been paid down by more than 30%. The fiscal effects of the Great Depression
were not evident until well into 1930. So, at a minimum, neither Coolidge's nor Hoover's major
efforts at naval reduction can be attributed to objective fiscal constraints. More broadly, such
fiscal constraints as there were came from the policy of aggressively paying down the national
debt, which consumed between one-third and one-half of total government expenditures during
the early 1920s. Funds could have easily been freed up for naval building with lower debt
payments, higher taxes, or both.
There certainly was extensive support for a "Big Navy" within the Republican
congressional caucus during the 1920s. But, as the analysis above reveals, naval disarmament,
lower taxes, and the push for a lower national debt all had a common source: negative liberal
ideology. Interwar Republican administrations were opposed to resource extraction across the
board and thought unnecessary spending on the military particularly wasteful. It was both
abusive to the taxpayer, a burden on the economy, and a contributor to global instability-not
least of all in Europe, the region the Republican Party is supposed to ignore in sectoral
theories.m
More importantly, most sectoral analysis completely misses the source of all the energy
in America's European strategy during the 1920s: a genuine concern for economic and political
stability in the Old World. As noted earlier, Republican foreign policy makers thought European
peace and prosperity would bring economic benefits to the United States. Hughes argued that
"The prosperity of the United States largely depends upon the economic settlements which may
be made in Europe," while Harding told Congress that economic growth was "inseparably linked
with our Foreign Relations" in Europe. These sentiments were responsible for the eventual
American efforts on behalf of the Dawes Plan and Locarno accords, as well as Hoover's flurry of
activity surrounding a war debt moratorium and disarmament during the Great Depression.
Ultimately, of course, Republican ideology left very little room for extensive commitments. But
the concerns of policy-makers belie the interests posited by sectoral theory. Hoover justified his
Depression era European diplomacy by explaining that "the problem before the world today is...
to secure economic peace," and earlier argued that without "the products we exchange, not a
single automobile would run; not a dynamo would turn; not a telephone, telegraph, or radio
"' Ibid., pp. 53, 117, and 142-143, 146-147 on Republican policy.
112 On the American financial situation, see Leffler, The Elusive Quest, p. 105; Randall G. Holcombe, "The Growth
of the Federal Government in the 1920s," Cato Journal 16, no. 2 (Fall 1996). On "Big Navy" Republicans, see
Kaufman, Arms Control During the Pre-Nuclear Era, pp. 23-30. It is worth noting that the extremely modest
amount of American intervention in the periphery under the New Era Republicans casts further doubts on the
sectoral approach.
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would operate." These are not the sentiments of a Party indifferent to economic relations with
Europe; they reflect a serious concern for "core" interests.' 13
THE FRACTURED STATE. A second kind of approach emphasizes the difficulties of
concerted grand strategy in an era of state weakness. American policy-makers' genuine concern
for European stability might have gone farther, this type of explanation claims, but for the
separation of powers, bureaucratic fiefdoms, and penetration of the government by private
interests. As Leffler puts it, American strategy was often "the result of uneasy compromises
between hostile branches of government, which themselves were wracked by a multitude of
conflicting pressures and irreconcilable goals." Cohen argues that "In the 1920s the United
States was more profoundly engaged in international matters than at any peacetime era in its
history," though this was not the formal engagement of the American government. Instead,
private financial interests molded American strategy: "the dollar, if not the flag, could be found
wherever the sun might shine at any given moment."
The resulting strategy was not always maximally coherent. Bureaucratic infighting
further increased this drag on American foreign policy. As Jeffrey Frieden argues , "the central
state apparatus found itself torn between conflicting interests" who "found allies within the
government bureaucracy so that domestic sociopolitical strife was carried out within the state
apparatus. The Federal Reserve system and the State Department" faced off against "the
majority of Congress, and the powerful Commerce Department," resulting in few successful
initiatives. In short, non-entanglement was more the result of political fratricide among key
actors and interests, rather than a principled choice." 4
Although not a theoretically grounded explanation per se, there is clearly some truth in
the fractured state approach. The American state, especially prior to the New Deal, is notorious
for its weakness and inability to powerfully direct policy in the tradition of European states. It is
not difficult to find examples of policy-makers disavowing their ability to undertake some policy
for fear of disturbing Congress. For instance, Harding once dismissed a proposal to cancel war
debts and reparations with the remark that "nothing of this tremendous importance could be
accomplished without the sanction of Congress. Those in Executive responsibility have really
very little authority." Similarly, bureaucratic wrangling, especially over safeguards for foreign
loans, was a real feature of American foreign policy. And the "apolitical" reliance on
industrialists and financiers during the peak of American engagement with the continent
bespeaks a penetration of government policy by private actors. It seems probable that these
features did exert some kind of "drag" on American grand strategy, or at least prevented greater
coherence in Republican policy. 5
Still, there are important limits to what the fractured state approach can tell us. The key
issue is that executive preferences often dovetailed with Congressional, bureaucratic, and private
113 First, third, and fourth quotes, Leffler, "Political Isolationism, Economic Expansionism or Diplomatic Realism?,"
pp. 422, 420; second quote Leffler, "American Policy Making and European Stability, 1921 - 1933," p. 214.
"4 Leffler, "The Origins of Republican War Debt Policy, 1921-1923," p. 585; Warren 1. Cohen, Empire Without
Tears: America's Foreign Relations, 1921-1933 (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1987), p. xii; Frieden, "Sectoral
Conflict and Foreign Economic Policy, 1914-1940," pp. 67-68. For other works that underscore the importance of
private actors in driving American foreign policy, see Joan Hoff Wilson, American Business and Foreign Policy,
1920-1933 (Lexington, KY: The University Press of Kentucky, 1971); Carl P. Parrini, Heir to Empire: United States
Economic Diplomacy, 1916-1923 (Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1969).
115 Leffler, "The Origins of Republican War Debt Policy, 1921-1923," p. 597. On private interests and bureaucratic
disputes, see Leffler, The Elusive Quest, pp. 90-112, 173-177, respectively.
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goals for American foreign policy. As Cohrs puts it, consideration for "strong Congressional
opposition to any more pronounced political engagement" was a factor in American strategy,
"but was not the decisive motive for America's official non-involvement. What the
administration chose to pursue, or not to pursue, still hinged on fundamental Progressive
premises." For instance, when it came time to settle allied war-debts, the fact that Congress had
made Harding and Coolidge's preferred settlements illegal did not stop either President from
presenting them as afait accompli.'1 6
In the same vein, bureaucracies did contend with each other about whether to supervise
private loans to Germany, but quickly got on the same page when the Coolidge administration
decided to embargo such credits to any country that hadn't settled its debts. Private interests,
while certainly useful to American diplomats, quickly yielded to public needs. During the
Dawes and Young negotiations, in which the banker's influence is justly touted, it was political
considerations that set policy. "American and British policymakers came to use financial
pressure as a strategic lever in their decisive attempt not to enforce the bankers' conditions,"
during the Dawes negotiations. And though the Young negotiations started with the plans of
Parker Gilbert, recall that the Coolidge administration quickly forced him to change tack and
present a completely different proposal more in line with negative liberal debt preferences. In
short, fractured though the American state may have been, the executive branch could act
decisively when it so chose. Apparent institutional inertia reflected its negative liberal
preferences more often than not." 7
Conclusion
American grand strategy under the interwar Republicans presents a model example of
TLFP's explanatory power. There was nothing approaching a potential hegemon in Europe,
eliminating any systemic incentive to make commitments abroad. The Republican leadership, by
contrast, had plenty of incentive to retrench and resist entanglement: their negative liberal
ideology implied an active policy could impose high costs on individual Americans. When faced
with the choice between European wealth and German weakness, American decision-makers
appreciated the trade-off and decided it wasn't their problem.
The Republican administrations of the 1920s were willing to tolerate a range of power
configurations in Europe, as long as American power was not part of the equation. They pursued
this strategy of non-entanglement despite a preference for a certain kind of European order. New
Era statesmen were essentially pro-German revisionists who hoped that gradual adjustments to
the Versailles settlement would integrate Germany into a peaceful and prosperous international
system. But the sacrifices America was willing to make to bring such an order about were
minimal. America would make no alliance commitments to reassure the French. Diplomats
would not facilitate a European reparations settlement by forgiving war debts. The government
would not back financial commitments to the struggling European economy. And military
involvement was simply out of the question. If this detachment meant artificial French
hegemony or resurgent German power, that was regrettable, but not worth making costly
commitments.
16 Cohrs, The Unfinished Peace after World War 1, p. 493.
"
7 Ibid., p. 174.
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Negative liberty was the motor force of American non-entanglement. American leaders
thought of war debts and military spending as impositions on the rights of the American
taxpayer, placing severe restrictions on the most obvious sources of American control abroad.
Indeed, the need to protect such negative liberal values impacted American strategy over an
array of different policy areas. When analyzing the dangers of the European scene, Americans
generally focused on their secure geography, finding little to worry about in European power
concentrations or ideologies.
In diplomatic affairs, the absence of American power was palpable in the strained
attempts of the Western European great powers to build a stable peace-but the United States
would not brook the risks of alliances, nor the costs to its citizens of beneficial engagement. In
regard to the military, Republican policymakers were ruthless in the economies they demanded
of the Army, which was of little use beyond deterring an invasion of the homeland. They
pursued naval reductions as well, especially through the mechanism of disarmament, but such
standoff power was more palatable to statesmen who thought mostly in terms of protecting trade
and hemispheric defense.
The international system had a noticeable but narrow impact on American strategy, by
integrating its ends and means over time. American statesmen were willing to make limited
commitments in order to support America's economic and ideological hopes for Europe. These
preferences led to Dawes and Locarno diplomacy, a slower than expected withdrawal from the
Rhineland, and Hoover's attempts to stabilize Europe during the Depression. However, when
the system presented more costly demands to maintain European stability, New Era Republicans
dropped their second-order goals rather than contravene ideological limits on their political
means. In sum, negative liberal ideology restrained American commitments by limiting the




Potential Hegemons and Positive Liberty: American Grand Strategy under Roosevelt
The administration of Franklin Delano Roosevelt is justly regarded as the hinge of modern
American political development. In domestic politics, Roosevelt created a dominant political
coalition that constructed an activist American state directed towards positive liberal ends,
dealing negative liberal ideals a blow from which they would never recover. In international
politics, Roosevelt grappled with a rapidly shifting structure of power, as Nazi Germany's rise to
potential hegemony in Europe posed a threat to American security unequaled before or since. In
short, during this period both of the independent variables identified in the Theory of Liberal
Foreign Policy (TLFP) outlined in Chapter Two were set at high values and pointed towards
American activity abroad. Unfortunately, disentangling their effects is not eased by the fact that
Roosevelt's haphazard administrative style, acute political sensitivity, and eye towards history
led him to deliberately obscure his decision-making process.
Just as importantly, the tectonic political transitions of the 1930s produced a
countervailing force that acted in the opposite direction, one outside TLFP's theoretical model.
Roosevelt's foreign policy operated under stringent domestic political constraints, particularly
with regard to the use of ground forces. Disillusionment with the First World War, the Great
Depression and its vicious political realignment, and an uncertain international scene all buoyed
isolationism to its high-water mark in the 1930s. A combination of public opinion and
congressional opposition restrained Roosevelt from his preferred strategy and ultimately forced
him into elaborate deceptions and political maneuvers in order to execute it. This domestic
constraint had an important impact on the course of American strategy towards Europe, which
delayed TLFP's predicted outcome but did not obstruct its logic.
Domestic impediments aside, TLFP does successfully explain the major variation in
American grand strategy during the Roosevelt era. From 1937 until the summer of 1940, the
Roosevelt administration pursued a strategy of buckpassing. American statesmen perceived both
a security threat and a major threat to American liberal values from Nazi Germany.
Domestically constrained from explicit American participation in European politics, Roosevelt
sought to expand American influence on the structure of power overseas by free-riding on
European efforts to contain Hitler. He made a limited set of diplomatic and military
commitments aimed at organizing and supporting a great power balancing coalition, while also
seeking a European settlement on positive liberal terms.
From the fall of 1940 onwards, Roosevelt sought to balance against Nazi Germany,
seeking direct participation in a ground war to destroy German power. Still politically inhibited
from immediate American entry, Roosevelt gradually led the country into a more diplomatically
and militarily aggressive posture, hoping to precipitate an Axis misstep that would open a
domestic window for the United States to enter the war. In so doing, he engaged in careful
manipulation of his policy and resorted to considerable subterfuge concerning its character.
' As Warren Kimball puts it, Roosevelt had a frankly "admitted desire to eliminate from the public record any
revelations concerning his personal decision-making process," a sentiment with which nearly every Roosevelt
scholar agrees. See Warren F. Kimball, The Most Unsordid Act: Lend-Lease, 1939-1941 (Baltimore, MD: Johns
Hopkins University Press, 1969), p. 3; William L. Langer and S. Everett Gleason, The Challenge to Isolation: The
World Crisis of 1937-1940 and American Foreign Policy (New York: Peter Smith, 1970), 1: 4; Frederick W. Marks,
Wind over Sand: The Diplomacy of Franklin Roosevelt (Athens, GA: University of Georgia Press, 1990), p. 6.
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Japan finally gave the administration the needed opportunity by attacking the American Fleet at
Pearl Harbor. Although the attack was certainly not the result of a deliberate conspiracy, as has
sometimes been scurrilously alleged, neither was it exactly an accident. As a part of his larger
efforts, Roosevelt had consciously set the United States on a collision course with Japan,
expected a Pacific war, and in all likelihood planned to use such a conflict as a springboard to his
primary goal of entering the European war.
Furthermore, the policy-making process predicted by TLFP is clearly evident in the
formation of American strategy. Geopolitics hovers like a brooding force over the entire period.
Even before the fall of France, the administration had genuine worries about a Nazi threat to the
Monroe Doctrine, helping to drive a search for American influence in Europe. After the fall of
France, these worries became nightmares, as the destruction or capture of the British Fleet
became a real possibility. But as TLFP expects, the high level of geopolitical threat led the
administration to resist pressures for non-entanglement, instead choosing to ramp up its
assistance to Britain and to rapidly expand military forces.
Roosevelt's positive liberal values are also manifest in the evolution of his foreign policy.
Before 1940, his biggest fear was that the German autarkic economic project would continue to
expand and perhaps even penetrate the Western hemisphere, strangling the American program of
free trade. Such an outcome would violate American positive rights to compete in world markets
on equal terms and would also threaten the positive liberal achievements of the New Deal at
home. Germany's autocratic regime made it likely to pursue this project with vigor and
violence. Indeed, consistent with TLFP, this expanded set of threat perceptions helps explain the
Roosevelt administration's worries about Latin America in the period before Germany became a
potential hegemon. Hemispheric penetration was tied up with the Nazi ideological and economic
threat, to which positive liberals were especially sensitive, and the administration lacked any
negative liberal reasons to dismiss security fears.
These positive liberal threat perceptions motivated Roosevelt's push to shape the
European balance of power as much as he could and were also evident in the liberal commercial
terms that sat at the heart of his peace proposals. Even after the fall of France, when geopolitical
concerns were unquestionably dominant, Roosevelt's positive liberalism helped push the
administration towards balancing rather than buckpassing. The buckpassing alternative of
buttressing a stalemate in Europe was real, powerful, and advocated by respected military
officials. But American planning documents show the influence of liberalism's commercial
values in justifying balancing and are consistent with Roosevelt's earlier views of German
autarky.
This chapter aims to verify these claims, showing the influence of both positive liberal
ideas and geopolitical threats. I begin, as before, by measuring the values of the independent
variables, demonstrating Roosevelt's solidly positive liberal views and showing that Germany
did not emerge as a potential hegemon until the fall of France. This allows me to generate
TLFP's central prediction: that America should have pursued a grand strategy of balancing.
Next, in a break with previous structure, I then examine an alternate explanation for American
grand strategy during the period that powerfully shaped American diplomacy: domestic political
constraint. The following two sections chart American foreign policy from 1937 to 1941,
showing it to be consistent with TLFP. I conclude by examining a case-specific alternate
explanation: the common historical claim that American foreign policy under Roosevelt was the
product of bureaucratic politics.
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Coding the Independent Variables
This section measures the values of TLFP's two independent variables: the Roosevelt
administration's concept of liberty and the level of geopolitical threat. I establish Roosevelt's
views on the nature of liberalism by surveying his explicit philosophical statements, his attitudes
on the centralization of political power, and his views on the legitimate scope of government
economic and fiscal interventionism. These observations are made during the period before he
assumed the presidency, following the methodological approach laid out earlier. I assess the
level of geopolitical threat by measuring the latent economic strength and extant military might
of the European poles during the 1930s.
I find that Roosevelt was fully within the set of positive liberal ideals, scoring as PL:
High. The structure of international power was changing to favor Germany throughout the
1930s, but Britain remained a close rival, and combined Anglo-French economic and military
power was equal to or greater than German power. In 1940, Germany defeated the Allies in
France, and emerged as a potential hegemon. I conclude the section by generating the
expectations for TLFP's grand strategic outcomes based on these codings.
ROOSEVELT'S CONCEPT OF LIBERTY
There is a school of historians who are fond of denigrating Franklin Roosevelt's
intellectual underpinning, denying that he had anything resembling an ideology. "At the heart of
the New Deal," Richard Hofstadter famously wrote, "there was not a philosophy but a
temperament." Oliver Wendell Holmes similarly quipped that Roosevelt possessed "a second-
rate intellect but a first-rate temperament." The tendency among this school is to laud the
2
monumental political achievements of the New Deal but attack its intellectual inconsistencies.
As many other historians understand, this has the story basically backwards: the politics
of the New Deal were buffeted with disorder and complexity, while its central ideological vision
was consistent and clear. As detailed by Sidney Milkis, Robert Eden, and others, during the
1932 campaign and his following administrations, Roosevelt developed a new "public
philosophy" running along positive liberal lines: America needed a new economic and
institutional order, with an active government vindicating positive rights. But my methodology
conservatism largely avoids this evidence, valuable though it is. 3
2 Sidney M. Milkis, "Franklin D. Roosevelt, the Economic Constitutional Order, and the New Politics of Presidential
Leadership," in The New Deal and the Triumph ofLiberalism, ed. Sidney M. Milkis and Jerome M. Mileur
(Amherst, MA: University of Massachusetts Press, 2002), p. 34; James MacGregor Burns, Roosevelt: The Lion and
the Fox (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, 2002), p. 157. Bums and Hofstadter are excellent examples of the
older historiographical tradition that de-emphasizes Roosevelt's ideology.
3 Among those who have underscored the basic consistency of Roosevelt's political philosophy are Milkis,
"Franklin D. Roosevelt, the Economic Constitutional Order, and the New Politics of Presidential Leadership";
Sidney M. Milkis, The President and the Parties: The Transformation of the American Party System since the New
Deal (Oxford, England: Oxford University Press, 1993); Sidney M. Milkis, "What Politics Do Presidents Make?,"
Polity 27, no. 3 (April 1, 1995): 485-496; Stephen Skowronek, The Politics Presidents Make: Leadershipfrom John
Adams to Bill Clinton, Revised Edition (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1997); Robert
Eden, ed., The New Deal and Its Legacy: Critique and Reappraisal (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1989); Daniel
R. Fusfeld, The Economic Thought of Franklin D. Roosevelt and the Origins of the New Deal (New York: Columbia
University Press, 1970); Charles Kesler, "The Public Philosophy of the New Freedom and the New Deal," in The
New Deal and Its Legacy: Critique and Reappraisal, ed. Robert Eden (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1989).
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Instead, I argue that a positive liberal vision was evident in Roosevelt's thought well
before he ran for president. His close associate and later head of the Democratic National
Committee Jim Farely noted that "Some of the things he has done during his administration,
while appearing to the ordinary man on the street as a wonderful accomplishment, quickly
performed, are things I have heard him discuss not only before he was elected, but before he was
nominated." In Farley's view, and in mine, before Roosevelt was "elected President he had a
full knowledge of the [office], and had in mind more or less definitely, the program he proposed
to put into effect a soon as he could bring about the necessary legislation and other actions
necessary in order to carry out his ideas." In his essential philosophic underpinnings, attitude
towards government centralization, and economic views, Roosevelt held strongly to positive
liberal tenets.4
PHILOSOPHY. Roosevelt's political philosophy was dedicated to an understanding of
liberty as the exercise of key capacities, both individually and collectively. Individually, citizens
had positive rights that must be vindicated in order for them to flourish. Collectively, a free
community had to be at liberty to act in the greater interests of all, which entailed a commitment
to participatory democracy as an intrinsic good. Together, these norms led Roosevelt to endorse
an active and interventionist role for government, to better provide the conditions for American
freedom.
Roosevelt clearly saw liberal rights as action concepts, which were pointed towards
achieving higher human goods and required preconditions for their exercise. On the subject of
poor houses for the aged, for example, he argued during his time as governor of New York that
"we can no longer be satisfied with the old method of putting them away in dismal institutions,
with the accompanying loss of self-respect, personality, and interest in life." Such institutions
could not facilitate the real goals of freedom. Similarly, measures of welfare provision, like
workman's compensation, minimum wages, and maximum hours legislation, were essential if
the workingman was truly to thrive: "modern social conditions have progressed to a point where
such demands can no longer be regarded other than as matters of absolute right," Roosevelt
insisted.5
Although by no means opposed to traditional negative rights of non-infringement,
Roosevelt was not particularly solicitous of them. As assistant secretary of the Navy in the
Wilson administration, he enthusiastically joined the faction that favored suppressing civil
liberties during the Great War. Infuriated by an article attacking compulsory service during
wartime, Roosevelt wrote the Justice Department expressing his wish that "you would send the
writer and his whole plant to [prison] for the rest of their natural lives." Even A. Mitchell
Palmer's notoriously aggressive department had to inform him there was no legal cause to do so.
In another case, he applauded zealous prosecutions, writing the U.S. Attorney for New York
State: "Pamphlets of this kind are undoubtedly attacks not on the individuals who make up the
4 Farley quoted in Milkis, "Franklin D. Roosevelt, the Economic Constitutional Order, and the New Politics of
Presidential Leadership," p. 34. 1 lack an appropriate metaphor with which to evoke the size of the Roosevelt
literature. In addition to works cited above and below, I have found the following treatments of Roosevelt's early
years helpful: Kenneth S. Davis, FDR: The New York Years: 1928-1933 (New York: Random House, 1979); Ted
Morgan, FDR: A Biography (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1985); Ernest K Lindley, Franklin D. Roosevelt (New
York: Blue Ribbon Books, 1934).
5 Thomas H. Greer, What Roosevelt Thought: The Social and Political Ideas of Franklin D. Roosevelt (East Lansing,
MI: Michigan State University Press, 1958), pp. I1, 14.
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Government but on duly constituted government itself, and I cannot help but feeling that in
certain parts of the country especially, every effort should be made to stamp them out." 6
After the war, he did take issue with an Admiral who had fired four naval yard workers
for being socialists. Three of them should have instead been dismissed on efficiency grounds,
Roosevelt thought, because "neither you nor I can fire a man because he happens to be a
socialist.... [but the fourth man] was alleged to have actually circulated revolutionary literature in
the shop, literature which advocated the Soviet form of government and which, therefore,
constituted, in my judgment, an attack on our own form of government. This is a very different
thing." 7
Roosevelt's positive view of individual rights was intimately linked to his collective
vision of freedom. He formulated these views very early, arguing in 1912 that "during the past
century we have acquired a new set of conditions which we must seek to solve. To put it in the
simplest and fewest words I have called this new theory the struggle for liberty of the community
rather than the liberty of the individual." Because in important respects, Americans could only
be free together, the government must act "to restrain the kind of individual action which in the
past has been detrimental to the community." Expanding further, Roosevelt claimed social
freedom was in no small part a collective capacity: "If we can prophesy today the State (or in
other words, the people as a whole) will shortly tell a man how many trees he must cut, then why
can we not, without being radical, predict that the State will compel every farmer to till his land
or raise beef, or horses? For after all if I own a farm of a hundred acres and let it lie waste and
overgrown, I am just as much a destroyer of the liberty of the community, and by liberty, we
mean happiness and prosperity, as is the strong man who stands idle on the corner, refusing to
work."8
Roosevelt believed that both the positive liberty of the individual and the collective
freedom of the polity developed together in historical tandem to facilitate effective action and
greater human flourishing. "Every new star that people have hitched their wagon to for the past
half century," Roosevelt thought, "whether it is anti-rebating, or anti-trusts, or new fashioned
education, or conservation of our natural resources or State regulation of common carriers, or
6 Frank Freidel, Franklin D. Roosevelt, I: The Apprenticeship (Boston, MA: Little, Brown and Company, 1952), p.
334.
7 Frank Freidel, Franklin D. Roosevelt, II: The Ordeal (Boston, MA: Little, Brown and Company, 1954), p. 3 1.
Roosevelt would later occasionally express skepticism of censorship during his presidential career, though largely in
terms of the difficulty of enforcement. Off the record to the press, he used the example of Mae West's scandalous
turn in a radio sketch, "Adam and Eve." Roosevelt said: "Now the script was all right-if you or I read it, all right,
but Mae West-my God, what she put into it! How do you censor intonation?" But he basically accepted that the
government ought to be able to stop people from saying really outrageous things. See Greer, What Roosevelt
Thought, pp. 14-15.
8 David K. Adams, "The New Deal and the Vital Center: A Continuing Struggle for Liberalism," in Franklin D.
Roosevelt: The Man, the Myth, the Era, 1882-1945, ed. Herbert D. Rosenbaum and Elizabeth Bartelme (Westport,
CT: Greenwood Press, 1987), pp. 107, 108; Freidel, Franklin D. Roosevelt 1, p. 132. This speech quoted in the next
paragraph and elsewhere below as well, was made publically to the People's Forum of Troy New York. The speech
occurred outside of an electoral context and before a potentially unfriendly audience, given the views Roosevelt was
advocating. It seems free of any instrumental taint, and is generally regarded as Roosevelt's first attempt to
articulate a political philosophy. Were that not enough, he also expressed the same views privately at around the
same time. For instance, he wrote a friend that he regarded opposition to his bill regulating timber cutting in private
forests as "based on the assumption that the State has no right to tell a private individual how he shall cut trees on
his own land." Roosevelt disagreed. See Fusfeld, The Economic Thought of Franklin D. Roosevelt, p. 44.
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commission government... [each is a step] in the evolution of the new theory of liberty of the
community."9
The same type of theory can be seen in the introduction to his abandoned manuscript on
American history, written while convalescing from polio. Roosevelt noted that the Crusades
"accomplished in the end more for civilization and democracy than any previous event.
Knighthood and overlordship took on responsibilities to others. Feudal barons were taught to
look beyond their own castle domains, and to work with other individuals to a common end."
But while praising this development of European civilization, he also criticized the lack of
effective options for the broad mass of people: "there was far less freedom as we know it for the
great mass of the European population than their ancestors had enjoyed under the tribal
conditions which prevailed in the days of roman supremacy.... A mere handful of humanity,
certainly less than one in a hundred, owned and controlled the very lives and fortunes of the
other ninety-nine." Part of the development of collective social freedom involved building the
capacity of individuals to control their "very lives and fortunes."10
The importance of collective freedom naturally led Roosevelt to emphasize active
participation in democracy as an intrinsic, rather than instrumental, good. While he was in the
New York State Senate, for instance, he wrote to a constituent that the direct primary "will be for
the good of the whole Country as the whole theory of our Government is built upon the
assumption that every citizen takes an active interest in his own government." Roosevelt
privately eulogized Woodrow Wilson upon his death in 1924, writing a friend that "Woodrow
Wilson's administration gave to the average citizen a greater opportunity to take part in his own
government than ever before" and that "Woodrow Wilson in his life gave mankind a new vision
of pure democracy." The goal of politics, he argued in 1928, was to make "under [the] changing
conditions of each generation a people's government for the people's good." And he defended
the Democratic Party's 1928 nomination of Al Smith because a president needed Smith's "rare
ability to make popular government function..., to reverse the present trend towards apathy and
arouse in the citizenship an active interest-a willingness to resume its share of the responsibility
for the nation's progress. So only can we have a government not only for the people but by the
people also." 1
Roosevelt understood that securing individual and collective rights to exercising effective
freedom required a much more activist role for government that had previously been acceptable
in America. In 1916 he privately and publically defended the Democratic Party as the
"progressive" party in America, endorsing the then-unprecedented government activism under
Wilson. "We ought to go out and make the fight on the really great accomplishments of the past
four years," he argued, and swore to his wife Eleanor that the campaign made him "hope to God
I don't grow reactionary with advancing years," a tendentious interpretation of the relatively
moderate Republican candidate, Charles Evans Hughes. In August, 1916, he reported that at
9 Freidel, Franklin D. Roosevelt I, p. 132.
0 Roosevelt, rough draft to a "History of the United States," in Eleanor Roosevelt, Elliot Roosevelt, and Joseph P.
Lash, eds., F.D.R., His Personal Letters: 1905-1928 (New York: Duell, Sloan and Pearce, 1950), pp. 546-552,
quotes 546, 547.
" Freidel, Franklin D. Roosevelt I, pp. 124, 125; Adams, "The New Deal and the Vital Center," p. 108; Greer, What
Roosevelt Thought, p. 98.
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dinner his aunt "gave the usual line of talk 'agin the government' and I delivered the eulogy per
contra. Think it did Aunt Doe good at least.'
In general, he championed the activist elements of the Democratic Party's past,
encouraging party members to "remember that many of the ideals and principles enunciated by
Mr. Bryan and his associates of those days are now law of the land, principles considered
visionary then but accepted whole-heartedly today." Upon hearing of the death of President
Harding, he wrote a friend that Coolidge "will be considered, of course, a conservative, which
means we must nominate a progressive without fail," and added, "If I did not still have these
crutches I should throw my own hat in the ring." Though often seeking to unite the national
party under bromides acceptable to all factions, Roosevelt's heart lay with the progressives and
their vision of active government.' 3
This positive liberal vision came through in his execution of public policy as a state
senator and governor. His test of whether a particular function should be public or private was
simply "which can do it better." As such, he sought to use the state to regulate areas where
private individuals were running riot against the public interest. As a state senator, he showed
pictures of the devastation caused to a Chinese town by deforestation, claiming "this will happen
in this very state if the individuals are allowed to do as they please with the natural resources to
line their own pockets during their life." His proposed regulations were so extensive they could
not command the support of the progressive committee he controlled in a progressive New York
Senate. Roosevelt also argued the government needed to step up where society was not
providing the effective conditions for real free action. As the Depression began, he spearheaded
the effort for welfare relief agencies and unemployment insurance, arguing "one of the duties of
the state is that of caring for those of its citizens who find themselves the victims of such adverse
circumstance[s].""
Roosevelt probably best summed up his philosophy of government in an interview he
gave the New York Times after he had been elected governor. "I believe that in the future the
State-and when I say the State I do not mean New York alone-will assume a much larger role
in the lives of its citizens. Public health, I believe, is a responsibility of the State, and I think
there will be a general widening of its activities to promote general welfare. The State educates
its children. Why not also keep them well? Now some people are going to say this is socialistic.
My answer to them is that it is 'social' not 'socialistic'." The demands of exercising real liberty
meant the government had to intervene to provide its extensive preconditions.' 5
12 Freidel, Franklin D. Roosevelt I, p. 266; Roosevelt to Eleanor Roosevelt, November 9, 1916 and August 5, 1916,
both in Roosevelt, Elliot Roosevelt, and Lash, F.D.R., His Personal Letters: 1905-1928, pp. 339, 313-314, quotes
pp. 339, 313.
3 Freidel, Franklin D. Roosevelt, II, pp. 53, 164.
14 Frank Freidel, Franklin D. Roosevelt, II: The Triumph (Boston, MA: Little, Brown and Company, 1956), p. 12.
To be completely fair, he also gave an olive branch to his defeated opponents in the interview, mentioning at the end
that "the best government is the least government." But the thrust of his remarks and underlying beliefs are clear,
and he had no incentives to misrepresent the views that had helped win him the election. As Roosevelt had noted in
an earlier 1926 speech, "If we accept the phrase 'the best government is the least government' we must understand
that it applies to the simplification of government machinery" rather than to a reduction of the scope and depth of
government action. Indeed, without even bolder and more vigorous government action, America was "headed for
decline and ultimate death from inaction." See Fusfeld, The Economic Thought of Franklin D. Roosevelt, p. 99.
*5 Greer, What Roosevelt Thought, p. 28; H.W. Brands, Traitor to His Class: The Privileged Life and Radical
Presidency ofFranklin Delano Roosevelt (New York: Doubleday Books, 2008), p. 237; Freidel, Franklin D.
Roosevelt I, p. 137.
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CENTRALIZATION OF POWER. Roosevelt favored the centralization of political power and
found the separation of powers an impediment to democracy and effective government. He
particularly favored the executive branch over the legislative branch, and as his presidency
would show, the judicial branch as well. While not opposed to federalism per se, he often
believed it outmoded for solving modern problems. Though he occasionally found it politically
expedient to express devotion to the structural principles of American government, his policy
concerns generally pointed him towards a greater concentration of power.
Roosevelt saw the fractured power of America's constitutional structure as a major
problem for expanding American liberty. The problem with American government, he opined in
a 1928 memorandum, is that "we have today side by side an old political order fashioned by a
pastoral civilization and a new social order fashioned by a technical civilization. The two are
maladjusted." The solution, he argued in a 1929 essay dubbed "The Age of Social
Consciousness," was to revise institutional forms and roles. Though admitting that the
centralization of power carried dangers, Roosevelt argued that "we are married to it for better or
for worse; we are a part of it, and whatever our doubts and fears we can do no good to our fellow
men by sitting idly by or seeking to dam the current with a brick."16
Increasing the power of the executive would allow both for more efficient administration
and increasing democratic responsibility. In opposing a law to reorganize the New York
highway commission as a state senator, for example, Roosevelt argued that it fracture power
instead of concentrating authority in a single authority. "I should be the first to favor any
measure," Roosevelt importuned, "looking to concentration of responsibility in one man who
would be responsible to the governor, and through the governor to the people.... This, after all, is
to my mind the best kind of democratic doctrine." Indeed, the executive played a critical role in
making democracy work, because "Leadership must educate the public, if it expects to get the
public response necessary for effective action." Power must be concentrated and made
responsible, not divided and made unthreatening.' 7
The inherent division of the legislative branch made Roosevelt skeptical that it could be
useful for acting in the public interest. He believed legislatures used their powers mostly for
political purposes, complaining that parliamentary investigations were not abiding by two "often-
forgotten principles": all investigations needed to be in the public interest, and "all persons,
unless or until formally charged with crime, shall be shielded from suspicion or innuendo
through publicity." Put more bluntly, legislative oversight interfered with executive
administration. As assistant secretary of the Navy, he complained bitterly that Congress did
nothing more than bore people to sleep and gum up the works of administration. Roosevelt
wanted to run the Navy efficiently, with minimal interference: "it would be a perfectly simple
thing if they could forget prerogative, precedent, parliamentary law and Magna Charta, to put
into effect-any businessman could do it-a system by which the legislative branch of the
government would move along American lines." He praised the British civil service, appointed
by a unitary executive and not interfered with by representative bodies. "While the general
British business methods are inferior to the American," Roosevelt thought, "the business of the
Government is on the whole a more efficient machine than our government." 8
16 Adams, "The New Deal and the Vital Center," p. 108; Greer, What Roosevelt Thought, p. 29.
17 Franklin D. Roosevelt I, pp. 123-124; Greer, What Roosevelt Thought, p. 1 10.
'8 Greer, What Roosevelt Thought, p. I 10; Freidel, Franklin D. Roosevelt, II, pp. 123-124.
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Roosevelt was no friend to federalism and local control, either. Despite a feigned distrust
of federalizing schemes, Roosevelt wrote a supporter of public utilities that "the complexities of
modem civilization and the breaking down of state boundaries... seem in many cases to demand
some form of government requisition to prevent abuses or extortion." Like Woodrow Wilson, he
supported a uniform national divorce law, even though there were strong states' rights counter
arguments made against his proposal that he had to parry. During the 1920's, Roosevelt gave a
wide variety of speeches on behalf different political causes and in the service of rebuilding the
Democratic Party. Even James McGregor Burns, a skeptic of Roosevelt's ideological coherency,
admits that "certain threads ran through many of his speeches: nationalism... rather than
localism or sectionalism, internationalism rather than nationalism, the use of the government to
solve problems, [and] the improvement in government machinery to handle heavier burdens."
Roosevelt repeatedly associated federalism as an impediment to his larger vision, lumping it with
other parts of the American tradition that needed modification for modern times.' 9
Certainly, Roosevelt had occasion to deploy the rhetoric of American constitutionalism
on behalf of his political purposes. For instance, the typical way for early twentieth-century
politicians to dodge the prohibition issue was to come out for "local option," a political option of
which Roosevelt quickly availed himself. In trying to reunite a fractious Democratic Party, he
sometimes used states' rights language to pull along reluctant southern powerbrokers. And of
course, as Governor of New York, it was an outrage against federalism anytime the national
government wanted to interfere with his plans, and a violation of separation of powers if the state
courts and assembly protested his measures too vigorously. Still, these instances of traditional
federalist rhetoric were fairly transparent in their aims, rare in their use, contradicted by
Roosevelt's other statements, and opposed to the thrust of his political and philosophical
program. It is safe to say that Roosevelt supported the transformation of American institutional
forms in the service of a more activist government.2
ECONOMIC AND FISCAL VIEWS. The heart of Roosevelt's positive liberal program was
government intervention in the economy, through business regulation economic planning.
Roosevelt had a mixed set of statements on fiscal norms, but was clearly no fiscal conservative.
He strongly favored labor unions and sought to strengthen them through government support,
while often disdaining for business interests and alleging them to be at the heart of American
economic dysfunction.
As early as 1912, Roosevelt's mistrust of the market system was evident. He argued that
"To state it plainly, competition has been shown to be useful up to a certain point, but
cooperation, which is the thing we must strive for today, begins where competition leaves off."
This cooperation amounted to state coercion on behalf of economic goals, which is why the
terminology was important: "If we call the method regulation, people hold up their hands in
horror and say 'unamerican' or 'dangerous,' but if we call the identical process co-operation
these same old fogies will cry 'well done."' Regulation should extend beyond the forests and
waterways into all areas of economic life. For example, in a magazine article he authored in
1932, he called for government intervention in financial markets. "The government must protect
its citizens against financial buccaneering. No Federal Administration can prevent individuals
19 Freidel, Franklin D. Roosevelt, II, p. 207; Burns, Roosevelt 1: 1882-1940, p. 7 1. On Roosevelt's push for a federal
divorce law, see Freidel, Franklin D. Roosevelt 1, p. 127. Unlike Wilson, Roosevelt wanted to make divorce law
less strict.
20 For treatments of some of this opportunism, see Ibid., p. 128; Freidel, Franklin D. Roosevelt, 1I, p. 205; Greer,
What Roosevelt Thought, Ch. 4.
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from being suckers, but our government has the right as well as the positive duty to dissect, for
the benefit of the public, every new form of financial action."21
In general, Roosevelt rejected the classical liberal appreciation of market society. At
Groton, Harvard, and Columbia he had studied economics under moderately reformist free-
market thinkers. As he later quipped, "I took economics courses in college for four years, and
everything I was taught was wrong." In 1929, he made an argument that in the hands of Calvin
Coolidge might have been part of an impassioned defense of market institutions: "it is literally
true that the 'self-supporting' man or woman has become as extinct as the man of the stone
age.... Consider the bread on our table, the clothes upon our backs, the luxuries that make life
pleasant; how many men worked in sunlit fields, in dark mines, in the fierce heat of molten
metal, and among the looms and wheels of countless factories, in order to create them for our use
and enjoyment." But instead of reflecting on this miracle of decentralized coordination,
Roosevelt used the example as a platform for proposing a series of active interventions into
22business and private enterprise.
Government economic planning was central to Roosevelt's view of how liberal society
should be developed. In May 1932, Roosevelt spoke on the Great Depression at a
commencement address in Georgia. He remarked that "I have no doubt some of you have been
impressed with its chaos, its lack of a plan. Perhaps some of you have used stronger language.
And stronger language is justified." Much of the waste "could have been prevented by greater
foresight and by a larger measure of social planning." In 1931, Roosevelt backed the Swopes
Plan for industrial management, the centerpiece of which was "the establishment of balance
between production and consumption through control of production" within government-backed
cartels. His private letters of the time considered proposals to restrict "abnormal consumption"
and "abnormal production," including regulation of the manufacturing industry and restricting
credit to consumers. Roosevelt's distrust of the market and advocacy of economic planning was
integrated with his positive liberal vision of freedom's purpose. Government had to be
"something more than a necessary evil." It was instead "an agency first to protect society and
then to promote and guide all the people into better ways of living." 2 3
Roosevelt's fiscal views were mixed. Rhetorically he advocated a balanced budget, but
in practice he was a deficit spender as Governor of New York and as president of the United
States. He had no practical problem with increased taxation, often arguing that the under-
collection of tax revenues was close to criminal. He fulminated in a mid 1920s newspaper
column that "if all taxes, especially those on property, were enforced 100%, the average man's
taxes could be cut." And following the First World War, he admitted privately that the high
post-war costs of living were caused by "the inflation of currency for war purposes as well as the
relative scarcity of goods." But this did not lead him to propose tighter money or balanced
budgets; instead he pushed for a host of government interventions and price-fixing laws for
"commodities like coal that the average citizen may be assured that the supply will be adequate
and the price reasonable." At a minimum, the manner in which the government ran its finances
21 First and third quotes Greer, What Roosevelt Thought, pp. 60, 68; second quote Freidel, Franklin D. Roosevelt I,
p. 132.
22 Burns, Roosevelt 1: 1882-1940, p. 20; Greer, What Roosevelt Thought, p. 60.
23 Brands, Traitor to His Class, p. 240; Fusfeld, The Economic Thought of Franklin D. Roosevelt, pp. 201, 200, 99.
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was not a major item of concern for Roosevelt. More likely he found loose fiscal and monetary
standards useful for pursuing policy goals.2 4
Roosevelt's take on business and labor is much clearer. Following Hoover's 1928
victory, Roosevelt wrote a colleague that "the business community is not much interested in
good government... so long as the stock market soars and the new combinations of capital are
left undisturbed." But when good times came to an end the Democratic Party needed to be
"sanely radical enough" to attract a disgruntled populace. Roosevelt had a friendlier view
towards farmers and labor organizations. Farmers had not gotten "an even break," and Roosevelt
wanted "our agricultural population to be put on the same level of earning capacity as their
fellow Americans." 25
As assistant secretary of the Navy, Roosevelt did what he could to bolster the cause of
labor, including changing the methods by which pay scales were set and abolishing the
institution of "Taylorist" methods of scientific labor management in naval yards. His support for
labor is probably best shown in the words of the unions themselves. One union chief advised his
subordinate when negotiating with the secretary of the Navy to "take what is offered and go after
the rest when Mr. Roosevelt returns." The chairman of the State Federation for Labor in New
York wrote Roosevelt that "Your support on behalf of all labor legislation has been that of an
earnest representative of the people and if our compensation bill is placed in your hands I have
no fear of the result." So close was their relationship that Roosevelt personally nominated
Samuel Gompers for an honorary degree at Harvard. Labor was a major example of "the
forgotten man" that Roosevelt would promise to help on the campaign trail, and whose liberty
the government needed to guarantee. 26
COMPOSITE CODE. Franklin Roosevelt was the transformational figure in American
politics, raising to dominance the positive interpretation of liberal freedom. Heir to the
ideological tradition started in earnest by Wilson and Theodore Roosevelt, his political
philosophy was in place well before his presidency. He endorsed a vision of freedom as an
action concept, a value that could not be fully realized unless individuals possessed the material
preconditions to exercise their freedom and the community could act to guide society towards
better ways of living. His focus on communal freedom naturally led him to view democratic
participation as an intrinsically valuable part of the liberal heritage. He believed democratic and
liberal norms needed to be vindicated by a strong, activist state that had a positive duty to
support far-reaching rights.
As such, he was friendly to the centralization of political power, particularly in the
executive branch and away from state and local authorities. That power was to be used to
intervene directly in the economy, by regulating business and engaging in centralized planning.
Using the government to strengthen labor unions against disreputable business was an important
24 Fusfeld, The Economic Thought of Franklin D. Roosevelt, pp. 92, 80. For Roosevelt's intermittent rhetorical
support for a balanced budget, see Greer, What Roosevelt Thought, pp. 51-52. The last quote in the paragraph is a
particularly good summary of one of the proposals Roosevelt pushed in the early 1920s, but it does come from a
campaign speech, which is an inherently suspect source.
25 Roosevelt to Pell, January 28, 1929, in Eleanor Roosevelt, Elliot Roosevelt, and Joseph P. Lash, eds., F.D.R., His
Personal Letters: 1928-1945; 2 Vols. (New York: Duell, Sloan and Pearce, 1950), 1: 24-25, quote 24; Greer, What
Roosevelt Thought, p. 69.
26 Brands, Traitor to His Class, p. 78; Freidel, Franklin D. Roosevelt 1, p. 122. On Roosevelt's general support of
labor and his recommendation for Gompers, see Freidel, Franklin D. Roosevelt I, pp. 198-202; Freidel, Franklin D.
Roosevelt, II, p. 54.
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part of advancing freedom's reach. Although an astute political operator who occasionally drew
on some negative liberal rhetoric for tactical purposes, Roosevelt's positive liberalism comes
through amply in private and non-instrumental settings. I thus code Roosevelt as PL: High, fully
within the set of typical positive liberal ideals.
Table 5.1: Roosevelt Administration's Concept of Liberty
Explicit Centralization Economic and Overall
Philosophy Fiscal Views
Roosevelt Rights are Skeptical of Government has PL High: fully
positive concepts separation of a positive duty to within the set.
whose exercise powers; very regulate business
secures higher supportive of and to plan the
values; liberty executive over economy; market
also exists legislative society is flawed;
collectively; power; anti- inflation and
democracy is federalism and taxes are fine;
intrinsically localism, though labor is to be
good; state must sometimes helped; business
actively instrumentally is suspect.
vindicate rights, supportive. o
GEOPOLITICAL THREAT
I turn now to coding the geopolitical threat during the 1930s. To do so, I rely as before
on two central concepts of power. Initially, I aim to assess the latent economic potential of the
European great powers. I employ three different indicators to get a sense of whether there was
any one power economically strong enough to potentially over-run the continent. First, I
compare the European poles on the Correlates of War (COW) index of steel production and
energy consumption; this measure provides a rough take on economic size and high-technology
industrial potential. Second and third, I compare great powers at the same level of economic
development using Angus Maddison's series of historical GDPs and Paul Bairoch's index of
total industrial potential. Maddison's series is conventionally regarded as the best measurement
of raw economic size,, while Bairoch's index includes a series of high-technology industries
beyond steel production.
Next, I seek to measure the basic military balance. I do so by looking at the size of
European armies and historical assessments of their quality. The data on army sizes were
compiled by John Mearsheimer. The idea is to determine whether a single power held a decided
advantage in a short war before the combatants could mobilize. A pole that held such an
advantage could be a potential hegemon.
These indicators show that, although German power was growing in the 193s, Germany
was not a potential hegemon until 1940. Depending on which indicators are given the most
credence, English total economic strength closely approached that of Germany until at least
1938, and perhaps afterward. Combined French and British economic capacity was probably
superior to Germany's, or at least its equal. The same is true of readily mobilizeable military
forces, where Germany did not attain superiority over France until 1938 and obtained equality
with the Anglo-French coalition only in 1940. American decision-makers had plenteous support
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for believing that the distribution of power in Europe was stable, as long as the British could get
their Army to the continent.
After the shocking collapse of France and its subsequent economic exploitation by the
Third Reich, however, Germany bestrode Europe like a colossus. It controlled more than half of
all European industrial potential and was faced with militarily weak and politically isolated
rivals. While the possibility of an Anglo-Soviet balancing coalition existed, such an alliance did
not come into being until Hitler invaded the Soviet Union. In short, from the perspective of the
United States, geopolitical threat skyrocketed in May 1940.
LATENT ECONOMIC POWER. Table 5.2 shows the COW steel and energy index from
1935-1940. Germany was already Europe's leading industrial power by 1935, though its size
relative to the British remained close until 1938, when Germany gained an advantage
comparable to its earlier non-hegemonic superiority in 1913. The economic potential of a
possible Anglo-French coalition exceeded Germany until 1938, after which the two sides sat at
rough equality.2 7
Table 5.2: Relative Percentage of European Industry, 1935-1940 (COW)
1935 1936 1937 1938 1939 1940
Germany 33.0 32.5 32.9 36.3 36.3 35.9
Britain 28.4 28.0 28.0 24.7 25.7 27.0
France 13.4 12.4 12.0 11.2 11.8 7.6
USSR 25.2 27.1 27.1 27.8 26.3 29.4
Ger/Br 1.16 1.16 1.18 1.50 1.41 1.33
Ger/Br+Fr .79 .80 .83 1.01 .97 1.04
Moreover, even this modestly threatening German advantage is overstated by the German
superiority on the steel production metric. As noted earlier, steel production is conventionally
used in power calculations because it indicates capacity in the high-technology sectors necessary
to build top-of-the-line military forces. An economy that produces a lot of steel therefore shows
itself to have command of an essential element of national power. However, the actual amount
of steel produced by any given country is determined by the peacetime requirements of domestic
economies and by international comparative advantage in the location for steel plants. If a state
needs to quickly produce large quantities of steel for wartime mobilization, it can channel its
economy towards greater production. Furthermore, economies open to world trade can rely on
imports from other steel producing nations. The size of the German power jump in 1938 is due
in no small part to state-directed increases in steel production for the expansion of the
Wehrnacht.
Table 5.3 presents economic comparisons of French, British, and German GDP from
1936-1940, as well as Bairoch's industrial production index for the year 1938, which is his
27 Data in the table are drawn from the COW dataset associated with J. David Singer, "Reconstructing the Correlates
of War Dataset on Material Capabilities of States, 1816-1985," International Interactions 14, no. 2 (1988): 115-132.
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observation year for the 1930s. The Soviet Union is excluded from the table because it is not
clear that its command economy had yet approached the level of industrialization present in the
western powers, and because most Soviet economic figures from the period are extremely
dubious. As the table shows, both measures downscale the size of the German advantage and
moderate the trend of Germany's power increase. German's industrial advantage over Britain
was probably more on the order of 1.15 or 1.18 in 1938 and experienced a more gradual but real
climb throughout the decade. On these measures, Germany never obtained economic equality
with the allied coalition.28
Table 5.3: Relative Percentage of European Industry, 1936-1940, (Maddison GDP)
1936 1937 1938 1939 1940 Bairoch
1938
Germany 39.3 39.7 41.4 42.8 43.2 214
Britain 37.3 36.8 36.0 34.3 37.8 181
France 23.3 22.5 22.7 22.9 19.0 74
Ger/Br 1.05 1.08 1.15 1.25 1.14 1.18
Ger/Br+Fr .65 .67 .70 .75 .76 .84
Compare these data with the situation after the fall of France. Table 5.4 shows the
relative industrial strength of the European great powers from 1941-1944. Unfortunately,
economic data during the war are difficult to accumulate and often unreliable. This table shows
the basic COW index for energy consumption and steel production, but with data drawn from the
more reliable sources. The power conclusions are very clear: Germany became a potential
hegemon. It controlled more than half of European wealth and outstripped the remaining great
powers by a factor of two to one or more. Only a coalition between Britain and the Soviet Union
could rebalance the system, but Germany had succeeded in politically dividing the two states.
From the point of view of the United States, the European balance of power disintegrated after
the fall of France.2 9
28 Data in the table are drawn from Angus Maddison, "World population, GDP and per capita GDP, 1-2003 AD,"
data at http://www.ggdc.net/maddison/ (2007); Paul Bairoch, "International Industrialization Levels from 1750 to
1980," Journal of European Economic History 11, no. 2 (1982): p. 299. These data help explain the British and
French decision to wage a war of economic attrition in 1939.
29 This table is a reformatted version of the one found in John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics
(New York: Norton, 2001), p. 73.
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MILITARY POWER. The military balance tells much the same story. Table 5.5 presents
the size of standing armies in Europe prior to the Second World War. The 1940 and 1941
figures are the actual forces mobilized by both sides for the operations in France and Russia; the
British figure for 1941 is the total size of its mobilized Army, though most of it was deployed on
the home islands. France had the largest Army in Europe for most of the period, and Germany
did not gain a serious advantage until the year of decision itself. The combined Anglo-French
forces exceeded their German counter-parts until 1940, when the Germans gained equality.
Given that some advantage accrues to an unsurprised defender, and that the war had been going
on since 1939, American leaders had no cause to believe the Germans would rapidly annihilate
the Allied forces as they did.30
Table 5.5: Size of European Standing Armies, 1935-1940 (Mearshei er)
1935 1936 1937 1938 1939 1940 1941
(fighting (fighting
army) army)
Germany 480,000 520,000 550,000 720,000 730,000 2,760,000 3,050,000
Britain 196,137 192,325 190,830 212,300 237,736 402,000 2,292,000
France 642,875 642,875 692,860 698,101 900,000 2,224,000 n/a
USSR 1,300,000 1,300,000 1,433,000 1,513,000 1,520,000 n/a 2,900,000
Ger/Fr or .75 .81 .79 1.03 .81 1.24 1.05
USSR (41)
Ger/Fr+Br .57 .62 .62 .79 .64 1.05 n/a
Assessments of military quality show a patchwork of problems and successes. All
European societies faced a terrific conflict between guns and butter during the 1930s, and the
varying pace of rearmament created a series of deficiencies and bottlenecks in every country.
But a general pattern is clear. The Red Army was a large but hollow force. Stalin had procured
huge quantities of materiel, but much of it was obsolete-of the 24,000 tanks in service in 1941,
only 967 were of the latest design, the rest being far inferior to German equipment. The Army
was large, but largely composed of untrained and illiterate peasantry. The office corps had been
liquidated by Stalin's purges, with 90% of all General officers and 80% of all Colonels dead.
Impressive on paper, the Red Army faced deep problems in practice. 31
30 The data in the table are drawn from Ibid., pp. 317, 320.
3 Paul M. Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict from 1500 to the
Present (New York: Random House, 1987), p. 325.
200
The British Army was in better internal shape, but was not very useful for fighting a large
land war. Britain had virtually no capability for continental intervention until 1939, having
devoted most of its limited defense sums to the Royal Navy and Royal Air Force. Early British
experiments with mobile warfare doctrines had petered out by the 1930s, and the British Army
was small and structured largely for imperial defense. It had fairly modern equipment, but very
little of it: on John Mearsheimer's estimate, Britain brought only 100 tanks to the fight in the
Low Countries in 1940. The Royal Navy and Air Force were relatively powerful and well
equipped, however, so Britain had a decent chance of executing its strategy for a long war of
continental defense and economic attrition.3 2
The French Army was sizeable, and by the late 1930s quite competent, but oriented
entirely for defensive operations. Economic scarcity had starved it of modern equipment and so
it was in the midst of modernizing its force when war came. The French Navy was unreasonably
well provided for, given its near strategic uselessness, which contributed to the starvation diet of
the French air force-the Armee de L 'aire had few planes, such equipment as they had possessed
deficiencies, and there was little aerospace production capacity within the country. Still, by the
time of the German attack, the French had organized the foundation of a reasonably adequate
defense along the Maginot Line, with a powerful fighting force poised to defend in Belgium. 33
The German military was in the best shape, though it by no means looked like the world-
beater it swiftly became. Germany started its rearmament earlier than other powers and by 1938
was pumping nearly 20% of its GDP into its armed forces. The Wehrmacht and Luftwaffe had
modern weaponry, excellent leadership, and innovative doctrines for ground warfare. But the
German military machine was built for coercive diplomacy and quick aggression, not extended
warfare. There were low stocks of ammunition, critical shortages of spare parts, and insufficient
production capacity across the force. The professionalism of German cadres was also low due to
the rapid expansion of the Army. The German air force was well suited for supporting the
Army, but lacked the capacity for strategic bombing. The German Navy was of very modest
size, though it possessed some submarine strength that would prove important. Overall, the
German military had strength in breadth but not depth.
Overall, the structure of power in Europe before May 1940 looked serious but stable. A
Franco-British coalition appeared to have the military power and economic strength to contain
Hitler. After the fall of France, however, the military situation imploded. The Wehrmacht was
supreme in all of non-Russian Europe and was poised at the English Channel to potentially finish
off Britain. In the east, Germany faced a large but potentially ineffective Soviet force, while
British armed strength could not be brought to bear on the continent. This weakness might have
been remedied if the British and Soviet poles could have joined forces, but Hitler had politically
isolated them both. In American eyes, the situation was ominous.
SUMMARY OF CODING
Franklin Roosevelt embraced positive liberal views in their fullness. He saw rights as
exercise concepts that required preconditions for action, supported the centralization of political
32 Ibid., pp. 315-320; Barry R. Posen, The Sources of Military Doctrine: France, Britain, and Germany Between the
World Wars (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1984), pp. 156-157; John J. Mearsheirmer, Conventional
Deterrence (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1983), p. 81.
3 Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of Great Powers, pp. 310-314; Posen, The Sources of Military Doctrine, Ch. 4.
3 Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of Great Powers, pp. 303-309; Posen, The Sources of Military Doctrine, pp. 193-201.
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power to vindicate those rights, and was especially concerned to intervene in the marketplace in
order to ensure economic foundations for the exercise of liberal values. The European system
was stable until 1940, as Britain and France had the economic and military strength to balance
rising German power. After the fall of France, Germany emerged as a potential hegemon that no
American statesman could have ignored.
TLFP therefore predicts that the Roosevelt administration should have pursued as much
influence in Europe as it could get in order to promote and defend liberal values. Given the
strength of Germany, a preponderance strategy was unlikely, so TLFP predicts early balancing.
Furthermore, after the fall of France, Germany's potential hegemony should have sparked even
more intense balancing commitments and less emphasis on liberal goals abroad. All else equal,
then, the Roosevelt administration before 1940 should have sought to make forward
commitments in order to shape its preferred power constellation, and it should have moved to
increase those commitments as the German danger grew, with a greater focus on forestalling
German hegemony.
All Else Not Equal: the Role of Domestic Political Constraints
However, TLFP's outcome predictions were impeded in the case by powerful domestic
political constraints on Roosevelt's freedom of action. These constraints represent a factor
outside of the theoretical model, constituting an important subsidiary influence on the course of
American foreign policy. I break with my previous expository structure and address this factor
first, in order to situate the examination of American grand strategy within its domestic political
context.
Simply put: public opinion and congressional opposition tied Roosevelt's hands in
directing foreign affairs. As the war in Europe gained intensity, these constraints loosened but
did not disappear, particularly with regard to the deployment of ground forces abroad. The result
was that Roosevelt's plans consistently ran in front of his capability to act on them. American
grand strategy developed more slowly than it otherwise would have, as Roosevelt maneuvered
around political obstacles. In the end, Roosevelt was able to overcome those obstacles,
vindicating TLFP's balancing prediction. But the process was long and winding, impeded by a
domestic political force that demands recognition.
Roosevelt's political acumen led him to understand the limits within which his foreign
policy had to operate. After the negative public reaction to his speech calling for the
"quarantine" of international aggressors, he wrote his old headmaster at Groton that "I am
fighting against a public psychology of long standing-a psychology which comes very close to
saying "Peace at any price."' He repeatedly complained that "The country as a whole does not
yet have any deep sense of world crisis," and worried that "public opinion over here is patting
itself on the back every morning and thanking God for the Atlantic Ocean (and the Pacific
Ocean)." Roosevelt wrote to an internationalist supporter that he was "pursued by catchcries in
this country, and I am in the midst of a long process of education" in his attempts to lead the
public. As late as September 1941, he explained to Canadian Prime Minister Mackenzie King
that his options were limited because "I have to watch this Congress and public opinion like a
hawk."3 5
3 Second quote in Steven Casey, Cautious Crusade: Franklin D. Roosevelt, American Public Opinion, and the War
against Nazi Germany (Oxford, England: Oxford University Press, 2001), p. 24. Others in Roosevelt to Peabody,
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Roosevelt's methods of observation were many and sundry. He kept careful tabs of elite
opinion by reading a half dozen of the most important newspapers every morning. As the war
progressed, he had a digest of opinion in the three hundred dailies of widest circulation prepared
for him, which soon used basic statistical techniques to analyze trends. Most of the President's
day was spent taking meeting and phone calls with important congressional and opinion leaders,
which he likened to taking a "public opinion bath." He also kept careful tabs on the White
House mail, particularly after policy initiatives or major speeches.36
But most importantly, Roosevelt devoured public opinion polls, which had developed
into their modem form during the 1930s. The results of these polls are telling, especially after
the war began to heat up in Europe. To begin with, they showed that the public was going to be
difficult to motivate to action. In December 1939, two-thirds of respondents agreed with the
statement "the German people are essentially peace loving and kindly, but they have been
unfortunate in being misled, too often, by ruthless and ambitious rulers" against only twenty
percent who affirmed that "the German people have always had an irresponsible fondness for
brute force and conquest which makes the country a menace to world peace so long as it is
allowed to be strong enough to fight." The same poll showed that half the public hoped that
Britain would "crush Hitler but not the Germans" with only nineteen percent opting for German
partition and just fourteen percent supporting permanent German disarmament. 37
Polling also revealed that Americans felt secure. In January 1939, only forty-six percent
of respondents thought that America should defend the Philippines if it were attacked, and only
forty-three percent thought Mexico was worth American blood and treasure, both positions
running slightly ahead their opposites. Only twenty-seven percent would consider defending
Brazil. By January 1940, opinion was more worried, running two to one in favor of defending
the Philippines, Mexico, and Hawaii if they were attacked. But these positions could still only
gamer around fifty-five percent support, hardly an overwhelming majority. Furthermore, the
public generally confident that Britain would win the war. The United Kingdom was a seventy-
five percent favorite when the war began in September 1939. This number plummeted during
the spring offensives of 1940, but had risen back to seventy percent by December 1940. The
public perception of Germany's victory prospects peaked in June 1940, when thirty-five percent
of respondents thought Hitler would win. This was the only month during the entire war that
more people believed that Germany would win than Britain. 38
With these views as a basis, it is not surprising that the public favored non-intervention.
In November 1939, only twenty percent of respondents favored all aid to the European
democracies short of war, against fifty-four percent who desired impartial neutrality and trade
with all belligerents. By July 1940, pure neutrality was running even with entry into the war on
the side of Britain at about a quarter of the population, but a forty percent plurality would only
go as far as biased neutrality. From August 1940 onward, trends in support for the proposition
that "the United States should risk war to help great Britain" ran opposite to those for the view
October 16, 1937; Roosevelt to White, December 14, 1939; Roosevelt to Murray, February 10, 1938; Roosevelt to
King, September 27, 1941, all in Roosevelt, Elliot Roosevelt, and Lash, F.D.R., His Personal Letters, 1: 716-717, 11:
967-968, 757-758, 1216, respectively.
36 Casey, Cautious Crusade, pp. 17-18.
3 Ibid., p. 22. The polling cited here and in the paragraphs that follow are the polls known to have been read by
Roosevelt. They were largely produced by Fortune magazine and pollster Hadley Cantril at Princeton. Roosevelt
did not trust the Gallup Poll, as he saw George Gallup as a Republican who was in the tank for his opponents.
38 Ibid., pp. 25-26.
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that "the United States will get into the war." That is, as the public perceived direct participation
in the war to be more likely, it was less willing to support Britain, though support for both
positions ran over fifty-percent. After the fall of France, compulsory military service
commanded the assent of only half of the public, despite the fact that eighty-eight percent
believed that America should "arm to the teeth" in the event of German victory, rather than try to
get along peacefully with Hitler. Finally, support for a declaration of war against Germany
topped out at twenty-nine percent in June 1941, representing a hard cap against explicit
balancing.39
Certainly, though, there was room for Roosevelt to maneuver. In July 1940 two-thirds of
Americans believed the war would affect them personally, and by September, sixty-one percent
thought that Germany would attack the United States within the next decade. After the fall of
France, substantial pluralities favored a host of measures supporting Britain. In September 1940,
almost two-thirds of the public favored the "destroyers for bases" deal and fifty-six percent
thought America should increase its production of aircraft for British purchase. Support for
convoying ships bound for Britain hovered between fifty and sixty percent from May to August
1941. More generally, after December 1940, public opinion bounced between fifty and seventy
percent in favor of supporting Britain at the risk of war, with the public more inclined to take
risks when the situation looked less dangerous. Even the much reviled Soviet Union was
supported by the American public, of whom seventy-three percent hoped for a communist
victory. By July 1941, Americans rejected the idea of a negotiated peace in Europe by a margin
of fifty to thirty eight percent.
Congressional opposition to a forward foreign policy was as significant as public
ambivalence. Roosevelt had been defeated in Congress over the neutrality acts during the 1930s,
when strict legislation was passed in place of his proposals allowing for executive discretion in
determining aggressors. In 1937, a bill requiring a national referendum in order to declare war
was pushed back with narrow margins. In the spring of 1939, Roosevelt's first attempt to amend
the neutrality act to allow arms shipments to the Allies was defeated, despite a major political
effort on the part of the administration in favor of revision. Even important victories in Congress
were near things-the August 1941 bill to extend the draft passed by a single vote in the House
of Representative, and the final repeal of the neutrality acts in the fall of 1941 was a bloody fight
passed by only eighteen votes in the same chamber. Roosevelt's most impressive political
victory, the bipartisan passage of the Lend-Lease act, was secured only by three months of
debate and a corresponding political offensive. The lesson that Roosevelt drew from these
experiences was that it was preferable to act in ways that did not require Congressional approval,
and that he could only hope to obtain such approval with considerable effort and substantial
public support.4 1
These factors impacted American grand strategy in two ways. First, Roosevelt
recognized that ground forces were the most sensitive issue in the public mind. For example, he
told diplomat Robert Murphy that "American mothers don't want their boys to be soldiers" but
they "don't seem to mind their boys becoming sailors." And in September 1941, he was worried
9 Ibid., pp. 23-30.
" Ibid., pp. 24-30; Adam J. Berinsky, In Time of War: Understanding American Public Opinionfrom World War I
to Iraq (Chicago, IL: University Of Chicago Press, 2009), pp. 49, 51.
4' For accounts of these political battles, and the congressional environment more generally, see Robert A. Divine,
The Illusion ofNeutrality (Chicago, IL: University Of Chicago Press, 1962); Manfred Jonas, Isolationism in
America, 1935-1941 (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1966).
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that strategic conclusions from military planning to "invade and crush Germany" would leak,
eliciting "a very bad reaction from the public." Other examples are legion, and noted in the
analysis below. As Steven Casey, the leading expert on the impact of public opinion on
Roosevelt's foreign policy, puts it: Roosevelt "had no fundamental aversion either to war or to
U.S. troops fighting in it.... [And] had FDR been able to work in a domestic vacuum" he would
have adopted a more forward strategy "centering around the use of land troops." This political
constraint fundamentally restrained the positive liberal proclivity towards ground forces for
several years.
Second, American grand strategy developed more slowly than it would have otherwise.
Roosevelt was forced into frequent political maneuvering in order to coax the public and
Congress along, and had to pick his battles rather than make a frontal assault every time he
wanted to act. As he wrote in the 1930s, "the public psychology and, for that matter, individual
psychology, cannot, because of human weakness, be attuned for long periods of time to a
constant repetition of the highest note on the scale." Roosevelt understood that "people tire of
seeing the same name day after day in the important headlines of the papers, and the same voice
night after night over the radio" and was "full of dread" that his fireside chats "would lose their
effectiveness." A great deal of the delay and hesitation in Roosevelt's foreign policy stemmed
from the knowledge that he needed greater political support to move forward, and his careful
attempts to raise such political capital.
Roosevelt pithily summarized his dilemma to British ambassador Lord Halifax in
October 1941, telling him "his perpetual problem was to steer a course between the two factors
represented by (1) the wish of 70% of Americans to keep out of war; (2) The wish of 70% of
Americans to do everything to break Hitler, even if it means war." Domestic political opposition
was therefore an important cause of American grand strategy before the Second World War,
holding back Roosevelt's attempts to make greater American commitments for several years. In
the analysis below, I frequently note the impact of domestic opinion on the Roosevelt
administration's decision-making. However, geopolitical forces and positive liberal goals
eventually overcame these restraints. While domestic impediments were important, TLFP's
expectations are ultimately vindicated in the process of American foreign policy formation and
the outcome of American grand strategy.4 4
American Grand Strategy, 1937-1940: Buckpassing
Though domestic political constraints prevented Roosevelt from pursuing TLFP's
expected balancing strategy, the logic of positive liberty and geopolitical threat pushed American
policy as far down the strategic continuum as it could go until 1940. Roosevelt implemented a
buckpassing strategy as a second-best option. The premise of the administration's strategy was
to seek as much influence over the structure of European power as it could, while still free-riding
on European policies. Roosevelt hoped that through limited diplomatic and military
commitments, America could assist in forging a European settlement on liberal commercial
42 Mark A. Stoler, Allies and Adversaries: The Joint Chiefs of Staff the Grand Alliance, and U.S. Strategy in World
War II (Chapel Hill, NC: The University of North Carolina Press, 2000), pp. 36, 57; Casey, Cautious Crusade, p.
15.
43 Roosevelt to Baker, March 20, 1935, in Roosevelt, Elliot Roosevelt, and Lash, F.D.R., His Personal Letters, 1:
466-467; Casey, Cautious Crusade, p. 34.
44 Casey, Cautious Crusade, p. 30.
205
terms, or at least organize and support a balancing coalition able to contain Germany's
threatening autarkic project.
This strategy can be observed in its component policies. Roosevelt's perception and
response to the German security threat occurred very early, well before the European balance of
power dramatically changed. Moreover, the military threat depended on the perception of
ideological and economic vulnerabilities in the Western hemisphere. It was this extended field
of vision for threats-Roosevelt administration's perception of a German autarkic threat to
American liberal values, and the autocratic regime that facilitated its self-defeating economic
policy-that was the major motivation for American diplomacy during the period. American
diplomatic and military initiatives took two forms. First, Roosevelt pushed peace plans that
would result in a settlement that mitigated the ideological threat. Second, he sought military and
diplomatic means to support the West European democracies against Germany. These included
the application of economic coercion, access to raw materials and military equipment, the supply
of combat aircraft, military coordination, and the assurance of diplomatic support if the coalition
stood firm. He also initiated American rearmament through airpower, the only fashion in which
he could influence the calculus of power in Europe.
The logic of TLFP drove these policies. For its part, the international environment
provided a plausible threat to American security in the Western hemisphere. But the Roosevelt
administration feared German expansion even into strategically insignificant areas, and
responded to it before the balance of power changed. In the main, positive liberal concerns
underlay America's perception of the German threat: Hitler's expanding zone of autarky
threatened American free-trade rights throughout the world, and by extension, the positive liberal
New Deal at home. The goal of economic openness and non-discrimination was therefore at the
heart of Roosevelt's vision for a European settlement. These liberal motivations caused
Roosevelt to push out for as much diplomatic influence on the European power structure as
possible within domestic constraints. Both geopolitical threat and liberal fears pushed America
away from non-entanglement and towards more European commitment.
This section demonstrates the buckpassing character of American strategy and its
geopolitical and liberal origins. I proceed in the usual manner, analyzing American grand
strategy across three areas relevant to TLFP's causal logic: America's perception of European
threats, its diplomatic policy towards allies, and its military posture at home and abroad.
RESPONSE TO EUROPEAN THREATS
Roosevelt perceived both material threats to American security and ideological threats to
American values. First, without a doubt, the Roosevelt administration perceived a real threat to
hemispheric security by 1937, fearing that economic and political penetration of Latin America
would lead to an Axis military presence. However, the administration recognized that the
military threat was minimal while the European balance held, and often deployed the argument
instrumentally for other reasons. Second, the hemispheric threat was linked to a more general
fear of Germany's growing autarkic economic sphere, which threatened to strangle commercial
liberalism in South America and throughout the world. Together, these fears made German
power increasingly intolerable: even if the Nazis did not dominate Europe, the extension of their
economic project would hold American values at risk. The European system had to be
reordered, and America would need to exert influence in order to achieve this aim.
MATERIAL THREAT: POWER POLITICS IN THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE? As the European
situation darkened in the late 1930s, the Roosevelt administration began to perceive a security
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threat from Nazi Germany. On November 14th, 1938, President Roosevelt warned his cabinet
that "the recrudescence of German power at Munich had completely re-oriented our own
international relations; that for the first time since the Holy Alliance in 1818 the United States
now faced the possibility of an attack on the Atlantic side in both the Northern and Southern
hemispheres." The United States must, Roosevelt argued, "have a sufficiently large air force to
deter anyone from landing in either North or South America." These fears had been building
during the autumn crisis. In early October he told his hawkish Secretary of the Interior, Harold
Ickes, that he feared "Germany will be wanting colonies and in the process of satisfying its
appetite... England will offer her Trinidad and prevail upon France to offer her Martinique. This
would give Germany strong outposts on our eastern coast as well as the coasts of Central and
South America.' 45
On January 4th, 1939, Roosevelt told the American ambassador to Mexico stories of the
German Luftwaffe's strength, seeing it as a threat to American security because of its potential to
produce a Nazi "foothold" in Brazil through support of revolutionary attacks on the state.
Ambassador Daniels was surprised that Roosevelt sincerely "spoke as if that might actually be a
real danger to the continent." But the President believed the threat was real, particularly in light
of advances in airpower. As he wrote to his Ambassador to Great Britain, Joseph Kennedy, "we
over here, in spite of great strides toward national unity during the past six years, still have much
to learn of the 'relativity' of world geography and the rapid annihilation of distance." He
similarly worried about the demise of the European bulwark after Munich: "Our British friends
must begin to fish or cut bait. The dictator threat from Europe is a good deal closer to the United
States and the American continent than before." 46
Roosevelt was far from alone in worrying about a military threat to the Western
hemisphere. His right hand man in the State Department, Undersecretary Sumner Welles,
worried that there would be German-inspired rebellions in Uruguay, Argentina, and Brazil, all
"as part of a large Nazi movement to obtain control of those countries." Treasury Secretary
Henry Morgenthau interpreted (incorrectly, I argue below) Roosevelt's rearmament program as
an effort to make the United States "so strong that nobody can attack us.... We want enough
planes to take care of the whole South American continent, too." Morgenthau also joined with
Roosevelt confidant Adolph Berle in urging the State Department to adopt a softer policy
towards Mexican oil expropriations. "Mexico is already trading oil for German planes, which
would undoubtedly mean German instructors," he worried. In general, Berle represented an
administration faction favoring non-entanglement and an emphasis on hemispheric security.
"Both European contesting groups," he thought, "would seek to establish footholds in this
hemisphere.... Any such foothold, no matter by whom established, would be unfriendly to us.' 4 7
Such traditional realist fears were expressed with some frequency and undoubtedly
influenced American grand strategy during the pre-belligerency period. Importantly, the growth
4s John Morton Blum, From the Morgenthau Diaries (Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin, 1959), 11: 48; Patrick
Hearden, Roosevelt Confronts Hitler: America's Entry into World War II (Dekalb, IL: Northern Illinois University
Press, 1987), p. 125; Ickes Diary, October 9, 1938, in Harold L. Ickes, The Secret Diary ofHarold L. Ickes; 3 Vols.
(New York: Simon and Schuster, 1954), 11: 484.
46 David G. Haglund, Latin America and the Transformation of U.S. Strategic Thought, 1936-1940 (Albuquerque,
NM: University of New Mexico Press, 1984), pp. 111-112; Roosevelt to Kennedy and Roosevelt to Pell, November
12, 1938 and October 30, 1939, both in Roosevelt, Elliot Roosevelt, and Lash, F.D.R., His Personal Letters, 11: 949-
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of German power and aggressiveness attracted American concern well before Germany became a
potential hegemon. There are three reasons to believe that other factors were at work besides the
international environment in the Roosevelt administration's perception of a threat to the Monroe
doctrine.
First, Roosevelt understood quite well that military invasion of the Western hemisphere,
or even its strategically meaningful political penetration, was an extremely unlikely proposition
as long as the European balance of power remained intact. A confidential military report assured
him in 1936 that a military threat to South America would require "the complete accord" of all
four naval powers in Europe, and that "a challenge on the Pacific Coast... or on the Caribbean
Coast seems impossible." In response to the worries expressed above, Admiral Leahy told
Sumner Welles, assistant secretary of state and Roosevelt henchman, that the Navy could stop
any "filibustering" by Axis friendly groups in Brazil as long as the Navy could use Brazilian
ports. Indeed, in 1939 military planners believed good hemispheric relations showed that the
United States could "rely on the cooperation of nearly all Latin American states to oppose any
German or Italian violation of the Monroe Doctrine." The same report noted that without the
removal of the British and French Fleets, any serious violation of the Monroe doctrine would
come to nothing. Roosevelt acknowledged these facts privately by arguing that "the first act" of
a victorious Germany would be "to seize the British Navy or put it out of action," thereby
leaving the hemisphere vulnerable.4 8
Furthermore, the Roosevelt administration joined most observers in believing that a
European war would be lengthy, and that the Allies would hold an advantage. On the eve of
Munich, Roosevelt believed war was coming and that the Allied position was favorable: England
and France "will control not only the Atlantic Ocean but the Mediterranean," bottling the Axis
up. The French would "speedily mop up" Axis colonies and "would promptly liquidate Franco
in Spain." The Allies had plenty of ready cash, more resources, and would win a long-defensive
war, ultimately joined by almost every country in Europe. Even after the defeat of Poland,
Roosevelt believed that "the French and English have more stamina than the Germans" and
would win "if the war goes in normal course." His military advisors reiterated in March 1940
that "the French possess the finest army in the world," while Chief of Naval Operations Admiral
Harold Stark personally advised Roosevelt that "a successful attack by either belligerent on the
fortified Western Front is considered highly improbable." Quite clearly, Roosevelt understood
the conditions of a geopolitical threat to the United States required a dramatic shift in the
European power structure and believed those conditions unlikely to obtain.4 9
Second, purported threats to the integrity of the Western hemisphere were a politically
convenient peg on which to hang policies motivated by other concerns. Roosevelt often
publically used the threat to Latin America to defend his policy as one of non-entanglement and
hemispheric defense, while privately admitting his primary intent was to aid the Allies. He was
happy to tell the press about fifth column activity in Mexico, and to issue fantastic warnings that
48 Ibid., 53, 99, 125; Berle Diary, May 26, 1939, in Beatrice Berle and Travis Jacobs, eds., Navigating the Rapids:
From the Papers ofAdo/ph A. Berle (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, Inc., 1973), pp. 223-224, quote 223.
Even the ardent proponent of hemispheric defense, Adolph Berle, acknowledged that it would take a navally
dominant Germany before "we shall be meeting imperialist schemes in South and Central America, not on a paper
basis, as we do now, but backed up by an extremely strong naval and military force." See Berle Diary, June 28,
1939, in Ibid., p. 230.
49 Ickes Diary, September 24, 30, 1938; October 14, 1939, all in Ickes, The Secret Diary ofHarold L. Ickes, II: 474,
481, III: 37; Hearden, Roosevelt Confronts Hitler, pp. 140-141.
208
"it would take planes based in the Yucatan... about an hour and fifty minutes to smash up New
Orleans." But in a private session with the Senate Military Affairs Committee on January 1939,
he asked rhetorically: "What is the first line of defense of the United States...? On the Atlantic,
our first line is the continued independent existence of a very large group of nations." He
repeatedly cautioned the Senators to keep the meeting confidential and not to scare the American
people by repeating his argument that "I will do everything I can to maintain the independence of
these other nations.... that is the foreign policy of the United States."50
The President's profligate use of the Latin American argument as a political tool cautions
against treating it as the primary cause of American strategy. As Roosevelt put it to Ickes, "it
would be absolutely impossible for him... to go on the air and talk to the world as we were
talking. The people would simply not believe him." By Roosevelt's own admission and
behavior, he faced a domestic political problem for which hemispheric security arguments
proved very useful.s
Third, consistent with TLFP, Roosevelt's wider range of positive liberal threat
perceptions extended to plausible military threats beyond potential hegemony in Europe.
Moreover, the material threat to the Western hemisphere depended on Axis penetration through
economic and ideological means. South America contained strong trade ties to Nazi Germany,
was led by authoritarian leaders potentially sympathetic to European fascism, and contained
millions of unassimilated immigrants from Axis countries. These were not simply a set of
potential dominoes leading to military penetration of the hemisphere, but were part and parcel to
a larger set of threats to American values that Roosevelt saw. It is to these ideological dangers
that I now turn.52
IDEOLOGICAL THREAT: AUTOCRACY AND AUTARKY. TLFP predicts that positive liberals
will see ideological illiberalism abroad as threatening to American values at home and overseas.
And indeed, the biggest threat perceived by the Roosevelt administration in the 1930s was not
the rise of German power per se, but rather the autarkic and autocratic political project of the
European dictatorships. Its primary worry was that Germany, Italy, and Japan would succeed in
creating economically self-sufficient blocks based on illiberal trade practices. American trade
would be shut out of most of the world, with disastrous consequences for American liberal
values. This economic threat was linked to the regime type of the dictatorships. American
statesmen believed that the autarkic project was ultimately a loser, not just for America, but for
Europe and Asia as well. Unfortunately, autocratic political rule substituted this contradictory
and self-defeating project for the will of the mass public. The only way for the dictatorships to
resolve the domestic problems stemming from their economic stupidity was to pursue an
aggressive foreign policy, which made them threatening to America whether or not the European
system was stable.
The Roosevelt administration gave high priority to free-trade for a host of positive liberal
reasons. First of all, Americans simply had a positive right to sell their wares abroad, one that
the government had a duty to vindicate. Secretary of State Cordell Hull, leader of the free-
50 Haglund, Latin America and the Transformation of U.S. Strategic Thought, 1936-1940, p. 123; Barbara Reardon
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University Press, 1997), pp. 195-196.
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Economic Aspects ofNew Deal Diplomacy (Boston, MA: Beacon Press, 1964).
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traders in the administration, wrote Roosevelt in 1935 that "As our own population becomes
more and more dense, as the struggle for existence in this country becomes more intense, as we
feel increasingly the need of foreign markets, our definite concern for open markets will be more
widely felt among our people and our desire for and insistence upon free opportunity to trade"
will only increase. Roosevelt noted in the same year, in the context of East Asia, that "the
American people would not go to war to preserve the integrity of China," but they would in order
to retain "their right to trade with China."53
During the private meeting with the Senate Military Affairs Committee described above,
Roosevelt defended his policy of aiding the allies by invoking "our ability not only to defend
ourselves against attack on our own continental limits but also our right to treat with the rest of
the world and to avoid putting up a very high barbed wire fence all around us." Others in the
administration agreed with Roosevelt's assessment. The military, in its new RAINBOW
planning of 1939, defined American national security to include "not only freedom from
invasion, but also freedom from external injury with our world trade." Admiral Leahy wrote
Roosevelt in 1938, apropos of the crisis in the Far East, "It is inconceivable to me that we as a
nation are going to give up our rights of trading" or to "confine our activities to our own
continental limits." A large center of gravity in the Roosevelt administration was thinking about
free trade in terms of positive rights to be defended by the policy of the American state.54
Another positive liberal source of American free trade goals was a desire to protect the
New Deal at home. As noted above, Roosevelt had strong proclivities towards economic
planning, which had culminated in a set of programs designed to bring American production and
consumption into equilibrium, thereby hopefully stopping the decline in the price level. But if
American producers could not export their surpluses abroad, then the domestic economy would
have to undergo painful production adjustments that Roosevelt's internal programs were
designed to mitigate. Roosevelt thus believed that expanded international trade was "a vital part
of our recovery program." He argued that "foreign markets must be regained... There is no
other way to avoid painful economic dislocation, social readjustments, and unemployment."
Secretary Hull concurred, asserting in 1936 that "our domestic recovery can be neither complete
nor durable unless our surplus-creating branches of production succeed in regaining at least a
substantial portion of their lost foreign markets." After all, as a State Department official
explained, "Unsold surpluses, by glutting home markets, demoralize the prices received for that
part of the of the output or crop sold at home, and thereby spread havoc and cause dislocation"
55throughout the economy.
Roosevelt had not engaged in massive state expansion designed to mitigate the "havoc"
and "dislocation" that the Depression imposed on American liberty, just to turn the process of
adjustment back over to the unfettered free market. Nor was he willing to continence "a series of
self-supporting, water-tight national units, with Socialistic control," that American diplomats
saw as the second alternative to the "old liberal idea of unrestricted trading." Laissez-faire and
totalitarian economic management were equally repellent to the middle way of the positive
liberal state. Instead, Roosevelt sought to "correlate the two parts" of his recovery program: "the
5 Hearden, Roosevelt Confronts Hitler, pp. 71-72.
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[New Deal] internal adjustments of production with such effective foreign purchasing power as
may be developed" by free trade practices. The autarkic barriers to international commerce
imposed a "growing cost both to the United States and to other nations [that] is becoming
intolerable. World trade for the profit of all must be liberalized and freed from discriminatory
trade practices."56
These positive liberal priorities quickly produced a designation of Germany as a principal
threat to American rights. Germany was pursuing discriminatory trade practices designed to
secure spheres of exclusive German economic influence in the raw material rich developing
economies of Europe and the world. Sumner Welles noted in 1937 that Germany's autarkic
practices had "resulted in the displacement of American trade even in lines where American
products have proven themselves able to hold the field against all ordinary competition." "More
than any other thing," the State Department stressed, American trading rights depend "upon
whether Germany can be brought back into a free economic system." Otherwise, "important
sections of the world-Central and Eastern Europe and many of the American Republics-will
be unable to follow liberal policies," and even more ominously, the other great powers may be
drawn "constantly further away from the liberal commercial system." As German foreign policy
became more aggressive, American fears of German autarky increased. The Anschluss of
Austria was worrisome not primarily because of its power political implications, but because
"Germany's restricted economic system has penetrated into Central and Southeastern Europe
with almost unbelievable speed." This system "is tending to elbow-out trade with those powers
which practice a liberal trade policy." A liberal system of free trade depended on containing and
reversing the spread of autarky.57
Unfortunately, German regime type indicated permanent hostility to American liberal
priorities. Hitler had juiced the German economy with rearmament and autarky in a way that
was unsustainable but impossible for him to back away from politically. Influential State
Department analyst George Messersmith argued in 1934 that "the only hope for our markets in
Germany lies in the return of reasonable government to Germany." In 1936 he reiterated that
"the relief Germany needs in the way of markets is real, but it cannot come with safety or be
facilitated by anyone until the menace of the present government is removed." Failing that,
rearmament would just continue, and economic cooperation "could only result in feeding the
monster that is about to devour Europe." Roosevelt himself worried about this problem, noting
somewhat wistfully that "there is no one unemployed in Germany, they are all working on war
orders." "If Germany visualized a peaceful working out of the political and economic
problems," he later wrote, "common sense would require the starting of conversations as soon as
possible in order to avoid an even worse financial situation."58
But the Nazi dictatorship evidently lacked common sense. Writing to his Italian
ambassador, Roosevelt fretted that "the more I study the situation, the more I am convinced that
an economic approach to peace is a pretty weak reed for Europe to lean on.... The answer
[Europeans] all give to any plea for reduction in armaments is that millions of workers would be
thrown on the street. How do we make progress if England and France say we cannot help
Germany and Italy to achieve economic security if they continue to arm and threaten, while
56 Ibid., pp. 27, 35, 47.
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simultaneously Germany and Italy say we must continue to arm and threaten because they will
not give us economic security?" Given autocratic resistance, Roosevelt came increasingly to
hope that the internal contradictions of the autarkic program would lead to its demise if Germany
could be stymied internationally. He held out the "the hope... that this type of government
represented by these three [axis] countries is being severely tested from the inside, especially in
Germany, and that there may be a break in the logjam." Messersmith had justified the brief
American trade war against Germany in the early 1930s as an attempt to foment just such
domestic revolution-the Nazis "must have credits, they must have trade, or they cannot pull
through." 59
The abuse of their own people indicated that the dictatorships were likely to be very
threatening to American liberal values, regardless of their geopolitical position. Roosevelt saw
Germany, Italy, and Japan as "the three bandit nations" in the grips of a dangerous "Junker
crowd." Roosevelt thought that Hitler himself was "a madman" and "his counselors, some of
whom I personally know, are even madder than he is." His view of Chamberlin's appeasement
policy amusingly epitomized the administration's understanding of the European fascists: "If a
Chief of Police makes a deal with the leading gangsters and the deal results in no more hold-ups,
that Chief of Police will be called a great man-but if the gangsters do not live up to their word
the Chief of Police will go to jail." Germany was likely to permanently threaten the American
free trade program, since "eventually, of course, they will have to pay" for their suboptimal
economic policies, and gangster regimes would probably try to solve their problems through
conquest. As Roosevelt jotted on one document about economic conditions in Germany,
"Hitler-bad shape-war way out." Such states might even rouse the notoriously quiescent
American people: "if we get the idea that the future of our form of government is threatened by a
coalition of European dictators, we might wade in with everything we have to give." 60
The failure to secure an open trading system through internal pressure on Germany
reinforced Roosevelt's positive liberal threat perceptions. He believed that dictatorships could
only rule by deceiving their people. He mocked the German ambassador on the subject of
Hitler's trumpeted four-year economic plan, asking whether it would "give Germany more to eat
or merely keep her from having less." The mass of European people themselves were more
trustworthy in Roosevelt's eyes: "I still believe that in every country the people themselves are
more peaceably and liberally inclined than their governments." The Germans were
"unfortunate" for having to suffer under its "type of government," and their national culture was
similar to America's, emphasizing strong families and private property. "I don't know that the
United States can save civilization," Roosevelt remarked at one point, but "we can make people
think and give them the opportunity of saving themselves. The trouble is that the people of
Germany, Italy, and Japan are not given the privilege of thinking." 61
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ROOSEVELT'S VISION FOR EUROPE. The Roosevelt administration's concern for German
autarky and autocracy led it to seek a revision of Germany's power position in the international
order. As the European crisis advanced, Roosevelt became more and more dissatisfied with the
existing distribution of power: even if the Allies held in the west, Germany would still pose a
major threat to the liberal values embodied in an open world trading system as it expanded its
system elsewhere. Moreover, the autocratic regimes of the fascist states would make it very
difficult to strike a bargain on liberal terms. To vindicate America's right to free trade, the
existing balance of power would have to be reordered. Totalitarian regimes simply could not be
the first-ranking states in Europe, and America would have to make some kind of commitment to
forestall this eventuality.
In 1937 and 1938, Messersmith wrote a series of memos on the European situation that
resonated in the State Department and the White House. Worried about an ultimate threat to the
Monroe Doctrine, Messersmith was part of a faction within the State Department unusually
cognizant of importance of the balance of power. But even he framed the European problem as
ideological at its core: "It is very simple and perhaps convenient for some in the democracies to
state that they are not interested in ideologies but the most vital and basic factor in the present
situation is this conflict of ideologies." The diplomatic and military conquests of the fascist
states were creating a new international order with security, economic, and political
ramifications. "It is becoming increasingly clear," he argued "that if the democracies, including
the United States, are not willing to defend their political, social and economic views now by all
peaceful methods at their command, it is only a question of time when they shall have to defend
them with force."62
Messersmith saw open trading systems in Europe and Latin America as some of the
principle American values threatened by the growth of German power. "The externals of the
whole movement in the Far East and in Europe give the picture of a reversion to the worst stages
of feudalism," he argued, and criticized those who failed to see "that Germany needs today
economic relief which will enable her to continue her program toward mastery in Europe." Part
and parcel of her autarkic project required economic domination of Southeast Europe and
probably the Scandinavian states and the Low Countries. Such domination would in turn freeze
out the American trade program and close most of the continent to transatlantic exchange.
Messersmith emphasized that it was "not only territory which is in play-as too many observers
are inclined to think. In some ways territory is the least at stake." What "is in play
fundamentally are new ideas and new forces.... directly opposed to our concepts, basic ideals
and principles of action." The ideology that underlay the Reich's autarkic drive was
incompatible with American liberal values and a direct threat to them. 63
Importantly, this threat existed independent of a balance of power on the continent.
Germany's astonishing success was linked to her ability to expand even though "the balance in
the way of actual power is against them." Germany did not need to win a decisive victory to
pose a dire threat, she only needed to avoid a major loss: "Through the fortification of the
Western frontier, which has made rapid progress, she will soon be able to hold England and
France there, and any blockade of the North coast by the English and French fleets will not be so
both in Roosevelt, Elliot Roosevelt, and Lash, F.D.R., His Personal Letters, 1: 530-531, quote 531, and 11: 949-950,
respectively. The experience of the war would lead Roosevelt to change his mind about the German people.
62 Messersmith to Hull, October 11, 1937, in FRUS, 1937,1: 140-145, quotes 140, 141.
63 Ibid., first and third quotes, 143, 142; Messersmith to Hull, February 18, in FRUS, 1938 1: 17-24, quote 19.
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serious for Germany as she will have most of the things which she needs in the areas in
Southeastern Europe over which her control is extending.... if Germany gets economic or
political control, or both, of Southeastern Europe she will be in a position to put England and
France into a secondary place in Europe and practically immobilize them." In such a state, "I am
confident that in the end we would have our troubles in South America where Germany, Italy
and Japan are already so active and where they have their definite objectives" of access to raw
materials and domination of trade. Germany could not threaten American security without
destroying the Allies, but "With England and France in a purely secondary position," she could
64
complete her autarkic project.
It was this commercially illiberal program, and the egregious regime type that drove it,
which made Germany such a threat. As Berle told the Roosevelt, Germany's European
ambitions would not necessarily "recreate a power which will invariably attack Western
Europe." Hitler sought the traditional German objective of a "reconstituted great Germany, plus
the old Austro-Hungarian region.... Were the actor anyone other than Hitler... we should regard
this as merely reconstituting the old system, undoing the obviously unsound work of Versailles
and generally following the line of historical logic." But, as Messersmith later argued, "the
Germany with which certain arrangements could have been made under Stresemann and Bruning
is a different Germany from the one we have to deal with under Hitler. And arrangements which
were then possible, and which would have been constructive, are today impossible until there is a
regime of law and order in Germany." 65
Roosevelt basically accepted this analysis, fearing that continued Nazi rule and any
extension of German autarky boded poorly for American access to many world markets. At a
cabinet meeting in late January 1939, Roosevelt argued that if Hitler attacked in the west instead
of the east, "this country is going to suffer tremendously.... Hitler will not have to control all of
Europe and South America in order to make it difficult for us economically.... If Hitler can
dominate the major part of Europe, he can serve notice to [South America] that unless it accepts
fascist principles and yields to fascistic economic domination, all of her exports will be cut off."
Meeting with Ickes a few days later he "developed the theory that our first line of defense is
really the small countries of Europe.... He seriously thinks that if Hitler extends his power over
these small countries and then uses the economic weapon that will be his, he will be striking a
serious blow at us without even a thought of trying to land a soldier on our shores."66
Writing to his Irish ambassador in March, Roosevelt noted that "there are fifteen or
sixteen independent nations in Europe whose continued independent political and economic
existence is of actual moment to the eventual defense of the United States." His examples
included such political and military powerhouses as "the Baltic States... Romania, Bulgaria, and
Yugoslavia," and a host of other small nations who if they "were to lose their present political
and economic independence, again the position of the United States would be weakened." Given
that the German absorption of these states would not affect much change in the balance of
power, but would help cement the Reich's autarkic project, the emphasis should be laid on the
economic part of Roosevelt's analysis. In this regard, it was the Nazi-Soviet entente that made
his fears skyrocket. Although allowing that the Pact might temporary, Roosevelt wrote a friend
64 Messersmith to Hull, October 11, 1937, in FRUS, 1937,1: 140-145, quote 144; Messersnith to Hull, February 18,
in FRUS, 1938 1: 17-24, quotes 20, 21
65 Farnham, Roosevelt and the Munich Crisis, pp. 99, n. 29, 166.
66 Ickes Diary, January 29, 1939, in Ickes, The Secret Diary of Harold L. Ickes, 11: 568, 571.
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that if "Germany and Russia win the war or force a peace favorable to them, the situation of your
civilization and mine is indeed in peril. Our world trade would be at the mercy of the combine
and our increasingly better relations with our twenty neighbors to the South would end-unless
we were willing to go to war on their behalf against a German-Russian dominated Europe." 67
The State Department was making much the same argument about the coming collapse of
free trade principles at the hands of European totalitarianism. Following the partition of Poland,
Hull feared the Nazi-Soviet entente would "prevent any Europeans from trading with us except
on conditions which Berlin lays down." State Department hands like Herbert Feis warned that
"Hitler has become so decisive a factor in determining what lies ahead of every producer in this
country that the economist simply cannot think in terms of steady, ordinary development," while
Assistant Secretary of State Breckinridge Long feared the two totalitarian powers would
"exclude us from practically all of those [European] markets."68
Notably these liberal threats were seen without a corresponding fear of direct military
penetration of the Western hemisphere. Long argued that even if the British Fleet were
destroyed "we are not even then confronted with a military difficulty. It will take Germany a
long time to mop up in Europe, and our Fleet would be able to take care of any two Fleets
Germany could muster.... There would, however, be an immediate economic effect here. Our
markets in Europe would fall off.... That this would make enormous changes in American
political life must be taken for granted." Obviously the remark about the British Fleet was an
exaggeration, but it illustrates the distance of direct security fears from the European war.
Similarly, Adolph Berle believed that Russo-German success would mean "our great test will be
economic: can we maintain enough economic life for this hemisphere so that one country after
another country in South America will not be forced by trade relations into the Berlin orbit?" If
Latin America became part of the closed German economic block, American trade would be
forever bottled up.69
In short, as TLFP predicts, the mere existence of a European balance of power was not
enough for the Roosevelt administration. European autarky had to be rigidly contained, or it
would continue to expand at the expense of traditional American trading rights and the New Deal
political economy. European autocracy meant such expansion was likely. If liberal values were
to gain needed international breathing space, the German economic project would have to be
stopped, and/or the German power position would have to be reduced. 0
DIPLOMATIC POLICY
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Roosevelt therefore reached out for influence with which to affect European economic
outcomes and the structure of power that determined them. Fenced in by domestic politics, the
administration was limited to a buckpassing strategy: it aimed to shape Allied political strategy
while essentially free riding on the actions of the West European democracies. Roosevelt's
strategy had two principle strands. First, he tried to propel forward a European political
settlement founded on liberal commercial principles. Though skeptical that the German regime
would make the deal, he was willing to accept political appeasement as part of the bargain if it
could truly be struck. Second, he maneuvered to organize a European balancing coalition and to
assist it through those tools that were domestically available to him: economic coercion, naval
assistance, material support, and diplomatic backing.
A LIBERAL COMMERCIAL SETTLEMENT. Roosevelt's first preference was to make limited
diplomatic commitments in the hopes of negotiating a liberal European settlement. This choice
reflects the administration's positive liberal values and its perception of a German threat as much
ideological as it was martial. The administration made several intermittent efforts to find a
permanent European peace between 1936 and 1940, although diplomats were cognizant of the
increasingly long odds facing these attempts as perceptions of the German threat grew. The
foundation of each peace overture was a multilateral commitment to free trade and disarmament
in Europe, including the prospects of American mediation and access to American markets.
The basic positive liberal outlines of the American peace plan were established in a
Sumner Welles proposal of October 1937, which was pushed forward by Roosevelt at various
times thereafter. The central element was an international conference to reach agreements on
"The methods through which all peoples may obtain the right to have access upon equal and
effective terms to raw materials and other elements necessary for their economic life." As his
collaborator Berle put it, "the intent" was to begin "discussing access to markets." In 1938,
Welles agreed with the British ambassador that if Germany and Italy "decided to move outside
of their present autarkic system as a result of satisfactory political adjustments, [they] would find
themselves in a very difficult transitional state, both commercially and financially," and that
America "would then consider how they individually might help in the restoration of normal
commercial and financial relationships." This was why, Welles pointed out, Roosevelt was so
interested in "devising of methods for the freeing of restrictions upon trade between nations and
the most effective manner of promoting an opportunity for all nations to participate in the
processes of world trade on a basis of equality of treatment." 7'
Though careful to avoid taking an American position on European political
"adjustments," the clear counterpart to the proposal was appeasement in Central Europe. Welles
noted that "every kind of adjustment, if undertaken, might perhaps be more readily arrived at if
all nations come to a common agreement" on international economic and political principles. In
addition to free trade, Berle envisioned a principle of "international equity... defined in the old
Latin sense of the appeal to justice which can be used to revise legal obligations and be relieved
of them if they failed to meet the facts." Welles told the British that "the President frankly
recognized that certain political appeasements in Europe" were "evidently an indispensable
factor in the finding of bases for world peace." Trusting that such "political appeasements would
prove completely successful," he agreed that America would strive to "obtain some scheme of
71 Welles to Roosevelt, October 26, 1937, in FRUS, 1937, 1: 668-670, quote 669; Berle diary, October 28, 1937, in
Berle and Jacobs, Navigating the Rapids, pp. 143-144, quote 143; Welles-Lindsay meeting, March 8, 1938, in
FRUS, 1: 126-130, quotes 129.
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general cooperation in Europe not only political, but likewise economic." Cognizant of
buckpassing's limited influence, the Roosevelt administration was not going to quibble about the
fate of Central European territory if America could end European autarky.
In general, Roosevelt attempted to gain as much influence on behalf of liberal principles
as he felt he could get away with domestically. Roosevelt strongly supported the Welles
proposal, which was ultimately quashed by British hesitancy to interfere with appeasement and
Hitler's refusal to be appeased. Writing to his German ambassador in 1936, Roosevelt joked that
escalating European troubles meant "As President I have to be ready just like the fire
department!" He also urged, in the same letter, that if events "should get to the point where a
gesture, an offer, or a formal statement by me would... make for peace, be sure to send me
immediate word." Following the outbreak of war in 1939, Roosevelt met with British
ambassador Lord Lothian on December 13 to discuss war aims. Lothian wrote Whitehall that the
President "evidently hopes that before his time is up he may be able to intervene as a kind of
umpire." 73
Prior to the conclusion of the Munich crisis, Roosevelt made several attempts to exert just
this kind of influence. Despite fears of domestic backlash, he offered to attend an international
conference to resolve territory, trade, and disarmament issues if the British and the French would
call it, and sent diplomatic notes at the height of the crisis that essentially offered American
mediation. Roosevelt also made repeated efforts to bluff Hitler into thinking America might be
more committed than his domestic political constraints would allow. In August 1938 he warned
publically that "We in the Americas are no longer a far away continent, to which the eddies of
controversies beyond the seas could bring no interest or no harm," and privately remarked that
"the occasion seemed to fit in with the Hitler situation and had, I hope, some small effect in
Berlin." On September 4, he authorized American ambassador to France William Bullitt to warn
that "if war should break out again in Europe, no human being could undertake to prophesy
whether or not the United States would become involved in such a war." And in his final peace
note to Hitler, he suggested that negotiations should be expanded to include "all the nations
directly interested in the present controversy" and noted that despite a lack of European interests,
"The conscience and the impelling desire of the people of my country demand that the voice of
their government be raised again and yet again to avert and to avoid war." 74
Roosevelt's activism was in pursuit of a personal diplomatic vision that shared the State
Department's focus on commercial openness. Temporarily relieved that war had been averted at
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Munich, he wrote Canadian Prime Minister Mackenzie King that "I am still concerned... when
we consider prospects for the future." Without "a lowering of trade barriers... a new crisis will
come." In the December 13 private meeting with Lord Lothian earlier described, Roosevelt
outlined his peace aims in terms of the "four freedoms," long before he had voiced these
sentiments in public. Any peace settlement, Roosevelt felt, would have to be based on the liberal
freedoms of religion and speech, as well as "freedom for trade and access to raw materials.""
Indeed, after Munich, the Roosevelt administration made a series of overtures for peace
along exactly these lines. On April 14, 1939, Roosevelt again appealed to Hitler, asking him to
promise not to invade a long series of European countries. In return, the United States would
participate in a conference to find "the most practical manner of opening up avenues of
international trade to the end that every nation of the earth may be enabled to buy and sell on
equal terms in the world market as well as to possess assurances of obtaining the materials and
products of peaceful economic life." As war approached in August 1939, he once again sent
messages to Central European governments and to the King of Italy, implicitly offering an
American mediation of territorial disputes and promising negotiations to "open avenues of
international trade." These efforts were bolstered by State Department planning for a
commercial peace.76
Roosevelt's peace attempts culminated in a set of overtures during the winter of 1940.
He asked James Mooney, president of General Motors, to discreetly contact Hitler to see if he
would accept American mediation of the war on commercial liberal terms. He sent forty-two
neutral nations a message that proposed a conference to discuss the post-war peace, emphasizing
the importance of disarmament and free trade; he hoped that this conference might eventually
find itself represented at the European peace-table. And he sent Sumner Welles on a peace
mission to Europe to sound out the different great powers on the acceptability of liberal peace
terms. None of these efforts were successful, but they represented the best hope of resolving the
European conflict on terms consistent with American values, without decisive intervention that
was politically impossible at home. Roosevelt's goals and intentions were clear. As Mooney
had put it earlier, "If Germany is not to move east politically, she must move west
economically." 77
ORGANIZING THE BUCK-CATCHERS. Given the threatening nature of Germany's autarkic
and autocratic project, Roosevelt was cognizant that free trade proposals had ever slimming
chances. He therefore simultaneously pursued another diplomatic route: organizing a balancing
coalition in Europe to which the United States could provide limited assistance. That is,
Roosevelt sought to ensure there were European buck-catchers through whom American
influence could be felt. Under even more severe domestic constraints than in his peace
initiatives, he nonetheless worked hard to apply American power to the European situation
through methods that were politically acceptable at home.
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As early as 1935, Roosevelt was pressing for "methods by which the weight of America
could be thrown into the scale" in support of European balancers. His first suggestion was that
the Allies should establish a complete economic embargo on Germany, under the terminology of
a "blockade." America would then "recognize" the "blockade" as "effective," and refuse to trade
with Germany or invoke neutral rights. After all, "A boycott or sanction could not be recognized
by us without Congressional action but a blockade would fall under the Executive's power after
the establishment of the fact." Roosevelt was soon marrying this kind of stick to the carrot of his
peace proposals. In 1937 he suggested "the possibility of evolving a comprehensive
international program" that would feature "far-reaching economic measures, drastic
disarmament, and a renovation of the existing peace machinery," to be backed by an embargo on
dissenters denying them "the economic benefits of the more nearly just international society.""
These proposals eventually developed, in the context of Japanese aggression, into FDR's
famous "quarantine speech" of early October 1937, which proposed the complete economic
isolation of aggressors. Again, the central premise of quarantine diplomacy was to bring
American pressure to bear with those instruments that might be domestically acceptable. As
Roosevelt put it during a 1937 cabinet meeting, "if Italy and Japan have developed a technique
of fighting without declaring war, why can't we develop one.... We don't call them economic
sanctions, we call them quarantines." Ickes' record of a similar discussion notes that "As
[Secretary of the Navy] Swanson continued to shout for war in his feeble old voice, the President
remarked that he wanted the same result as Swanson, but that he didn't want to have to go to war
to get it." Major public blowback from the quarantine speech and utter Allied disinterest in such
concepts meant that the administration's plans never got very far internationally. But they were
indicative of the direction Roosevelt was trying to move.79
This direction can be seen most clearly during the Czech crisis, when Roosevelt's
principal strategy was to stiffen the Allied spine in containing German power. Roosevelt
referred contemptuously to appeasement when it was not embedded in his larger plans for
revived world trade. Of one particularly frank State Department memo on the topic he wrote:
"this written by junior underling in State Department... is half baked and certainly not our
current policy." As the Czech crisis proceeded and it appeared the Allies would not fight over
the Sudetenland, Roosevelt privately anticipated a short and brutal German-Czech war, after
which Britain and France will "wash the blood from their Judas Iscariot hands." He continued to
outline to his cabinet a picture of defense-dominant world where "France could [not] penetrate
the German frontier. It would cost France a million men to do this. Neither could Germany
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overcome the Maginot line... Russia cannot strike effectively at Germany across Romania.
Neither could England be effective" on land. If the Allies would fight, this was the kind of war
that would not require American troops and could be supported with substantial but tacit
American aid. 80
Roosevelt did his best to impress this point on the European Allies, assuring them of
American support if they would hem in German expansion. British ambassador Lindsay
reported on September 12 that Roosevelt was willing to offer the Allies "everything but troops
and loans" if they stood firm, as his actions were constrained by domestic political factors. On
the 19th, Morgenthau recorded that Roosevelt was "ready to go pretty far in demonstrating
United States sympathy for "a defensive war fought from the air and with an economic blockade,
and that night the President met secretly with ambassador Lindsay. Roosevelt told him of his
willingness to support a British blockade if the Allies could avoid a technical declaration of war,
so that he "could find that we were not at war, and that the [Neutrality Act] prohibition of export
on arms need not be applied to us." Even if the Neutrality Act had to be invoked, Roosevelt
proposed ways around it by shipping war materials to Canada where they could be assembled
and re-exported. During the meeting, Roosevelt was "quite alive to the possibility that somehow
or other in indefinable circumstances the United States might again find themselves involved in a
European war," but thought it was "almost inconceivable that it would be possible for him to
send any troops across the Atlantic" unless England itself was invaded. All the more reason to
wage the kind of war to which America could give immediate tacit aid and perhaps someday its
full public support. 8'
Roosevelt followed through on his policy of organizing and strengthening a European
balancing coalition after it became clear to him in early October how much had been given up at
Munich. He had remarked at several points before and during the crisis that "in carrying out our
neutrality laws we would resolve all doubts in favor of the democratic countries." Roosevelt
aggressively sought the ability to decide when a state of war existed and to distinguish between
aggressors and victims, which was a(n illegal) reality by the autumn of 1938, when the President
planned the export of restricted materials to Canada. He also assured British Prime Minister
Chamberlin that in the event of war he would "help all I can" and that "the industrial resources of
the American nation [were] behind [Britain] in the event of war with the dictatorships." As
Roosevelt moved to put as much American weight behind the containment of Germany as was
feasible, plans for implementing the "Arsenal of Democracy" concept were being made well
before the outbreak of war. 82
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In order to implement his diplomatic concepts for buckpassing to a European coalition,
Roosevelt made efforts both to stiffen British and French resolve in 1939. He repeatedly urged
Britain and France to speed up their rearmament and told them that America could only help
those who helped themselves. He told Lord Lothian that "he would do nothing if Great Britain
cringed like a coward" and that the British needed to drop their "'We who are about to die, salute
thee' attitude.... What the British need today is a good stiff grog..." At the same time, the
President worked hard to repeal the neutrality acts and formalize American support for Britain.
Roosevelt met repeatedly with House and Senate leaders throughout the spring of 1939, telling
them that "every possible effort should be made" to repeal the arms embargo, which "would
make less likely a victory for the powers unfriendly to the United States." After fighting
opposition every step of the way, repeal was defeated, and Roosevelt indicated to congressional
leaders that he would take the issue to the people. When war broke out in the fall he kept his
promise, successfully repealing the arms embargo. And in fulfillment of his earlier concepts, the
State Department raised hardly a protest at the imposition of the British blockade. 83
MILITARY POLICY
Roosevelt's military policy was a compromise between domestic pressure for
hemispheric unilateralism and his own desire to influence the structure of European power.
Rather than push for a large, balanced rearmament program designed to secure the Western
hemisphere, which held wide political support, he aimed at an ambitious program of air
rearmament intended to facilitate British and French strength. This program would allow
American resources to make a rapid impact in Europe, while still free-riding on the Allied
coalition. Additionally, he took several other steps to prepare for limited American participation
in the European war: he intervened to restructure American war plans, reorganized the defense
bureaucracy, increased naval procurement, and coordinated military planning with the British.
AIR REARMAMENT AND BUCKPASSING. Following the Munich agreement, Roosevelt
moved America's buckpassing strategy into high gear by pushing for an ambitious program of
airpower production. The goal of the program was to produce thousands of combat aircraft that
could be sold to the Allies as well as to build the industrial facilities capable of producing many
thousand additional planes. The program would also facilitate American rearmament, though
that was not its primary goal. Instead, Roosevelt hoped to reinforce his diplomatic efforts in
Europe by strengthening the European balancing coalition. Moreover, he rejected the politically
easier path of proposing massive American rearmament in defense of the Western hemisphere,
thereby rejecting the non-entanglement strategy. He did so not out of concern for its fiscal costs,
about which he displayed a lack of concern often found among positive liberals, but because he
was determined halt Germany in Europe.
demands. He probably expected that Hitler had called the Munich agreement in order to back down from his
extreme position that minority German areas be included in the Reich. The American government did not realize
how much had been conceded for several days, at which point Roosevelt began to reiterate his earlier anti-
appeasement argument. The alternate interpretation is based on the misreading of two key documents. This issue is
persuasively discussed in Farnham, Roosevelt and the Munich Crisis, pp. 116-119, 144-146.
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The essence of Roosevelt's program was the creation of a large industrial base for the
construction of airplanes and the immediate production of as many combat top-line aircraft as
possible. The plan was put together at a secret retreat at the President's home in Hyde Park, New
York in mid-October, 1938. Presidential "fixer" Harry Hopkins and Treasury Secretary
Morgenthau were the only high American officials present, with representatives from the State,
War, and Navy departments conspicuously absent. French and British representatives, though,
were in attendance. According to Morgenthau's description, the purpose of the meeting was to
work out the logistics and finance of "our producing 15,000 airplanes a year for this country...
he is thinking is terms of three shifts.... [and] eight plants located around the United States."
The President had no problem with the associated costs, initially suggesting a $3 billion figure-
nearly half of all federal spending combined-to be paid for with $2.5 billion in deficit spending.
Morgenthau noted that "When I talked to the President about taxes, he didn't seem interested."8 4
Roosevelt wasn't much interested in building an American air force either, as it turned
out. The primary purpose of the program was gain what leverage he could by supplying the
British and the French. At a November 14 cabinet meeting designed to propel his plans through
the bureaucracy, Roosevelt explained that "When I write to foreign countries I must have
something to back up my words. Had we this summer 5,000 planes and the capacity to
immediately produce 10,000 per year, even though I might have to ask Congress for authority to
sell or lend them to the countries in Europe, Hitler would not have dared to take the stand he
did." Moreover, he thought that "our only important need was... an abundance of aeroplanes.
He said there was little need of more battleships, forts, military posts and ammunitions." Army
Air Corps General Hap Arnold concluded that "the President did not seem to want an American
air force at all, feeling that new barracks in Wyoming 'would not scare Hitler'; what he wanted
was 'airplanes-now-lots of them."' Another military officer present believed Roosevelt's
purpose was to help the Allies "to build up aerial fleets that might overawe Hitler or..., if war
should come,... even help to defeat Hitler without American armed intervention" on the
ground. 85
After dictating his policy to a surprised cabinet and an opposed military bureaucracy,
Roosevelt worked hard to press his policy to fruition. He continued planning "to do his best to
provide partly-finished basic materials, which did not come within the Neutrality law, for an
extra 20,000 to 30,000 planes." As part of a broader study of "how the American aircraft
industry could best serve France's need," Roosevelt appointed a liaison officer to exchange
design and manufacturing information with the Allies, thus circumventing "existing official
channels." He promised to get around the congressional prohibition on foreign loans, claiming
that money could be made "to seep through" if necessary. And, over the vitriolic opposition of
the Army, Roosevelt authorized the French to inspect and buy secret experimental American
aircraft not yet in production. Morgenthau shoved the decision down the War Department's
84 Farnham, Roosevelt and the Munich Crisis, pp. 177, 178. On original cost and deficit estimates, see Ibid., pp.
176, n. 12, 178. Both the cost amounts and the number of planes diminished as policy moved forward and
Roosevelt was forced to confront the realities of plane production. "Every time I have talked to the President the
number of planes he has in mind has become less," Morgenthau noted. "In about the month or so that the President
has been discussing this thing, he is getting more and more practical about it... he has gone from 40,000 planes a
year down to 10,000 planes in two years. So I think we have made some progress." See Blum, From the
Morgenthau Diaries, 11: 47; Famham, Roosevelt and the Munich Crisis, p. 182, n. 33.
85 Farnham, Roosevelt and the Munich Crisis, pp. 184, 185.
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throat with typical aplomb: "The President of the United States says that we consider the
Maginot line our first line of defense.... Those are my orders."86
Roosevelt obviously expected his policy of buckpassing to the Allies to complement
American rearmament. As he put it in a January 10 meeting assaulting the Army bureaucracy,
"the only check to a world war, which would be understood in Germany, would be the creation
of a great [French] air force and a powerful force in this country." But the Allies would have
clear priority; the needs of hemispheric defense were slighted. For instance, while naval aviation
would be a critical part of defending South America, the Navy was given only a couple of
hundred planes. Morgenthau recorded that "As far as the Navy is concerned, [Roosevelt] said
they've got enough." Roosevelt also slighted the Army as an insufficient influence on Hitler,
arguing that even if "a 400,000 manned army were in being and were well equipped" it would
have nowhere near the deterrent influence of "a heavy striking force of aircraft." Finally, he
explicitly ordered that priority be given to Allied orders "even if this meant the postponement of
our own buying program." This priority persisted even after the war had begun: "up to a certain
number, at any rate, we would let England and France have first call."8 7
Most critically, Roosevelt made these decisions in the face of a domestically superior
alternative policy: extensive rearmament for defending the Western hemisphere. That there was
large congressional support for rearmament was well known at the time; every major defense bill
or military appropriation between 1937 and 1940 passed with large margins, including a majority
of isolationist votes. One isolationist senator justified Congress' refusal to repeal the neutrality
acts to Roosevelt by arguing that "Congress had just passed a two billion dollar national defense
bill" which was all the "ammunition" America needed against the dictators.88
Moreover, the military bureaucracy was unremittingly hostile to the President's program,
demanding a "balanced rearmament" among the services, and one that took the priority of
hemispheric defense seriously. It was military opposition to his program before Congress that
forced Roosevelt to meet with the Senate Military Affairs committee. But instead of accepting a
large, balanced rearmament program, he privately defended his commitment to aid the Allies
while publically casting his policy as hemispheric defense. In so doing he willingly chose to
86 Ibid., pp. 179, 176, 191; Reynolds, The Creation of the Anglo-American Alliance, pp. 42-43, quote 43; Blum,
From the Morgenthau Diaries, II: 68. Roosevelt had to jam his measures through the military bureaucracy at
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Roosevelt had "an evident wish and desire that every effort be made to expedite the procurement of any type of
plane desired by the French government." See, Farnham, Roosevelt and the Munich Crisis, p. 192.
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production was influenced by some of the general airpower lunacy that was in the water throughout the 1930s. See,
e.g., Herbert S. Dinerstein, "The Impact of Air Power on the International Scene, 1933-1940," Military Affairs 19,
no. 2 (July 1, 1955): 65-71. But, even granting that he held some false beliefs, his program represented a coherent
way for him to press for international influence and to buttress the European balancers.
88 For the quote, and other similar assessments of the political situation, see Farnham, Roosevelt and the Munich
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absorb a great deal of political punishment, calculating that in the end his strategy would be
acceptable to the American people.89
ORGANIZING, PLANNING, AND COORDINATING FOR WAR. Roosevelt also took a series of
other military steps to facilitate his buckpassing strategy. The thrust of these steps was to ensure
his personal control of American military policy and to prepare the country's defenses for the
possibility of being drawn into a European war.
Roosevelt began to express dissatisfaction with existing military options in 1937, when
he ordered the military to scrap its ultra-aggressive war plan ORANGE for a unilateral offensive
in the Western Pacific and to replace it with a plan that envisioned a two-ocean war fought with
Great Britain as an ally. These orders ultimately resulted in the five RAINBOW war plans, three
of which were premised on an explicit alliance with the European Allies. At the same time,
Roosevelt worked to make sure his strategic priorities would be followed within the bureaucracy.
He personally handpicked Admiral Harold Stark to be the Chief of Naval operations and General
George Marshall to be the Army Chief of Staff, going well down the seniority lists in order to
promote them. In July 1939, Roosevelt further provided his chosen chiefs with a direct link to
him by transferring the Army-Navy Joint Board to the executive office of the President and by
requiring all major military decisions to have his approval. 90
In naval matters, Roosevelt actually began his rearmament push before Munich. He
authorized a 20% increase in force levels in 1937, adding significantly to what was already a
$500 million dollar expansion effort. He also approved a series of naval talks with the British in
order to coordinate planning in case of war. During these talks, the United States agreed to
concentrate its fleet in the Pacific to relieve the British Fleet for war in European waters, while
providing patrolling and limited cruiser assistance in the Atlantic. When war occurred, these
patrols were instituted under the guise of a "neutrality zone" for the Western hemisphere.
Roosevelt himself expected to be very aggressive with these patrols in order to limit the
liabilities of the British fleet to the Eastern Atlantic and the Mediterranean.91
SUMMARY OF AMERICAN GRAND STRATEGY, 1937-1941
Contrary to TLFP's ceterus paribus expectations, the Roosevelt administration did not
pursue a balancing strategy before the fall of France. All other things were not equal-Roosevelt
faced strict domestic constraints that limited his ability to make commitments abroad. Instead,
he opted for a buckpassing strategy as a second-best option, reaching for as much international
influence over the balance of power as could be obtained while still free-riding on the efforts of
89 On the military's opposition and Roosevelt's persistence see Farnham, Roosevelt and the Munich Crisis, p. 210;
Stoler, Allies and Adversaries, p. 17, esp. n. 51; Keith D. McFarland, Harry H. Woodring: A Political Biography of
FDR 's Controversial Secretary of War (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 1975), pp. 167-171.
90 Lester H. Brune, Origins ofAmerican National Security Policy: Sea Power, Air Power and Foreign Policy, 1900-
1941 (Manhattan, KS: MA/AH Publishing, 1981), pp. 106-114; Stoler, Allies and Adversaries, pp. 15-2 1.
9' On these naval issues, see Brune, Origins ofAmerican National Security Policy, pp. 106-114; Hearden, Roosevelt
Confronts Hitler, pp. 73-75; Reynolds, The Creation of the Anglo-American Alliance, p. 61. Roosevelt hoped
American neutrality patrols could help keep the Germans at bay in the Atlantic. As he told King George VI,
America would "have a patrol from Newfoundland down to South America and if some submarines are laying there
and try to interrupt an American flag and our Navy sinks them, it's just too bad. What are they going to do? In
other words, he is going to play the game the way they are doing it now. If we fire and sink an Italian or German,
well.. .we will say the way the Japs do, 'So sorry.' 'Never happen again.' Tomorrow we sink two." Farnham,
Roosevelt and the Munich Crisis, p. 213, n. 153.
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other poles. The process of American strategy formation bears out the predictions of TLFP's
geopolitical and liberal variables. The systemic pressure of rising German power raised real
fears within the administration about the integrity of the Western hemisphere. These fears also
were intimately tied to a positive liberal worldview: German autarky threatened to restrict
American trading rights in Latin America and throughout the world. To shape a more suitable
balance of power, the Roosevelt administration sought greater international control through its
military and diplomatic policy, attempting to negotiate a liberal commercial peace and to
organize and support a European balancing coalition within domestic constraints.
Several pieces of evidence confirm TLFP's causal process predictions in especially
persuasive fashion. First, as German power expanded, the Roosevelt administration became
concerned about the military penetration of the Western hemisphere, but largely because it was
linked to other positive liberal worries. The set of dominoes that had to fall in Latin America
were ideological and economic in origin, and were part of a larger fear of the German autocratic
and autarkic project. Roosevelt worried that if Germany kept expanding, liberal values would be
sacrificed: American trading rights would be curtailed and the New Deal political order would be
threatened. This led the administration to decide that Germany simply could not be allowed to
remain the first ranked power in Europe, even before it became a potential hegemon.
Second, achieving this demanding configuration of power meant Roosevelt required
more international leverage. He reached out with diplomatic and military tools in order to get it.
He did his best to organize a European balancing coalition during and after Munich, promising
all aid short of war to help the Allies contain Hitler. Roosevelt tried solution after solution to
help America throw its weight on the scales, making proposals for "quarantines" and end runs
around the neutrality acts. Most notably, Roosevelt fought to arm the Allies with American
aircraft, hoping to turn American factories into a kind of aerospace arsenal for European
democracy, two years before his famous speech of that name. He did so while seeking an
unbalanced rearmament at home, trying to prepare America for war with the only weapons he
believed could be used to influence the European balance of power: air and naval power.
Third, Roosevelt's diplomacy was motivated by positive liberal aims. He made several
attempts to negotiate a settlement in Europe based on open trade and non-discrimination. The
end of German autarky was the key.element in these plans; if Germany could be brought back
into peaceful world commerce he was willing to tolerate the appeasement of German territorial
ambitions. As the war progressed and the prospects for peace dropped, Roosevelt thought about
the post-war world in terms of commercial openness and the "four freedoms," ordering peace
planning begun on this liberal basis well before he had announced these goals publically.
Finally, the impact of domestic political constraints is readily apparent in the Roosevelt
administration's diplomacy. Before Munich, Roosevelt found naval blockade and economic
support for the European balancers attractive because they could be employed without
Congressional approval. After Munich, air and naval rearmament were chosen because such
weapons could be produced under the guise of defending the Western hemisphere-Congress
might permit a balanced rearmament to buttress a non-entanglement posture, but Roosevelt
understood he could never deploy ground troops to Europe. Roosevelt therefore deployed
arguments about the military threat to the Western hemisphere publically and instrumentally,
even as he privately believed the European Allies would block Hitler and admitted his strategy
was to help them in Europe. If America were going to exert the kind of control over the
European balance of power needed to see Hitler defeated, Roosevelt had to use politically
acceptable tools.
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Roosevelt's strategy failed because his expansive goals for the balance of power outran
his buckpassing tools. Peace strategies had little hope of coming to fruition when neither the
Allies or the Axis would to listen to them, and Roosevelt's lack of diplomatic leverage meant the
Europeans controlled the relationship. Military support from the air and sea could buttress allied
power, but it could not stop the German onslaught on land when it came. Broad liberal goals
required more extensive balancing commitments-commitments Roosevelt could not make
politically. But as security pressures rose, those constraints would loosen, allowing TLFP's
variables to push American posture towards balancing.
American Grand Strategy, 1940-1941: Transition to Balancing
On May 10, 1940, the Wehrmacht invaded France and essentially defeated the French
Army within a few days. This victory radically changed the balance of power, making Germany
a potential hegemon in Europe and causing America to change grand strategies. Over the course
of 1940 and 1941, Roosevelt transitioned to a balancing strategy: he sought to make a forward
commitment of American power to the continent, preparing for a ground force intervention to
destroy the German power position. But still constrained by domestic political aversion to a
European land war, the move to balancing was halting and gradual, as Roosevelt probed for
ways to overcome opposition and lead the country into full participation in the war. America's
strategic shift was nevertheless clear from the response to the increased threat of German power,
military preparations for future American security, and diplomatic maneuvering to involve
America in the conflict.
Fears for American security rose dramatically in May 1940, and after a brief delay,
resulted in the decisive rejection of a non-entanglement strategy in favor of increased aid to
Britain. American statesmen clearly decided that Germany's military machine had to be smashed
and its political position devastated. The Lend-Lease program committed America to a costly
program of supporting a British victory that American leaders knew London could not win alone.
Roosevelt's increasingly aggressive naval posture in the Atlantic secured Britain's lifeline and
sought to provoke Germany into open hostilities. Roosevelt further adopted a confrontational
policy towards Japan, virtually ensuring the Pacific conflict that eventually eroded the domestic
hurdles to an American invasion of Europe.
TLFP's logic drove this strategic shift from buckpassing to balancing. The emergence of
a European potential hegemon was unquestionably the strongest force driving policy during the
period, informing military planning, defense decisions, and the firm commitment to British
survival. But it is crucial to recognize that a buckpassing strategy founded on the continued
survival of Britain through naval and economic support was plausible and had high-level
advocates in the administration. Indeed, the Nazi invasion of the Soviet Union made this
strategy especially promising, since Stalin would be a powerful buck-catcher if he could survive
the initial onslaught. No doubt, the concern that Germany might win a quick victory or
consolidate an overwhelming position in Western Russia was a powerful geopolitical incentive
to balance, and increased the aggressiveness of American policy. But the Eastern front also
presented an enticing opportunity for further buckpassing. Geopolitical threat did not, therefore,
completely determine American strategy.
The Roosevelt administration's positive liberal fear of a closed world economic system
also influenced the decision to balance rather than buckpass. Military planning documents
advocating balancing reveal that American interests in Europe were defined in terms of
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American trade and its rights to equal commercial opportunity. An expanded zone of German
autarky in Europe was unacceptable, even if Britain survived. Furthermore, two of the major
moves towards intervention had been decided before the invasion of the Soviet Union: Lend-
Lease and escalation in the Atlantic. The positive liberal impetus of the balancing decision can
also be observed in the administration's vision for the post-war order.
All of these factors thus continue to show the influence of positive liberal values on
American strategic choices during the period. This logic is especially evident upon closer
examination of three strategic areas: American perception and response to European threats,
military policy, and diplomatic policy.
RESPONSE TO EUROPEAN THREATS
With the fall of France, administration perception of geopolitical threats rose sharply and
determined the immediate policy responses to shore up the defenses of the Western hemisphere.
After a short delay, these same geopolitical forces also propelled Roosevelt to decisively reject
non-entanglement in favor of continued buckpassing to Britain, increasing America's level of
commitment and support. At the same time, positive liberal threat perceptions were still present
in administration discourse, indicating that the perceived problem of German autarky had only
increased with Germany's potential hegemony.
MATERIAL THREAT: THE EMERGENCE OF A POTENTIAL HEGEMON. On April 2 9 th, 1940,
Roosevelt wrote Italian dictator Benito Mussolini, urging him to stay out of European war. "I
see no reason," Roosevelt argued, "to anticipate that any one nation, or any one combination of
nations, can successfully undertake to dominate either the continent of Europe or much less a
greater part of the world." Within three weeks, this sentiment and the strategy that overlay it
were in ruins. Hitler had routed France and Britain, destroying the European balance of power
and establishing the Third Reich as a potential hegemon. Germany's new position was a threat
to the Western hemisphere. Though balancing did not come immediately, systemic pressures
quickly came to dominate American grand strategy, exactly as TLFP, and indeed any
geopolitical theory, predicts.92
Geopolitical pressures had been growing in administration thinking as the war heated up.
An early 1940 version of RAINBOW 5, the war plan that would later become the basis of
American strategy as the world crisis progressed, was premised on the defeat of Britain or France
"with a resultant threat to the security of the United States and to the letter or the spirit of the
Monroe Doctrine." Assistant Secretary of State and presidential confidante Adolph Berle
reflected the common administration belief that America had "a very real and solid interest in
having the British, not the Germans, dominate the Atlantic." Roosevelt himself worried that the
American people were too confident in keeping out of the war, reflecting privately that he was
"not going around thanking God for allowing us physical safety within our continental limits."
In fact, he argued the oceans were not the "reasonably adequate defensive barriers [of] the past."
The United States could not afford to "wage a last-ditch battle for American independence"
against a European hegemon; it would be "suicide" to "wait until they are in our front yard."93
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By the middle of May 1940, Germany was, if not in the front yard, then busy ripping up
the neighbor's garden. The physical and political integrity of the Western hemisphere was no
longer a rhetorical convenience, but the target of imminent danger. The Latin America bureau of
the State Department reported that "It is daily clearer that the situation in Argentina, Uruguay
and Brazil is deteriorating in the sense that a successful revolution backed by the Nazis is
becoming a more likely possibility." Political change could easily become militarily significant;
Marshall worried about "the possibility of a sudden seizure of airfields and ports in Northeast
Brazil by forces already in the country and acting in collusion with small German forces." "In
view of... the rapidity with which Germany develops operations once her preparations are
complete," Marshall wrote, "we now face the distinct possibility of a lodgment by small German
forces in Northeast Brazil which would require a very strong effort on our part to dislodge."
These widespread worries led Roosevelt to demand crash military plans for an expeditionary
force of 100,000 men to Brazil, code-named POT OF GOLD. Though far beyond existing
military capabilities, the plan reflected the level of security fear permeating the administration.94
German military successes meant these fears persisted throughout 1941. On the eve of
Hitler's invasion of Russia, Assistant Secretary of State and Roosevelt's close friend Sumner
Wells expressed a common concern: "The situation is changing with great rapidity and the
possibility of German aggression against the Western hemisphere is becoming more imminent.
In the considered judgment of the President and of the service heads of the War and Navy
Departments, the most vulnerable points from the standpoint of the security of the Western
hemisphere" were in Iceland and Brazil. These fears seem surreal in light of large streams of
intelligence that suggested Hitler was preparing for war, or at least coercive diplomacy, with
Stalin. That they were taken seriously, and acted upon, shows the increased significance of
hemispheric vulnerability after the fall of France. The economic and ideological possibilities in
Latin American societies took on ominous military significance in the geopolitically threatening
world of 1940-1941.95
A closely related geopolitical concern was the survival of the Allied fleets. After the
invasion of France, Roosevelt hastily prioritized RAINBOW 4, the military plan for unilateral
defense of the Western hemisphere. The plan noted that the surrender of the Allied fleets to
Germany would rapidly create "naval equality or superiority with respect to the United States
Fleet" and that "Even the destruction of the British and French Fleets will afford Germany and
Italy naval freedom of action in the Atlantic." Therefore, the plan emphasized, "the date of the
loss of the British or French Fleets automatically sets the date of our mobilization." Much of
Roosevelt's frenzied diplomacy in May-June of 1940 was centered on preserving the European
navies, without which he saw "nothing between the Americas and those new forces in Europe."
Desperately trying to keep the French in the war, Roosevelt warned them that "we regard the
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retention of the French fleet as a force in being as vital to the reconstitution of France and of
French colonies and to the ultimate control of the Atlantic.... The same thought is being
conveyed in the strictest confidence to the British regarding the British fleet."96
Even after summer 1940, these geopolitical concerns remained the foundation of
American strategy. Following Roosevelt's reelection in November 1940, Chief of Naval
Operations Admiral Harold Stark submitted the famous "Plan Dog" memorandum to the
President. The memo outlined a grand strategy that regarded the "the balance of power existing
in Europe" as a "strong pillar of the defense structure of the Americas." Stark argued that "The
collapse of Great Britain or the destruction or surrender of the British Fleet will destroy this
balance and will free European military power for possible encroachment on this hemisphere."
Roosevelt's tacit approval of Plan Dog led to talks with the British that produced a joint war plan
known as ABC-1. As that document argued, America "must maintain such dispositions as will
prevent the extension in the Western Hemisphere of European or Asiatic political or military
power." Roosevelt himself also continued to express fears of a hemispheric threat in 1941.
In short, evidence from the policy-making process and Roosevelt's own views strongly
support the logic of TLFP. The surprise emergence of Germany as a potential European
hegemon was the overwhelmingly dominant driver of American strategy. The administration's
threat perceptions are aptly summarized in the diary of Colonel Paul Robinett, an important
military planner, after the German invasion of the Soviet Union: "Germany and Russia are
fighting for world domination, [and] which ever wins will be a long way on the road to
domination...; finally, if any one power dominates Asia, Europe, and Africa, our country will
ultimately become a second class power even if we gain South America and the whole of North
America"98
ROOSEVELT REJECTS NON-ENTANGLEMENT. Once the balance of power had shifted, the
first important decision facing the administration was whether it could continue its buckpassing
strategy, or whether German success had reduced the efforts of 1937-1939 to a shambles.
Though the decision seems obvious now, it was not at the time. The United States military and
many within the administration were advocating a grand strategy of non-entanglement:
abandoning Britain and preparing to defend the Western hemisphere alone. But after a period of
indecision, Roosevelt continued his buckpassing strategy and increased American commitments
to Britain-essentially laying the ground for the balancing strategy he preferred.
In a May 22 memorandum entitled "National Strategic Decisions," Army Chief of Staff
George Marshall listed several "Further imminently probable complications of today's
situation," including: "Nazi-inspired revolution in Brazil"; "Widespread disorders with attacks
on U.S. citizens in Mexico and raids along our southern border"; "Decisive Allied defeat,
followed by German aggression in the Western Hemisphere"; and "all combined." American
96 Rainbow No. 4, August 14, 1940 (approved), in Steven T. Ross, ed., U.S. War Plans: 1938-1945 (Boulder, CO:
Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2002), p. 34; Ian Kershaw, Fateful Choices: Ten Decisions That Changed the World,
1940-1941 (New York: Penguin, 2008), p. 212; Roosevelt to Bullitt, May 26, 1940, in Orville H. Bullitt, ed., For the
President, Personal and Secret: Correspondence between Franklin D. Roosevelt and William C. Bulliti (Boston,
MA: Houghton Mifflin, 1972), pp. 431-432.
97 Stark Memorandum, November 12, 1940, in Ross, U.S. War Plans, pp. 55-66, quotes 62, 57. ABC-I, March 27,
1941 (approved) in Ibid., p. 70. For Roosevelt's views see Roosevelt, Marshall, Hull meeting, January 16, 1941, in
Larry I. Bland and Sharon Ritenour Stevens, eds., The Papers of George Catlett Marshall (Baltimore, MD: Johns
Hopkins University Press, 1981), II: 391-392.
98 Quoted in Stoler, Allies and Adversaries, p. 50.
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unpreparedness meant that only the Western hemisphere could be protected adequately, and this
implied decisions "as to what we are not going to do." Marshall's memo set the agenda for a
meeting with Roosevelt, Stark, and Welles, and its implications were clear. As Marshall later
put it to Secretary of the Treasury Morgenthau, "we have got to weigh the hazards in this
hemisphere of one thing or another." Sending all immediate aid to Britain, as requested by
Churchill, would be "a drop in the bucket on the other side [of the Atlantic], and it is a very vital
necessity on this side.... Tragic as it is, that is that." One officer would argue in June that if
America sent aid to Britain and she fell, "every one who was a party to the deal might hope to be
found hanging from a lamp post." At the meeting on the 22nd all parties agreed that avoid
confrontations in the Pacific and "that we must concentrate on the South American situation."99
These fears for the Western hemisphere and the threat of British defeat delayed serious
aid to Britain for several months. But both before and after the meeting on the 22nd, Roosevelt
was pushing for ways to maintain his buckpassing strategy and increase American resistance to
Germany. On May 16, he instructed Treasury Secretary Henry Morgenthau to swap existing
American aircraft for the future orders the French had placed, justifying the risk by suggesting
that "after all, we will not be in the war for 60 or 90 days." Welles argued only two weeks later
that "our influence would probably be the decisive factor if we could send our fleet and air force
to Europe" and complained bitterly that by the time "the American people are ready to act it
might be to late to save the allies." But Roosevelt's electoral constraints notwithstanding,
Sumner Welles recommended building up a military force "for other purposes, if advisable, than
the strict defense of the Western hemisphere." 100
On June 13, Roosevelt instructed the military to plan on the assumption that Britain and
France would remain in the war, fighting from their empires if necessary, and that American air
and naval units would be actively involved in the war. He fought against Marshall's dogged
insistence on holding back American materiel from Britain, and achieved a compromise that
"overruled the military" on the matter of "continued aid to Britain": Britain could be sent such
equipment as would help her stay in the war until the end of the year. Sales to Britain in June of
heavy guns, rifles, and ammunition reduced American stocks by twenty-five percent. In late
June, the Roosevelt approved naval staff talks with the British to coordinate cooperation and
contingency planning.101
These efforts culminated in the destroyers-for-bases deal, approved on August 2.
Immediately upon becoming Prime Minister, Churchill had requested extensive American aid,
including a number of World War I era destroyers to assist with naval patrols while new
construction was coming on line. At first, the administration resisted, worried about American
needs and pointing to the restriction Congress had put on the sale of surplus material without
approval by the service chiefs that it was unnecessary for national defense. But by the middle of
July, Roosevelt was changing his mind. Ultimately, the administration exchanged fifty old
" Marshall Memorandum on National Strategic Decisions, May 22, 1940, in Bland and Stevens, The Papers of
George Catlett Marshall, 11: 218-219; Haglund, "George C. Marshall and the Question of Military Aid to England,
May-June 1940," p. 748; Stoler, Allies and Adversaries, pp. 25, 28.
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destroyers for the rights to lease naval and air bases on British possessions in the Caribbean and
Churchill's private pledge never to surrender the British Fleet.102
To make the deal, Roosevelt employed dubious legal arguments cooked up by Benjamin
Cohen and Dean Acheson arguing that he could, by executive order, act directly contrary to the
relevant Congressional legislation. He also worked assiduously to secure the support of Wendell
Willkie, his internationalist Republican opponent in the 1940 election. On some accounts, he
threatened Admiral Stark with relief as CNO if he would not publically approve the deal, which
the Navy hated. It was an extraordinary effort for a momentous strategic decision. As Mark
Lowenthal argues, the decision, after months of stalling, "now represented a definite
commitment to Britain's resistance and survival." 03
Roosevelt's decision to continue and increase American commitment was the logical
implication of his acceptance of the geopolitical problem. As Churchill cabled him, if a battle
for Britain went poorly, his government might fall and be replaced with a collaborationist
government. If "others came in to parlay amid the ruins," Churchill wrote, "you must not be
blind to the fact that the sole remaining bargaining counter would be the fleet." Once joined with
"the great resources of German industry, overwhelming sea power would be in Hitler's hands."
Moreover, as British Ambassador Lord Lothian, any successful attack on Britain "would
automatically imply the loss of a large proportion of our fleet." The hawkish members of the
cabinet pushed this same syllogism throughout the summer; protecting the Western hemisphere
meant protecting the British fleet, and protecting the fleet meant sending the destroyers.
Roosevelt himself summarized his strategic rationale in a rare personal account of the August 2
cabinet meeting: "It was the general opinion, without any dissenting voice, that the survival of
the British Isles under German attack might very possibly depend on their getting these
destroyers." 0 4 The strategic decision had been made: America would cast its lot with Great
Britain.
IDEOLOGICAL THREATS: GERMAN AUTARKY DOMINANT. Despite the powerful influence
of geopolitical threats during the chaotic summer of 1940, the Roosevelt administration's
positive liberal fears of German autarky had not disappeared. Indeed, they strongly shaped
diplomatic and military policy as the American posture developed prior to Pearl Harbor.
On May 17, 1940, as the extent of German victories became more apparent, Roosevelt
worried to Vice President Henry Wallace about American trading rights "if England and France
were completely wiped out and we lost the entire European market." Morgenthau openly
worried that "The Germans will form some sort of over-all trading corporation" after the war that
would discriminate or exclude American products. Assistant Secretary of State Breckinridge
Long bleakly recorded in his diary on May 28 that "if Germany wins this war and subordinates
12 On the destroyers for bases deal, which is generally regarded as a pivotal decision in American policy, see
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Europe, every commercial order will be routed to Berlin and filled under its orders somewhere in
Europe rather than the United States." In markets to which American merchants still had access,
they would "have to compete against [the] slave labor of Europe," which would cause a return to
the "falling prices" and "declining profits" of the Depression, "with the consequent social and
political disturbances." Either the New Deal would have to be abandoned, or even stricter
controls on the economy put in place.
A regnant German economy in Europe would rapidly erode America trading rights in the
rest of the world. Berle warned the President on May 25 that once Berlin was the purchasing
agent for three hundred million Europeans, it would come to dominate markets in the Western
hemisphere. As Sumner Welles put it on May 31, "If there were a German customs and
monetary union throughout Europe and the Argentine were notified that it could only export its
goods to Europe under the terms dictated by Germany the Argentine would quickly acquiesce."
The administration quickly began planning to protect a free-trade zone in the Western
hemisphere by investigating the possibility of a giant monetary and customs union. State
Department official Will Clayton grimly summarized that "If the rest of the world adopts
totalitarian methods of trade we will be compelled to conform." Roosevelt ordered planning for
the project to proceed quickly, since "it was necessary to move forward at once in as much as if
England blew up Germany would begin making effective trade agreements in Latin America and
we would be on the scene too late." 106
These plans were abandoned because of technical difficulties and the growing belief that
Britain could hold out. But positive liberal fears of German autarky continued to seep into the
Roosevelt administration's plans. Admiral Stark's November 1940 Plan Dog memorandum
defined "the possession of a profitable foreign trade, both in raw material and in finished goods"
as a critical national interest and a foundation of military strength. This interest justified Stark's
interventionist stance, since "The restoration of foreign trade, particularly with Europe, may
depend on the continued integrity of the British Empire." The September 1941 Victory Program
went even further, establishing as one of American war aims "the establishment of regimes
favorable to economic freedom and individual liberty" at least "as far as practicable."
For their part, Army planners nearly revolted. Colonel Paul Robinett described the
document as "the imposition of our own ideology upon the world." Marshall wrote to Stark that
the liberal war aims "seem purely political and therefore somewhat out of place in this paper."
But the paper was a political document ordered by the politician-in-chief on behalf of his
political aims. The liberal language stayed in the Victory Program and demonstrates the
continued impact of positive liberal threat perceptions as the administration thought about the
future European situation.' 0 7
MILITARY POLICY
The Roosevelt administration's military policy opens another window into the evolution
of American grand strategy after Germany emerged as a potential hegemon. The need to plan
and procure for America's future security in the midst of the world crisis forced the
administration to make a choice. Should it continue buckpassing, aiming to keep Britain alive
""5 Hearden, Roosevelt Confronts Hitler, p. 159; Long diary, May 28, 1940, in Israel, The War Diary of Breckinridge
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and the Atlantic secure, but not otherwise commit to the eventual defeat of Germany? Or should
it prepare for an eventual offensive to break German power and remake the European order?
The buckpassing strategy was quite plausible and had influential advocates within the
administration. But overwhelmingly, American statesmen chose to prepare for balancing.
Military planning, civilian opinion, and defense preparations all revealed the administration's
concept of the future balance of power. German ownership of continental Western Europe was
intolerable; there could be no negotiated peace. The United States would require a large army to
annihilate Hitler's regime.
THE BUCKPASSING ALTERNATIVE. The case for continued buckpassing to Britain, rather
than adopting a balancing policy of full belligerency, remained viable until December 7, 1941.
The strength of the buckpassing argument was especially potent after Hitler attacked Russia in
June 1941, as it brought to the fore a second and even more powerful buck-catcher than Britain.
Indeed, some historians believe Roosevelt aimed at a buckpassing strategy until Pearl Harbor,
arguing like David Reynolds that he sought to make the American contribution in "arms not
armies-acting as the arsenal of democracy and guardian of the oceans, but not involved in
another major land war in Europe." These judgments, the existence of viable buck-catchers, and
the presence of vocal buckpassing arguments within the administration all suggest that the
strategic choice between balancing and buckpassing was not fully determined by the pressures of
the international system.108
There was a strong continentalist and isolationist strain of thinking in the United States
military, particularly in the Army, which made its presence felt from 1940-41. Led by Lt.
General Stanley Embick, these officers felt that the Western hemisphere was eminently
defensible so long as Britain survived, which did not mean either the Churchill government or
the British Empire had to survive. Embick warned that America should not let itself be "duped"
into voluntarily entering the war, as it had in 1917. Embick was pulled out of retirement by
Marshall to be his strategic advisor and to serve "in a confidential capacity at the White House"
as a personal military advisor to the President. His advice was taken very seriously: he briefed
Stimson and Roosevelt on his opposition to armed convoys for goods bound to Britain and his
disapproval of the British Mediterranean strategy. Apparently, he was influential in delaying the
use of convoys and squashing Roosevelt's plans for intervention in North Africa in spring 1941.
Even Stimson, whose views were 180 degrees opposite of Embick's, saw him as "one of our best
strategists-a Retired General whom we all rely on, including the President." 109
As Mark Stoler points out, "Embick was far from alone in such beliefs." Important Army
planners and advisors to Marshall like Colonel Paul Robinett complained that "U.S. policy now
follows British policy." America was little more than a slave to British imperial policy and its
"false leader" Churchill. According to this view, American strategy should focus instead on
securing island outposts in the Western hemisphere behind which "a vast fleet could range from
108 Reynolds, The Creation of the Anglo-American Alliance, p. 288. For similar arguments, see Stoler, Allies and
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continental bases." Such dissent became so frequent from Army planners that in April 1941
Stimson had to order Marshall to muzzle and reassign buckpassing advocates. But even
Marshall himself was willing to make the buckpassing argument in high places. He reflected in
May 1941 that "we will not need a 4,000,000 man Army unless England collapses," and he
urged a focus on defending Latin America "beyond a shadow of a doubt." Marshall agreed with
the consensus that "collapse in the Atlantic would be fatal" but sometimes served as a voice for
the elements in the administration who saw the prevention of such a collapse as a maximum
goal." 0
The persistence of buckpassing arguments shows that despite the disaster caused by the
fall of France, the United States still had a viable geopolitical position. If Britain could hold,
Hitler would be hemmed in by the British Fleet in the Mediterranean and the combined Anglo-
American Fleets in the Atlantic. A wary and powerful Soviet Union would be on his eastern
border. As even the highly interventionist Victory Program noted, Hitler's invasion of Russia
presented "by far the best opportunity for a successful land offensive against Germany, because
only Russia possesses adequate manpower situated in favorable proximity to the center of the
German citadel." Given the time, difficulties, and costs required to deploy American ground
forces, bleeding Hitler in Russia through a program of military and economic aid to the Allies
and its naval protection was a live option.11
PLANNING FOR BALANCING. Despite the appeal of alternatives, American military policy
ran towards balancing, not buckpassing. From the summer of 1940 on, strategic planning,
material production, and military and civilian opinion in the administration all trended towards a
large ground force intervention in the European war.
Stark's Plan Dog memorandum argued a buckpassing approach of "purely naval
assistance" could not bring victory. The key to protecting the Western hemisphere would be "to
effect the complete, or at least, the partial collapse of the German Reich." American interests
also existed in East Asia, but there geopolitical factors cut a different way. Stark argued that it
was of doubtful utility "to reduce Japan to the status of an inferior military and economic power.
A balance of power in the Far East is to our interest as much as is a balance of power in Europe."
In the view of Stark and other military planners, once Germany was defeated, Japan could be
dealt with swiftly. As the Victory Plan argued, "If Germany were defeated... it is probable that
Japan could be forced to give up much of her territorial gains." Japan's autarkic project was
considered manageable under normal circumstances, but by 1940 Germany's was not. 1 2
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Stark's major premise was that "Alone, the British Empire lacks the manpower and
material means to master Germany," and was threatened in Egypt with the loss of "intact
geographical positions from which a successful land invasion can later be launched." To ensure
victory, Stark felt that "the United States, in addition to sending naval assistance, would also
need to send large air and land forces to Europe or Africa, and to participate strongly in this land
offensive." The memorandum ended by recommending balancing: "an eventual strong offensive
in the Atlantic as an ally of the British, and a defensive in the Pacific." This strategy would be
the "most fruitful" of available options, "particularly if we enter the war at an early date" and
"obtain full equality in the political and military direction of the war." 1 3
Roosevelt agreed with Stark's arguments, though he swore him to secrecy. He ordered
the government to plan and prepare based on Plan Dog's assumptions, and to use it to coordinate
with Britain. He explicitly expressed his views on January 16, 1941, at a meeting outlining the
American position for the upcoming staff talks with the British. Roosevelt was not ready "at this
particular time" to be drawn into war, since he believed that was Hitler's objective and because
"the Army should not be committed to any aggressive action until it was fully prepared to
undertake it." But Roosevelt accepted the primacy of the Atlantic and the need to be on the
defensive in the Pacific. He also ordered the Navy to prepare to convoy shipping to Britain and
to extend the American "neutrality zone" to 300 miles off the East Coast." 4
Roosevelt's fear of imminent war and his acceptance of Plan Dog's strategic premises led
to further balancing plans. The Anglo-American staff talks resulted by March 1941 in ABC-1,
the joint war plan quoted above that assumed full American belligerency and embodied the
assumptions of Plan Dog, including the creation of a large Army for "the eventual offensive
against Germany." Around the same time, a revamped Rainbow 5 called for "the decisive defeat
of Germany" and stipulated that "The building up of large land and air forces for major offensive
operations against the Axis Powers will be the primary immediate effort of the United States
Army." 15
Despite the renewed opportunity for buckpassing created by the German invasion of
Russia, the administration only intensified its plans for balancing. Roosevelt's response to the
invasion was to a review of "the overall production requirements required to defeat our potential
enemies." This was the origin of the Victory Program, which was gauged towards the "complete
military defeat of Germany" such that "her entire European system would collapse." The
alternative of "an inconclusive peace" would "give Germany an opportunity to reorganize
continental Europe and replenish her strength." The Victory Program emphasized that "naval and
air forces seldom, if ever, win important wars. It should be recognized as an almost invariable
rule that only land armies can finally win wars." The plan thus called for a 215-division Army,
nine million men strong, which by 1943 would have as its "principal theater of war" a "sustained
and successful land offensive against the center of German power." Roosevelt ordered and at
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least tacitly approved all of this military planning. American military policy in 1941 was based
on, in the words of the Victory Program, "active participation in the war by the United States."' 1
Outside of explicit military plans, highly placed military and civilian opinion in the
administration coalesced quickly around full intervention. Stark told his staff that the question
was "when, not whether" the United States would become involved in the fighting. He also
reminded the more cautious Marshall that "If the United States is to succeed in defeating the axis
forces it must act on the offensive, instead of solely on the defensive." Marshall more or less
agreed, and argued to the president in September that "Germany cannot be defeated by supply of
munitions to friendly powers, and air and naval operations alone. Large ground forces will be
required" in order to "come to grips with and annihilate the German military machine." In June
1940, Roosevelt fired his Secretaries of War and Navy and replaced them with interventionist
Republicans Henry Stimson and Frank Knox. They joined influential hardliners like Roosevelt's
personal lieutenants Harry Hopkins and Sumner Welles, as well as cabinet hawks Henry
Morgenthau and Harold Ickes, in making the case for war." 7
Given the increasing concentration of hawkish opinion in the administration, it is not
surprising that rearmament was designed to support a balancing strategy. Over the summer of
1940 defense spending increased by a factor of five, an increment of $10.5 billion. Moreover,
the unbalanced rearmament of 1938-39 was replaced with an equal priority on building a
massive land army. Over the course of 1940 the administration took steps to mobilize, train, and
equip an army of four million men by the end of 1942. This ambitious endeavor required the
immediate mobilization of the National Guard and the institution of the first peacetime draft-
politically risky choices that Roosevelt was willing to make. Indeed, one of the fiercest political
fights of the entire New Deal era was the debate over renewal of the draft in 1941, which passed
by a single vote in the House of Representatives. By the time of American entry into the war, the
Army had grown to nearly two million strong, only somewhat behind the planned breakneck
pace of expansion.
DIPLOMATIC POLICY
The Roosevelt administration's balancing strategy was consummated in three major
policy initiatives following the election of 1940. First, the decision to pursue all-out aid to
Britain, culminating in the "Lend-Lease" program, was intended to ensure British victory in a
war that policy-makers did not think the British could win on their own, and was under-taken
with the knowledge it would inexorably lead to greater involvement on the part of the United
116 The Victory Program, September 11, 1941, in Ibid., quotes p. 104. Roosevelt's continued concern with domestic
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States. Second, though still very cautious with public opinion, Roosevelt gradually brought the
United States deeper into the conflict in the Atlantic in 1941, hoping both to secure the British
lend-lease lifeline and to provoke an incident with Germany that would result in full hostilities.
Though unable to fully remove domestic constraints, aggressive naval action ultimately led to an
undeclared war against Germany in the Atlantic. Finally, and importantly, Roosevelt adopted a
radically more confrontational policy towards Japan, imposing an oil embargo that was slowly
strangling the Japanese imperial project. He did so in the knowledge that he had put America on
a collision course with Japan. There is good reason to believe this policy was deliberately
adopted to force a conflict that would remove his domestic constraints for good and allow the
United States to enter the ground war against Germany.
LEND-LEASE. The diplomatic beginning of the American balancing strategy was the fall
1940 decision to support all-out aid to Britain in pursuit of decisive victory over the Axis. This
commitment reached its pinnacle in the "Lend-Lease" program authorizing Roosevelt to supply
defense material to any country he deemed essential to American national security, in return for
unspecified "considerations" after the war. Though publically sold as a buckpassing measure-
one that would substitute for direct American involvement-the tremendous level of aid
envisioned strongly implied a balancing commitment and the ultimate use of American ground
forces. The administration was well aware of this truth, which most of the President's advisors
saw as an attractive feature of the program. Roosevelt's personal views as to whether Lend-
Lease meant balancing are less clear during late 1940, but his positive liberal inclinations
certainly made him willing to acquiesce to the large fiscal costs and economic interventionism
required by the pursuit of Hitler's decisive defeat.
Lend-Lease was predicated on assumptions incompatible with a free-riding posture. The
first reason for the connection between Lend-Lease and balancing was obvious: American aid
would do no good at the bottom of the sea. In the fall of 1940, Britain appeared to be losing the
battle of the Atlantic, as shipping losses out ran new construction by a ratio of 5:1 between July
1940 and June 1941. Admiral Stark believed that Britain would survive no more than six months
if current trends continued, that American escorts for Lend-Lease goods were necessary, and that
these convoys would lead to eventual American entrance into the war. Churchill wrote the
President a letter on December 7 1940, outlining British prospects in 1941, which Roosevelt
studied carefully while on vacation and which is widely considered to have been the genesis for
Lend-Lease. The letter argued that "the decision for 1941 lies upon the seas; unless we can
establish our ability to feed this Island, [and] to import munitions of all kinds which we need...
we may fall by the way." Churchill went on to urge American convoying of Atlantic trade, or
failing that, a large grant of American ships with which the British could increase convoys. The
administration's top military and civilian policymakers all concurred, agreeing with Stimson's
December 13, 1940 argument that "the eventual big act will have to be to save the life line of
Great Britain in the North Atlantic." 119
Even more important were the kinds of orders the British were placing, and what these
meant for American grand strategy. Churchill's strategy was, in Gleason and Langer's words, "a
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grand staying operation." As he observed to Roosevelt, circumstances do "not enable us to
match the immense armies of Germany in any theatre where their main power can be brought to
bear." Instead, Britain would bleed Germany in peripheral theaters, starve her with the blockade,
and punish her with strategic bombing, while Britain grew strong and fully mobilized her
economy-much the same strategy advocated by Roosevelt from 1937-1940. But even
Churchill acknowledged that an expeditionary force would have to deliver the coup de grace to a
weakened Germany. So, in addition to thousands of airplanes and hundreds of ships, the British
wanted to buy materiel for a large Army, with American resources to arm and equip ten divisions
in 1941 alone.' 20
However, the deficiencies of this strategy are precisely what had led Stark to argue in
Plan Dog that American entry would be essential. Stark doubted that decisive victory could "be
accomplished by bombing and by economic starvation.... It surely can be accomplished only by
military successes on-shore." And Britain simply lacked the resources, particularly in
manpower, to annihilate Germany: "Assistance by powerful allies is necessary both with respect
to men and with respect to munitions and supplies." Secretary Knox summed up the issue
bluntly before a high level meeting to discuss the proposed ground force purchases. He declared
that "I should like to say in this crowd before the English get here... that the English are not
going to win this war without our help, I mean our military help.... they cannot win alone.... We
needn't talk of it outdoors, but I think it is true." Stimson concurred, arguing in December that
"We could not permanently be in the position of toolmakers for other nations which fight." As
shown earlier, Roosevelt had read and approved action based on Plan Dog, and been advised by
Stimson, Knox, and other hawks for months. All-out aid to Britain was a commitment to the
destruction of Germany-a commitment to American balancing.'
Furthermore, supplying massive quantities of equipment to Britain would have large
fiscal and economic costs. The American economy, even with slack capacity coming on line
from the Depression, was having a difficult time producing enough materiel for American
rearmament without cutting into civilian production-Army and Navy plans were behind
schedule and appropriated funds were going unspent. The British proposed to add an additional
$7 billion in orders for 1941, roughly two-thirds of the American defense budget. "The
difficulty," Stimson argued, "is simply that we haven't got capacity enough in this country at this
stage of the game."
In order to produce enough to arms for both Britain and the United States, Roosevelt
would have to put the American economy on a war footing. Such a move would involve deep
government intervention in the civilian economy, mandating, for instance, more shifts and longer
hours in defense plants; severe restrictions on the production of automobiles, commercial
airplanes, and machine tools; and conscripting other industrial facilities that could be used for
defense production. The administration hawks conceded that this intervention was the price of
victory.12 2
12 Langer and Gleason, The Undeclared War, p. 231; Churchill to Roosevelt, December 7, 1940, C-43x, in Kimball,
Churchill and Roosevelt, the Complete Correspondence, 1: 103. On British purchases and strategy see Langer and
Gleason, The Undeclared War, pp. 184-186, 231-233.
121 Stark Memorandum, November 12, 1940, in Ross, U.S. War Plans, p. 57; Langer and Gleason, The Undeclared
War, p. 187; Kershaw, Fateful Choices, p. 233.
22 Langer and Gleason, The Undeclared War, pp. 185-186, 183, and more generally, 180-190. Stimson was a vocal
support of the need for a balancing strategy and its corresponding economic interventionism. He argued in
December 1940 that American production could not be raised to the necessary levels to support both Britain and
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Finally, British resupply was increasingly beyond the means of the British people. As
British Ambassador Lord Lothian, in a calculated indiscretion, told the American press: "Well
boys, Britain's broke; it's your money we want." Churchill more diplomatically warned that
"the moment approaches when we shall no longer be able to pay cash" for purchases in America.
Although the Roosevelt administration rated British divestible assets more highly, it was rapidly
coming to the same conclusion. After studying British finances in detail, Knox reluctantly
remarked, "We are going to pay for the war from now on, are we?" When Morgenthau replied,
"Well, what are we going to do, are we going to let them place more orders or not?" Knox was
definitive: "Got to. No choice about it."
Not only would the civilian economy be rearranged, but the proceeds would also go to
Britain free of charge. The strategic consequences of aid to Britain were clear. As Stimson put
it, "Can we take measures that are going to put us into a position where eventually we will be
committed to going to war just to save our investment, or to save the purpose for which we made
the investment, unless [we] have the consent of Congress?" Roosevelt was willing to absorb
these costs, both economic and political, in return for greater influence over the course of the
conflict. Thus were Lend-Lease and the American balancing strategy born. 123
Though Roosevelt's personal views on balancing versus buckpassing are hard to pin
down in 1940, there can be no doubt that he understood the basic outlines of the balancing
strategy embodied in Lend-Lease. He had been ruminating on how to solve British financial
difficulties for some time and cooked up the basic public relations sophistry behind the program
himself after reading Churchill's letter: "We will give you the guns and ships you need, provided
that when the war is over you will return to us in kind the guns and ships we have loaned you."
He also quickly abandoned his earlier opposition to rationalizing defense production,
putting economic decisions under the authority of a small board led by Knox and Stimson.
Roosevelt made the basic argument to the public: "We must have more ships, more guns, more
planes-more of everything. This can only be accomplished if we discard the notion of
'business as usual.' This job cannot be done merely by superimposing on the existing productive
facilities the added requirements for defense. Our defense efforts must not be blocked by those
who fear the future consequences of surplus plant capacity." And though, regarding convoys, he
"hadn't quite reached that yet," he was familiar with the military thinking dictating
intervention.
American reannament "until we got into the war ourselves." After the entrance of Russia into the war, he urged
Roosevelt towards intervention in order to take advantage of the "war psychosis" that could increase production.
See Kershaw, Fateful Choices, p. 226; Lowenthal, Leadership and Indecision, II: 632. It is also worth noting that
Lend-Lease and the corresponding reorganization of American industry required a tremendous grant of executive
power that was fiercely contested in Congress. While executives are seldom much troubled by such grants of
power, this feature of American strategy dovetailed with Roosevelt's positive liberal ideology. See Kimball, The
Most Unsordid Act.
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24 Langer and Gleason, The Undeclared War, pp. 238, 243 and more generally, 237-251; "Arsenal of Democracy"
Radio Address Delivered by President Roosevelt, December 29, 1940, in Franklin D. Roosevelt, The Public Papers
and Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt: War AndAid To Democracies, 1940, ed. Samuel 1. Rosenman (New York:
Random House, 1941), pp. 633-650. Note also Roosevelt's rejection of a negotiated peace in Europe in the speech,
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AGGRESSIVE ACTIVITY IN THE ATLANTIC. Slowly and haltingly, ever cognizant of
congressional and public resistance, Roosevelt moved American policy towards entrance into the
war over the course of 1941. Probably by spring of 1941, and almost certainly by July,
Roosevelt was seeking an incident in the Atlantic that could clear the hurdles of domestic
constraint and allow America to balance against Germany. A welter of Roosevelt's personal
statements confirms the intent behind an increasingly aggressive naval policy.
Following the passage of Lend-Lease, for example, Roosevelt began to express his desire
to provoke Hitler into an "incident" that would justify full hostilities. On a fishing trip with
Harold Ickes and other members of his inner circle, Roosevelt remarked that "things are coming
to a head; Germany will be making a blunder soon." Ickes believed "There could be no doubt of
the President's scarcely concealed desire that there might be an incident that would justify our
declaring a state of war against Germany or at least providing convoys to merchantmen carrying
supplies to Great Britain." A month later, in a meeting with William Bullitt, "The President
added that the problem which was troubling him most was that of public opinion. He had just
had an argument with Stimson on the subject. Stimson thought that we ought to go to war now.
He, the President, felt that we must await an incident and was confident that the Germans would
give us an incident." 2 5
Similarly, as American naval policy began to intensify in May, Roosevelt told his
Secretary of the Treasury that "I am waiting to be pushed into this situation." Morgenthau noted
in his diary that "He had previously said that he thought something might happen at any time,
and I gathered that he wanted to be pushed into the war rather than lead us into it." Roosevelt
put the point bluntly at a cabinet meeting on May 23, 1941. Though seeking to take a strong
anti-German line in the Atlantic, and to prod public opinion in an upcoming speech, Roosevelt
averred that "I am not willing to fire the first shot." All of the cabinet hawks complained bitterly
about his hesitancy in their diaries, with Stimson providing the best summary: Roosevelt was
"waiting for the accidental shot of some irresponsible captain on either side to be the occasion
for going to war."12 6
By October 1941, Roosevelt was openly praising Admiral Stark's paper calling for
America "to enter the war against Germany as soon as possible." In November, Roosevelt's
right-hand man Henry Hopkins wrote him a note criticizing an Army general for "doing a great
deal of harm" in speaking publically about American military unpreparedness. This kind of
agitation made the American public disinclined "to go all the way," a criticism reflecting
Hopkins' assumptions about their mutual preference to enter the war. Hopkins was not alone in
this assumption, as practically everyone who talked to Roosevelt in the summer of 1941 came
away with the same impression. One British aristocrat, Lord Beaverbrook, visited Roosevelt
before the Argentia Conference of 1941 and found that "the whole administration were in favor
scale of a dictated peace, and get the best out of it that we can. They call it a 'negotiated peace.' Nonsense! Is it a
negotiated peace if a gang of outlaws surrounds your community and on threat of extermination makes you pay
tribute to save your own skins? Such a dictated peace would be no peace at all. It would be only another armistice,
leading to the most gigantic armament race and the most devastating trade wars in history." Clearly, Roosevelt is
not trying to stir the public up into a limited defense of Britain.
25 Ickes Diary, April 12, 1941, in Harold L. Ickes, The Secret Diary ofHarold L. Ickes; 3 Vols. (New York: Simon
and Schuster, 1954), III: 466, 470; Roosevelt-Bullitt meeting, April 23, 1941, in Bullitt, For the President, Personal
and Secret, p. 512.
126 Morgenthau and Stimson quoted in Reynolds, The Creation of the Anglo-American Alliance, p. 347, n. 38;
Roosevelt quoted in Ickes Diary, May 25, 1941, in Ickes, The Secret Diary ofHarold L. Ickes, III: 523.
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of going to war." Canadian Prime Minister Mackenzie King spoke with Roosevelt on August 22
after Argentia and believed he wanted, in Frederick Marks' words, "immediate entry into the
war." The German charge in Washington cabled to Berlin in July that reliable American and
foreign sources reported Roosevelt was determined to provoke war with Germany. 127
These common interpretations of Roosevelt's strategy were due as much to the
development of American naval policy in the Atlantic as they were about his bellicose comments
to all and sundry. Though extremely hesitant about the political costs of pursuing convoying,
Roosevelt understood that Lend-Lease would be worthless if the Germans won the battle of the
Atlantic. He began to push as for American involvement as quickly as he thought possible.
Roosevelt's Atlantic policy can be thought of having roughly three parts. First, from
April to June 1941, he began a series of escalating naval moves short of convoys aimed at
helping the British, and probably intended to provoke an incident. Several came close to
meeting the bar but for various reasons fell short, including a chase after a German battle cruiser
following the sinking of the Bismarck, and several instances of American ships dropping depth
charges on real or suspected submarines. 12 8
Second, during the same period, Roosevelt ordered the occupation of key points in the
Western hemisphere astride the convoy route, most prominently in the garrison of Iceland.
These positions were of little use for defending the continental United States but put America at
prime risk of encountering Germany on the high seas and would also be useful in the event of a
future land war against the Germans in Europe. Admiral Stark thought the move to Iceland was
"practically an act of war." Roosevelt told Halifax that the occupation meant "the whole thing
would boil up very quickly and that there would very soon be shooting."129
Third, from July to October 1941 he moved towards the policy of "undeclared war":
convoying the British, repealing the remaining neutrality laws, and ordering the Navy to shoot
German vessels on sight. Churchill described Roosevelt's policy best, after Roosevelt confirmed
the adoption of convoys at the Argentia meeting:
The Prime Minister gave his impression of the President's attitude towards the entry of the United States
into the war. He was obviously determined that they should come in. On the other hand, the President had
been extremely anxious about the Bill [for renewing the Draft], which had only passed with a very narrow
majority. Clearly he was skating on pretty thin ice with Congress.... If he were to put the issue of war and
peace to Congress, they would debate it for three months. The President said he would wage war and not
declare it, and that he would become more and more provocative. If the Germans did not like it, they could
attack American forces.... The President's orders to these escorts were to attack any U-boat that showed
itself, even if it were 200 or 300 miles away from the convoy. Admiral Stark intended to carry out this
order literally, and any Commander who sank a U-boat would have his action approved. Everything was
to be done to force an incident.' 30
27 Trachtenberg, The Craft oflnternational History, pp. 82, 84, ns. 15, 11; Marks, Wind over Sand, pp. 164-165,
esp. n. 107.
128 Lowenthal, Leadership and Indecision, 1: 528-539; Heinrichs, Threshold of War, Ch. 3 and esp. 46, 48, 80-81,
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Alliance, p. 347 n. 38.
129 Marks, Wind over Sand, p. 164; Reynolds, The Creation of the Anglo-American Alliance, p. 208. On the Army's
view that Iceland was useless for hemispheric defense, and on its naval strategic significance, see, respectively,
Stoler, Allies and Adversaries, p. 45; Heinrichs, Threshold of War, pp. 82-88.
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Ultimately these measures were able to ensure victory for the British in the Battle of the
Atlantic, but they did not succeed in clearing the domestic hurdles to a balancing strategy, for
two reasons. First, Hitler sought to appease the Americans in the Atlantic: "under no
circumstances," the commanding German Admiral wrote on May 22, "does he wish to provoke
incidents which may cause U.S. entry into the war." On July 19, Hitler gave specific orders
against attacking, "in the extended zone of operations, U.S. merchant ships, whether single or
sailing in English or American convoys." Second, the naval war had brought Congressional
isolationists into high dudgeon. Neutrality repeal had passed by extremely narrow margins and
Roosevelt's opponents were openly accusing him-quite correctly-of trying to bring America
into the war. As Roosevelt had to admit to Halifax on October 10, "if he asked for a declaration
of war, he wouldn't get it, and opinion would swing against him." In order to play the role of a
fully committed balancer, Roosevelt ultimately needed the help of the Japanese. And, as we
shall see, the attack on Pearl Harbor was no Deus Ex Machina in this regard.131
PROVOCATIVE POLICY IN THE PACIFIC. On December 7, 1941, Japan attacked the Pacific
Fleet at Pearl Harbor and precipitated American entrance into the war as a fully committed
balancer in Europe. Japan took this aggressive gamble because the United States had pushed its
back against the wall in the preceding four months. At the same time Roosevelt was ramping up
the undeclared war in the Atlantic, he had also changed course to a hard-line policy in the
Pacific: America placed an economic stranglehold on Japan through a complete oil embargo,
escalated its diplomatic demands to include Japanese withdrawal from China, and deliberately
stymied the ensuing peace negotiations. In effect, Roosevelt declared that Japan would abandon
its empire in Asia or would be starved out of it through lack of resources. Though anxious to
delay hostilities until American defenses in the Pacific could be improved, Roosevelt chose his
policy with the full knowledge that he was placing America on a collision course with Japan.
Given his desire to enter the European war, and his knowledge of the domestic political window
a Japanese attack would give him, it is likely Roosevelt chose his policy with exactly these ends
in mind.
Briefly summarized, American policy towards Japan prior to July 1941 was one of
deterrence and containment, in line with the defensive posture in the Pacific advocated by all the
major military planning discussed above. America had long been opposed to Japan's imperial
project for ideological reasons. But, as Paul Schroeder puts it, America "did not intend to go to
war for the sake of China." Instead, the Roosevelt administration sought to deter Japan from its
expected "southern advance" into the resource rich British and Dutch colonies in the South
Pacific and to wean Japan away from its alliance with Germany. In pursuit of these goals,
Roosevelt employed both carrots and sticks. The fleet was stationed at Pearl Harbor, where it
could supposedly menace a Japanese military advance, and economic restrictions on the sale of
scrap iron and other war materials to Japan were put in place. At the same time, in spring 1941
Secretary of State Cordell Hull embarked on a set of comprehensive negotiations with Japanese
ambassador Nomura, aimed at improving Japanese-American relations and forging a settlement
in the Pacific. American diplomats hoped to reach a Pacific settlement on liberal terms, or at to
freeze the status quo in the region while the European conflict developed. 32
m Hearden, Roosevelt Confronts Hitler, pp. 203, 206; Kershaw, Fateul Choices, pp. 324-327.
132 Paul W. Schroeder, The Axis Alliance and Japanese-American Relations, 1941 (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University
Press, 1958), p. 174. Other good accounts of American policy towards Japan include Jonathan G. Utley, Going to
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The key problem was to deter Japan without provoking her into Pacific conquests that
would draw America into an Asian war. As Roosevelt wrote Ickes after Hitler's invasion of the
Soviet Union, referring to MAGIC decryptions of Japanese communications, "I think it will
interest you to know that the Japs are having a real drag-down knock-out fight among themselves
and have been for the past week-trying to decide which way they are going to jump-attack
Russia, attack the South Seas (thus throwing their lot with Germany), or whether they will sit on
the fence and be more friendly with us. No one knows what the decision will be but, as you
know, it is terribly important for the control of the Atlantic for us to keep peace in the Pacific. I
simply have not got enough Navy to go round-and every little episode in the Pacific means
fewer ships in the Atlantic." The administration's biggest worry was a potential Japanese
invasion of the Dutch East Indies, which contained substantial oil reserves. A major fear among
American policy makers was that a move to cut off Japanese oil supplies would precipitate just
such an attack. In light of American support for the British Empire, and the presence of
American forces in the Philippines that would likely be attacked, a Japanese attack could bring
the United States to war in the wrong theater.13 3
Roosevelt thus specifically warned Nornura on July 24, 1941 "that if Japan attempted to
seize oil supplies by force in the Netherlands East Indies, the Dutch would, without the shadow
of a doubt, resist, the British would immediately come to their assistance, war would then result
between Japan, the British and the Dutch, and, in view of our own policy of assisting Great
Britain, an exceedingly serious situation would immediately result." He then told the
ambassador that earlier American forbearance on embargoing oil shipments had been in the
service of encouraging Japanese restraint in the East Indies. A week earlier he had told his
cabinet that he was opposed to an oil embargo if Japan moved into southern Indochina, as
MAGIC intelligence was suggesting it would, because an embargo "would simply drive the
Japanese down into the Dutch East Indies, and it would mean war in the Pacific." In late June,
Roosevelt had fended off requests from Ickes to place an oil embargo on Japan by derisively
questioning whether he would still recommend action "if this were to tip the delicate scales and
cause Japan to decide either to attack Russia or to attack the Dutch East Indies." For fear of
these outcomes, Roosevelt sought to keep tight control over the oil issue, warning Ickes that
"exports of oil at this time are so much a part of our current foreign policy that this policy must
not be affected in any shape, manner or form by anyone except the Secretary of State or the
President."13 4
However, American policy was changing in July. The invasion of Russia had triggered
two corresponding policy debates: one in Japan concerning which opportunities to seize and
another in the United States about how to respond to potential Japanese moves. Roosevelt's man
in the State Department, Sumner Welles, had been advising him to switch to a coercive strategy
War with Japan, 193 7-1941 (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1985); Heinrichs, Threshold of War; Marks, Wind over
Sand, Chs. 2-3.
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with Japan. Welles believed that tough economic sanctions would "provoke Japan to war" with
America "before long." He told British ambassador Halifax on July 9 that he had advised
Roosevelt to put "a complete economic embargo on Japan as soon as the Japanese committed
any overt act" but that Welles "was not in favor of telling the Japanese in advance that this would
be the United States' attitude." Halifax further reported on July 18, probably after the cabinet
meeting of that day, that "The president personally definitely contemplates a full embargo on all
oil products."1 35
In fact, despite having given his cabinet "quite a lecture" on the risks of an oil embargo at
the July 18 meeting, Roosevelt also noted that "if Japan went overboard, we would ship no more
oil." Though holding back from a full embargo, he approved a very tight set of licensing
controls on oil products and the freezing of Japanese financial assets. A further "understanding
was that... we ought to get the English to make certain moves at the same time." The policy was
to be coordinated with similar embargoes by the Dutch, the British, and the Free French in South
Asia. Japan was to be squeezed, though not yet strangled. Clearly aware of the risks of using oil
as a coercive tool, the President was nonetheless of two minds about it. 36
In the weeks following the Japanese occupation of Indochina, Roosevelt ceased his
hesitation and reversed course. At a cabinet meeting on July 24, he went ahead with the system
of export licensing to Japan and the unfreezing of Japanese funds to pay for exports. All trade
with Japan other than cotton would be banned, and low quality oil and gasoline would be cleared
for export only in the much-reduced quantities of 1935-1936. The President was inclined to
initially grant the licenses for petroleum export, but warned that "this policy... might change any
day and from there on we would refuse any and all licenses." Roosevelt sought a flexible system
under which "we can follow any policy we desire in its administration and then that policy can
be changed from day to day without issuing any further orders." 3 7
Ickes wrote that Roosevelt "thought it better to slip the noose around Japan's neck and
give it a jerk now and then," rather than simply drawing it tight. But in the short term, at least,
he ordered it drawn very tight indeed. Assistant Secretary of the Treasury Dean Acheson
reported to the bureaucracy in charge of unfreezing assets that Welles told him "for the next
week or so the happiest solution" would be "to take no action on Japanese applications." In fact,
documents draw up "to embody the suggestions [Acheson] made following the meeting" where
he had announced Welles' instructions suggest the period envisioned was two weeks. Welles
was in charge of designing the policy to implement Roosevelt's July 24 concepts, reporting to
Roosevelt on July 31, that "For the time being, the Foreign Funds Control Committee is holding
these applications without action." In the intervening two weeks, Welles and Roosevelt would
be traveling to Argentia to confer with the British.'
m3 Trachtenberg, The Craft of International History, pp. 96, 92, n.34; Blum, From the Morgenthau Diaries, 11: 377-
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At Argentia, the British voiced their desire that "the economic measures [be] kept up and
screwed up." Churchill argued that "It would be essential to maintain the full pressure of
economic measures which the U.S. Government had already adopted in regard to Japan."
Roosevelt agreed, and "declared that he had every intention of maintaining economic measures
in full force." Welles discussed "the subject of the application of the American freezing orders
against Japan" in great detail. "The application was very strict," Welles assured his British
counterpart. On oil, "no licenses were being granted except for crude oil up to an amount
corresponding with that exported in 1935. This quantity had already been reached and therefore
no more crude oil would be allowed except sufficient to take Japanese ships from American
ports home to Japan. No licenses were being given for the export of aviation gasoline, ordinary
gasoline or lubricating oil." The noose was now drawn tight.139
American diplomats coupled this economic warfare with political intransigence. Over
the next four months, Japan offered the United States virtually every diplomatic concession it
had ever asked for, in a frantic attempt to restart the flow of oil. At various different points,
Japanese diplomats offered promises not to attack the Soviet Union, to cease the southern
advance, to neutralize Thailand, and to withdraw from Southern Indochina. But American
diplomats now demanded that Japan settle the war in China and completely withdraw,
recognizing Chiang Kai-shek's government as the only legitimate authority. Though anxious to
find a way out of their disastrous engagement in China, Japanese leaders could not just simply
surrender every term of importance relating to a conflict that had cost them four years, two
hundred thousand lives, and enormous resources. As Welles put it to Australian diplomats on
November 14, Japanese leaders had to "provide some justification to their own people after four
years of national effort and sacrifice" in China. He "could not believe" that the Japanese would
"agree to evacuate China completely." But "nothing less" would "satisfy [the] United
States." 140
The sudden change to an incredibly tough negotiating position on China was likely
intended to make diplomacy fruitless, rather than representing a new valuation of national
interests in China heretofore absent in the previous four years of American diplomacy. Indeed,
American leaders were much more interested in planning for war than negotiating peace.
Stimson summarized a cabinet meeting on October 16, the day the Konoe government fell, as
facing "the delicate question of the diplomatic fencing to be done so as to be sure that Japan was
put into the wrong or made the first bad move-overt move." In early November, Roosevelt
accepted the military's recommendation to keep talks open but to accept war in case of a direct
attack on British, Dutch, or American possession in the Pacific. Throughout the summer and fall
of 1941, Roosevelt implied that the purpose of talks was to "keep the Japanese in play" for
139 Trachtenberg, The Craft of International History, p. 1 00.
14 Ibid., p. 90. For an example of Japanese concessions, including the explicit promise of no further aggression and
a pledge not to interfere in the Nazi-Soviet war, see Noiura-Roosevelt meeting, August 28, 1941, FRUS, Japan, II:
572-574. On the shift in American negotiating posture to a focus on China see Schroeder, The Axis Alliance and
Japanese-American Relations, pp. 66-67, 90, 173-182. It is an open question whether any Japanese government
could have carried the military along with the virtual surrender America was demanding, but Trachtenberg presents
some evidence that a civilian triumph was at least plausible due to the position of the emperor and the widely
acknowledged risks of war among high-ranking officers; See Trachtenberg, The Craft of International History, pp.
104-114.
245
"babying the Japanese along" so as to "play for time" in negotiations while the European
situation developed. 14 '
At a November 25 meeting with Roosevelt, the major policy-makers all considered war
inevitable in light of MAGIC intercepts showing the Japanese nearing their deadline for action.
"The question," recorded Stimson, "was how we maneuver them into the position of firing the
first shot without allowing too much danger to ourselves." Various political rationales for war
were discussed, and Hull was assigned to write a memorandum justifying war to the public if
Japan attacked Thailand.142
In early December, Roosevelt told the British that if Thailand were attacked, it would
take "a few days to get things into political shape" but that if Japan hit anywhere else "we should
obviously all be together." He confirmed on December 3 that this meant military support and
authorized the start of military cooperation with the British in the Southwest Pacific. War
messages were prepared for Congress, and a last-minute appeal to the Japanese emperor was
drafted in order to prepare public opinion in the United States: it would be sent and announced
publically only after reconnaissance had confirmed the coming of the Japanese attack. The
Japanese choice of Pearl Harbor made these preparations academic.14 3
Although certainly open to debate, the bafflingly provocative character of American
policy in the Pacific is best understood as part of Roosevelt's European balancing strategy. The
President probably intended to use conflict with Japan as a way to overcome domestic opposition
to entering the European war. The scenario had been contemplated in American military
planning which Roosevelt had approved and even edited: "if forced into a war with Japan, the
United States should, at the same time, enter the war in the Atlantic." The American military, in
its myriad debates with the British planners, reassured its counterparts that if America entered
into war with Japan it would "at once engage in war with Germany and Italy." And, as noted
earlier, Roosevelt expressed agreement with Stark's argument that "the United States should
enter the war against Germany as soon as possible, even if hostilities with Japan must be
accepted." The scenario envisioned by Stark was one of Japan invoking the tripartite pact if the
United States declared war on Germany, but it is further evidence that the Roosevelt
administration had no intention of abandoning its Atlantic-first strategy if a Pacific War broke
out.144
Furthermore, Roosevelt had intelligence indicating Hitler might well declare war on
America if it entered a conflict with Japan. In August 1941, a British decrypt showed Hitler
promising the Japanese ambassador in Berlin, Oshima, that "in the event of a collision between
Japan and the United States Germany would at once open hostilities with the United States." In
early November, the German acting ambassador in Washington, who was working as an
American agent, confirmed that Germany would declare war on the United States if it fought
Japan. The Americans also received MAGIC decrypts of a very specific promise of German
belligerence from Nazi foreign minister Ribbentrop to Oshima, as well as other comments by a
high-ranking official in the German Foreign Ministry that reflected his understanding of Nazi
14' Langer and Gleason, The Undeclared War, p. 659; Heinricbs, Threshold of War, p. 155; Hearden, Roosevelt
Conf-onts Hitler, p. 214; Trachtenberg, The Craft of International History, p. 128.
142 Trachtenberg, The Craft ofInternational History, p. 128; Langer and Gleason, The Undeclared War, p. 886 and
see pp. 845-846 for a long excerpt of the military planning outlining the conditions for war in Asia.
43 Heinrichs, Threshold of War, p. 217.
44 First and third quotes, Trachtenberg, The Craft ofInternational History, pp. 126-127, 121, nn. 164, 153. Second
quote in Leutze, Bargainingfor Supremacy, p. 242.
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participation in a Japanese-American war. These and other reports flowing in after Pearl Harbor
convinced Roosevelt to wait before declaring war on Germany, correctly hoping that Hitler
would do the job for him.145
Roosevelt had good reason to conclude that a Japanese attack anywhere in the Pacific
would have opened a domestic window for intervention against Germany, and indeed, he was
preparing for such an eventuality. Paul Schroeder has persuasively demonstrated that the
tripartite pact had "caused a profound hardening of American public opinion against Japan-a
once-for-all identification of the Empire with the Axis, with Hitler and the whole program of
world conquest and the menace of aggression which America was sure he represented." It seems
clear the link was generally accepted as a domestic political fact. As one academic noted at the
time, "Japan's alliance with the Axis has done more than anything else to convince Americans
that the war in Europe and the war in Asia are the same war." 146
The tightly perceived link between Germany and Japan was even more evident among
opinion leaders and public officials. Even the usually dovish American ambassador to Japan,
Joseph Grew, argued that "Japan has associated with herself with a team or system of predatory
Powers, with similar aims and similar methods. It will be the better past of wisdom to regard her
no longer as an individual nation... but as part and parcel of that system which,... will assuredly
destroy everything America stands for." Glaringly, during the brutal debates on neutrality
revision of November 1941, Japan's identification with Germany was accepted as established
fact-by both sides. As one isolationist senator argued, "Hitler is trying to inveigle this country
into war, trying to get us to commit some overt act which will bring Japan into war against us."
Another isolationist argued in the House that the appointment of Tojo was "due to the personal
pressure of Mr. Hitler upon his Japanese allies." All this occurred as the undeclared war was
being fought in the Atlantic, with Japan studiously ignoring any obligations it might have under
the tripartite pact. Congressional opinion had already made its assessment of Japan. 4 7
Public opinion after Pearl Harbor bears out these suppositions. On December 10, after
the American declaration of war against Japan, but a day before Germany and America
exchanged declarations of war, a Gallup poll asked "Should President Roosevelt have asked
Congress to declare war on Germany, as well as Japan?" Ninety percent of respondents
answered "yes," slightly outdistancing support for Mom and Apple Pie. On that same day, the
isolationist America First Committee voted to disband, before America had entered the European
war. Between December 7 and December 11, isolationist newspapers commonly accepted that
Hitler was the puppet master behind Japanese actions and interventionist newspapers trumpeted
it as God's truth. The isolationist Seattle Post-Intelligencer ran the headline "Hitler behind Jap
strategy" on December 9, the same day the front page of the New York Times read "Ex-aide of
Goebbels calls Japan 'Stooge'; Nazis dictated attack, says Miss Knaust." 14 8
Roosevelt was certainly aware of the basic political climate linking the Axis powers, and
there is evidence the administration was preparing the ground to make the case for war on that
basis. As noted earlier, while the final round of talks with Japan spiraled into oblivion, Hull
raised the tripartite pact to prominence as an objection to reaching a settlement, even though
1 Trachtenberg, The Craft of International History, p. 125; Gerhard L. Weinberg, A World at Arms: A Global
History of World War 11 (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1994), p. 1001, n. 298.
146 Schroeder, The Axis Alliance and Japanese-American Relations, pp. 22, 23.
147 Ibid., pp. 22, 186.
14' Richard F. Hill, Hitler Attacks Pearl Harbor: Why the United States Declared War on Germany. (Boulder, CO:
Lynne Rienner, 2003), pp. 37, n. 16, 115, and see p. 22 on the decision of the America First Committee.
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Japan had all but publically disavowed any relationship with Germany. As he put it on
November 20, "The American people believe that there was a partnership between Hitler and
Japan aimed at enabling Hitler to take charge of one-half of the world and Japan of the other
half." Schroeder notes that "From November 17 on, it was common for conversations to be
occupied almost entirely with the Pact, a fact which Nomura reported in bewilderment to his
home office."
Not coincidentally, this is the line Hull took on November 25 when discussing political
strategy with Roosevelt his top foreign policy officials: war should be justified by "freedom of
the seas and the fact that Japan was in alliance with Hitler and was carrying out his policy of
world aggression." In the context of major military preparations and the expectation of
Roosevelt "that we were likely to be attacked, perhaps by next Monday," Stimson reassured
Chiang Kai-shek's nervous ambassador "to have just a little more patience, and I think all things
will be well." Unless Stimson also possessed presently unknown reasons to believe that peace
was in the offing, it appears that the administration did not find the prospect of a Pacific war
unwelcome. 149
Immediately following the Peal Harbor attack, Roosevelt appeared to be preparing
opinion in just this manner. Harry Hopkins recorded that the ensuing war conference "met in not
too tense an atmosphere because I think that all of us believed that in the last analysis the enemy
was Hitler and that he could never be defeated without force of arms; that sooner or later we
were bound to be in the war and that Japan had given us an opportunity." Although obviously
hoping that Hitler would rashly declare war, Roosevelt assured Stimson on December 7 that,
while the initial declaration of war would be against Japan, "he intended to present the whole
matter" of the German connection "two days later." And in fact, on December 9, Roosevelt gave
his famous "Win the War" speech in which he accused the Japanese of acting under Nazi
coercion and alleged that the government had (non-existent) intelligence showing "that German
and Japan are conducting their military and naval operations in accordance with a joint plan."
Made easier by Pearl Harbor, the logic of these arguments could have applied with equal
coherence to a Japanese attack elsewhere in the Pacific. 150
POST-WAR PLANS. As American balancing attempts hastened after the invasion of the
Soviet Union, so too did preparations for the post-war world. These plans bore the stamp of the
Roosevelt administration's positive liberal goals: the were based on establishing a liberal trading
regime, the deconstruction of the British Imperial Preference system (or Ottawa agreements), and
a commitment of American power to a concert system that would provide the political stability
for a return to free trade.
Though the State Department had long been planning for a post-war world along liberal
lines, the process was re-started and reinvigorated in late July on the orders of Welles, just as the
new Japanese policy was forming. It was also prompted in part by fears that economic autarkists
among the New Deal set might start to gain influence over the post-war world. Berle noted that
"The State Department is going to have to do some strictly defensive work. About everyone in
town suddenly yearns to run the economic foreign policy of the United States." Hull feared that
"if [the New Dealers] really get in the saddle they will adopt a closed economy" as the basis for
149 Schroeder, The Axis Alliance and Japanese-American Relations, pp. 97, 96; Langer and Gleason, The
Undeclared War, p. 886; Christopher Thorne, Allies of a Kind: The United States, Britain, and the War against
Japan, 1941-1945 (Oxford, England: Oxford University Press, 1978), pp. 83-84.
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peace policy; the President himself was "determined that there shall be no depression of prices
after the war." Given that Roosevelt was not about to abandon New Deal economic controls to
the tender mercies of laissez-faire adjustment, free trade was the only solution."'
State Department thus officials planned for "a world-wide open economy" based on
international economic regimes emphasizing non-discrimination. Berle hoped to create some
"financial sentiment for the only financial arrangements which will make possible something like
open trade." The anticipated need for European reconstruction was to be used as a lever in
bringing Europe on board. One State Department memo suggested sending surplus American
agricultural products to Europe after the war, free of charge. But "one quid pro quo for such a
gift, however, might be an agreement not to produce these same surplus commodities under
highly uneconomic conditions with the support of high tariffs, quotas, prohibitions, government
subsidies, etc." As another official noted, "the provision of food to the half-starved European
population at the end of the war will prove to be a lever by means of which influence can be
brought to bear upon the political and economic reconstruction of Europe." 52
Essential to the envisioned peace was integrating Britain into the post-war commercial
system. Though Britain's democratic regime and recent history of expanding trade with the
United States led policy-makers to have some optimism about future British economic policy,
the Americans despised the British system of Imperial Preference, which tightly discriminated
against all trade from outside the Empire. The State Department worried that Britain would feel
"strong postwar pressure for accentuated Empire self-sufficiency, couple with clearing
arrangements of the Nazi type," and would make attempts "to close the Empire further and
further by means of increased imperial preferences." Berle warned Roosevelt in July 1941 that
British proposals to re-provision Europe were designed "to channelize the trade and economics
of this area through London when the war is over." He later acerbically commented that "a plan
to regionalize the world (leaving us the Western Hemisphere) has already been turned down by
our people." The consensus fear of the administration was that it would see post-war "British
control over their foreign trade and foreign payments equaling or exceeding the pre-war
restraints of continental countries."]53
The summer of 1941 therefore saw concerted action to combat the threat of British
closure. The Roosevelt administration used the negotiations over the promised Lend-Lease quid
pro quo and the declaration of the war aims at the Argentia conference to ensure British non-
discrimination after the war. Dean Acheson wanted to draft a Lend-Lease agreement right away,
"in the hope that if we sat down right away before we got too deeply committed in this war with
the British they would be willing to go quite a way toward either cracking now or laying the
foundations for cracking the Ottawa agreements." British negotiator John Maynard Keynes
recognized the ideological character of American goals, complaining that the American ideas of
commercial non-discrimination were just "all that old lumber" of nineteenth century trade
theory, representing "the clutch of the dead, or at least moribund, hand." For their part,
American diplomats were apoplectic at Keynes' pushback, grousing that "Despite the war the
Hitlerian commercial policy will probably be adopted by Great Britain. If and when we do
Berle diary, November 18, 1941, in Berle and Jacobs, Navigating the Rapids, pp. 377-378, quote p. 377;
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become involved we shall give all and get nothing other than a good screwing to our trade by
Great Britain." Berle spluttered that "If this is worked out, the only economic effect of the war
will be that we have moved a closed-economy center from Berlin to London."i54
Roosevelt and Welles put personal pressure on Churchill to give up Imperial Preference
in issuing the Atlantic Charter, a declaration of liberal war aims composed at the Argentia
conference, in August 1941. One of the articles called for open and non-discriminatory trade.
Roosevelt ultimately allowed Churchill to insert a caveat about "due respect for existing
obligations" to the British dominions, but made American terms clear. He could only "accept
temporary closed arrangements if Britain made it clear that on broad lines and as an objective it
stood for non-discriminatory, free-for-all trade." Indeed, though claiming that he was not asking
Churchill to trade Imperial Preference for Lend-Lease, Roosevelt later forced the British to
accept a key clause that pledged both parties "to the elimination of all forms of discriminatory
treatment in international commerce and to the reduction of tariffs and other trade barriers." As
he wrote to Churchill in explanation, the idea was to construct "a free, fertile economic policy"
and to "organize a different kind of world where men shall really be free economically as well as
politically." 5 5
Of course, the key foundation for the success of these liberal plans was American
commitment. State Department planner Harley Notter summarized it well: "the most sweeping
assumption which must of course be made in our work is that Germany will be defeated and that
England with participation on the part of the United States will win the war by a clear and
uncompromising victory, enabling us to disarm the enemy." Roosevelt also understood that the
liberal world economy would depend on some kind of American security presence. He told
Keynes and Halifax on May 28, 1941 that "He refused to consider the possibility that America
would not take her full share of responsibility for the post-war situation in Europe, political as
well as economic. The Europeans," on Roosevelt's view, "were to be told just where they get
off." Furthermore, Keynes noted, Roosevelt "clearly contemplated that a British-American
police force should take all the necessary responsibility for maintaining order for some time to
come.
Roosevelt reiterated these themes at the Argentia conference. He wanted to delay the
creation of a new international organization "until after a period of time had transpired and
during which an international police force composed of the United States and Great Britain had
an opportunity of functioning." Churchill reported back to his cabinet that "The President
undoubtedly contemplates the disarmament of the guilty nations, coupled with the maintenance
of strong united British and American armaments both by sea and air for a long indefinite
period." Like many of Roosevelt's schemes, the details were to be worked out later, and it is
unclear exactly what kind of ground force commitment he was willing to consider. But he
repeatedly "spoke with emphasis about the importance of the United States and Great Britain
retaining preponderance of sea and air power, in order to be in a position to enforce order on the
world." Roosevelt understood that vindicating liberal values abroad meant a balancing
commitment, both in entering the war and enforcing the peace.'57
1 Hearden, Roosevelt Confronts Hitler, p. 235; Reynolds, The Creation of the Anglo-American Alliance, p. 276;
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SUMMARY OF AMERICAN GRAND STRATEGY, 1940-41
As TLFP expects, the United States seriously increased its level of commitment to
Europe after the fall of France, gradually adopting an ever more forceful balancing strategy.
Both the content of American foreign policy and the process evidence regarding its formation
confirm the predictions of the theory. America planned and armed for a major ground force
intervention in Europe; adopted increasingly costly and aggressive commitments through Lend-
Lease, undeclared war in the Atlantic, and the strangulation of Japan; and rejected buckpassing
alternatives even after the invasion of the Soviet Union made them especially plausible.
Geopolitical and liberal pressures drove this strategy. The collapse of France made Germany a
potential hegemon and sparked a drive to defend the Western hemisphere by increasing aid to
Britain. At the same time, fears of autarky and hopes for a post-war regime of free trade shaped
military planning, peace planning, and the relationship with the British.
It is worth highlighting three kinds of evidence discussed above. First, the disintegration
of the European power configuration was the largest motive for American behavior during the
period. The international system sent the Roosevelt administration a signal about threats that it
could not ignore, driving American posture towards greater international commitments over and
against voices pushing for non-entanglement.
Second, as TLFP expects, the Roosevelt administration evolved towards a balancing
strategy over continued buckpassing. By the fall of 1940, Roosevelt had approved military
planning that called for the complete destruction of German power by land assault. He had also
approved aid to Britain that would be superfluous if the maintenance of British survival were all
that was at stake, and which was likely to lead to war in the Atlantic. Roosevelt then slowly
escalated just such a war, doing his best to provoke an incident that would spark full hostilities
with Hitler, while defending the British lifeline. The balancing policy culminated with an about
face in the Pacific, as the administration shifted from the deterrence and containment of Japan
towards forcible coercion on behalf of goals America had never valued highly before. Though
no smoking gun exists, it is likely that Roosevelt's policy in Asia was intended to provoke a
Japanese attack that could be used to clear the last domestic hurdles towards intervention in
Europe.
Third, the balancing posture was influenced positive liberal goals. Geopolitical pressures
were extremely important but did not by themselves determine the decision between buckpassing
and balancing: Roosevelt was frequently advised by advocates of buckpassing who stressed that
America's strategic position would remain secure if Britain and Russia remained unconquered.
At the same time, Roosevelt's positive liberal understanding of American commercial interests
continued to influence and military plans for war and diplomatic visions for peace. In order to
obtain more international influence, the administration was willing to take on the fiscal burdens
of Lend-Lease as well as the large-scale economic interventionism it required, another
preference characteristic of positive liberalism. Moreover, three major elements of the balancing
strategy-all-out aid to Britain, escalation in the Atlantic, and post-war plans for an open trade
regime-were already in place well before the invasion of the Soviet Union, suggesting that this
geopolitical signal only intensified a grand strategy that already commanded administration
support.
In the final analysis, both of TLFP's variables were pointed towards more international
commitment, and both worked powerfully to bring about a balancing posture. Of the two,
systemic forces were probably the more powerful, in the sense that they come through more
251
clearly in the documentary record. But they did not dictate American balancing by themselves: it
is hard to explain that the timing and content of the major American policy decisions without
reference to Roosevelt's liberal goals. In order to protect the Western hemisphere, German
power did not have to be destroyed at great financial cost and with large American ground
forces. But those means would be required to ensure the removal of economic autarky and the
vindication of American trading rights. American balancing had both liberal and geopolitical
roots.
Counter-Argument: Bureaucratic Politics
Against the argument made here, a prominent alterative explanation can be advanced.
Some historians interpret Roosevelt's grand strategy in terms of bureaucratic politics. Roosevelt,
it is sometimes maintained, was an undisciplined and impulsive decision-maker who frequently
left major decisions of policy to his confused subordinates. The administration was therefore
rent with intra- and inter-bureaucratic struggles, and America foreign policy was little more than
the outcome of pushing and hauling within the executive branch. The result was an incoherent
diplomatic and military policy, an over-extended posture in the Pacific, and finally, an accidental
war with Japan caused by the triumph of a hawkish faction within the State Department.' 58
Variants of the bureaucratic politics argument all begin by assessing Roosevelt as a poor
administrator with little real vision for American strategy. Fredrick Marks writes that "it is
FDR's lack of any coherent strategy in the field of foreign policy that forms a prominent theme"
when analyzing his diplomacy. Mark Lowenthal agrees, arguing that "President Roosevelt's
foreign policy, for all the linearity later imposed on it, was actually a series of fits and starts
whose interconnection the President himself denied at the time;" the President "regularly failed
to define this for those subordinates responsible for executing this policy, leaving them to arrive
at their own conclusions upon which to base and carry out their own plans." Into this strategic
gulf stepped a welter of bureaucratic agencies and agendas whose competition was the driving
force in determining American foreign policy. As Jonathan Utley has it, "the foreign policy
establishment of the Roosevelt administration was a snake pit of influential leaders and faceless
bureaucrats working at cross-purposes, striking deals, and not infrequently employing sleight of
hand in order to move the nation in the direction each thought most appropriate." 159
The resulting foreign policy posture was strategically incoherent and over-extended in the
Pacific. Mark Stoler argues that Roosevelt's preference for "expedient and often illogical
compromises that offered everyone some immediate satisfaction" meant that he failed to
158 The most sustained and powerful arguments for a bureaucratic politics explanation of Roosevelt's foreign policy
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Going to War with Japan, p. xiii.
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decisively shape American military policy. "World War II thus began in Europe with the U.S.
armed forces disagreeing over appropriate strategy," Stoler concludes. "As a result, U.S. war
plans remained vague and unworkable," and in some cases he gave "each service what it desired
but worsen[ed] the mismatch between U.S. ends and means in Asia." Along these lines, the
State Department consistently took on a more aggressive diplomatic posture than the military's
Atlantic first grand strategy stipulated. Marshall was consistently frustrated, remarking that he
had to "begin the education of the President as to the true situation... after a period of being
influenced by the State Department" and that "the influence and accomplishments of the State
Department have been unfortunate" in their impact on the Atlantic war. 160
Most provocatively, Jonathan Utley and Irvine Anderson have argued that the Pacific war
was essentially brought on by a State Department bureaucracy gone out of control. In this view,
Roosevelt wanted to initiate only a partial embargo on Japanese oil purchases and assigned the
planning to "Sumner Welles, a man Roosevelt could trust." But the final responsibility for
executing the release of funds for what oil the Japanese could buy fell to a committee led by
Assistant Secretary of State Dean Acheson, who "had his own ideas about what should be done
with Japan, and they did not include letting it get any oil." With Secretary of State Hull sick and
distracted, and Welles and Roosevelt meeting with the British, Acheson and his hawkish
associates had only to steamroll several low-level bureaucrats to effectively institute a complete
embargo. Acheson managed to temporarily obscure the truth of the situation by blaming the
Treasury Department, and by the time Welles and Hull learned what was going on "it was too
late. To have reopened the flow of oil after a month's cut-off would have sent the wrong
message to Tokyo and reinforced the position of the Japanese hard-liners, who claimed the
United States would give in."1 6'
The bureaucratic politics explanation points to some very real features of American
foreign policy before World War II. Roosevelt definitely allowed, and indeed, cultivated,
bureaucratic conflict, which allowed him to get multiple points of view and to employ different
parts of the bureaucracy as he saw fit. It is also true that Roosevelt was not much for the details
of planning, preferring to focus on the big picture and leave implementation to others. Finally,
American strategy developed more slowly than many members of the administration preferred,
and it is not hard to find examples of executive agents complaining about the timing and content
of American foreign policy. Together these features of Roosevelt's decision-making process
probably contributed in some way to the disintegration of strategic ends and means in American
foreign policy. One such example might be Roosevelt's decision to appease the Army's desire
not to defend Asia and the Navy's desire for a more forward presence by removing the Army
garrison from China but not the Marine garrison.'6 2
In the main, however, the bureaucratic politics argument is not persuasive, for two
reasons. First, it is clear that Roosevelt went out of his way to ensure he controlled major
policies and in fact made all the important decisions himself. He may have ceded some of the
details of implementation to various agencies, but nothing of real substance. Second, most of the
examples adduced by bureaucratic interpretations amount to little more than officials grousing
that their organizations' strategic preferences were not dominating policy. But the United States
had a legitimately difficult strategic problem and had to deploy scarce resources broadly.
160 Stoler, Allies and Adversaries, pp. 21, 17, 42.
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American posture was over-extended in the Pacific because Roosevelt could not afford to write
off the British Empire in East Asia; America went to war in the Pacific because Roosevelt
decided to provoke Japan.
Roosevelt deliberately divided and rearranged the executive branch in order to ensure his
personal control, creating "a government within a government." For instance, in 1939 Roosevelt
put the Army-Navy joint planning board in the executive office of the President in order to keep
watch on military planning, and he ordered the revision of the old "color" plans himself. He
reached deep into the Army and Navy promotion lists in order to select Marshall and Stark as his
Chief of Staff and Chief of Naval Operations, allowing him to bypass the service secretaries and
become "the sole coordinating link" between military and diplomatic foreign policy. In policy
matters, Roosevelt was more than willing to micromanage the bureaucracy when he thought it
was important: during the Atlantic escalation "he maintained a direct wire to the Navy's Ship
Movements Division to keep track of vessels on neutrality patrol."16 3
Roosevelt was far from dilatory when he felt he had to act, even in the face of large
political constraints. He showed with his response to the Munich crisis and plan for supplying
Allied airpower that he was willing to go to the mattresses with the bureaucracy when it opposed
him. As Farnham put it, "Roosevelt alone was the architect of those policies and the policy
outcomes do not mirror the balance of bureaucratic forces but rather reflect the sort of subjective
adjustment of values" unique to Roosevelt. He was also up to facing political challenges when
they could not longer be avoided. The fight for the first revision of the neutrality acts after
Munich and the battle over Lend-Lease, though ending in different outcomes, both demonstrate
Roosevelt's control over executive branch policy and his possession of coherent strategic
rationales. In general, Roosevelt either designed or actively approved all of the major policy
initiatives in American foreign policy discussed above.'64
However one assesses American posture in the Pacific and the final route to war, there
should be little doubt that it was Roosevelt who set that policy. In October 1940, Roosevelt fired
Admiral Richardson as commander-in-chief of the U.S. fleet after a serious of disastrous
meetings where Richardson expressed "the most scathing condemnation of the Orange plan, and
of war planning itself, ever written by a high naval commander." Roosevelt wanted officers who
would carry out his policy, even if they felt that policy dangerously under-resourced. Similarly,
while Marshall was right to understand that the State Department was delaying the redistribution
of resources to the Atlantic, he was wrong believe that Roosevelt had been hood-winked by
Pacific Hawks. Waldo Heinreich's detailed account of the Atlantic escalation in spring 1941, on
which the discussion above relies, shows that Roosevelt was carefully managing the gradual
transfer of ships to the Atlantic in order to maintain deterrence in the Pacific. And although
Stoler is correct to argue that in the fall of 1941 "from a military perspective the president and
the State Department seemed to be insanely willing to provoke a second war in the Pacific," he is
wrong to treat the military perspective as normative. The President had political aims which
could be served even with a militarily over-extended strategy.1 65
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Indeed, the Utley-Anderson argument about the imposition of the arms embargo is
implausible in part because the President was well aware of the military constraints he was
facing across two vast oceans. As noted above, Roosevelt worried that "I simply have not got
enough Navy to go round-and every little episode in the Pacific means fewer ships in the
Atlantic." He complained to Stimson "that he just did not have enough [naval] butter to cover
the bread" of a two-ocean war. The bureaucratic politics argument relies on Roosevelt's
knowledge of this situation and his delay in deciding how aggressive the new Japan policy would
be in order to argue that the embargo must have been the work of someone else. That, and the
fact that low-level bureaucrats found Dean Acheson abrasive, is the heart of the bureaucratic
politics case. 1 66
But as we have seen, the President was clearly of two minds in July about how far to
push Japan, was running policy through the hawkish Sumner Welles, and had agreed to delay a
full decision until after meeting Churchill. At the Argentia meeting, both Welles and Roosevelt
expressed their desire to strangle Japan, sometimes in very explicit terms. Furthermore, it seems
tremendously unlikely that Roosevelt, who assiduously consumed MAGIC intelligence, would
have remained ignorant of Japan's plight or hid his anger when he discovered the mix-up. He
also had many opportunities during the ensuing three months of negotiations to reverse policy
back to containment and deterrence, and it stretches credulity to believe that slightly withdrawing
the knife from the throat of the obviously desperate Japanese would encourage rather than deter
aggression. Roosevelt knew what he was doing.16 7
In truth, the President faced a very difficult strategic situation. Having decided in the
summer of 1940 that American strategy depended on the survival of the Britain, Roosevelt could
not simply write off the British Empire in Asia (and with it the Philippines) to a Japanese
government that was known to be looking for opportunities to expand. Plausibly, resources and
raw materials from that area were of great importance to British survival, as many argued at the
time. But even if they were not, the loss of British naval assets and political power in Asia at a
very desperate time was going to be a major blow to the Churchill government, and perhaps to
continued British participation in the war. A committed buckpasser might well have taken that
risk, insisting with General Stanley Embick that the integrity of the British Isles and the survival
of the Royal Navy were the only matters of importance. But as we have seen, Roosevelt
accepted an opposite set of assumptions, emphasizing the priority of maintaining the whole
British position, and he told the Japanese as much directly.
It may be true, as the Army and some Navy elements argued, that the presence of the
fleet in the Pacific was militarily useless. But given that it had been put there before the war to
deter Japan, its continued presence during the extended negotiations of 1941 sent a powerful
signal about the American political commitment to containment in the Far East. Moving the
fleet to the Atlantic in the numbers and rate suggested by Marshall and others would have
seriously undermined the American attempts to keep the Pacific quiet. In short, a buckpasser
might have focused on a narrow set of demands for the balance of power and chosen a
mechanism that conserved costs and limited American influence. But Roosevelt had broader
aims for the configuration of power in Europe, saw more numerous threats, and required more
control. Roosevelt wanted to balance, and this temporarily required an over-extended posture in
166 Roosevelt to Ickes, July 1, 1941, in Ickes, The Secret Diary of Harold L. Ickes, III: 567; Heinrichs, Threshold of
War, p. 56.
167 Forcefully arguing these points is Trachtenberg, The Craft of International History, p. 98.
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the Pacific. In fact, it was the essential element that allowed America to eventually achieve
Roosevelt's balancing strategy and enter the war in Europe.
Conclusion
The forces shaping American grand strategy before World War II were complex. Liberal
and geopolitical forces alike pointed towards greater international commitments to shape the
configuration of power in Europe, while domestic politics, a variable outside TLFP's model,
clearly restrained Roosevelt's ability to make such commitments. Still, TLFP goes along way to
explaining the underlying structure of American foreign policy and the forces driving it.
Before the fall of France, America pursued a buckpassing strategy, aiming to shape the
configuration of power abroad while operating within domestic political limitations. This
strategy was a second-best alternative to balancing: America sought not to primarily conserve
costs but to secure as much influence as domestic political constraints would admit. The
Roosevelt administration pursued this strategy through a range of diplomatic and military
policies intended to bolster the European democracies through economic support, military aid,
and an unbalanced rearmament program that held hope of influencing the European conflict.
American strategy had both geopolitical and liberal origins. The Roosevelt administration had a
genuine concern for the security of the Western hemisphere generated by rising German power.
But these worries were part and parcel of a larger positive liberal nightmare: an economic sphere
of German autarky that restricted American trading rights and threatened the New Deal at home.
After the fall of France, Roosevelt's strategy evolved towards balancing, as the collapse
of the European balance of power dramatically increased American security fears while
loosening domestic constraints. By the autumn of 1940, military planning was calling for a
ground force invasion of Europe to destroy German power. Over the course of the next year,
Roosevelt adopted Lend-Lease, protected the British lifeline in the Atlantic while waging an
undeclared naval war against Hitler, and strangled Japan through an oil embargo.
While the geopolitical incentives for this strategy are obvious, they did not determine
American balancing posture alone. Positive liberal concerns remained a part of military
planning, State Department visions of Peace, and diplomacy with Great Britain. The Roosevelt
administration had buckpassing alternatives available and they were advocated within the
administration. America did not need to destroy German power to ensure its security, but did
require a massive commitment if it wanted to permanently secure an open-trading regime.
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Chapter Six
Negative Liberty and Cold War: American Grand Strategy under Truman
The extenuating political circumstances initiated by the fall of France were instituted in the early
Cold War as unexceptional: geopolitical concerns were the predominant influence on American
foreign policy. However, America did not adjust gracefully to the era of realist pressures.
Indeed, the Truman administration began what would be a fifteen-year period of fighting against
the geopolitical tide. Though the international system became increasingly bipolar over the
course of Truman's two terms in office, his administration grasped at any policy that might undo
this trend. Desperate to pass the buck of containing Russia to someone-anyone--else, the
Truman administration discovered they would need to construct another pole to catch it. Rather
than bow to systemic pressures, Washington accepted the challenge.
In truth, America opted for a road under Truman that it had rejected under Roosevelt.
Both administrations faced a Europe of potentially balanced power centers undermined by
political divisions. Roosevelt solved the problem by deciding to commit American forces to
destroying German power, instead of supporting a Russo-British coalition that might have
prevented German hegemony but left the Reich politically intact. The Truman administration
discovered that it had to rebuild German power if the American commitment was ever to be
removed. But Germany could only be rebuilt if it could be politically tied to the rest of Europe,
lest West European resources be torn between fear of the Red Army and a reborn Wehrmacht.
The central dilemma of American strategy in the early Cold War thus centered on crafting a
policy that successfully consolidated a West European coalition against the USSR, without
drawing the United States into that coalition's permanent defense.
TLFP proves an insightful tool for analyzing the course of American grand strategy under
Truman. America pursued a buckpassing approach that went through two phases, roughly
coterminous with Truman's two terms in office. Immediately following the war, American
diplomats hoped that cooperation with the Soviet Union might yield a European power
constellation consisting of two loose groups in the East and the West. America would be
associated with the western group, but would quickly withdraw from Europe. America would
thereby forestall the costly foreign policy commitments feared by an administration populated
with negative liberals. However, as it became clear how powerful the Soviets might be and how
weak the Europeans were, American policy shifted towards a more concentrated effort at
building up the western power complex. American statesmen embraced the concept of a "third
force," whereby short-term American investments in Europe's economic reconstruction and
political federation would yield a Western pole of power capable of balancing the East.
During Truman's second term, this strategy was undermined by a shifting military
balance. The loss of the American nuclear monopoly in 1949 threw the defense of Europe into
doubt during the critical period of integration and reconstruction. The Truman administration
felt compelled to step up its level of military commitment to preventing Soviet hegemony,
through extensive rearmament and a forward defense of Europe. Nevertheless, it did not
abandon its vision of a third force upon which the United States could free-ride. Instead, the
administration increased the pace and scope of its integrative efforts while emphasizing the
temporary nature of an American contribution rooted in nuclear weapons.
The process surrounding these shifting commitments bears the marks of TLFP's
independent variables. On one level, the international system was extremely significant in
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shaping American decisions. The threat of Soviet hegemony provided the primary motive behind
all of America's major commitments, and feedback from the international system repeatedly
forced an adjustment of politico-military ends and means. But American foreign policy only
needed such strategic integration because the Truman administration's negative liberal biases
were prone to downplaying threats and reducing costs. This ideological tint expressed itself in
diplomacy that emphasized burden-sharing and a military policy based on projecting power from
offshore. The international system demanded a commitment towards preserving the European
system; negative liberal ideology pushed American strategy towards buckpassing rather than
balancing.
In this chapter I use TLFP to explain the character of American grand strategy from
1945-1952, demonstrating the importance and interaction of the international system and
negative liberal ideology. I begin by coding TLFP's independent variables. I assess the Truman
administration to be basically within the negative liberal camp and rate the Soviet Union as a
potential hegemon throughout the period. For reasons explored below, both these judgments are
subject to a certain amount of measurement error. I then chart American commitments over each
of Truman's two terms in office. I judge America to have pursued a buckpassing strategy during
both timeframes, but divide the period in order to capture potentially important changes on both
independent variables. Chapter Seven contains a set of counter-arguments to TLFP for the entire
1945-1963 period covered in this study.
Coding the Independent Variables
Harry Truman was a rarity among modem Presidents: he took a back seat to his State
Department in running foreign policy. As his advisor George Easley put it, "to the President, the
Secretary of State was number one. The State Department was the senior department."
Inexperienced and apprehensive about foreign affairs, Truman was inclined to rely upon close
advisors who he trusted and felt were knowledgeable. Despite his later protests to the contrary,
almost all Truman scholars agree that he was willing to cede to others both the day-to-day
operation of American foreign policy and the development of the high concepts that drove it.
Rather, his role consisted primarily vetoing proposals he did not support while being kept
apprised of important developments.'
Truman's policy abdication makes presenting data on his administration's ideological
valence somewhat problematic: a number of individuals might be coded, many of who have few
readily available biographies or writings to consult. Below, I do the best with what is available,
proceeding in a slightly different manner from before. In addition to surveying Truman's
ideological expressions, I add information on the kind of political appointments he made more
generally. I then code Truman's secretaries of state. Since data is scant, I often combine
categories of expression. George Marshall presents a particularly difficult case, as I explain
below. All of this is to say that the measurements that follow must be approached with a certain
Easley quote in Benjamin 0. Fordham, Building the Cold War Consensus: The Political Economy of U.S. National
Security Policy, 1949-51 (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 1998), pp. 109-110. The assessment of
Truman's foreign policy approach is widespread, for example in Alonzo L. Hamby, Man of the People: A Life of
Harry S. Truman (Oxford, England: Oxford University Press, 1995), p. 510; Marc Trachtenberg, A Constructed
Peace: The Making of the European Settlement, 1945-1963 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1999), pp.
39.
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caution. Nevertheless, I believe there is still enough information to be useful and to facilitate
reasonable judgments.
TRUMAN'S CONCEPT OF LIBERTY
Harry S. Truman is the most difficult figure to code in this study. That his rural
background ended up in command of an urban political party underscores the ill fit between
Truman and his times. He became the political leader of a rapidly modernizing America
undergoing the birth of a truly national politics, but was steeped in an older milieu of early
American values, with a very different understanding of the scope and role of political
institutions. He had little in the way of a well-defined political philosophy; Truman's politics
were mostly a matter of inheritance. As a result he had a deeply mixed, and often incoherent,
ideological outlook. On the one hand, he deeply distrusted modem bureaucracy, was a staunch
fiscal conservative, and looked askance at the increasing size and scope of the New Deal State.
On the other hand, he championed democracy, strong executive leadership, and economic
regulation on behalf of the little guy. The resulting attitudes were as confusing as they were
important for American foreign policy.2
EXPLICIT PHILOSOPHICAL STATEMENTS. Truman was not one for grand philosophic
statements or making political claims founded on a well-developed worldview. Nevertheless, in
those situations when he reached for liberal ideas to justify his approach, he often spoke in the
language of negative liberty. He had a classical night watchmen justification for the state,
believing that it ought to "act as a sort of umpire between producer and consumer, between
bankers and their customers, and between railroads and their shippers." By playing this kind of
neutral role, Truman believed that moneyed special interests could be prevented from hijacking
the government and turning it against the common man, another trope of negative liberty.3
Truman's biographers generally note the poor fit between Truman's worldview and his
leadership role a Democratic Party dominated more by a Northern urban core than the Southern
rural agrarian base of Truman's upbringing. As Hamby puts it, Truman was
a product of late nineteenth century liberal individualism, and a moral absolutist who believed deeply in the
traditional values of the American middle class. He and other "insurgent progressives"... were cut from a
similar cloth... usually small town and Protestant in background, they faced a world of big cities, giant
corporations, large labor unions, organized pressure groups, and faintly alien collectivist social ideologies.
They adjusted uneasily to the world of the 2 0'h century and the New Deal.4
Like most Americans, Truman was convinced that the extraordinary circumstances of the
Depression justified extraordinary and unprecedented measures to reverse them. But like many
of the negative liberal politicians who acquiesced to the policies of Roosevelt's first term,
Truman considered these powers justified only by the state of emergency and limited to its
duration. Unlike many New Deal liberals, he argued in favor of viewing relief measures as
temporary expedients, saying that "I am against giving another nickel to those who can work,
have the opportunity and won't do so." Despite being a Roosevelt ally, in the late 1930s he
2 There are many good works on Truman's life. For this summary and much of the coding below, I have relied on
the most comprehensive, Hamby, Man of the People.
3 Ibid., pp. 217.
4 Ibid., pp. 216.
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joined with the conservative opposition in Congress to oppose high relief spending. Also like the
congressional conservatives, he blamed government interventions for many of the problems the
New Deal was trying to solve, especially depressed agricultural prices. On the whole, when
asked to talk about his ideology by his friends, he identified as just "a little left of center." After
receiving praise from a left-wing tabloid, he told his staff that "I may be on the wrong track after
all." 5
Truman could also justify himself in the language of positive liberty. His characteristic
concern with efficiency in government was rooted in part in early twentieth century
Progressivism. He despised big business, finance, and concentrated economic power, and hoped
that efficient government could help make society more democratic. This positive liberal vision
of democracy he often stated bluntly: "the human animal can't be trusted for anything good
except en masse. The combined thought and action of the whole people of any race, creed, or
nationality will always point in the right direction." In order to exercise collective good
judgment, the state needed to unite people. It would also be necessary to provide for their most
6basic needs, and he defended his haphazard extension of New Deal measures in these terms.
Mostly, Truman did not speak or think in high concepts, more comfortable with the
pulling and hauling of practical politics as he knew it. But when he did reach for ideas to order
his intellectual universe, he drew on the resources of negative and positive liberty in roughly
equal measure. In this sense, Truman was a genuinely mixed figure in the trajectory of
American liberal ideas. In domestic politics, the result was Truman's uneasy leadership of a
modernizing political movement. In foreign affairs, events saw him apply his older ideas about
liberty to a new international situation and defer on most judgments to his negative liberal
advisors
CENTRALIZATION OF POWER. Truman frequently expressed hostility towards centralizing
political authority in the hands of the state. He was often against expanding the role and scope of
government, and was unremittingly opposed to bureaucrats and bureaucracy in his personal
rhetoric. Outlining his ideas for how Congress should respond to the recession of the late
1930's-after the "emergency" had passed-Truman proclaimed that it should "ease taxes on the
little corporation, make labor and business cooperate, pass as little new legislation as possible,
adjourn Congress and let lawmakers go home... come back here and abolish the unnecessary
boards, bureaus and commissions, and fashion an economical form of government." Economic
ills would not be solved by further state-building: "no one wants to see the government in
business. My pet aversion is a bureaucrat-a Washington bureaucrat is the worst form of
political parasite." 7
Indeed, Truman's private remarks about his hatred of bureaucracy bordered on the
vitriolic. "The longer I am here, the more I hate the bureaucrats," he remarked to a friend, as
"they have neither common sense [n]or judgment." He commonly referred to them as
5 Ibid., pp. 213-217, 271-273; quotes pp. 216, 271, 363. On the widespread acceptance of emergency conditions by
politicians of all ideological stripes during the first Roosevelt administration, and on the negative liberal desire to
limit the understanding of "emergency", see Robert Higgs, Crisis and Leviathan: Critical Episodes in the Growth of
American Government (Oxford, England: Oxford University Press, 1987), pp. 168-172; James T. Patterson,
Congressional Conservatism and the New Deal: The Growth of the Conservative Coalition in Congress, 1933-1939
(Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1967), pp. 1-18. On the emergence of the conservative opposition to Roosevelt
and its aims and rhetoric, see Ibid., passim.
6 Hamby, Man of the People, pp. 153-157; 361-381; quote p. 314.
7 Ibid., quote p. 216.
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"pinheads," "cookie-pushers," and "stripped-pants boys," expressing opposition to giving them
more power or increasing their number. Truman did not always express this opposition with his
vote, but neither was he unwilling to do so: he came to Washington prepared to vote against the
National Recovery Administration-Roosevelt's signature New Deal program-on the grounds
that it empowered a byzantine administrative structure and cartelized the market. He was
relieved when the Supreme Court struck down the measure down as unconstitutional.8
The State Department, interestingly, came in for special abuse. Truman loved to tell
anecdotes about their pompous attitude and aristocratic affectations. He once characteristically
noted in his diary that "the smart boys in the State Department, as usual, are against the best
interests of the U.S." This may explain Truman's propensity to entrust his foreign policy to close
associates he felt shared his values, rather than the machinations of a professional bureaucracy he
mistrusted.9
Truman instead identified with small business entrepreneurs and had the small
businessman's decentralist instinct. As students of the period have noted, "small business is a
state of mind-it is the state of mind of the average American rich or poor," one that frequently
expressed itself in a strong dislike for economic regulation and grants of economic authority.
Truman was a former small businessman himself, having run several failed enterprises and
accumulated a good deal of debt. Strikingly, he blamed the failure of his haberdashery on the
Federal Reserve's undue economic influence. Moreover, many of Truman's friends, advisors,
and political backers were from the Missouri business community, including several self-
described conservatives. He apparently took their advice quite seriously, which caused
internecine warfare between those in his administration who favored labor, regulation, and New
Deal economics, and those who resisted centralized economic controls.' 0
These negative liberal instincts were equally prevalent in Truman's career in Jackson
County, Missouri politics. He repeatedly stressed his desire to run the County Court like a
business, claiming he would "be the county's servant just the same as if I were president of a
corporation." He largely fulfilled his promises to bring a new efficiency and business sense to
county dealings, turning a crippling deficit into a surplus. He actually managed to squeeze a
great deal of waste, fraud, and abuse out of the administration formerly run by the Pendergast
machine, even defying his political bosses to do so. His administration was focused on
providing genuine public goods, including a major bond issue to improve and build new county
roads that ended up being far cheaper than the alternative piecemeal approach. The Court under
Truman mostly ignored issues of relief and services for the poor, which did not fall within the
business-minded ambit of his vision."'
However, Truman's distrust of centralization was not consistent. Especially when
concentration of power could be cast as a gain in efficiency, and placed in the hands of a
dedicated public servant rather than a Byzantine bureaucracy, Truman could be found favoring
such proposals. In Jackson County he proposed a new sewer system that aroused "Jeffersonian
opposition" from those who resented the intrusion into an area conventionally dealt with on an
individual basis. He also hoped to reorganize, streamline, and cut costs in County government
by concentrating most power in the hands of the Chief Judge, a position that he did not hold but
' Ibid., pp. 213-215, quotes p. 216, 273, 314.
9 Ibid., quote p. 327.
0 Ibid., pp. 97-98, 372-375, quote on p. 259.
" Ibid., pp. 115-131, 149-153, quote p. 117.
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that his administration had returned to respectability. Truman had a principled belief in the
importance of executive power, which he was able to cognitively differentiate from his hatred of
bureaucracy, despite the obvious relationship of the two concepts.
Truman took this principle to Washington, where he defended large grants of power to
Roosevelt on the grounds that a powerful President could produce efficiencies necessary to
combat the emergency. He went so far as to defend Roosevelt's court packing plan, the most
bitterly contested and least popular measure of the entire New Deal era. It should also be noted
that though his views on issues were mostly expressed in terms of patronage and politics, his
voting record in the senate was reliably New Deal. Consistent with his views on the
centralization of power, he was most reliable on issues of executive authority, labor, and foreign
policy; least reliable on business regulation, the expansion of public power, and welfare relief.
Operationally a New Deal supporter, he aided the centralization of power in some areas and
opposed it in others.1 3
ECONOMIC AND FISCAL VIEWS. Harry Truman was staunchly fiscally conservative.
Though willing to raise some taxes in order to fund government programs, he was a dyed-in-the-
wool budget balancer. Referring to the fiscal crunch of the late New Deal, Truman asserted that
"the money has been spent and the bill must be paid... I am ready to vote to cut down expenses
and for any tax bill that will raise sufficient revenue to pay what we owe." As noted above, in
Truman's Jackson County days his fiscal conservatism dovetailed with his sometime opposition
to political centralization and love of efficiency. His tight-fisted approach to budgeting and
revenues resulted in a fiscal renaissance for Eastern Missouri, adding a new and modem system
of roads to boot. In a machine dominated jurisdiction this kind of turnaround was truly
remarkable, and owed much to Truman's sense of fiscal discipline.' 4
In Washington, Truman made his political name by creating and overseeing the "Truman
Committee," a congressional body that investigated waste, fraud, and abuse during World War
II. This committee hounded business, labor, and government bureaucracy in an effort to prevent
the abuse of taxpayer money. Indeed, it was in terms of the taxpayer rights that Truman
constantly defended the enterprise, saying that "you and I are going to pay for the cost, the waste
and the inefficiency in the form of increased taxation for years to come." He was able to gain
political leverage out of the enterprise, but it appears that his work was driven by genuinely felt
fiscal views. Indeed, Truman was so successful in bringing to light uncomfortable information
on wartime spending that his efforts generated several attempts to squash the committee.
Willing to go against Roosevelt in time of war if the committee was politically hamstring,
Truman got the President to back down the committee's enemies. His commitment to fiscal
rectitude drove the bulk of his politics during the war years. 5
Truman continued his balanced budget commitments once he was president. He wanted
to keep the post-war deficit as small as possible and insisted on a surplus for 1947. Truman's tax
and monetary policies were designed to control inflation as much as possible during the post-war
economic conversion. Very skeptical of Keynesian doctrines, Truman ensured that the newly
12 Ibid., pp. 153-160.
13 Ibid., pp. 214-215, 273. A detailed analysis of Truman's muddled voting record is Gary M. Fink and James W.
Hilty, "Prologue: The Senate Voting Record of Harry S. Truman," Journal ofinterdisciplinaty History 4, no. 2
(Autumn 1973): 207-235.
14 Hamby, Man of the People, pp. 113-131, 149-153, quote p. 216.
" Ibid., pp. 248-260, quote pp. 251-252. So deep did his investigations go that at one point Truman had to be
stopped by Secretary of War Henry Stimson from investigating the Manhattan project.
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formed Council of Economic Advisors was dominated by conservatives, appointing no New
Deal economists, and only one social reformer in Leon Keyserling. Even when events or politics
dictated higher government spending, Truman maintained his balanced budget views and did his
best to impose them on the state. On this dimension, Truman was firmly in the negative liberal
camp. 1
Still, on the relation of the state to the economy, Truman was more often in the positive
liberal camp. He admired and identified with "Brandeisian" economic thought of the
Progressive Era that castigated corporate power and sought to use the coercive leverage of the
central state to bring large producers down to size. Truman was a leading attack dog of the
railroads on grounds of economic concentration, even though the railroads had basically been
bankrupted by government regulation after the First World War. More generally, he argued that
"Wall Street brought about Government regulation and the depression. If Wall Street had
produced the necessary statesmen" the economic interference of the government would have
been unnecessary. In truth, his early forays into economic regulation from Washington were
rooted in his early Jackson County views, where he had attacked concentrated wealth, financial
power, and corporations.' 7
As President and leader of the new model Democratic Party, continued these themes with
enthusiasm. He appeased the urban base of the Democrats by taking up full employment and
expansion of the welfare state as his platform after the war. His economic reconversion policies
maintained price controls while allowing wages to rise. The result was a widespread round of
strikes, inflation, and rationing, with the black market taking off in popularity. In part, these
policies were chosen because of Truman's ideological and political sympathy with the labor
movement. Truman identified Labor with the economic "little guy." He often ranted about the
duplicity of John Lewis and other labor leaders, but mostly backed their cause. As Hamby avers,
"Truman made a clear distinction between established big business, which he reflexively
disliked, and big labor, which he usually supported... in his heart, he found it hard to envision
men who worked with their hands as a threat to American values." Economic reconversion was
such a disaster because Truman's constant zigzagging and patches on failing policy were
animated by a desire to do right by labor.' 8
POLITICAL APPOINTMENTS. What can we learn about Truman's conflicting philosophical
preferences from the way he staffed his administration? They seem to reveal that, in the crunch,
he fell back on the older negative liberty leanings of rural Missouri in deciding who would make
important decisions and give him counsel. His administration did include East Coast elites such
as Clark Clifford and Dean Acheson, who had adopted the positive liberal proclivities emerging
in the Democratic Party. Yet, "he also maintained an additional group of top staff advisors, such
as Matthew Connelly and Military Aide Harry Vaughn, from social backgrounds more like his
own who tended to be politically conservative... they maintained ties with conservative political
elites and bureaucracies like the FBI."
Connelly, in particular, was a very powerful figure as the keeper of the Truman's
appointment book-it was impossible to see the President without going through Connelly. He
was also the only person who was allowed to sit in on the weekly meetings of Truman and the
Democratic Congressional Leadership, and was the last person to talk to Truman at the end of
16 Ibid., pp. 364-386.
" Ibid., pp. 154, 219-223.
I Ibid., pp. 154, 219-223, 363-380, quote p. 272.
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each day. In oral history interviews, Connelly dripped with contempt for some of the positive
liberals in the administration, contempt reminiscent of the way Truman talked about bureaucrats.
Characteristic are his remarks about Dean Acheson: "Mr. Acheson, in my vernacular, would be
considered an egghead, not a practical administrator, and not a man who represented the opinion
of America, or of the people of America. Mr. Acheson, for some reason, was more or less
beholden to the operations of the British Government. In my opinion, these things conflicted
with the viewpoint of Mr. Truman, who was all American." This kind of influence was bound to
be important in Truman's decision making.' 9
In terms of policy appointments, Truman's instincts pushed him away from the left wing
of the Democratic Party. He threw out almost the whole of Roosevelt's domestic staff,
distrusting anyone who smelled of the New Deal ideology. Those he lacked the political cover
to simply fire, like Henry Wallace and Harold Ickes, he forced out within a year. He would later
demonize Wallace and his associates as communists during the 1948 campaign. The lack of
New Deal veterans in his administration, combined with Truman's personal indifference, is often
used to explain the political failure of most of the liberal Fair Deal legislative agenda. As
Connelly later put it of the Party's left wing, Truman "suffered them but he did not believe in
their movement." The result was that "all the so-called liberals were backing Eisenhower [to be
drafted in the 1948 election]. Whatever liberals are, I don't know."20
In foreign policy positions, Truman was more willing to keep Roosevelt's team. Positive
liberals such as Dean Acheson held important positions in Truman's first term, as did Averell
Harriman and Paul Nitze, both of whom might be put in this category. Still, even leaving aside
the major principals examined below, the group of foreign policy experts employed by Truman
featured several clear exponents of negative liberty, many self-identified "conservatives," and a
wealth of Republicans and anti-New Dealers. The aristocratic reactionary George Kennan is
probably the most famous of this group, and justly deserves his renown as the primary thinker
behind the early Truman foreign policy. But Robert Lovett, Lewis Douglas, and John McCloy
were also members of the Foreign Policy establishment who leaned anywhere from right to hard
right on domestic politics, and played prominent roles in the administration. It is also worth
remembering that John Foster Dulles and Dwight Eisenhower, whose negative liberal leanings
are analyzed in Chapter Seven, made contributions to the Truman foreign policy that were not
inconsiderable: Dulles as the Republican representative consulting for a bipartisan foreign
policy, and Eisenhower as the first general in charge of NATO. Truman's appointments,
especially on foreign policy, reveal a tendency to trust men with the older set of negative liberal
values.
COMPOSITE CODE. All in all, Truman's background and political role were discordant,
producing an ideological cacophony that is difficult to interpret. Given his distrust of the state,
the bureaucracy, and his fiscal conservatism, it would be inappropriate to group him with
'9 Fordham, Building the Cold War Consensus, pp. 50-51, quote p. 50. Connelly quote in Connelly Oral History
Interview, August 21, 1968, pp. 331. See also the interviews of November 27 and 30, 1967, which are sprinkled
liberally with the same kind of invective. All are accessible on the Truman Library's website,
http://www.trumanlibrary.org/oralhist/connly.htm.
2( Fordham, Building the Cold War Consensus, pp. 103-110. Connelly Quotes from Connelly Oral History
Interviews, August 21, 1968 and November 30, 1967, p. 440 and 276 respectively.
21 Fordham, Building the Cold War Consensus, pp. 99-100. For assessments of the views of the upper rungs of the
"establishment" in the Truman administration, see Walter Isaacson and Evan Thomas, Wise Men: Six Friends and
the World They Made (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1986).
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positive liberal figures like Wilson, Roosevelt, Kennedy, or Acheson. His openness to executive
power, economic regulation, and some positive liberal rhetoric, however, seem incommensurate
with the politics of Harding, Coolidge, Hoover, or Eisenhower. As such, I rate him as a
genuinely mixed figure. However, for the purposes of coding his entire administration, his
political appointments, particularly in foreign policy, seem to have tended towards the older set
of negative liberal values. Since Truman himself did not take a very strong role in commanding
American strategy, I believe this justifies adding a negative liberal thumb on the scales. The
obvious potential for measurement error, though, should encourage a cautious appraisal of the
results, and suggests areas for future research.
BYRNES' CONCEPT OF LIBERTY
Another practical politician who found success by hitching himself to the New Deal,
James Byrnes came from a considerably different background than the president he served as
Secretary of State. Like Truman, his Democratic Party affiliation was part of his southern
heritage rather than a vehicle for ideological expression. Unlike Truman, the South Carolinian
Byrnes had more social resources for shaping such an ideology: he hailed from the wealth
Democratic elite who ran South Carolina politics from Charleston. This background gave him
an inclination for incremental reform combined with a temperament ill suited to radical change,
later pronounced in his role as a decentralist and anti-desegregation Governor. Ideologically, his
fits solidly, though not completely within the negative liberal camp. In spite of his New Deal
associations, he held a limited vision of government power, was opposed to its further
centralization, and endorsed fiscally conservative and economically non-interventionist views.
EXPLICIT PHILOSOPHICAL STATEMENTS AND CENTRALIZATION. Byrnes initially came to
Washington as an ally of Woodrow Wilson committed to progressive but incremental
government reform. Ideologically, however, this entailed very little deviation from the anti-
statist and decentralist tendencies of the post-bellum South. Indeed, even into the first part of the
Great Depression, Byrnes was resistant to the intervention of the federal government, going so
far as to support Herbert Hoover's opposition to direct federal aid to municipalities, which
"presumed an activism between the federal government and the states unenvisioned by [the
progressive] New Freedom." As Byrnes' biographer David Robertson puts it of Byrnes and
other conservative Southern Democrats, "in their adherence to a strict fiscal conservatism and a
limited federal activism, none of these senators showed a disposition to construct a Democratic
Party liberal ideology beyond what had sufficed [for Southern Democrats] during the lifetime of
Woodrow Wilson."23
Like most politicians, the "interregnum of despair" between Roosevelt's election and
inauguration, replete with bank failures and sharp economic contraction, made Byrnes much
more ideologically pliable. He became one of Roosevelt's organizers in the Senate during the
early New Deal and provided many votes and much political cover for Roosevelt's policies.
Even then, though, Byrnes thought of these changes as temporary measures only. In 1933, after
the famous "hundred days" of New Deal legislation he argued that whether the New Deal
policies were "idealistic or revolutionary, you have the knowledge that most of them were
22 On Byrnes background and career, see David Robertson, Sly and Able: A Political Biography of James F. Byrnes
(New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1994), pp. xi-34.2 3 Ibid., both quotes by Robertson on p. 132. To be sure, Byrnes also had political motivations for his support for
Hoover.
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authorized by Congress only for the period of the Emergency. When the emergency passes they
must pass." In short, he was still a firm believer "in the rights of sovereign states" even if these
rights had to temporarily "adjust to changing conditions."24
After his 1936 re-election, Byrnes followed through on his rhetoric. In the teeth of the
recession of 1937, he declared before a national radio audience that "I voted for every recovery
measure. If today the same conditions existed, I would vote for the same appropriations. But the
same conditions do not exist. The recovery program of this administration has accomplished its
purpose. The emergency has passed." In place of supporting new measures, Byrnes become one
of the de-facto leaders of the congressional "conservative coalition" opposing the Roosevelt
administration: although he did not sign a conservative manifesto popular among the group, in
1938 he was identified as one of the top three leaders by the New York Times. In this role, he
organized a "hold back the New Deal movement" that stymied Roosevelt's proposals in the
name of federalism and anti-statism. He went so far as to oppose Roosevelt's attempted purge of
the Democratic Party in the South, once referring to President as "a little Sherman marching
through the South." Had the purge been successful, the move would have eliminated many
opponents of federal expansion and government activism. Ultimately, his ideological vision
would cost him, as Roosevelt mollified the liberal wing of the party by refusing Byrnes as vice-
25
president in 1944, on the grounds that he was too conservative and too Southern.
FISCAL AND ECONOMIC VIEWS. The platform of Byrnes' conservative coalition was
simple: less government spending and less regulation of the economy. Like many negative
liberty minded elites, Byrnes saw relief measures as "excessive government spending," and led
opposition to direct welfare payments and federal job-creation programs like the Works Progress
Administration (WPA). Byrnes also took up anti-labor agitation, opposed housing legislation,
and impeded numerous other proposals the Congressional conservatives felt would contribute to
the deficit. The conservative coalition counted among its many victories the defeat of maximum
hours, minimum wage proposals; a Byrnes resolution condemning sit-down strikes; cuts to the
relief and WPA budgets; and several urban redistribution measures. On all these issues, Bymes
was a leading opponent.26
On issues of economic regulation, Byrnes and his allies applied pressure against many
New Deal programs they felt impinged on economic opportunity and smacked of collectivism.
As early as 1935, Byrnes led the charge against the "death penalty" provision in a major utilities
bill, which dissolved any utility firm that did not meet the open-ended standards of federal
regulators. A firm ally of Bernard Baruch, the wealthy Democratic financier, Byrnes opposed
these and other regulations as fundamentally anti-capitalist. He orchestrated Baruch's
devastating testimony against an "undistributed profits tax" that Roosevelt had instituted as a
populist re-distribution measure. Both men regarded the labor sit-down strikes already
mentioned as the theft of private property, pure and simple. Later in his role as head of the War
2 4 Ibid., Byrnes quotes on p. 155. On the interregnum of despair and the hundred days, see Higgs, Crisis and
Leviathan, pp. 167-180.
25 Robertson, Sly and Able, pp. 246-266, quotes on 248, 249, and 278. Emphasis is Byrnes'.
26 Patterson, Congressional Conservatism and the New Deal, pp. 129-163, esp. pp. 142-154, 152-155. See also
Robertson, Sly and Able, p. 248. As both Patterson and Robertson note, Byrnes was not a completely principled
opponent of statist measures, as he still relied on Roosevelt for some measure of political power. For instance, he
supported both Roosevelt's court packing plan (like Truman) and his executive reorganization bill, both of which
drew heavy fire from anti-statists. He was nonetheless one of the most influential leaders of the conservative
coalition.
266
Production Board, Byrnes plans for reconversion to a civilian economy were focused on getting
the government out of business as soon as possible, ignored liberal goals on employment and
industrial policy. In sum, on issues of federal involvement in the economy, Byrnes was much
more comfortable with the pre-New Deal regulatory environment than with many New Deal
economic measures.27
COMPOSITE CODE. Though an erstwhile New Deal ally, James Byrnes was more in the
set of negative liberal beliefs than out of it. His "emergency" justification for the New Deal and
his strong federalist tendencies mark him as a negative liberal on issues of decentralization and
the role of the state. His fiscal conservatism and concern with government spending on areas it
was not authorized were typical of negative liberal rhetoric, and his opposition to economic
regulation was rooted in the older tradition of American values. While not within this study's
ambit, it is worth noting that Byrnes spent the 1940s and 1950s attacking Truman's Fair Deal
domestic agenda and waging a decentralist battle against federal power as Governor of South
Carolina. All in all, I rate Byrnes NL: Medium, solidly within the set of typical negative liberal
views.28
MARSHALL'S CONCEPT OF LIBERTY
George C. Marshall served as Truman's special envoy to China, his Secretary of State,
and his Secretary of Defense. Annoyingly, he said very little about politics. Like many military
officers of his day, he did not vote as a matter of principle, believing that it would interfere with
his ability to serve the civilian chain of command. As he wrote to an officer who suggested he
run for public office, "putting such an idea into a man's head is the first step towards destroying
his usefulness... as soon as an ulterior purpose or motive creeps in, then the trouble starts and
will gather momentum like a snowball... I ask you not even to tell your wife what you thought."
Marshall thought of himself as a servant of the public and would not tolerate even the hint of
political partisanship. 29
This tendency means that he left behind only hints of his political views. I have therefore
adopted a less systematic approach to coding Marshall's concept of liberty. I have collected
circumstantial evidence about his ideology in two categories: domestic and foreign policy.
27 Patterson, Congressional Conservatism and the New Deal, pp. 38-41, 130-137, 229-233. On Byrnes at the WPB,
see Alan Brinkley, The End ofReform: New Deal Liberalism in Recession and War (New York: Vintage Books,
1996), pp. 240-244.
28 Many scholars have noted the correlation between the anti-statist Southern democrats and their defense of
segregation and institutional racism. While the link is undeniable, it is worth noting that Southern Democrats
divided over the New Deal-many southerners were major backers of the President's agenda, including inveterate
racists. As Patterson puts it "except on racial issues, the south was not 'solid' in Congress" during the era of the
reaction against the New Deal-those who opposed it did so out of genuine ideological conviction. They were
"temperamentally inflexible" and were often "essentially Jeffersonian Democrats, to the degree that politics
permitted." Byrnes fit this mold, motivated more by ideology that racial issues. Patterson, Congressional
Conservatism and the New Deal, quotes p. 330 (emphasis added), and p. 16. On the non-solid south see Robertson,
Sly andAble, pp. 249-252.
29 George C. (George Catlett) Marshall, The Papers of George Catlett Marshall, ed. Larry I Bland and Sharon
Ritenour Stevens (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1981), hereafter PGCM, Marshall to Major
Charles S. Roller, January 15, 1941, II: 388. For a good summary of Marshall's career and on his opposition to
expressing political views, see Mark A Stoler, George C. Marshall: Soldier-Statesman of the American Century
(Boston, MA: Twayne Publishers, 1989), esp. p. 24.
267
Marshall had little incentive to dissemble, since he neither sought nor desired political
preferment. I believe the evidence points overwhelmingly towards a negative concept of liberty
rooted in an older set of American values. Still, given the odd nature of Marshall's career and
the idiosyncratic nature of the evidence, it is fair to treat it with a certain amount of caution.
MARSHALL'S DOMESTIC VIEWS. Virtually the only domestic political program Marshall
ever expressed any interest in or support for was the New Deal Civilian Conservation Corps
(CCC). The CCC was a jobs program that placed thousands of unemployed workers under the
command of the U.S. Army and employed them on environmental conservation projects.
Marshall was interested in the program because it strengthened his ideal of the citizen soldier and
seemed an adequate substitute for the Universal Military Training the Army favored. The citizen
soldier ideal was in many respects a substitute for a large standing military and has a long
pedigree in early American negative liberal thought. At best, this was an exception to what his
wife described as conservative political views, and likely dovetailed with them. The only other
expression of policy opinions found in Marshall's published papers is an expression of support
for civil liberties, which also fits with a negative liberal temperament.3 0
Marshall used to describe his politics thus: "I have never voted, my father was a
Democrat, my mother a Republican, and I am an Episcopalian." This clever statement obscures
the truth of his very conservative background-his father was a Southern Democrat in the mold
of the incredibly decentralist Grover Cleveland, while his mother came from a rock-ribbed
Republican and well to do family in Pennsylvania. As he admitted to his biographer, "my
political views [in early life] were largely those of my mother's. She was inclined to be a
Republican in her instincts" and gave him his first "political lesson" by approvingly noting the
defeat of a local Democratic candidate for Governor by the Republican machine in
Philadelphia.
Marshall's political views also come out in his friendship with a very active anti-New
Deal figure: Governor of Oregon Charles Martin, whom he knew from Martin's previous Army
career. Martin was an anti-labor rabble-rouser known for defending business and attacking
strikers. He was prone to extremely belligerent rhetoric, urging sheriffs deployed against
striking workers to "beat the hell out of them... crack their damn heads! These fellows are there
for nothing but trouble-give it to them!" Like many other advocates of negative liberty, Martin
considered sit-down strikes nothing less than the theft of private property, and frequently ordered
the national guard to put them down. As for the bureaucratic reforms of the New Deal, he was
fond of rephrasing Roosevelt's inaugural remarks as "we have nothing to fear from the future but
our own foolishness and slothfulness." 32
Surprisingly, Marshall did not treat Martin with the carefully hedged anti-political
language he usually deployed in his correspondence. Congratulating Martin on his election, he
30 Ibid., p. 59. See also Katherine T. Marshall, Together: Annals of an Army Wife (New York: Tupper and Love,
1946), pp. 11-19. On the citizen soldier anti-militarist negative liberty thought, see Arthur A. Ekrich, The Civilian
and the Military (Oxford, England: Oxford University Press, 1956). On civil liberties see Marshall to Frank
Murphy, April 7, 1939, PGCM, 1: 711.
First quote from Marshall to Charles J. Graham, September 23, 1941, PGCM, 11: 616. Next quotes in George C.
Marshall, George C. Marshall: Interviews and Reminiscencesfor Forrest C. Pogue., ed. Forrest C. Pogue and Larry
1. Bland (Lexington, VA: George C. Marshall Research Foundation, 1991), pp. 71 and 52.
On Martin, see Richard L. Neuberger, Our PromisedLand (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1938).
Marshall also expressed general agreement and appreciation for conservative figures Charles Dawes and Bernard
Baruch. See, PGCM, 1: 385-386, 594-595.
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wrote "mere congratulations would be a mild expression of my feelings... to me your splendid
career in civil life is one of the few cases where the genuinely fine character receives something
of the success deserved." Writing to General Pershing, he confessed Martin to be "amusingly
and daringly frank in his views on the present tendencies" of the New Deal. To Charles Dawes
he enthused that "Martin is making a great name for himself out here for fearlessness, extreme
frankness about the 'crack pot ideas' of this day and age, etc. The radicals are trying to organize
a heavy fight on him for the nomination next spring, and many Republicans are changing their
registration in order to vote for him." On the eve of that contest, Marshall wrote Martin that "I
submit my prayers and hopes towards your success... and I wish that I could cast my first vote in
your behalf." He called Martin's defeat "such a tragedy to the State of Oregon that I am without
words on the subject" and forwarded press clippings to Pershing that praised Martin for
sacrificing his own political fortunes for the good of Oregon. Given Martin's extremely strong
point of view, Marshall's very supportive comments, and Marshall's normal political reticence, it
appears that Marshall found much to admire in Martin's ideology. 33
MARSHALL'S FOREIGN POLICY VIEWS. Marshall was a firm supporter of civil control of
the military and keeping the power of the Armed services under the check of political control.
He refused to wear his uniform when testifying before Congress and demanded his aides do the
same, loath to give the Army a political stake in legislative decisions. Similarly, he felt that the
legislation requiring him to certify materials as non-essential before they could be sold to Britain
was unconstitutional: it took power away from the elected Commander and Chief and placed it in
the hands of an unaccountable military bureaucracy. In the run-up to World War II, he deftly
navigated the isolationist-interventionist divide, never endorsing any view beyond preparedness,
and bringing along both sides with his program of rebuilding the budget-starved Army. Indeed,
privately he was sometimes skeptical of interventionist measures like aid to Britain, which he
feared might be a lost cause sucking critical resources from the nation's defense. In general, he
defended all of his proposals as necessary for hemispheric defense, and advised against over-
extending the United States outside the Western hemisphere before it was attacked.
Marshall's cautious views about foreign policy and state building came through after the
war as well. While scandalized by the quick disintegration of the Army he had built following
the post-war demobilization, he noted that what was needed was a not a large Army but "an
attitude of preparedness that is not going to beggar the taxpayer and is going to be maintained in
time of peace." For this reason he favored Universal Military Training, as a way to split the
difference between preparedness and a small Army. Marshall also opposed the basing system
developed after World War II, which he felt was probably going to be unaffordable-his view
was that "you were not going to get the means to support these [bases] and they would be a
weakness instead of a strength.... the thing was to have certain things we had to have and
concentrate on them and let everything else peel off." Such disintegration was just part of the
way democracies fought war, and Marshall considered it a good thing, even if it sometimes had
bad consequences.3
Quotes are from Marshall to Charles Martin, November 7, 1934; Marshall to John Pershing, November 26, 1936;
Marshall to Charles Dawes, October 8, 1937; Marshall to Charles Martin, May 14 and May 2 7 h, 1938, respectively.
For press clippings, see Marshall to John Pershing, November 23, 1938. All are found in PGCM, 1: 442, 516, 560-
561, 597-598, and 654, respectively.
34 Stoler, George C. Marshall, pp. 71-84.
35 Quotes on Marshall, George C. Marshall: Interviews and Reminiscences for Forrest C. Pogue., pp. 253 and 571.
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Even though he ended up leading America into a more active foreign policy than ever
before, Marshall was very conscious to impose restraints and avoid overextension. In crafting
his famous Marshall plan address, Marshall admitted that he ignored the belligerent example set
by Dean Acheson's expansive speech in Mississippi the week before and instead relied on the
restrained approach of George Kennan and Charles Bohlen. He constantly worried about over-
committing American power, noting that "the feelings that were dominating action in Europe, I
felt certain, would be modified... we got into these things in a revengeful or vicious mood, and
now we were trying to get out of them." In a rare display of political posturing, Marshall argued
vehemently against extending American recognition to Israel, declaring that "this is not a matter
to be determined on the basis of politics" and threatening to break his habits of non-participation
and vote against Truman if he authorized the recognition. In short, he frequently displayed
concerns about the costs of foreign policy and the size of military bureaucracies. 3 6
COMPOSITE CODE. Though the evidence is sparse due to Marshall's steadfast avoidance
of political issues, circumstantial evidence indicates Marshall fits within the negative liberal
tradition. His background was one of conservative political ideas and his upbringing within the
older mold of American values. Such political views as he did express seemed to be in sympathy
with anti-New Deal ideological arguments, and he frequently expressed anti-statist concerns in
his foreign policy discourse. In light of the sketchy nature of the evidence, I code Marshall as
more in than out of the set of negative liberal ideals, as NL: Medium.
ACHESON'S CONCEPT OF LIBERTY
Dean Acheson was the ideal typical member of the American foreign policy
"establishment," driven in part by his adherence to the emerging set of positive liberal norms
becoming more common among the American elite. Unlike others in the Truman administration,
Acheson came to the Democratic Party for ideological reasons. He believed the concept of
freedom could be applied to groups as well as individuals, and he was cool towards the
separation of powers, fearing that judicial interference would limit executive prerogative. A
conventional Keynesian and supporter of big labor, Acheson's ideas about economics were
interventionist and influenced his take on foreign policy.
EXPLICIT PHILOSOPHICAL STATEMENTS AND CENTRALIZATION. Acheson came to a
positive concept of liberty early on in his career and associated his desire for a new liberalism
with the fortunes of the Democratic Party. In the 1920's he was a member of the Penguin Club,
a liberal debating society in Washington D.C., and became active in local Democratic politics in
Montgomery County, Maryland. In "sympathy with the New Freedom of Woodrow Wilson, the
politics of Republicans Warren Harding and Calvin Coolidge were increasingly repugnant," to
Acheson; New Era Republicans were associated with policies crushing the effective freedom of
labor and others who lacked the power and resources of business.
The core of Acheson's ideology was built on the massive disadvantages labor suffered
because of this lack of capacity. By themselves workers could not achieve their goals and seize
the opportunities nominally available to them. Instead, American's needed to recognize that "we
are passing... from the day of the individual to the day of the group." In an unpublished
36 Ibid., pp. 326; Robert H. Ferrell, George C. Marshall (New York: Cooper Square Publishers, 1966), p. 190. See
also Marshall, George C. Marshall: Inerviews and Reniniscences for Forrest C. Pogue., pp. 559-560; Stoler,
George C. Marshall, p. 173.
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manuscript, Acheson argued that "the press of the population, the centralization of power, the
intricacies of a highly developed culture are forcing the individual to secure his interests through
group rather than solitary action" and that "the group as an entity should develop interests as real
as any with which the law has to deal." Acheson was perfectly comfortable with the highly
interventionist and centralized state necessary to effect such a transformation. 37
Acheson's fervency for a positive liberalism only increased with the coming of the New
Deal. He was active in the movement to organize women in the garment industry, earning him
the appellation "brilliant as a lawyer, well known as a progressive... one who could understand
the heart of our labor movement," by labor leader David Dubinsky. Others viewed his actions
with less kindness, such as Jeffersonian Democrat and former Missouri Senator James A. Reed,
who sputtered that "if the devil scrapped the cauldrons of hell, and out of the scum created a
sensate being, he would not be as vile as this man [pointing cane at Acheson] who comes here to
defend stripping women naked in the streets of the city." Picking ideological sides like this
made him a prominent backer of Roosevelt, even after the latter had fired him from government
for refusing to defend potentially illegal policies. Recruited to join the "Democrats for Landon"
movement started by Lew Douglas and other future members of the Truman administration who
felt the New Deal had gone too far, Acheson declined, instead endorsing Roosevelt in a
newspaper editorial that was later reprinted as pro-Roosevelt propaganda. 38
As a lawyer, Acheson explained his positive liberal commitments most eloquently in
commentary on the law. He stood up for centralization of power in the executive branch in
speeches advocating judicial restraint-clearly aimed at the Supreme Court striking down New
Deal legislation. In the process he heaped praise on Chief Justice Roger Taney-infamous for
the DredScott decision-arguing that an active judiciary would disarm government "of the
powers necessary to accomplish the ends of its creation and see the functions it was designed to
perform transferred to the hands of privileged corporations." Acheson argued that property
rights had led to the restrictions on the lives of those who were not property owners, whose
"interests were not recognized in any way in our legal order." To remedy this deficiency,
government had to recognize "those who are not owners... have interests in property and in the
use of property which must be considered and protected" by government intervention. Such
intervention would be justified by as little as "a widespread popular belief that an industry has
been particularly resistant to control." As such, this was a job for the executive and not a
judiciary that "condemned on a priori reasoning the efforts of puzzled men as lacking any
rational foundation and as purely fanciful." 9
FISCAL NORMS AND ECONOMIC REGULATION. Though not often given to speaking about
fiscal issues, Acheson was a conventional Keynesian on economic affairs, believing that the
government had a duty to use fiscal measures to stimulate the economy. He "got on famously"
with Lord Keynes and was instrumental in easing negotiations with the British over the Lend-
Lease agreement and imperial preferences in trade. Acheson inserted language into the
37 Quotes in James Chace, Acheson: The Secretary of State who Created the American World (Cambridge, MA:
Harvard University Press, 1999), pp. 59 and 39, respectively. See also Ibid., pp. 48-49. First quote is by biographer
James Chace, second is from Acheson's unpublished book "The Administration of Justice in Industry" excerpted by
Chace.
38 Quotes in Chace, Acheson, p. 70. See also pp. 69-77.
See, David S. McLellan, Dean Acheson: The State Department Years (New York: Dodd, Mead & Co., 1976), pp.
31-35, quotes 31, 32, and 34.
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agreement emphasizing the importance of efforts "directed to the expansion, by appropriate
international and domestic measures, of production, employment and the exchange and
consumption of goods." 40
Acheson's proclivity towards economic regulation has already been demonstrated above.
Interestingly, he explicitly tied these views to international conduct. Consulting with Roosevelt
during the 1940 campaign, Acheson argued that President was too defensive about foreign
policy. What the campaign needed to do was "to relate the past eight years of the New Deal and
the great horizons it had opened for the common man to the dangers threatening freedom
everywhere." By making explicit the connection between government intervention and its
freedom promoting effects, Acheson felt Roosevelt could win support for a more active foreign
policy.41
Earlier, Acheson had diagnosed the root causes of the war in the failure of government to
manage the accumulation wealth. As he offered in reflecting on the causes of the world wars:
the "Nineteenth Century world economy was far from perfect. It contained within it injustices
that demanded correction"-dictatorship and militaristic expansion were "the response of Asia
and a large part of Europe to the failure of some of the vital mechanisms of the Nineteenth
Century world economy." This suggested a "therapeutic aspect" to American post-war policy,
centered on providing capital and supporting properly interventionist democratic governance in
the under-developed parts of Europe. In a world where people could make effective use of their
freedom, individuals abroad would not be tempted to pin the realization of their hopes on
42
aggression and dictatorship.
Acheson summarized his domestic and foreign policy views as seeking the creation of a
"political economy of freedom-at home and abroad." The purpose of domestic policy was to
provide effective freedom to American citizens through government intervention and regulation
of the economy. Concurrently, "the purpose of foreign policy is to preserve the freedom of our
homes, and also the freedom to do one's work... there are millions throughout the world with the
same aspirations-to be allowed to live out their lives in their own way." As in domestic affairs,
securing this freedom abroad would require active government intervention, both of foreign and
American governments. 4 3
COMPOSITE CODE. McClellan aptly summarizes Acheson's concept of liberty: "in
espousing the right of government to a larger role in the social order, Acheson looked further
than immediate goals of humanitarianism and meliorism... Acheson saw looming up the whole
question of American society adjusting to a new economic and social order which would
supersede that of individualistic liberalism." Acheson favored the group over the individual, the
centralization of power in the federal government and its executive branch, fiscal Keynesianism,
and heavy government regulation of the economy. He tied these beliefs explicitly to the
expansion of freedom, both at home and abroad. I place him fully within the set of positive
liberty, as PL: High.44
40 McLellan, Dean Acheson, pp. 47-49, quote 48.
41 Chace, Acheson, p. 81. This quote is a very succinct summary of the positive liberal attitude towards freedom at
home and abroad.
42 McLellan, Dean Acheson, pp. 38-39, quotes p. 38.
43 Robert J. McMahon, Dean Acheson and the Creation of an American World Order (Washington, D.C.: Potomac
Books, 2009), p. 216.
4 McLellan, Dean Acheson.
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Table 6.1: Concepts of Li erty Among Truman Foreign Policy-Makers
Explicit Centralization Economic and Overall
Philosophy Fiscal Views
Truman Support for Hated Staunch fiscal Mixed Liberal:
limited state role; bureaucracy; conservative; ideals from both
distrustful of thought somewhat anti- sets.
state growth; government welfare
strong supporter inefficient and spending;
of democracy as wasteful; loved economically







Byrnes Supporter of States rights Anti-welfare NL: Medium,
limited supporter. spending; anti- solidly within the
government; labor; wanted set.







Marshall Pro-civil Worried about NL: Medium,,
liberties; strong the fiscal and solidly within the
supporter of anti- economic costs set.




Acheson Liberty a group Pro-executive Economically PL: High, fully
concept; state power; interventionist; within the set.
must regulate concerned about fiscally








I turn now to coding the European balance of power during the early Cold War period.
To do so, I rely, as before, on two central concepts of power. Initially, I aim to assess the latent
economic potential of the European great powers. I employ three different indicators to get a
sense of whether there was any one power economically strong enough to potentially over-run
the continent. First, I compare the European poles on the Correlates of War (COW) index of
steel production and energy consumption; this measure provides a rough take on their relative
economic size and high technology industrial potential. Second, I examine Paul Bairoch's index
of total industrial potential. Third, I compare great powers at the same level of economic
development using Angus Maddison's series of historical Gross Domestic Products (GDP).
Maddison's series is conventionally regarded as the best measurement of raw economic size,
while Bairoch's index includes a series of high-technology industries beyond steel production,
which can be misleading on its own. I start the comparisons in 1947, the first year for which
reliable figures are available across all indexes.
Next, I examine the military balance of power, by comparing the relative size of
European armies. The idea here is to check and see if any major actor would have a decisive
advantage in a short war, independent of its industrial potential. Admittedly, the changing
technology of war and the likely geography of a third European conflict make the raw size of
European armies misleading if interpreted as a strict indicator of the military balance. Even so,
they are valuable as a very rough indicator of the ready forces available for a European fight.
The data here are collected from the COW dataset.
These indicators show that the Soviet Union was a potential hegemon, or at least on the
verge of becoming one. Economically, Great Britain underwent precipitous decline during from
1947-1952, while the Soviet economy continued to surge. By the early 1950s, the USSR
possessed an economic advantage over the next leading European pole greater than any other
peacetime comparison reviewed in this study. The trend was even starker in military terms, as
the Soviet Union plowed its economic gains into its Army, while the West European powers all
cut back military spending. The Red Army possessed a numerical advantage in its standing
forces greater than that of the Nazi's at the height of their power.
However, both of these measurements need qualification. The economic situation was if
anything, worse than the figures indicate. All of Europe had been devastated by the war and its
aftermath, but Germany was in the worst shape when the guns stopped firing. Not only was it
economically bankrupt and materially plundered, the Reich had politically disintegrated into four
zones occupied by the victorious powers. Thus, the largest pool of Western European latent
power was completely unavailable for counterbalancing Soviet gains. Nor was it clear, at least
initially, that France could even remain a going concern as a nation state. Militarily,
circumstances were more balanced than they appeared. Much of Soviet strength was hollow,
more a paper creation than a real force, and no European power was anxious for a test of
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strength. Moreover, the American nuclear monopoly made any Soviet conventional assault
suicidal, at least until the USSR could arm in kind, which it did in 1949.45
All in all, I rate the Soviet Union as a potential hegemon whose relative power was only
increasing. The European power configuration is closer to that of 1941-1944 than any other
period in this study. Like the position of Nazi Germany in those years, Soviet power could
theoretically be balanced by the remaining European poles. But also like the Nazi's, the USSR
enjoyed political and geographic advantages that worked against a balancing coalition. The main
source of potential strength in Western Europe was a political basket-case. The second leading
European power, Britain, was fading fast and had no clear long-term access to the potentially
decisive theater. Soviet growth rates, rearmament, and nuclear capabilities accelerated while the
Western European powers lagged behind on all fronts. In short, Soviet power had the potential
to over-awe all of Europe, but structural conditions also suggested it could be balanced. Whether
a balance would form was a political question, and indeed, the principal question of post-war
politics.
LATENT ECONOMIC POWER. Table 6.2 displays the figures from the COW index of steel
production and energy consumption. While the initial figures imply a rough equality between
the Soviet Union and Great Britain, the trend line is stark. The Soviet economy expanded and
the British position declined even more rapidly. The French economy stagnated. Only
politically shattered West Germany showed any signs of real growth. By 1950, the Soviet Union
was slightly more powerful in comparison to Britain that either Imperial or Nazi Germany ever
was. By 1951, the economic difference was vast, and this in comparison to Europe's offshore
power. Given the political state of Germany and absent an American commitment, it is unclear
how Britain would be able to deploy what strength it had if things came to a head on the
continent.
However, the table also shows that the potential for an anti-Soviet coalition existed. The
"big three" powers of Britain, France, and the Western Zones of Germany out produced the
Soviets by a quarter or more throughout Truman's time in office. Even "the six" countries of
what would become the EEC-France, West Germany, Italy, and the Benelux nations-
maintained a twenty percent advantage in industrial strength. The raw assets were there if the
political problems could be solved.
Table 6.2: Relative Percentage of European Industry, 1947-1952 (COW)
1947 1948 1949 1950 1951 1952
USSR 37.6 38.0 39.3 40.7 41.8 42.7
Britain 33.6 31.3 27.7 26.3 24.3 23.0
FRG 12.8 15.2 17.8 19.2 19.7 20.3
France 15.9 15.6 15.2 13.8 14.2 14.0
USSR/Br 1.12 1.22 1.42 1.54 1.72 1.85
USSR/Big .60 .61 .65 .69 .72 .75
Three
USSR/EEC .8 .8 .8 .8 .8 .8
4s Kennedy notes that "it was difficult to tell the difference, in economic terms, between France and Germany" after
the war, so badly had the Nazi's raped the French nation. On the devastation across Europe, including, to be sure,
the brutalized western zones of Russia, see Paul M. Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic
Change and Military Conflictfrom 1500 to 2000 (New York: Random House, 1987), pp. 361-368, quote 366.
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Table 6.3 shows much the same picture when measured via Maddison's GDP figures and
Bairoch's more comprehensive industrial/technological index. The latter is given for the year
1953, Bairoch's observation for the period. As is uniformly the case, the GDP figures show that
power is more balanced, but not in comparison to previous eras. By 1950, Soviet relative GDP
had outpaced previous German advantages by between a quarter and a third. Bairoch's index
also shows its highest ratio of any period, with the Soviet industrial potential rated at nearly 1.3
times that of the British. Still, Maddison's numbers also show the potential for a balancing
coalition, either among the big three or the six. 4 6
Also worth noting is that sectoral indicators are becoming less and less useful as the
world economy develops, increasing the superiority of GDP as an indicator of overall economic
strength. After Europe recovered from the war, its economies maintained similar levels of
economic development-the industrial revolution has done its work. As that level of economic
development increases overtime, the importance of steel production as a measure of
technological sophistication is drastically reduced. As the world economy integrates, at least in
the West, the location of steel production comes to matter less and less. And as European
economies become more sophisticated, gross energy consumption matters less than how
efficiently that energy is converted into real wealth. In short, latent economic power is more and
more obvious in the overall size of European economies as time runs forward. The Truman era
marks the transitional period. I continue to include COW and Bairoch data throughout the study
for consistency's sake.
Table 6.3: Relative Percentag of European Industry, 1947-1952 (Maddison GDP)
1947 1948 1949 1950 1951 1952 Bairoch
1953
USSR 36.0 37.2 37.4 38.0 36.8 37.4 328
Britain 31.9 29.9 28.1 25.9 25.7 24.5 258
FRG 15.7 16.9 18.0 19.7 20.8 21.6 180
France 16.4 16.0 16.5 16.4 16.8 16.5 98
USSR/Br 1.13 1.25 1.33 1.47 1.43 1.53 1.27
USSR/ Big .56 .59 .60 .61 .58 .60 .61
Three
USSR/EEC .67 .69 .68 .67 .63 .64 .8
MILITARY POWER. Table 6.4 shows the size of European armies given in the COW data.
These figures ought to be taken with several grains of salt. As the Second World War
demonstrated, the size of standing armies in the industrial age is less important than the total
46 Maddison does not give a measurement of Luxembourg's GDP, so the EEC production in the table measures only
five countries. Luxembourg matters most for the COW data, since it produced quite a bit of steel-though this only
underscores the decreasing utility of COW over time. I have bootstrapped an EEC figure for Bairoch's data, as he
includes only Belgium among the Benelux countries in his calculations. I have done so by conjuring a number for
Dutch industrial potential: I multiplied Bairoch's Belgian number by a ratio equivalent to the Netherland's GDP
advantage over Belgium in the relevant year of Maddison's data. I include no figure for Luxembourg. Obviously,
the Bairoch EEC figure should therefore be regarded with extreme caution. Nonetheless, I believe it gives a rough
sense of what total EEC latent wealth looked like, and it is consistent with the other indicators of EEC industrial
potential.
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manpower and equipment that could be mobilized for war. The Soviet figures are probably
inflated, and many of its divisions "existed only in skeleton form, or were essentially garrison
troops." A substantial portion of the Red Army was used to police its new provinces and satellite
states. The nuclear age also radically changes the calculus of conventional combat; certainly, it
would have been extremely risky for the USSR to try exploiting any conventional military
advantage they might have had during the period of American nuclear monopoly.47
Nonetheless, in a world where nuclear forces had not yet proliferated to the point of
Assured Destruction capabilities, and where continental powers had an uncertain prospect of
obtaining such weapons, the figures do give a fair picture of Soviet preponderance in Europe.
The USSR simply focused the majority of its resources on expanding its military and war
productive capacity, while the Western European states channeled resources more efficiently
towards broader economic recovery. Per capita GDP in Britain and France was nearly double
that of the USSR, with correspondingly greater standards of living, but the Soviet military
establishment reigned supreme. The table shows that by 1951, the total size of the Soviet
military was more than two and a half times that of the next five European powers combined.
This advantage was growing. In the short term, a Soviet attack was implausible for both
economic and strategic reasons. In the long term, the military balance looked ominous.4 8
Table 6.4: Size of European Standing Armies, 1947-1952 (COW)
1947 1948 1949 1950 1951 1952
USSR 2,700,000 2,900,000 3,600,000 4,300,000 5,000,000 5,800,000
Britain 1,302,000 847,000 770,000 689,000 826,000 872,000
France 580,000 577,000 588,000 695,000 620,000 655,000
Italy 280,000 310,000 330,000 235,000 320,000 325,000
Netherlands 233,000 233,000 233,000 226,000 218,000 211,000
USSR/Europe 1.13 1.47 1.87 2.33 2.52 2.81
SUMMARY OF CODING
The Truman administration was solidly in the negative liberal camp, rating as NL:
medium until at least Truman's second term. Truman himself had genuinely mixed views,
holding an incoherent blend of the negative liberal heritage and the positive liberal development
of the Democratic Party, of which he found himself the leader. His first two Secretaries of State,
James Byrnes and George Marshall, were at least solidly within the set of ideal typical negative
liberal attitudes. Evidence also indicates that there were a host of other negative liberal leaning
figures in the foreign policy apparatus of the Truman administration, though there has not been
space to fully code them here. Importantly, Truman took a backseat in making foreign policy,
leaving matters mostly in the hands of his negative liberal advisors.
The ideological valence of the administration began to change in Truman's second term,
when Dean Acheson emerged as a central figure in American foreign policy. As noted, Acheson
was fully within the set of positive liberalism, rating as PL high. His ascension to Secretary of
47 Paul M. Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict from 1500 to the
Present (New York: Random House, 1987), pp. 363-364; Matthew A. Evangelista, "Stalin's Postwar Army
Reappraised," International Security 7, no. 3 (Winter 1982): 110-138.
48 On per capita GDP, see Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers, p. 369.
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State means that the Truman administration moved more to the ideological center over time.
That said, many important negative liberal figures remained influential and thus moderated
Acheson's independent effect-a situation compounded by Truman's own oversight of U.S.
strategy. My composite code for the administration over its eight years in office is therefore NL:
Medium, though I acknowledge there is a waning of anti-statist influence under Acheson.
The balance of power reveals the Soviet Union initially on the verge of potential
hegemony and crossed that threshold at some point during the period. The key factors in making
this assessment are the rapid decline of British power and the slow political reconstruction of
Western Europe, trends of which decision-makers were well aware by 1946-1947. In principle,
Soviet power could be balanced: both the big three poles and the EEC six outstripped the USSR
in economic production. In practice, no coalition could possibly form while German power was
politically disintegrated, the French nation-state plausibly dead, and the British military therefore
without long-term access to the continent. In military terms, only the absolute priority of Soviet
economic reconstruction and the American nuclear monopoly held the Russian hordes in check.
Both of these restraints were loosening as time wore on.
TLFP therefore predicts America will adopt a grand strategy of buckpassing. The
Truman administration should have envisioned an organic balance of power in Europe, one that
prevented Soviet hegemony but was otherwise malleable. It should have sought to support and
organize a balancing coalition, but one designed to shift the costs of balancing to the Europeans,
in order to better preserve anti-statist values at home. As the negative liberal forces in the
administration wane, and geopolitical threat grows, we ought to observe more commitments
abroad. These should nonetheless maintain their buckpassing character, as the Truman
administration sacrifices potential control over the balance of power for reduced costs.
American Grand Strategy 1945-1948: Buckpassing
As predicted by TLFP, the American grand strategy during Truman's first term was to
pass the buck. The American vision was to create a self-sustaining balance of power in Europe,
on whose efforts the United States could free-ride. We can infer this strategy from its
component elements.
At first, American policy emphasized cooperation with the Soviet Union and attempts to
permanently reduce German power. The hope was to foster a benign international environment
where an American commitment could be limited to a brief period of financial support for
Europe and a small, temporary occupation of Germany. As growing Soviet power became more
ominous and the Cold War dawned, America intermittently transitioned to a confrontational
posture towards the Russians, focused on keeping Soviet influence out of Western Europe and
the western zones of Germany. Diplomatically, American statesmen sought to rebuild Europe
into an integrated and unified "third force" capable of balancing Soviet power alone. But the
U.S. focus was on economic recovery and integration, with a correspondingly limited military
strategy: a couple of under-strength American divisions occupying Germany backed by the threat
of one-sided air atomic war.
TLFP's expectations are further confirmed by the causal processes underlying the
formation of American strategy. Both the international system and negative liberal ideology had
important influence. Given the immense latent power potential in the Soviet Union, American
diplomats immediately perceived a material threat from Russia. But consistent with negative
liberal biases, they were at first inclined to downplay the danger in the hopes of reducing
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American costs. And it was only after cooperation with the USSR failed that American
statesmen began to worry about ideology, and even then only in power political terms: they
feared that communist subversion in the economically shattered West would bring all of
Europe's material resources into Moscow's orbit. Negative liberal sentiment also shaped the
character of policy commitments. Diplomatically, America favored allied strength and burden-
sharing ability over international influence; American military policy was limited to a relatively
small investment in off-shore nuclear capabilities.
In addition to providing the primary impetus for American commitments, the
international system also played an integrating role: the United States cycled through several low
cost alternatives to balancing, as initial attempts to limit American liability met with failure.
American statesmen were drawn slowly towards more involvement in shaping European politics
over the course of the period. Still, before the Korean War, American strategy was quite
restrained and surprisingly detached from European commitments. American retained a
buckpassing posture, focused on building an independent European pole of power.
RESPONSE TO EUROPEAN THREATS
Even before the end of the Second World War, American thoughts had turned to the post-
war order. With most of Europe a burnt out husk, and Great Britain economically broken, the
prospect of a bipolar future was recognized early. But several features of the new landscape led
to considerable optimism on the part of American decision-makers, who believed a
cooperative-or at least quiescent-relationship with the Soviet Union could be formed, and
American influence withdrawn from the continent. As cooperation failed and fears of Soviet
power grew, Americans began to worry that Western European communists and communist
sentiments might facilitate Soviet hegemony. Importantly, these fears were rooted in a concern
for the future balance of power, rather than as an ideological threat to the United States.
MATERIAL THREATS MINIMIZED. Consistent with negative liberal incentives, the
Truman administration was initially inclined to downplay the importance of Soviet latent
strength. To begin with, American power simply over-awed Soviet capabilities. The Soviets
had no navy worthy of the name and no air force capable of strategic attack. They had
developed a massive army, but lacked the industrial capacity that America had so convincingly
displayed during the war. The American atomic monopoly was a trump card the Russians could
not match. Furthermore, it was widely expected that Russia would be inwardly focused for a
period of several years as it attempted to rebuild itself, and that Moscow would welcome
American financial and technical assistance in doing so. American military planners believed
there would be a five to ten year period of Soviet weakness that would make confrontation a
losing game for the USSR. As the State Department's Bohlen-Robinson report noted, "any war
between the U.S.A and the U.S.S.R. would be far more costly to Russia than to the United
States." American capabilities would be "manifestly and decisively superior" to the Russians for
a period the authors labeled "American Hegemony, period I."49
49 Good examples of American unconcern with the threat of Soviet capabilities are discussed in John L. Gaddis, The
Long Peace: Inquiries into the History of the Cold War (Oxford, England: Oxford University Press, 1987), pp. 25-
28; and McAllister, No Exit, pp. 38-42. As McAllister notes, even the projected long term rise of Soviet power was
tempered with optimism about the possibility of cooperation. Quotes are in Robert L. Messer, "Paths Not Taken:
The United States Department of State and Alternatives to Containment, 1945-1946." Diplomatic History 1, no. 4
(1977), p. 306.
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American diplomacy was therefore aimed producing a stable balance of power based on
cooperation with the USSR. Occasional American bluster aside, the U.S. had given up keeping
Eastern Europe free from Russian domination relatively early. The State Department based
much of its early post-war thinking on exactly this concept, attempting to find a way to work out
a "spheres of influence" deal with the Soviets without explicitly saying so. Many diplomats
recognized the Soviet's economic and security interests in Eastern Europe as legitimate aims
America should embrace, perhaps even publicly, as a part of the "long-term stabilization of
American-Russian relations."
Another foundation of this relationship was recommended by Charles Bohlen, America's
top Russia hand: "sharing with the USSR, immediately and without condition, the knowledge
necessary for the production of the atomic bomb." This radical option was explored at the
highest levels of government as late as 1946, culminating in the Acheson-Lilienthal proposal for
the internationalization of nuclear weapons. The basic idea behind all these proposals was
simple: to shape future Soviet behavior during present American hegemony by asking for
"substantially less than the current capabilities of the United States could secure."50
This low-key response to lopsided Soviet power in Europe was not the work idealistic
cranks. It constituted the considered thinking of the United States government and was
manifested in real policy proposals to the Soviets. Against his initial judgment, Secretary of
State James Byrnes pushed hard for the internationalization of atomic energy at a December
1945 conference in Moscow, essentially offering the Soviets many of the technical secrets
necessary for the production of atomic weapons. Even though, for changing strategic and
political reasons, nothing ever came of the American nuclear proposals, the very fact that they
were even made is telling. The Truman cabinet approved them, Byrnes introduced the proposals
to the public in a radio address, and official offers were made to the Soviets to end the American
nuclear monopoly. Byrnes also agreed to recognize the governments of Soviet satellites in
Eastern Europe on what were basically Moscow's terms, and to settle the post-War peace treaties
exclusively with the "Big Three" allies, as Stalin had been demanding for months. In short, on
issues of atomic capability and a sphere of exclusive domination for Moscow, American
diplomacy was quite flexible.
The American vision for the balance of power was one of accommodation between two
loose power conglomerates in the East and West. Radical plans could advance so far because the
Americans had no intention of engaging in a security competition with the Soviets. The view of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) before Yalta in early 1945 is instructive: "it would seem in the
highest degree unlikely that Britain and Russia, or Russia alone, would be aligned against the
United States... so long as Britain and Russia cooperate in the interests of peace, there can be no
great war in the foreseeable future." The Soviets might be powerful, but a good working
relationship could make that power largely irrelevant in a military sense.s2
50 For the State Department's early views, see Messer, "Paths Not Taken." Quotes are from the Bohlen-Robinson
report, in Ibid., pp. 309-10. On America's policy of conceding Eastern Europe, see Marc Trachtenberg, "The United
States and Eastern Europe in 1945: A Reassessment," Journal of Cold War Studies 10, no. 4 (2008): 94-132.
Robert L. Messer, The End of an Alliance: James F. Byrnes, Roosevelt, Truman, and the Origins of the Cold War
(University of North Carolina Press, 1982), pp. 139-144, 149-155.
52 Quote from Leahy to Hull, May 16th, 1944, United States State Department, "Foreign Relations of the United
States" (FRUS) (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office), 1945, Malta and Yalta: 107-108.
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MATERIAL THREATS REALIZED. But by the spring of 1946, the policy of cooperation
seemed to be foundering, and thus Soviet power could no longer be ignored. George Kennan's
"long telegram" in early 1946 marked an attitudinal shift in official Washington. Arguing that
Moscow had deep-seated psychological insecurities, military dominance on land, and a highly
disciplined capability of ideological subversion and infiltration, Kennan asserted that only
vigilant opposition could prevent Soviet expansion. Soviet intransigence over Iran, Turkey, and
Germany, and belligerence in Stalin's public statements now seemed explicable. As importantly,
temporary U.S. atomic superiority and internal Russian disorder seemed much less important.
Kennan's message spread like wildfire in Washington. Within months it was presented as
dogma by the State Department; Secretary of the Navy James Forrestal ordered several hundred
copies printed and made it required reading for naval commanders.
The failure of cooperative policies meant Soviet power had to be viewed in a new light.
In November 1945, the State Department argued that "since the Soviet Union itself has many
internal problems to solve in the next few years... the Soviet Government may decide to
abandon its policy of full control in [Eastern Europe]. We should adapt our policy to encourage
them in this direction without loss of face, if circumstances permit." By April 1946, a leading
memorandum asserted "the U.S. must accept the fact that it is confronted with the threat of an
expanding totalitarian state which continues to believe and act on the belief that the world is
divided into two irreconcilably hostile camps." Senior statesmen shifted as well: President
Truman became much more belligerent and hard line between November and January, and James
Byrnes became noticeably more confrontational. Old disputes over Eastern Europe were
reinterpreted in a new light. What was formerly disreputable but understandable security driven
behavior by a recovering great power-such as the redrawing of the Polish-German border and
instituting totalitarian regimes in Poland, Romania, and Bulgaria-was now evidence of a
revisionist state using its considerable capabilities to expand.54
As TLFP expects, the pressure from the international system forced American diplomats
to reconsider their past approach. Faced with an unchecked presence in the heart of Europe,
Western European governments might be inclined to make political concessions to the USSR
that would open the door to the wider ideological subversion and economic losses Kennan
warned about. In effect, if Soviet power remained unbalanced, Western Europe's latent strength
might be peacefully absorbed into Moscow's industrial complex. The threat looked increasingly
real: Western Europe, and Germany in particular, was in very bad shape. There were millions of
refugees, a swath of devastated regions, no functioning economy to speak of, and a serious food
crisis. The winter of 1945-1946 was one of the worst in living memory. At the same time, the
Soviets were beginning to make obvious appeals to the German people. In early 1946, the
Russians forced the Socialist and Communist parties in Germany's Eastern zone to merge,
creating the appearance of a unified workers party, one that would have a certain legitimacy in
The "long telegram" is Kennan-State Department, February 22, 1946, FRUS, 1946, VI: 696-709. For the
thunderclap reaction see Messer, "Paths Not Taken," pp. 313-317; on the analysis of the telegram more generally,
John L. Gaddis, Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of Postwar American National Security Policy
(New York: Oxford University Press, USA, 1982), pp. 18-23. The transition away from a cooperative approach to
one more concerned with Soviet power is evident in the debate over national security policy during late 1945/1946
in FRUS, 1946 I: 1111-1171.
54 Department of State Memorandum, "Foreign Policy of the United States," December 1, 1945, FRUS, 1946 I:
1139; Matthews-SWNCC, April 1, 1946, FRUS, 1946 1: 1167. For top-level policymakers see Trachtenberg, A
Constructed Peace: The Making of the European Settlement, 1945-1963, pp. 37-41.
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the Western zones. The Russians continued to make overtures for influence in the administration
of the Ruhr, which would give them critical influence in the Western zone and industrial hear of
Europe.55
It was only in this context that American policymakers became seriously concerned
about the possibilities of communist expansion in Europe. By early 1946, General Lucius Clay,
head of the U.S. military government in Germany, was warning of communist influence in the
Western zones. As he wrote during the winter food crisis, when the Eastern zone had higher
food rations than the western zones, "there is no choice between becoming a communist on 1500
calories a day and a believer in democracy on 1000 calories. It is my sincere belief that our
proposed ration allowance in Germany will not only defeat our objectives in middle Europe but
will pave the road to a communist Germany." The State Department's views on Germany were
also more anxious, as Kennan argued firmly that "what the Russians want in Germany is the
dominant power over the life of the country: power both to control internal affairs and to govern
Germany's international behavior." In sum, by spring of 1946, the Russians were generally
thought to be an aggressive, powerful, and seeking to expand by all means short of war. Their
primary method of ideological subversion was seen as particularly threatening in Germany. 56
DIPLOMATIC POLICY
The Truman administration's vision of Europe's future power constellation comes out
most clearly in its diplomatic approach to Germany. The essential vision was one where no
single power dominated Europe, but was otherwise flexible about political structure. This
flexibility came from a desire to reduce American costs by shifting them to other states-
American statesmen had no intention of making a lengthy commitment to European stability.
However, some policies were more suited towards forestalling a European hegemon than others.
As Soviet power became clearer, the dictates of the international system pushed America
towards greater involvement in European politics. But negative liberal concern with increased
costs held America back from balancing commitments. This tension can be observed in three
major diplomatic initiatives: an attempt to work out a spheres of influence settlement in
Germany; an attempt to negotiate a "four-power pact" facilitating American withdrawal; and the
acceptance of American economic commitments through the Marshall plan.
SPHERES OF INFLUENCE. At the Potsdam conference in July 1945, Byrnes led American
policy in trying to create a quiescent power configuration in Europe, balanced between the
Soviet sphere of influence and a rebuilding Western Europe loosely associated with the United
States. In such a scheme, trying to organize the German economy and government as a single
unit under quadripartite control was a recipe for distrust, disagreement, and disaster. The central
problem was German reparations. The Soviet Union had demanded fifty percent of all post-war
reparations from Germany in acknowledgment of its wartime sacrifice. It had already begun to
strip its eastern zone of occupation of industrial equipment under an expansive definition of "war
booty." If the Soviets were going to move unilaterally like this, any agreement on reparations
would result in the western powers subsidizing Soviet actions, since they would have to help
55 McAllister, No Exit: America and the German Problem, 1943-1954, pp. 107-110; Krieger, "Was General Clay a
Revisionist?" pp. 168-173.
Kennan-Offie, May, 10, 1946, FRUS, 1946 V: 555-556, quote on 555. Clay quoted in Krieger, "Was General
Clay a Revisionist?" p. 172.
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finance imports into the Eastern zone to replace Soviet seizures. Serious friction stemming from
the Grand Alliance's very different preferences for running Germany was bound to result in a
burgeoning great power competition; a far more stable power configuration would be one where
Germany was more or less split in half.
Byrnes thus emphasized that "the United States wanted its relations with the Soviet
Union to be cordial and friendly... what had impressed him the most-it was more than the
money involved-was the desire to remove any source of irritation between our two
governments." So in place of the complicated set of agreements that would have been necessary
to administer reparations on an all German basis and run the occupation economy as a single
unit, Byrnes suggested that each ally should take reparations from its own zone, running the
occupation as each saw fit. In return for Soviet acceptance of what would have been the default
outcome anyway, Byrnes made two concessions. America would accept the Eastern border of
Germany where the Russians had drawn it and would send Russia some reparations from the
Ruhr valley: 15% of industrial capacity surplus to Western zone needs would be traded for
agriculture from the Eastern zone, and an additional 10% of surplus capacity would be given free
and clear. After much haggling, the Russians accepted the agreement, which was
enthusiastically backed by Stalin.57
But by the spring of 1946, the Byrnes policy had run aground on the shoals of the
international system. The administration realized that the Soviets were stronger and more
aggressive than expected, while the Europeans were weaker and more vulnerable to Soviet
subversion than it had hoped. Cooperating with the Soviet Union had not yielded two stable
spheres of influence that would permit an American withdrawal from Europe; instead the
Russians looked to be aggressively trying to co-opt parts of the western sphere via communist
proxies throughout Europe. American policy was refocused on "walling [the western zones] off
against Eastern penetration and integrating them into the international pattern of Western
Europe." Europe would have to be economically and politically rebuilt if it were to be kept out
of Soviet hands and an American departure ensured.58
In order prevent such unacceptable power configurations, the German people would need
to be convinced their future lay with the West. Such persuasion would require, in turn, the
economic revival of the western zones and the promise of some sort of political self-
determination in the near future. Above all, Germany had to be divided without America
appearing to have done so. The method for achieving these aims was a reversal of the Potsdam
agreement, and a decision to start economically and politically organizing the western zones of
Germany. In May 1946, Clay halted reparations payments from the "surplus capacity" of the
57 Quoted in Foreign Ministers meeting, FRUS, 1945, Potsdam 11: 430. Ambiguity in the Potsdam agreement and
disputes on its meaning between Byrnes and the leaders of the American occupation have obscured the nature of
American policy in 1945. Suffice it to say, all parties were looking to cooperate with the Soviets in one way or
another in order to facilitate an American withdrawal from Europe. For a thorough discussion of these issues see
McAllister, No Exit: America and the German Problem, 1943-1954, pp. 84-98; Trachtenberg, A Constructed Peace:
The Making ofthe European Settlement, 1945-1963, pp. 15-33. For example, General Lucius Clay, though
believing the grand alliance should run Germany as a unit, was an advocate of troop withdrawals, see Schwabe,
"The Origins of the United States' Engagement in Europe, 1946-1952," p. 162. For Clay's views generally, see
Krieger, "Was General Clay a Revisionist?" esp. pp. 168-173. On the disputes over how to run Germany within the
American government, see McAllister, No Exit: America and the German Problem, 1943-1954, pp. 98-116;
Trachtenberg, A Constructed Peace: The Making of the European Settlement, 1945-1963, pp. 43-47
58 Kennan-Secretary of State, March 6, 1946, FRUS, 1946 V: 516-520, quote on 519. See also Trachtenberg, A
Constructed Peace: The Making of the European Settlement, 1945-1963, pp. 51-54.
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western zones on the excuse that the Soviets were refusing to make the agreements necessary to
run Germany as a single economic unit. Of course, the deal struck at Potsdam was to avoid
doing exactly that. But the Soviets could not confront the United States with this publicly-
saying that both sides had essentially agreed to divide Germany nine months earlier-without
alienating the German people.59
The reparations stop gave the Americans and the British the freedom of action to move
ahead in economically organizing the western zones, merging their occupation areas into the
"bizone" in July, all the while claiming that they were the ones who wanted to run Germany as a
single unit. By the end of the summer, the Soviets and Americans were competing openly for
the hearts and minds of the German people. At the second session of the Paris Council of
Foreign Ministers (CFM) in July, Molotov accused the Americans of attempting to divide
Germany and destroy its industry. Responding with his famous Stuttgart speech in September,
Byrnes enthused that "it is the view of the American government, that the German people,
throughout Germany and under proper safeguards, should now be given the primary
responsibility for their own affairs." The Cold War was on. 60
THE FOUR POWER PACT. The Truman administration's early vision of cooperation
between two loose power masses was intended to solve the German problem: the Grand Alliance
would go its separate ways on organizing German economics and politics, but would work
together to keep Germany permanently militarily disarmed. To this end, Byrnes introduced a de-
militarization treaty at the Moscow conference in 1945, to Stalin's hearty approval. The treaty
called for a "four power pact" in policing and inspecting Germany to ensure it never rearmed for
a period of at least twenty-five years. It was designed to remove Germany from the balance of
power in Central Europe, thus reassuring the Soviets with American cooperation on the
permanent repression of German might. But the Russians were not reassured, having seen a de-
militarization pact fail to contain Germany twenty years earlier; and they were right to be
skeptical.
Although Byrnes often portrayed the treaty as a sign of American commitment and an
end to American isolation, it was actually an instrument of American withdrawal. After listing
an impressive array of conditions for German disarmament and providing for an inspection
regime, the treaty merely noted that its parties should negotiate other agreements "for the number
and type of forces that each party shall make available for purposes of this treaty... subject to
ratification... in accordance with their respective constitutional processes." It was commonly
assumed in American government that Congress would never ratify a permanent commitment.
Byrnes himself considered one of the primary benefits of the treaty the smaller American
occupation force it would allow, and he seemed to envision it being enforced primarily by
airpower. He also argued that to enforce the treaty the contracting parties could "rely more upon
a force of trained inspectors and less upon the infantry." Byrnes position reflected a negative
liberal concern with costs: the four power pact foresaw a quiet Europe policed by someone
else.6'
See McAllister, No Exit: America and the German Problem, 1943-1954, pp. 111-116 and Trachtenberg, A
Constructed Peace: The Making of the European Settlement, 1945-1963, pp. 44-47.
60 Quoted in Trachtenberg, A Constructed Peace: The Making of the European Settlement, 1945-1963, p. 53.
61 The text of the treaty can be found at FRUS, 1946, 11: 190-193, quote 193. For Byrnes and Molotov's views, and
the nature of the treaty as a troop reducing implement, see Denise O'Neal Conover, "James F. Byrnes and the Four
Power Disarmament Treaty," Mid-America 70 (1988): 19-34, Byrnes quoted on p. 22. Until the summer of 1946,
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The failure of the spheres of influence policy led Byrnes to abandon the four-power pact
except as a propaganda tool by the fall of 1946. But a renewed push for cooperation began under
Secretary of State George Marshall, who replaced Byrnes at the beginning of 1947. In typical
anti-statist fashion, Marshall believed that the American people would not, and should not,
maintain themselves on war-footing indefinitely in order to protect Europe. Unimpressed by the
red menace, Marshall believed that anti-communist sentiment was a fleeting fad when compared
to the burdens of power politics. He therefore viewed continued four power cooperation on the
German problem as essential for a long term solution to America's security interest in Europe
it would take good relations with the Soviets and among the other members of the Grand
Alliance to keep Germany down after America had left the scene. To be sure, American power
should be used to help this transition, perhaps'even for several years. But in the end only a
renewed great power concert could solve the German problem. So Marshall set about trying to
find a way to repair relations with the USSR and renew cooperation while administering
Germany as a single unit.62
His primary initiatives in this regard took place at the Moscow CFM in spring 1947.
Going into the conference, Marshall's basic view was consonant with the strategy Washington
had been pursuing in 1945. Described aptly by scholar/participant Charles Kindleberger before
the conference, it had "three basic ideas. One was that Germany should be militarily impotent.
Second that this should not cost us too much. Third, that we must agree in Europe with the other
victors and work out a system of international cooperation... it is our foreign policy to work out
an agreement with the Russians in Germany." For their part, the Russians were eager to return
to reparations, though now from current production rather than in capital equipment. Most of the
American government was opposed to any deal, more comfortable with the division of Germany
than "the hollow unification which in fact but opens the door to the accomplishment of Soviet
purpose in Germany as a whole." 63
Marshall's worries about the long-term costs of American strategy instead led him to
offer the Soviets a bargain. He made several key concessions to the Soviet position on
reparations, which required him to get approval to from President Truman. First, though the
official American position was that Potsdam precluded reparations from current production,
Marshall worked out a formula through which they would be possible. They would substitute for
capital equipment reparations that could not longer be made because of a simultaneous
agreement to revive the German economy. Second, these reparations would be valued in a way
that was extremely favorable to the Soviets: by their value as "going concerns" in the German
economy, which would provide a much heftier cut for Moscow. Finally, after a study had been
made hashing out the details, he was willing to let reparations start before Germany's fiscal
the treaty was primarily an instrument to reduce American commitment. See also Klaus Schwabe, "The Origins of
the United States' Engagement in Europe, 1946-1952," in NA TO: The Founding of the Atlantic Alliance and the
Integration of Europe, ed. Francis H. Heller and John R. Gillingham (Palgrave Macmillan, 1992), p. 163, and
Wolfgang Krieger, "Was General Clay a Revisionist? Strategic Aspects of the United States Occupation of
Germany," Journal of Contemporary History 18 no. 2 (April 1983): 165-184.
62 For a summary of Marshall's views and initiatives see Trachtenberg, A Constructed Peace: The Making of the
European Settlement, 1945-1963, pp. 56-58 and Phillip Zelikow, "George C. Marshall and the Moscow CFM
meeting of 1947," Diplomacy & Statecraft 8, no. 2 (1997): 97-124.
63 Zelikow, "George C. Marshall and the Moscow CFM meeting of 1947," p. 104, both quotes.
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house was in order. If the U.S.S.R. was willing to run Germany as a single unit, then it would be
able to have a stream of what would likely be generous reparations.64
At the same time, Marshall returned to the four power pact for the disarmament of
Germany as the primary instrument for managing the balance of power-and, ultimately, for
ensuring American withdrawal. Marshall stressed that the most important feature of the post war
world was whether the Grand Alliance could hang together. Against French objections that
American guarantees were not strong enough and that firmer alliances and international control
of the Ruhr were needed, Marshall argued that "we do not fear so much seeing Germany rising
again if a genuine agreement of the Four Powers is established. What we are worried about is a
Germany which will ally herself with one or the other of these Four associated powers... we
should recall that her motto is: 'Divide in order to rule'." A "genuine agreement" of cooperation
with the Soviets was necessary; far more necessary, Marshall argued, than any of the stringent
control measures the French imposed. Without it, Germany would eventually evade control
measures. Control measures might lapse, but if great power relations stayed friendly, they could
be re-imposed in a crisis.65
Marshall illustrated this point with a remarkable analogy that reveals his thinking on the
American role in Europe. At the same meeting with the French, he responded to repeated
protests by the French foreign minister in favor of harsh control measures by saying,
All the measures which you imagine for the establishment of the future regulation of Germany... seem to
me 'superficial', if I compare them with the necessity for the Four Power Pact.... I knew these problems
after the last war. I have personally heard Foch and Weygand talk about them. They were discussing at that
time, as now, the Ruhr. The solution of Foch was simple, it was a solution of force. Do you not think that
there may be an element of force in the Four Power Treaty? An element of continuity also? What
preoccupies me is not what is going to happen in four or five years in Germany, it is the situation in which
we will find ourselves within 10 years.
In other words, the control of Germany after World War II was likely to resemble the controls
used after World War I. There would be "elements of continuity." In a few years the Americans
would be long gone. The will to implement a "solution of force" would lapse in France, even as
it did twenty years earlier. The most important thing, then, was to make sure Germany could not
play the Allies off against one another, or join up with a hostile Soviet Union. The four-power
pact could prepare the American people to act in concert with their allies, if necessary, but the
solution would not be one of long-term occupation and dismemberment. It would be one of
friendly relations that might be called into service if needed.66
64 Ibid., esp. pp. 105-112. The document that Marshall circulated, CFM (47) (M) 97, 3 April 1947, is printed in US
Department of State, Germany, 1947-49, p. 410. On Marshall's battle with Acheson, see Marshall-Truman, March
31, 1947; Truman (written by Acheson)-Marshall, April 1, 1947; Marshall-Truman, April 1, 1947, FRUS, 1947, 11:
298-299, 301-303, 306-307. See also Truman's final response, approving Marshall's offer, cited in Zelikow,
"George C. Marshall and the Moscow CFM meeting of 1947," p. 112, n. 41. For an alternate view of Marshall's
diplomacy, see Robert H. Van Meter, "Secretary of State Marshall, General Clay, and the Moscow Council of
Foreign Ministers Meeting of 1947: A Response to Phillip Zelikow," Diplomacy & Statecraft 16, no. 1 (2005): 139-
167.
65 Marshall-Bidault meeting, March 13, 1947, FRUS, 1947, II: 246-49, quote on 247. See also Trachtenberg, A
Constructed Peace: The Making of the European Settlement, 1945-1963, pp. 55-58; Zelikow, "George C. Marshall
and the Moscow CFM meeting of 1947," pp. 112-114.
66 Marshall-Bidault meeting, March 13, 1947, FRUS, 1947,11: 246-49, quote 248-49.
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Marshall soon learned the lesson Byrnes had been taught a year earlier: the Soviets were
not interested in a deal, either on reparations or on a disarmament treaty. Stalin sought to
reassure Marshall about the eventual success of Allied negotiations, but Marshall left the
conference profoundly pessimistic about the prospects for future cooperation. Though he would
hesitate throughout the rest of the year to engineer a firm break with the Soviets, he also realized
that an alternative source of power was needed in Europe to balance the Soviets.
THE MARSHALL PLAN AND THE THIRD FORCE. His solution was to rebuild European
power, whence the genesis of the European Recovery Program (ERP) or Marshall Plan, the
famous American program for the economic reconstruction of Western Europe. After his return
from the Moscow CFM, Marshall put George Kennan in charge of the Policy Planning Staff at
the State Department and charged him to develop an economic plan for reviving Europe.67
The Marshall Plan had two essential elements. First, it aimed to rebuild the economy of
Western Europe to compete against Soviet power, primarily by breathing life into West German
industry, the engine of the European economy. The hope was that by pouring in a substantial
commitment of aid, Western Europe could be rebuilt and its politics stabilized within a few
years. At such time, the political economy of Europe would hopefully be remade on a self-
sustaining basis: possessed of the economic foundations for its own defense and psychologically
strong enough to resist the pressures of communist influence. 68
Consistent with the administration's previous preferences, America's substantial largesse
in the short term would reap a long-term reduction in costs. American effort would, in Kennan's
words, "be directed not to the combating of communism as such but to the restoration of the
economic health and vigor of European society. It should aim, in other words, to combat not
communism, but the economic maladjustment which makes European society vulnerable to
exploitation." A healthy Europe would not require American protection. And this more limited
goal would be a one time shot: "The program must contain reasonable assurance that if we
support it, this will be the last such program we shall be asked to support in the foreseeable
future." 69
Second, the ERP was aimed at integrating the sovereign states of Europe into a single
economic, and ultimately, political, unit. The idea was to create a "third force which was not
merely the extension of US influence but a real European organization strong enough to say 'no'
both to the Soviet Union and to the United States." The ERP would encourage such a force by
making economic integration a goal of the American effort, in the hopes that this would lay the
groundwork for political integration. The Europeans were to be encouraged "to assume there
was no one to help them, to imagine that they had no choice but to try to work out an acceptable
economic future without any outside support" and thus "adjust themselves to certain basic
67 Trachtenberg, A Constructed Peace: The Making of the European Settlement, 1945-1963, pp. 62-64; McAllister,
No Exit: America and the German Problem, 1943-1954, p. 129.
68 The literature on the Marshall plan is voluminous. Perhaps the best single source is Michael J. Hogan, The
Marshall Plan: America, Britain, and the Reconstruction of Western Europe, 1947-1952 (Cambridge, England:
Cambridge University Press, 1989). See also, McAllister, No Exit: America and the German Problem, 1943-1954,
p. 121-141; Trachtenberg, A Constructed Peace: The Making of the European Settlement, 1945-1963, pp. 62-65.
Kennan-Acheson, May 23, 1947, FRUS, 1947, 111: 223-230, quotes 225, 227. It is no accident that this memo on
the plans for an ERP ended with a call for immediate clarification of the "Truman Doctrine" which Kennan feared
was being interpreted as an open ended commitment. On the non-military and limited nature of the commitment see
also Schwabe, "The Origins of the United States' Engagement in Europe, 1946-1952," pp. 166-172; McAllister, No
Exit: America and the German Problem, 1943-1954, pp. 129-135.
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changes which have occurred and are continuing to occur in their international position." Once
Europe had adopted the economic pattern of the United States-a giant area of free exchange
and efficiently coordinated production-it would be prepared to lift its own burdens. As Armin
Rappaport argues, for the first time in history a great power was seeking not to divide and
conquer, but federate and unite.7 0
John Foster Dulles, who at this point was a major advisor to the State Department
representing the Republicans and had a large influence on policy making, advanced the third
force idea with vigor. On several occasions he defended the ERP on behalf of the administration
before a skeptical congress, even when he feared the Europeans were not moving fast enough on
integration. Dulles' fears demonstrate nicely the intended point of European unity. His private
objection to early forms of the NATO alliance was that "any permanent arrangement might seem
to guarantee the status quo and make it less likely, rather than more likely, that the Western
European democracies would unite to create strength between themselves." It was absolutely
vital that Europe be woken "from the illusion that we can be relied upon indefinitely to rescue
them from their own errors... we will subtract from the likelihood of Europe effecting her own
cure if we nurture the illusion that she can count on us; and we will add to that likelihood to any
extent that we help Europe see the awful danger she faces and the emptiness of reliance upon
us." This was the "basic concept of the ERP" and its ultimate end was the political unity of
Western Europe.
Once again, though, international resistance meant that American diplomacy was not as
effective as Washington had hoped. Europe proved very difficult to coordinate in its shattered
condition, and America ended up taking much more of the lead than intended. One important
reason for this failure was that the states of Europe sensed the American reluctance to make a
commitment and did not want to be abandoned. From the European perspective, rebuilding
Western Germany meant that it would have to be controlled, lest it return to aggressive
militarism or revanchist nationalism. Moreover, it also meant that the Soviets would be angered,
and that they might take steps to counter Western policy. In fact, they seemed to be doing just
that, as the blockade of Berlin was launched in response to Western plans for the political
unification of West Germany and coincided with the communist take over of Czechoslovakia. It
was Europe's collective desire for a security guarantee that drove diplomacy in the latter part of
this period, concluding in the founding of the North Atlantic Treaty in 1949.
70 Hickerson-Inverchapel meeting, January 21, 1948, FRUS, 1948,111: 9-12, quote on 11; Lovett-Clayton, August
14, 1947, FRUS, 1947, III: 356, both quotes. More extended discussion of economic integration and the concept of
a "third force" can be found in Michael J. Hogan, "Paths to Plenty: Marshall Planners and the Debate over European
Integration, 1947-1948," The Pacific Historical Review 53, no. 3 (August 1984): 337-366; Trachtenberg, A
Constructed Peace: The Making of the European Settlement, 1945-1963, pp. 62, 67-68, 114-115; Gaddis, The Long
Peace: Inquiries into the History of the Cold War, pp. 57-61. Tremendous support for European integration among
American elites and public is recounted in Armin Rappaport, "The United States and European Integration: The
First Phase," Diplomatic History 5, no. 2 (1981), esp. pp. 121-126; Geir Lundestad, "Empire" by Integration: the
United States and European Integration, 1945-1997 (Oxford, England: Oxford University Press, 1998), pp. 5-28.
71 McAllister, No Exit: America and the German Problem, 1943-1954, pp. 135-141 quotes on 138, 139.See also
Lovett-Vandenberg meeting, April 27, 1948, FRUS 1947, 111: 104-108.
72 On the disappointment of early American efforts at integration, see Schwabe, "The Origins of the United States'
Engagement in Europe, 1946-1952," pp. 167-176; Lundestad, "Empire" by Integration: the United States and
European Integration, 1945-1997, pp. 29-36. As they note, American efforts did not bear great fruit for several
reasons, including a desire not to be seen as politically interfering in European politics, and by British intransigence
on supranational solutions. On European security concerns generally see Trachtenberg, A Constructed Peace: The
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MILITARY POLICY
American military policy during the first Truman administration was a low-cost effort
consistent with its free-riding diplomatic posture; it emphasized minimal military connections to
Europe and standoff forces. Initially, the hopes for a spheres of influence peace facilitated an
aggressive demobilization that reduced American military power dramatically. After American
diplomacy reoriented around building a third force, military commitments lagged well behind.
American statesmen were satisfied to defend Europe with atomic airpower as a stopgap measure
prior to European recovery; they resisted several attempts at firmer military guarantees. Even
after the Truman administration acquiesced to the North Atlantic Treaty, it interpreted the
agreement in a unilateral manner and would not commit additional American troops. The
international system incentivized further American commitment, but the Truman
administration's negative liberal incentives meant that policy was mostly stationary.
POST-WAR DRAWDOWN. Wartime plans envisioned little post-war European role for the
U.S. military. American policy was mostly just a reiteration of traditional American interests in
the Western hemisphere and the Pacific. Europe was a notable exception to American post-war
basing plans, since the administration foresaw no long-term presence there. Early emergency
plans for war in Europe envisioned conflict arising out of accidents in Eastern Europe or the
Balkans and were premised on a straight withdrawal from the continent without any holding
action. Europe was an area of British and Russian interests, and the JCS agreed with Truman
that the limits of an American commitment should be to act as an umpire between them.
Regarding the Soviets in particular the JCS felt that "while the United States can afford to make
no concessions which leave its security or vital interests at the mercy of the Soviet Union, there
is almost no other concession which it can afford not to make to assure Soviet collaboration in
the maintenance of security." 73
Most impressive was the rapid de-mobilization the American military undertook, and its
implications for the conduct of American policy in Europe. American military strength dropped
by seventy-five percent in the first year after the war and another fifty percent by 1947.
Moreover, the "first-in/first-out" principle meant that American combat units lost their most
experienced personnel first. The Army therefore lost its combat effectiveness much more
quickly than even the already startling de-mobilization rate suggests. The JCS estimated that
most units had lost between fifty and seventy percent of their combat value as soon as two
months after VJ-day.
Though concerned about being required to support expansive political goals with this rag-
tag force, the military and the State Department fell back on a military strategy of very low
standing forces and a threat to re-mobilize American power. As Byrnes wrote to Secretary of
War Patterson: "It seems unlikely that the size of the occupation force in Europe by next July
[1946] (probably under 200,000) will be large enough to be impressive in providing support for
our political policies. The situation would not be greatly improved if the size of the force were
Making of the European Settlement, 1945-1963, pp. 73-86; Schwabe, "The Origins of the United States'
Engagement in Europe, 1946-1952"; McAllister, No Exit: America and the German Problem, 1943-1954, pp. 143-
148, 153-156.
73 McAllister, No Exit: America and the German Problem, 1943-1954, pp. 47-49; Truman views from press
conference, April 18, 1946, Public Papers of the Presidents: Harry S. Truman, 1946 (Washington, D.C., 1962); JCS
views quoted Stoler, "From Continentalism to Globalism," p. 314.
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double that figure next July. The important thing is that our country must have sufficient military
strength at home and abroad to give evidence of a determination to back up the policies of our
Government anywhere that may be necessary." In short, American military policy would be to
cooperate with the Soviets, dramatically scale down forces, and back its political objectives with
an implicit threat to regenerate conventional military power or use its atomic arsenal.74
ATOMIC TRIPWIRE. From a military perspective, rising international pressures on
American policy posed a question squarely: how would Europe be defended while the third
force was being built? Europe was still economically distressed and in no position to provide for
its own defense. Some kind of American commitment would be required. But what kind?
Europeans pushed for explicit alliance guarantees, military aid, and a forward defense of Europe.
France was particularly obstinate, refusing to sign on to the fusion and political unification of
West Germany without more of an American ante.7 5
But the United States resisted such balancing commitments, preferring to emphasize a
low-cost strategic posture using only off-shore military power. American diplomats were
content to stick with an "asymmetric" strategy of containment, one that focused on the economic
reconstruction and political stability of Western Europe as a whole-including Germany. They
downplayed the importance of rearmament for Europe and America alike. Europe would be
defended with a trip-wire military strategy: the presence of American troops in Germany would
serve to involve the United States in a European war if the Soviets were so foolish as to attack.
Massive Soviet conventional superiority might quickly overrun Europe, but the United States
would then launch a one-sided atomic air campaign to devastate Russia and any European
industrial centers captured by the Red Army. Eventually, America would win the war in virtue
of its atomic monopoly and re-liberate the continent. Needless to say, this strategy did not offer
much satisfaction to the Europeans. If they wished to forestall these outcomes, they would have
to overcome their own political divisions and develop the means to deter or defend against the
USSR. 76
Thus, the strategy had great appeal from a free-riding perspective. The Americans
rejected two successive European proposals for a security guarantee. The French hoped for a
74 Quote is in Byrnes-Patterson, November 29, 1945, FRUS, 1946 1: 1132. On mobilization see Patterson-Byrnes,
November 1, 1945, FRUS, 1946 1: 1111-1112 and Krieger, "Was General Clay a Revisionist?" pp. 175-176. For
the State Department's military views, see State Department meeting and memo prepared for the Secretary's staff
committee, November 13, 16, 1945, FRUS, 1946,1: 1119-1128. State recommended a bare bones military policy
focused on allied cooperation and greater mention of the atomic bomb.
75 For excellent accounts of British and French goals and tactics, see Peter Foot, "Britain, European Unity, and
NATO, 1947-1950," and Irwin M. Wall, "France and the North Atlantic Alliance," both in NATO: the Founding of
the Atlantic Alliance and the Integration ofEurope, ed. Francis H. Heller and John R. Gillingham (New York:
Palgrave Macmillan, 1992). See also, McAllister, No Exit: America and the German Problem, 1943-1954, pp. 150-
153.
76 The concept of an asymmetric strategy is used in this connection in Gaddis, Strategies of Containment: A Critical
Appraisal of Post war American National Security Policy. For the essence of the American military plan, see
Trachtenberg, A Constructed Peace: The Making of the European Settlement, 1945-1963, pp. 83-91; Wolfgang
Krieger, "American Security Policy in Europe Before NATO," in NATO: the Founding of the Atlantic Alliance and
the Integration of Europe, ed. Francis H. Heller and John R. Gillingham. The French could be quite colorful in
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three-power guarantee against future German aggression, along the lines of the four-power pact
proposed by Byrnes. This would bring America decisively into the security situation in Europe:
it would prevent future German revisionism, but even more importantly, would hedge against
Soviet aggression as the Western powers moved forward on reconstituting a German state. But
the Byrnes treaty had been based on the idea of Soviet cooperation; the situation now was Soviet
enmity. The State Department argued that "it would be futile to accept these restrictions and
bind only one part of Germany." And the wrong part, at that, as Western Germany needed to be
rebuilt, not disarmed.77
For the same reason the American government frowned on a British attempt to draw
America into an anti-German pact modeled on the Treaty of Dunkirk. As Kennan put it, "the
role of the German people in any European union will eventually be of prime importance. The
general adoption of a mutual assistance pact based squarely on defense against Germany is a
poor way to prepare the ground for the eventual entry of the Germans into this concept." Though
"only such a union holds out any hope of restoring the balance of power in Europe without
permitting Germany to become again the dominant power," it had to be one the Germans could
join. Moreover, "people in Europe should not bother their heads too much in the initial stage
about our relationship to this concept" and just concentrate on making a union work. If Europe
could unify, America would be happy to be the offshore ally of last resort.78
Kennan in fact led a section of the government that was very skeptical of any sort of
military commitment at all, on the theory that it would over-extend America and distract Europe
from the real and pressing business of "political, economic, and spiritual" unification. At most,
the American President should issue a unilateral declaration along the lines of the Monroe
Doctrine, declaring that if the Soviets decided to bully Western Europe they would answer to
American power. In the end, however, those who dealt most directly with the Europeans
realized that unification could not move forward without something that at least seemed like a
tangible security guarantee: the Europeans were simply too terrified of the dual menace posed by
the once and future Germany, and the now and present Russia. Out of this tension, after much
pulling and hauling, a deal was born. The United States would ratify the North Atlantic Treaty,
and the West European powers would move ahead with the potentially dangerous step of
creating West Germany.79
The Truman administration's international objectives thus drew it towards a formal
alliance, but its negative liberal commitments meant that even this historic step lacked heft.
America structured the treaty such that it retained the freedom to decide whether its
commitments had been invoked, and the Congress retained its authority in the war-making
process. When the treaty was debated in the Senate, the administration framed it as a deterrent.
Senator Vandenberg went so far as to declare that "I don't care if there were no subsequent
implementation, I would feel that the treaty had gone a long, long, way in the direction of an
insurance policy" just by way of its Article Five guarantee against aggression.
"No subsequent implementation" turned out to be a fair descriptor of the situation before
the Korean War. Congress delayed the funding of the "mutual assistance" portions of the treaty,
77 "Security Against Germany," State Department Paper, n.d. (early 1948) FRUS, 1948, III: 61-63, quote 62.
78 Kennan-Marshall, January 20, 1948, FRUS, 1948, 111: quotes 7-8.
79 Ibid. On the development of possible American proposals, see Timothy P. Ireland, Creating the Entangling
Alliance: The Origins of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (Westport, C.T.: Greenwood Press, 1981), pp. 80-
92.
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and cut this military aid from $1.4 billion to $500 million. $400 million of this was withheld
until organizational structures-the "0" in NATO-could be developed that would pave the way
for a future German military contribution in lieu of an American one. The first meeting of these
structures, in the form of the North Atlantic Council, reaffirmed the status-quo military strategy:
America would be responsible for strategic bombing and Europe would have to provide any
ground forces. As Wolfgang Krieger aptly summarized American posture, "in a way the policy
of asymmetric response, i.e. politico-economic containment, was a continuation of the pre-war
isolationist policy towards Europe."80
SUMMARY OF AMERICAN GRAND STRATEGY, 1945-1948
TLFP's predictions are confirmed by the American buckpassing strategy during
Truman's first term. Both the content of America's foreign policy posture and the process of its
formation are consistent with the theory. The administration's vision of the future European
power constellation was one balanced between an eastern and western sphere. The American
pole would be loosely associated with the western sphere, but would mostly free-ride on its
efforts as American statesmen anticipated an early departure from Europe. Negative liberal and
systemic impulses pushed American policy in opposite directions in implementing strategic
decisions. Soviet and European resistance to American buckpassing schemes caused statesmen
to alter policy, incentivizing a better match between America's diplomatic means and power
political ends. At the same time, the Truman administration's negative liberal aversion to costs
kept commitments minimal and focused strategy on building the strength of Western Europe.
I would highlight three especially compelling pieces of evidence for these claims. First,
the effects of negative liberty and the international system are both evident in American threat
perceptions and policy responses. In spite of the growing Soviet power advantage, policy-
makers were initially inclined to downplay the threat of a European hegemon. Rather than make
ready commitments to defend Europe's future, American diplomats tried to offer the Soviet
Union policy concessions, in the hope that cooperation might beget an easy balance between a
European-led West and a Soviet-led East. Additionally, negative liberal biases helped dismiss
communist ideology as threatening until it became part of a security question. Conversely, the
true size of Soviet power and the pressure of Soviet policy ultimately forced Washington to
acknowledge the threat and adjust its policies. This kind of systemic pressure moved American
strategy from a hazy idea of cooperation between European spheres of influence to a more
integrated idea of building a third force to oppose the Soviet Union.
Second, consonant with negative liberal tendencies, American diplomatic policy
systematically displayed an impulse to reduce costs and free-ride on others. The American plan
for managing the remnants of German power, evident in the Byrnes' Potsdam policy and the
four-power pact, was to leave the problem in European hands while promising to return if the
European security situation took a turn for the worse. Even after European penury and Soviet
predation convinced the Truman administration that it had to rebuild Western Europe, its
engagement remained limited and its eyes fixed on the exits. Through the means of the ERP,
American diplomats stressed economic reconstruction over military rearmament and pushed
European economic and political integration as a means to confront the Soviets. American
80 Ibid., ch. 3-5, quote p. 13 1. Krieger, "American Security Policy in Europe Before NATO," p. 101
292
policy adjusted repeatedly to international reality during the period, but never contemplated more
than limited and temporary American commitments.
Third, American military policy was nearly non-existent until the end of Truman's first
term. The end of the war saw a strikingly rapid demobilization that policy-makers
acknowledged as an impediment to any kind of expansive political goals. After the ERP moved
forward, the American Army was neglected in favor of a trip-wire atomic strategy that promised,
effectively, to destroy the European village in order to save it. The initial iteration of the North
Atlantic Treaty was less a military alliance than a public relations campaign, intended to reassure
European capitals without changing either the military situation on the ground or America's
actual defensive commitment. The Truman administration's desire to keep military costs low
integrated well with its cheap political strategy.
American Grand Strategy, 1949-1952: Buckpassing
Truman's second term saw at least some movement on both of TLFP's independent
variables. Russia's atomic test in August 1949 objectively changed the European military
balance. This change combined with Russia's rapidly growing economy to increase the salience
of potential Soviet hegemony. Concurrently, Dean Acheson's ascendance to Secretary of State
shifted the Truman administration's concept of liberty towards the center of the ideological
continuum, as a highly positive liberal figure assumed an important position for the first time.
The former change caused a marked increase of the American diplomatic and military
commitment to Europe, as it became clear that Europe needed a defense on the ground if it was
to withstand Soviet pressure. The latter change helped cement this more intense commitment,
since Acheson was more willing to contemplate a long-term engagement. At the same time, the
shift towards the ideological center also made American policy less coherent, as the Truman
administration's military strategy was pulled in multiple directions by different liberal ideas.
Nevertheless, the basic American strategy remained the same. The United States worked
harder and faster to build a third force in Europe, but still aimed to make the resulting pole an
independent power in its own right. Europe would balance the Soviets on its own. America
would help on the margins and as a last resort, while enjoying the blessings of liberty at home in
the form of a free-riding foreign policy. We can infer the continued buckpassing character of
this strategy from its constituent elements and from the policy-process that generated American
commitments.
Increasing Soviet power did not initially disturb the trajectory of American policy, as
diplomats pushed for innovative ways to advance European integration while politicians kept
military budgets low. The advent of the Korean War brought long-standing fears of Soviet
hegemony to the surface, but mostly just increased the pace and cost of American efforts to build
a third force in Europe. The Europeans were asked to accept German rearmament and
supranational military integration as the price of American divisions, whose deployment in
Europe was intended to be temporary. This deployment was accompanied by exhortations for
the Europeans to do more, and the development of an extensive nuclear capacity that would
allow the Americans to do less.
The process of American policy-making reveals that the international system clearly
signaled a growing disintegration between Washington's political-military means and ends. This
gap ultimately did result in an increased American commitment to shape European politics at
higher costs. But negative liberal biases held back a response to increasing Soviet power for
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over a year. They further impelled Washington to continue pushing for a third force after the
Korean War began and increased diplomatic agitation for burden-sharing mechanisms.
Meanwhile the American ground force commitment was limited to six divisions and priority
given to off-shore power. In the aggregate, systemic pressures forced costlier and more
integrated strategic commitments, while negative liberal priorities shaped those commitments to
cap American costs and encourage European independence.
RESPONSE TO EUROPEAN THREATS
Estimates of Soviet capabilities increased drastically after Russia tested an atomic
weapon in 1949. This event caused intense worry in the Truman administration and led to NSC-
68, a strategy document aimed at mobilizing the American government for war. The North
Korean invasion of South Korea confirmed the concerns voiced in NSC-68 by demonstrating
that Soviet power was far greater than previously expected. Still, before the Korean invasion,
negative liberal constraints held back a policy response to the administration's escalating sense
of material threat; there likely would have been very little change in European strategy absent the
Korean War.
NSC-68 AND ESCALATING MATERIAL THREAT. On August 29, 1949, the Soviet Union
detonated its first nuclear device, sending shockwaves throughout Kazakhstan and the American
government. Although not unexpected, the explosion came earlier than anticipated, and the
development threw the delicate balance of power in central Europe into question.
Soviet atomic capability radically changed the military situation, increasing the potential
for Russian hegemony in Europe. The American tripwire military strategy depended on the
prospect of a one-sided atomic air war. Even if, as was likely, Western Europe was overrun, the
eventual mobilization of American nuclear power would bludgeon the Soviet Union into
submission with a force that it could not match or stop. This advantage allowed the Americans
to take a somewhat leisurely attitude towards fighting the war-as late as 1949, the American
nuclear strategy was backed by only a few weapons and incompetent Air Force plans. But in a
two-sided nuclear exchange, speed would be of the essence. Each side would be trying to
annihilate its enemy's potential for nuclear attack, weapons development, and heavy industry.
These incentives could lead to a long and deadly war where the Soviet advantage in Europe
might never be reversed, and which America could conceivably lose if it did not strike quickly
enough. 81
Policy-makers therefore began displaying serious concern about the implications of
growing Russian power. The American Embassy in Moscow argued that "in view of favorable
developments on the atomic energy and China fronts, the Embassy believes that Moscow may
consider it an opportune time to regain the initiative on the German question." The JCS began to
advance their long-held views in favor of German rearmament with renewed vigor. In the year
after the explosion, American intelligence began to pick-up signs that the Soviets were preparing
to flex their new-found muscle. The Soviet economy started transitioning to a war footing:
military and civilian stockpiles were being established, war material was pushed into forward
Trachtenberg, A Constructed Peace: The Making of the European Settlement, 1945-1963, pp. 97-98. See also
Marc Trachtenberg, "The Nuclearization of NATO and U.S.-West European Relations," in NATO: the Founding of
the Atlantic Alliance and the Integration of Europe, ed. Francis H. Heller and John R. Gillingham (New York:
Palgrave Macmillan, 1992); David Alan Rosenberg, "The Origins of Overkill: Nuclear Weapons and American
Strategy, 1945-1960," International Security 7, no. 4 (Spring 1983): 3-71.
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areas, and factories were being reconfigured for armaments production. Spies in the Eastern bloc
countries reported that high-level Soviet communist officials were telling their satellite
counterparts that the Soviets had a window of opportunity in central Europe, which could only be
exploited before the West built up strength. Emigres from the Eastern block similarly brought
word of increased military exercises and offensive military planning. We now know that there
was an aborted plan to attack Tito's Yugoslavia during the period, so that these rumors were not
without foundation. 82
The product of these fears for European security was NSC-68. This paper, less strategy
than propaganda, was designed to "so bludgeon the mass mind of top government" as to permit a
change in policy: a bigger defense budget, a stronger military posture, and a more aggressive
diplomatic strategy of "rolling back" Soviet strength where possible. Though its authors, Paul
Nitze and Dean Acheson, were cagey enough not to put a dollar figure on their proposal or
outright call for German rearmament, they harped on increasing Soviet power, the inadequacy of
American military strength, and the need to rally support from allies. There is scattered evidence
that the Truman administration might have been on the verge of implementing some form of the
proposed policy. Internal opponents of the policy and fiscal conservatives such as head of the
Council of Economic Advisors Edwin Nourse were replaced with policy supporters. Others, like
Secretary of Defense Louis Johnson, were marginalized. Apparently the beginnings of an effort
to mobilize support in Congress were being made, and hardliner Averell Harriman was brought
83in to manage the process of "implementing" the programs of NSC-68.
For the Truman administration, the proof that NSC-68 was right about Soviet geopolitical
strength came from North Korean attack on South Korea on June 25, 1950. Western statesmen
assumed, correctly as it turned out, that Stalin had authorized the attack as part of his program of
expansion. The analogy to Germany was obvious in many minds: would the communists use
their new found power advantages to attack another divided country that was lightly defended?
The West Germans certainly had a hysterical reaction. The American liaison to the Bundestag
reported that the parliaments members had "cleaned out the market [for cyanide], prepared to
take their lives when the Communists come." German industrialists began to take out
advertisements in Communist newspapers as a hedge against political change. Especially after
the Chinese responded to the American escalation of Korea, American decision-makers believed
that there was grave danger for Europe. As Acheson noted in a late 1950 NSC meeting, "time is
shorter than we thought... we used to think we could take our time up to 1952, but if that were
right, the Russians wouldn't be taking such terrible risks as they are now." 84
82 Walter LaFerber, "NATO and the Korean War: A Context," Diplomatic History 13, no. 4 (1989): 461-478, quote
465; Fordham, Building the Cold War Consensus, pp. 25-46. Trachtenberg, A Constructed Peace: The Making of the
European Settlement, 1945-1963, p.98; Ernest R. May, "The American Commitment to Germany, 1949-55,"
Diplomatic History 13, no. 4 (1989): 431-460, esp. pp. 442-443.
83 NSC-68 is found in FRUS, 1950,1: 234-292. The "bludgeon" quote from Acheson's memoirs, quoted in Robert
A. Pollard, "The National Security State Reconsidered: Truman and Economic Containment, 1945-1950," in The
Truman Presidency, ed. Michael J. Lacey (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1989), p. 230. For a
good discussion of the meaning and influence of NSC-68, see Marc Trachtenberg, History and Strategy (Princeton,
NJ: Princeton University Press, 1991), pp. 107-1 12. On the advances made in pushing NSC-68 through the
government, see Fordham, Building the Cold War Consensus, pp. 41-74.
84 May, "The American Commitment to Germany, 1949-55," p. 440; Quote in Thomas A. Schwartz, America's
Germany: John J. McCloy and the Federal Republic of Germany (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press,
199 1), p. 126; see pp.124-130 more broadly. Acheson quoted in Marc Trachtenberg, History and Strategy
(Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 199 1), p.11 4 n. 46.
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It therefore became essential to counteract the rapidly increasing Soviet capabilities.
Western Europe needed some kind of forward defense on the ground, for two reasons, both
articulated well by Chairman of the JCS, Omar Bradley. First, in a two-sided atomic war, he
argued flatly, "we might be in danger of losing." Particularly if the Soviets built up sufficient
nuclear forces, the American industrial advantage could be quickly wiped out, and the outcome
of a long war put in doubt. As a result, the Soviet conventional advantage in Europe would be
that much more valuable of an asset in turning the continent's production against the Western
hemisphere. Second, and more importantly, Bradley had argued earlier that "we cannot count on
friends in Western Europe if our strategy in the event of war dictates that we shall first abandon
them to the enemy in promise of later liberation" which could produce "nothing better than
impotent and disillusioned allies in the event of war." Such impotence and disillusionment was
in widespread evidence during the summer of 1950.85
THE PERSISTENCE OF AN ASYMMETRIC STRATEGY. But these revised assessments of
Soviet power did not immediately cause a change in strategy. American policy remained
focused on advancing European integration and economic reconstruction. The Defense budget
remained restricted and the State Department continued to emphasize non-military solutions in
the European arena.
Negative liberal constraints worked to minimize the administration's response to the
international environment before Korea. Truman's dedication to fiscal conservatism had kept
the military budget very low throughout his presidency. Even during the war scare of 1948,
when the communists gained control of Czechoslovakia, Truman derogatorily "commented that
every department of the government has gone warlike." Truman granted the JCS only $3.2
billion in additional funds-a third of the supplemental appropriation they had sought. He then
cut the budget the next two years. Indeed, the biggest cut, in the planned FY 1951 budget,
occurred in December 1949, in the face of growing concerns about Soviet power and
intentions.8 6
The administration had also held the line on its low cost free-riding strategy of building a
European third force. It opposed German rearmament, despite JCS protests and British
encouragement. Truman had called a JCS plan to rearm Germany "decidedly militaristic," and
Acheson had gone so far as to tell Congress that "I think everybody is clear that it would be quite
insane to make any sort of [German] army of any kind whatever." During the winter of 1949-
1950, the State Department would often have to put out fires set by those who favored German
rearmament, as these kind of rumors were treated with grave seriousness by Europeans. Even
following the North Korean invasion, the State Department still briefly resisted German
rearmament, arguing that it would undo the strategy of integration that was moving forward with
the Schuman plan. Only in late July 1950 did Acheson reverse this position and adopt a more
militarized approach.87
Finally, NSC-68 was initially put on ice due to negative liberal concerns about cost.
Upon receiving the report, President Truman referred it to the NSC for further consideration,
adding that "I am particularly anxious that the Council give me a clearer indication of the
85 Trachtenberg, A Constructed Peace, quotes pp. 98 and 101.
86 Generally see Pollard, "The National Security State Reconsidered," quote p. 215. See also Fordham, Building the
Cold War Consensus, pp. 25-40.
87 Truman-Acheson, June 16, 1950, IV: 688-689, quote 688. James McAllister, No Exit: America and the German
Problem, 1943-1954 (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2002), quote on p. 174; 173-176, 184-186 generally.
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programs which are envisaged in the Report, including estimates of the probable cost of such
programs." Truman demanded that all kinds of budgetary authorities be included in the
discussion, presumably so that he could ensure his fiscal priorities were adhered to. The note
concluded with italicized instruction that "it is requested that this report be handled with special
security precautions in accordance with the President's desire that no publicity be given this
report or its contents without his approval." This is consistent with action Truman took three
years earlier with the famous Clifford-Easley report, a similar anti-communist manifesto that
Truman locked all copies of in his personal safe. In May, Truman would tell the press twice that
he was going to cut the defense budget again the following year, and he mentioned to aides that
the budget for NSC-68 "was definitely not as large as some people seem to think." It seems
likely that either NSC-68 was headed nowhere fast, or would at most have resulted in a modest
budget increase, consistent with the selective steps Truman was taking towards its
implementation.
DIPLOMATIC POLICY
American diplomacy during the second Truman administration continued to emphasize a
free-riding posture. American statesmen focused their efforts on European integration,
responding to systemic resistance by considering the relationship of Great Britain to the growing
power mass on the continent as well as pushing new supranational plans. After the Korean War
began, American strategy intensified, shifting towards European rearmament and integration in
the military field. But the new phase of American strategy was more of an acceleration of
existing plans than an actual change of course. New military and diplomatic commitments were
made, but the focus remained on European integration and self-sufficiency. These goals would
now just have to come on a faster timetable.
BRITISH PARTICIPATION. For almost a year after the Soviets had tested their nuclear
weapon, America's European diplomacy stayed on the same track. Despite increasing
international military pressures, the major debate in the Truman administration was on how to
proceed with European integration. Tactical disagreements did not obscure the consensus that
economic and political ties were to be stressed, while pushing German rearmament back-even
in light of the new Soviet strength. The result was an important decision about America's
diplomacy with Britain.89
For the American buckpassing strategy to succeed, European resistance to integration had
to be overcome. This systemic feedback caused America to adjust its diplomatic means and
ends. Kennan realized that the British "tended to exert a retarding influence" and would put an
88 Truman-Lay, April 14, 1950, FRUS, 1950, 1: 234-235, quotes both pages. Emphasis in original. See also May,
"The American Commitment to Germany, 1949-55"; Fordham, Building the Cold War Consensus quote, p. 59. See
Pollard, "The National Security State Reconsidered," on Clifford-Easly report.
89 There were two schools of integrationist thought in the Truman administration. The first argued that British
leadership in European projects was essential; the second believed it detrimental. The "pro-Britain" school of
thought eventually lost out to the "continental" school of thought, led by the arguments of George Kennan and Dean
Acheson detailed in the text. For an example of the debate, see Meeting of the U.S. Ambassadors at Paris,
afternoon session, October 21, 1949, FRUS 1949, IV: 483-496, esp. 491-496. On agreement to de-emphasize
military preparations, see Klaus Schwabe, "The Origins of the United States' Engagement in Europe, 1946-1952," in
NA TO: the Founding of the Atlantic Alliance and the Integration of Europe, ed. Francis H. Heller and John R.
Gillingham (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 1992), p. 172
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"upper limit" on the measures necessary to eventually rearm Germany and create the
supranational political decision making structure needed to direct a revived German Army.
Worse still, when the British made commitments that their disintegrating political situation could
not deliver on, "this usually resulted in having the problem created by such commitments ending
up on our doorstep"-exactly the situation American policy was trying to avoid. Better to
encourage British association with America and Canada, while letting the continental European
states form the nucleus of the third force.90
Though more of an Anglophile than Kennan, Acheson agreed a new approach was
needed to overcome systemic resistance to American strategy. The buckpassing goals of
American diplomacy dictated a reduced British role in European projects. While integration did
not require "at this time an extensive surrender of sovereignty" the State Department always had
to consider "the larger concept of European integration we hope ultimately can be achieved." In
this vein, Acheson "believed that France and other continental powers would be willing to go
farther along road to integration (including Western Germany) than would the British, and...
would not wish to see this progress retarded by British reluctance." France needed to become a
leader in the process of creating supranational institutions if these were "to create a structure
strong enough to carry out the purposes of the Atlantic Pact and resist threats from the East"
which were central to the "analysis of what is needed if Russian or German, or perhaps Russian-
German domination, is to be avoided." Like the U.S., Britain should participate where it could,
but probably couldn't be expected to surrender this kind of sovereignty. Indeed, the British
might be a positive hindrance: Truman believed that "the British are doing everything possible to
break up Western European unity," while Acheson had to reprimand London for stirring up a
hornet's nest by pushing German rearmament. The debate on integration tactics was a turning
point: one of the most notable aspects about the "special relationship" with Britain between
1950-1960 became the especially derogatory treatment London received on issues of European
integration-viewed less as a British Lion than a Trojan Horse. 91
ECSC. Without British interference, America had better odds of constructing a
supranational institution on the continent, one that would eventually be able to balance Soviet
power without American help. But as American diplomats constantly noted, integrationist
attempts had to be led by Europeans in order to have success. By late 1949, Acheson was
practically begging Prime Minister Schuman of France to take the lead on building supranational
organizations with in Europe and "to advance the Germans a political credit they have not fully
earned." In May 1950-responding in part to American attempts to strengthen the Atlantic
Alliance-France came through with the Schuman plan for a unified market in coal and steel.92
90 Meeting of the combined policy committee, September 13, 1949, FRUS, 1949, 1: 520-522, quote p. 521.
91 Acheson-Douglas, October 24, 1949; Acheson-Perkins, October 19, 1949, FRUS, 1949, IV: 344-345, 469-472.
Quotes on 345, 471, 472. Truman-Acheson, June 16, 1950, FRUS, 1950, IV: 688-89, quote 688. See also Acheson-
McCloy, June 21, 1950, Ibid., 689-690.
92 Acheson-Schuman, October 30, 1949, FRUS, 1949, III: 622-625, quote 624. Some of the exceptions to the
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long-term American commitment. Dean Acheson's views had changed by 1951, as will be developed below. For
American integration efforts during this time frame see Timothy P. Ireland, Creating the Entangling Alliance: The
Origins ofthe North Atlantic Treaty Organization (Westport, C.T.: Greenwood Press, 1981), pp. 168-169, and Alan
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The European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) was a proposal to turn European coal
and steel into a cartel of rationalized production and sale. It was significant economically
because it involved commercial cooperation among its member nations and discrimination
against those without. But more important was the fact that it gave authority to a supranational
decision-making body. National authorities and private companies would give up their capacity
to influence decisions over the very sinews of modern military power; it would be impossible for
a nation to organize a military rearmament without either the permission of this body, or its
obvious deconstruction. This fact served as a large confidence-building boost between France
and Germany, for obvious reasons. From the American perspective, the proposal was also
exciting because it provided the industrial basis for a genuine third force. What the supranational
body could prevent, it could also produce: the foundation of a truly European military power.93
Washington was ecstatic, and with good reason: American diplomats had been
advocating similar solutions for years. As head of the World Bank, John McCloy had proposed
an early version of the ECSC. And as John Foster Dulles noted in a contemporaneous telegram
to Acheson, "this proposal is along the lines that Secretary Marshall and I thought about in
Moscow in 1947, but which we did not believe the French would ever accept." Nor was
American enthusiasm limited to cheering from the sidelines. Behind the scenes, American
diplomats worked diligently to get the ECSC negotiated and ratified. McCloy, as High
Commissioner of the German occupation, used threats and promises of considerable influence to
break heads among German industrialists and get the deal done. German interests were over a
barrel, having to accept French domination and give up valuable considerations to fend off
McCloy's pressure.94
AMERICAN COMMITMENT, GERMAN REARMAMENT, AND THE EDC. After the invasion of
South Korea, American statesmen quickly realized Europe would need more than a third party
nuclear deterrent for its defense. But their first impulse was to respond by funding the Europeans
to defend themselves, in the style of the Marshall plan and other third force thinking. Acheson
sent an all-hands message to American diplomats in Europe, informing them that they could
expect a large degree of American assistance in raising forces, including the extension of
Marshall Plan aid and new programs from Congress. He also admonished that Europe should
"think and act in terms of an effort over the next two years, limited only by... its ability to
recruit, train, and maintain qualified manpower to meet its requirements under NAT planning...
we believe all countries will have to accept lower levels of consumption than would otherwise be
possible and will have to divert resources from investment in peacetime production to other
purposes." Though Acheson was happy to discourse on European sacrifices, the lengthy
telegram made no mention of American forces. Subsequent diplomacy at North Atlantic Council
would withhold the promise of U.S. troops until mid-August, 1950.95
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However, it soon became apparent that American troops were exactly what would be
required to overcome European resistance. France wanted it "clearly demonstrated that in any
war that might come, French soldiers would be dying for something that has a chance to
survive." Germany wanted similar assurances, driven by their aforementioned despair over
Soviet power after Korea. In general, it was argued, the allies "doubt that the Soviet hordes can
be resisted. Their view is that there is practically no chance of their being successful in war... the
problem is how to encourage the rebirth of a determined will to fight. Except for the relatively
rare individual, among most people the will to resist is related to their calculations of their
chances of success." In order to give the Europeans the psychological strength to make the
sacrifices required to rearm, an American military contribution would have to be made, just as it
required an American economic contribution in the Marshall Plan to bolster European economies
against communism. By early August, the American ambassadorial team was firmly agreed on
this point.96
The international system had sent another signal that American political goals were
outstripping its means-an increased American military commitment to Europe would be
required to ensure the latter's political integrity. However, this increased commitment was
coupled with policies designed to make it temporary and less costly: German rearmament and the
creation of an integrated European Defense Force, one that could both restrain German
autonomy and forge the nucleus of an army that could balance the Soviets. Given long-standing
American policy opposing German rearmament, and the intense trouble that would ensue over
the issue in the next four years, these changes are particularly noteworthy.
The logic of combining the American commitment with German rearmament and an
integrated European army was shaped, at least in part, by the fear of a long-term American
entanglement. When American Ambassador to Britain Lewis Douglas first broached the idea of
an American commitment to Acheson on July 12, he noted that the Joint Chiefs of Staff were
opposed to parts of his proposal, and that "you may consider that this letter should go directly
into the waste paper basket. If so, I understand completely." The same feelings came through
again as officials wrestled with the problem of German rearmament and an integrated force.
Americans recognized that the only way to get around French objections to German troops was
to integrate them into a non-national force; "a truly common effort is the only way out." But as
Ambassador to France David Bruce argued:
Such an approach may run up against the problem that the European nations probably could go much
farther than the US and the UK in surrendering control of their defense and rearmament effort to a central
body. The French are aware of this fact and acknowledge that it will be more difficult to bury the fear of
Germany in a strictly European army than it would be to bury it in an army with a wider basis. However,
just as the Schuman proposal or a European federation can be part of a more loosely united Atlantic
community, so also could a European army participate in NATO.
Department, the deployment of American troops to Europe was not officially sought by Truman until late in the
summer.
96 Bruce-Acheson, July 28, 1950; Douglas-Acheson, August 8, 1950; both in FRUS, 1950,111: 151-159, 190-192
quotes 158, 191. The emerging debate, which is quite interesting, can be followed in the same volume of FRUS,
esp. FRUS, 1950,111: 132-207.
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McCloy and Douglas also suggested a similar approach of attaching the American contribution
to a European army more loosely through NATO. A clear motive-and concern-of the
American commitment was the ability to continue the policy of the third force. 97
The same buckpassing motives required German rearmament, though there was
disagreement within the administration over how soon rearmament should be pursued. By 1950,
it was commonly expected that America had only eighteen months to two years left of control in
West Germany. In that time, Germany would have to be tied firmly to the West. If the West
rearmed but left Germany behind, Germany would be nothing more than a ward of the United
States, its people demoralized and dispirited, prone to neutralism and communist appeals. It was
also unlikely such a situation would be stable on the American end. In response to French
complaints about the "delicacy" of French opinion on the subject of German rearmament,
McCloy was livid. "U.S. opinion is getting damn delicate itself" he wrote to Acheson, and if
"U.S. Troops should get pushed around without German troops to help them because of French
reluctance to face facts, I should shudder to think how indelicate U.S. opinion would suddenly
become." 98
America was not going to be the permanent caretaker of Europe. If rearmament were
going to happen now, then the Germans had to come along now, and further integration had to
proceed swiftly-America could not afford to leave behind a politically unstable and divided
Europe. This was the logic of the "single package" proposal insisting on German rearmament
and U.S. commitment simultaneously. As the official statement of the U.S. position put it, "it is
our objective to assist the European nations to provide a defense capable of deterring or meeting
an attack. When this objective is achieved it is hoped that the United States will be able to leave
to the European nation-members the primary responsibility, with the collaboration of the United
States, of maintaining and commanding such force." Some kind of organization had to be left
behind when the Americans departed, and it had to have a device for containing Germany within
Western Europe. An American withdrawal could only be underwritten by integration and
German rearmament, and these critical elements could not be risked by delay.99
The French were dead set against German rearmament, both for domestic political
reasons and because they feared it would provoke the Soviets. After the single package was
introduced at a NATO meeting in September 1950, the French broached a counter-proposal.
Instead of German rearmament with strict restraints through NATO, they suggested a genuinely
integrated European force, of the kind supported strongly in the State Department. This proposal
was eventually crafted into a sincere overture for further supranational integration in the military
97 Douglas-Acheson, July 12, 1950; Bruce-Acheson July 28, 1950; both in FRUS, 1950,111: 130-132, quotes 132,
157-58. For further comments about a more distant American relationship to the proposed European force, see
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FRUS, 1950,111: 190-192 (esp. 192), 205-207 (esp. para 2, 206), 180-182 (esp. para 7, 182), respectively.
98 For great detail on McCloy's treatment of the German problem see Schwartz, America's Germany, esp. pp. 124-
155, 216-234, quote p. 139. See also Acheson's comments to the North Atlantic Council, in Acheson-Acting
Secretary of State, September 15, 1950, FRUS, 1950 III: 316, which are typical of concern about German Eastward
orientation found in many documents. On arguments against German rearmament see Douglas-Acheson, August 2,
1950, "But to plunge Germany into this matter to soon, before we have made our commitments and the French will
to fight has been substantially encouraged, is hazardous business"; Bruce-Acheson, July 28, 1950; Bruce-Acheson,
August 9, 1950 "German man-power... should be postponed"; all in FRUS, 1950,111: 177-179, 151-158 (esp. 156),
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99 Acheson and Johnson-Truman, September 8, 1950, FRUS, III: 273-278, quote 277.
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realm, known as the European Defense Community (EDC). Through the mechanism of
negotiating and ratifying the EDC treaty, the French would delay German rearmament nearly
until Eisenhower's second term. In the interim, Eisenhower was named Supreme Commander
Allied Forces, Europe (SACEUR) and three additional American divisions were sent to the
continent. Nevertheless, the negotiation over German rearmament that dominated the next four
years of diplomacy in Europe was spurred in the first place by the renewed American desire to
exit the European continent.100
Indeed, the American fear of a long-term commitment runs through the various attempts
to grapple with the impasse over the EDC. Acheson's initial impulse was to secure temporary
German rearmament and then build the core of the EDC force structure within NATO while the
French and Germans were hashing out the details. He felt that from the "long term view point it
is probably neither practical nor in the best interests Europe or U.S. that there should be a US
Commander in Europe or substantial numbers of U.S. forces on Continent. We would, however,
regret to see the concept of international forces that is now accepted ever disintegrate to point
where nothing would remain on the Continent except national forces solely under national
control." Eisenhower could organize the defense of Europe such that French and German units
were grouped together, and could place them under the command of a French General on the
Central Front. In this way, there "would be a force which, as a military force, would not have to
be changed in any fundamental way whenever the time came that the overseas contingents might
be withdrawn."' 0'
But most of the American diplomats serving in Europe thought that these tactics would
be unable to achieve American free-riding aims. Bruce argued in another famous "long
telegram" that "after US commander and US troops are withdrawn, national components in
NATO will surely revert to separate national armies unless there is permanent European political
structure." A supranational force could not wait, and its postponement might even prevent an
American exit. What is more, the French and Germans would simply never come to terms any
other way; the EDC would be the fastest way to achieve German rearmament in the near term.
McCloy agreed with this analysis, while stressing the long-term goals of American diplomacy in
a meeting with West German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer. He pressured the Chancellor to
move forward quickly with the EDC because the "concept of European army is in harmony with
US long-range policy of closer association for Europe and is akin to Schuman Plan and the
federation of Europe." These integrative measures were essential because "it is evident that no
single country has resources to defend itself but that Europe together has the resources adequate
for a real defense against the East." In short, the EDC was now the sine qua non of the third
force strategy. If the American buckpassing strategy was to succeed it required up-front
investment in integrating institutions that could not be built on the fly at a later date.' 0 2
There were some in the government who disagreed with this entire line of thinking,
ultimately including Dean Acheson. Yet, whatever his personal views, support for a third force
100 For a detailed analysis of the convoluted diplomacy leading to the EDC, see McAllister, No Exit, pp. 189-205.
The delay was not purely due to the French; the West Germans contributed by insisting on strict political equality in
any force in which they participated. At one point the Germian minister negotiating demanded that his parking spot
be next to those of the other delegation heads. Schwartz, America's Germany, p. 211.
101 Acheson-Bruce, June 28, 1951; Acheson memo, July 6, 1951; both in FRUS, 1951, III: 800-805, 813-819,
quotes 802 and 816. 1 have corrected abbreviations from the original telegram.
102 Bruce-Acheson, July 3, 1951; McCloy-Acheson, July 6, 1951; both in FRUS, 1951, 111: 805-812, 1487-1489,
quotes 806 and 1487-1488. 1 have corrected abbreviations from the original telegrams.
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within the administration won Acheson's support. After Bruce, McCloy, and Eisenhower all
expressed firm support for the EDC as the fastest route to German rearmament and American
long term goals, Acheson presented the third force position to Truman: America should support
the creation of a supranational EDC in order to reconcile continental fears and interests, while
placing it within the "broader" framework of NATO in order to mitigate "British and other fears
of continental integration." This was the same idea that Douglas, Bruce, and McCloy had
presented a year earlier and essentially the same concept that Kennan had worked out in 1949.
And indeed, Acheson would play hardball to defend the essence of this position: a
temporary American commitment. France, Belgium, and the Netherlands all got cold feet in the
run-up to the signing of the EDC convention, justly afraid that it would weaken NATO and leave
them alone on the continent with a rearmed Germany. But Acheson resisted their demands for
further American commitments and for guarantees of American troop increases if Germany were
ever to leave the EDC.10 3
The Truman administration gave the Dutch the equivalent of John Foster Dulles' later
''agonizing reappraisal" speech-a scarcely veiled threat that American support could only be
guaranteed by further integration, rather than European demands for further commitment.
McCloy and Bruce's suggestions both used a lecturing tone, captured well in Bruce's sentence:
"this opportunity must not be lost, and if Benelux opposition has this result, it would be hard to
justify to American opinion." Acheson went easier on the French, but his opposition to their
importunes was just as resolute: "It must be made clear that our troops are not in Europe to
police the obligations of friends but to prevent aggression from without."
In the end, Acheson refused to modify the American position in order to promise the
French more security, with the exception of a face-saving change "not altering the meaning" of
the tripartite declaration of general support America and Britain would make. As Acheson
described the issue to the President, "all this is largely theoretical. Seventeen years hence either
the European Defense Community will be a strong, vital community from which no component
would wish to withdraw, or else long before then it will have received the kiss of death and be
but a hollow shell." European unity would survive on its own, or not at all.10 4
MILITARY POLICY
American military policy during Truman's second term featured the massive rearmament
associated with the Korean War and the commitment of American divisions to Europe. But in
administering these programs, the Truman administration continued to push its negative liberal
preferences: rearmament focused on nuclear weapons, the American ground commitment was
limited, and efforts were made to shift more costs to the Europeans. By the end of Truman's
time in office, high-level American strategy had become disintegrated: Truman was unwilling to
103 Acheson and Lovett-Truman, July 30, 1951, FRUS, 1951, III: 849-852, quote 850. On Acheson's opposition to
American withdrawal, see Spofford-Acheson, July 8, 1951; Acheson telegram French Embassy, July 16, 1951; both
in FRUS, 1951, III: 821-824, 832-836, esp. 822 and 835.
104 Bruce-Acheson, January 3, 1952; McCloy-Acheson, January 3, 1952; Acheson-Truman, February 16, 1952;
Acheson-Bruce, May 24, 1952; Acheson-Truman, May 26, 1952; all in FRUS, 1952-1954, V: 572-576, 576-578, 78-
80, 679-680, 680-683, quotes on 575, 79, 680, 681. Note also that during the long haggling over this issue, every
party was clearly anticipating the future effective (if not formal) dissolution of NATO and an American withdrawal
from the continent. See FRUS, 1952-1954, V: 631-634, 674-675, 677-80; Eisenhower-Acheson, July 7, 1951,
FRUS, 1951,111: 819-820.
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shoulder further American costs and Europe seemed unable to increase its own resource
extraction. The positive liberal Dean Acheson was focused entirely on ground forces and was
dismissive of attempts to substitute tactical nuclear weapons for troops. American grand strategy
was integrated on the ground by Eisenhower in his post as SACEUR, where he developed a
doctrine similar to the one he would employ as president.
LIMITED GROUND FORCES, NUCLEAR BUILD-UP. The new military commitment to
Europe was actually quite small compared to what might have happened. Despite a desire to
build a forward conventional defense, the United States only contributed six divisions to the
NATO line throughout the Cold War. This modest contribution meant that NATO could not
maintain an entirely conventional defense of West Germany without additional troops, at least
during the Truman period. Indeed, much of the fear generated in the Senate "Great Debate" over
the American commitment stemmed from unofficial estimates that America would have to
provide as many as fifteen divisions. Rather than focus on building ground forces, though, the
Truman administration opted to send over only three additional divisions, promised before
Congress they would be a temporary commitment, and accepted limitations on its ability to raise
the number of troops without further Congressional approval. The administration relied instead
on military assistance funding to spur further contributions from Europe. 10 s
Truman's negative liberal impulse to cut costs meant that the administration pushed
strongly for investment in independent European defense capacity, and for the European
production and finance of as much major military material as possible. As one report put it,
"U.S. aid after the capital buildup period must taper off sharply. Unless Europe is in position to
maintain its own defense effort post '54 it will not have achieved the goal of NAT adequate
security, based on the economic and political health and independence in Europe." Marshall,
then secretary of defense, explained the negative liberal sentiments driving policy in his
proposed defense to Congress: "we are buying European manpower in place of U.S. manpower
in the interest of the defense of the U.S. The European people have real economic problems
resulting from the war. They have lost great numbers of men and they have a difficult
Communist vote problem. In helping them solve these problems and get ahead with the defense
effort with U.S. assistance, we are defending the U.S."106
At the same time, the Truman administration focused on offshore military power: it
increased the budget for nuclear weapons three times during the 1950-1952 period. This
included a several fold increase in the amount of fissile material and a two orders of magnitude
increase in the number of weapons. The strategic air offensive against the Soviet Union
remained top military priority, and the Air Force received over forty percent of the Defense
budget. Several crucial technological innovations were funded and developed during this period,
which increased the efficiency and yield of nuclear weapons. Finally, the development of
tactical nuclear weapons for battlefield use moved forward at a brisk pace. The result of these
decisions was the development of a robust American nuclear capability, both on the battlefield
and strategically, paired with a relatively anemic ground effort. As Marc Trachtenberg aptly
105 John S. Duffield, Power Rules: The Evolution of NA TO's Conventional Force Posture (Stanford, CA: Stanford
University Press, 1995), pp. 51-59.
106 ISAC report, August 17, 1951; Meeting on the MTDP Gap, June 21, 1951; both in FRUS, 1951, III: 248-253,
197-204, quotes 249, 201-202. For the extensive strategizing throughout government over how to get Europe to
build and finance a defense capability, see also the meetings and memos in FRUS, 1951,111: 1-6, 29-34, 58-64, 82-
86, and 123-125.
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describes, it was "as if the United States was telling its European allies: you want forward
defense? Then come up with the troops. But if you can't, don't complain if we end up relying
on nuclear weapons." The administration's military decisions, though increasing the ground
commitment to Europe, were also consistent with the negative liberal focus on avoiding ground
troops and using standoff power to limit liability.107
STRATEGIC DISINTEGRATION. But by the end of the Truman administration, competing
perspectives behind American strategy were at odds with each other. Some in the State
Department thought that European integration was well on its way to developing an independent
center of power, but that America had to forestall the opinion that "we are now looking forward
to not too distant time when we can bring our troops home and return to pre World War II
relation to Europe." By 1952, Acheson himself had gone further than supporting just a lose
association with Europe, arguing that the U.S. should oppose the "possibility of a European
Union becoming a third force or opposing force." On the other side, David Bruce and other
European diplomats averred that "little consideration has been given in the US to the possibility"
of the third force becoming hostile to the United States and were openly debating Kennan's
proposals for long term withdrawal from Germany.' 0 8
This confusion was reflected in American military strategy: led by the positive liberal
Dean Acheson, the administration's diplomatic efforts focused entirely on a conventional build-
up. The Lisbon conference in 1952 set the force goals that were supposed to guide NATO
throughout the Cold War, and they were predicated on a wholly conventional defense as far East
as possible. Once this goal was explicitly made out to be a strong area defense East of the Rhine,
the force requirements of the concept were simply more than the economies of Western Europe
could bear. But the Truman administration still pushed relentlessly for an entirely conventional
strategy. Diplomacy during this year was focused on the issue of "closing the gap" between the
Lisbon force goals of 89 divisions (itself a political compromise) and what the Europeans were
willing to provide.109
At the same time, Acheson's ground force priorities were running into Truman's cost
cutting proclivities. Acheson saw tactical nuclear weapons as "Buck Rodgers gadgets" and
repeatedly fought off European attempts to utilize nuclear forces as a way to restrain the defense
build-up. But Truman refused the suggested alternative that America "assume some additional
portion of force requirements under the plan, after all the water has been squeezed out and we
have asked them [Europe] to do everything they can." In short, the administration was
demanding a conventional defense, but conflicting preferences at the highest levels of
government ruled out every method of achieving it: America would not use tactical nuclear
weapons, it would not contribute more, and Europe could not contribute more. Despite strong
signals from the international system, American military means were disintegrated from its
107 Rosenberg, "The Origins of Overkill," pp. 21-27. Trachtenberg, History and Strategy, p. 159. See also, Robert
A. Wampler, "Conventional Goals and Nuclear Promises: The Truman Administration and the Roots of the NATO
New Look," in NA TO: the Founding of the A tlantic Alliance and the Integration of Europe, ed. Francis H. Heller
and John R. Gillingham (Palgrave Macmillan, 1 992), 353-380.
108 Webb-Spofford, August 17, 1951, FRUS 1951, 111: 254-256, quote 255; Acheson-Bruce, September 19, 1952,
FRUS, 1952-1954, V: 323-327, quote 324; London Chiefs of Mission Meeting, September 24-26, 1952, FRUS,
1952-1954, VI: 643-665, esp. 655-662, quote 655.
109 On the Truman approach generally see Wampler, "Conventional Goals and Nuclear Promises: The Truman
Administration and the Roots of the NATO New Look," passim; Duffield, Power Rules, pp. 47-52 and 56-64.
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political goals, perhaps because the growing liberal incoherence within the administration pulled
policy in different directions.
It was left to Eisenhower as SACEUR to construct the obvious solution on the ground: to
use what conventional forces he had, and what nuclear forces he could get, to defend Europe as
far to the East as possible. Eisenhower did exactly this, putting into place the basic pieces of
what would later become the "New Look." He secured the command of nuclear forces for use
on the continent, squelched military proposals for an initial American retreat from Germany in
the event of war, and developed a plan based on the fifty to sixty divisions he thought he could
obtain alongside the early use of nuclear weapons on the battlefield. The pattern of America
military policy as actually implemented thus stayed on the same course it had been on since
World War Two. Though the Korean War had drawn the United States into a closer
commitment, American diplomatic policy was still building a center of power in Europe, and
American military policy was still seeking to limit American liability through a temporary
ground deployment and a nuclear strategy.' 0
SUMMARY OF AMERICAN GRAND STRATEGY, 1949-1952
TLFP correctly predicts a continued buckpassing strategy during the second Truman
administration. American policy remained centered on building a third force in Western Europe
that could block Soviet hegemony, though rising Soviet capabilities increased the cost and effort
Washington sank into the project. Even given its increasing engagement to protect an acceptable
balance of power in Europe, American policy retained important free-riding elements: the
number and pace of integrative projects increased, ground force commitments were kept to a
minimum, and the existing emphasis on nuclear weapons only rose. While the level of threat in
the international system rose after the Soviet nuclear test, and Dean Acheson's positive liberal
views reduced the administration's level of ideological coherence, core negative liberal
personnel were retained in the diplomatic corps and Defense Department. Combined with
Truman's fiscal rectitude and mixed ideological views, significant negative liberal impediments
existed to a ready embrace of a balancing strategy.
Three kinds of evidence highlight TLFP's power to explain the persistence of American
buckpassing. First, systemic and negative liberal influences on threat perception continued to
work at cross-purposes. The Soviet nuclear test started a chain of American security worries
culminating in NSC-68, which advocated massive American rearmament and implied further
commitments to Europe in order to oppose Soviet power. The trip-wire military strategy was
deeply problematic once America lost its nuclear monopoly, and American political hopes for
European balancing were increasingly tenuous in the face of such an obvious threat. Even so, it
was more than a year before American policies actually became integrated with their goals, as
Truman preferred to keep military budgets low and stashed NSC-68 in a dark corner of the
bureaucracy. The balance of power drove increasing threat perceptions, but negative liberal
cost-consciousness impeded a policy response.
110 Acheson quote from Meeting on the MTDP Gap, June 21, 1951, FRUS, 1951, III: 202. On European defense as
it was actually developed on the ground during the late Truman period, see Trachtenberg, History and Strategy, pp.
160-162; Wampler, "Conventional Goals and Nuclear Promises: The Truman Administration and the Roots of the
NATO New Look," pp. 363-368. On Truman administrations conventional focus and dismissal of nuclear weapons,
see Ibid. p. 353-360.
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Second, negative liberal priorities meant America's European diplomacy continued to
work towards a third force and the pursuit of innovative solutions in order to advance this goal.
The decision to break with British preferences on European integration reversed a long-time tacit
priority in American diplomacy. The ECSC was a real integrative breakthrough, facilitated by
years of American advocacy and an intense round of political strong-arm tactics in Germany.
The ECSC promised to form the core of a real power center, and it was this context that made the
increasing American troop commitment plausible. American statesmen made clear that this
temporary commitment had to be paired with intense economic strains on Europe's part, a major
German military contribution, and a supranational political framework for managing it all. The
Truman administration accepted several years of international turmoil and increasing military
risk in order to secure these third force goals; it was not about to absorb the costs of defending
Europe for the long-term.
Finally, increasing ideological incoherence in the administration may have swamped
systemic pressures for strategic integration. On the one hand, Truman's cost cutting proclivities
limited the American troop commitment to six divisions. The Defense Department emphasis on
developing a massive and varied nuclear arsenal and the political emphasis on inducing
European troop increases both meshed well with this vision. On the other hand, Acheson's
NATO diplomacy was focused entirely on ground forces and he dismissed the battlefield
possibilities of nuclear weapons. The combined effect was to acknowledge the need for a
forward defense of Europe but simultaneously rule out every method of achieving it. It fell to
Eisenhower to integrate American military strategy with its political goals, when as SACEUR he
instituted an early version of his nuclear heavy "New Look" strategy. And as the next chapter
will show, Eisenhower's military choices were rooted in his ideological views.
Conclusion
American grand strategy in the early Cold War was subject to frequent adjustment and re-
integration, as the Truman administration's negative liberal biases sat uneasily within an
international system that increasingly tended towards bipolarity. TLFP expects this kind of
strategic outcome: when international and ideological incentives point in opposite directions,
policy will often swing between liberal preferences and systemic imperatives. Interestingly, the
growing disintegration between the second Truman administration's political ends and military
means was plausibly the result of rising ideological incoherence. The positive liberalism of
Dean Acheson meshed well with an international system incentivizing a forward defense of
Western Europe. The administration's build up of nuclear forces and insistence on small ground
commitments would eventually produce a coherent alternative under Eisenhower's influence.
But by 1952, the two tendencies were at odds with each other, and the result was a forward
commitment without an assured forward defense.
In the main, though, TLFP's variables produced a reasonably coherent buckpassing
strategy throughout Truman's time in office. During his first term, the administration quickly
recognized the European power imbalance, but worked to downplay its importance through
cooperation with the Soviets. When the cooperative policy fell apart over Germany, the
administration acknowledged the realities of Soviet power and worked to develop a third force.
This strategy was designed to allow an early American withdraw from the continent and a
reduction of costs, albeit not as quickly or as inexpensively as had been originally envisioned.
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Thus, the ERP emphasized European integration and economic recovery, while military policy
was little more than a threat to unleash the strategic deterrent.
After the Soviets broke the American nuclear monopoly, American commitments were
forced to change, though they did so at a leisurely pace, given the stakes. It took an unexpected
war in Asia to launch a policy response to growing Soviet power. Still, American statesmen
retained a near obsession with building a European pole. A number of important diplomatic
initiatives preceded Western rearmament, which was itself coupled to integrative and political
projects of impressive ambition. The American commitment continued to be envisioned as
temporary, while the bulk of American defense spending built a powerful nuclear force well
suited for an offshore power. The negative liberal aversion to military costs, entangling
alliances, and permanent bureaucracies was evident during both periods. It would only increase
after Truman left office.
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Chapter Seven
Buckpassing, Balancing, and the Cold War Transition: American Grand Strategy under
Eisenhower and Kennedy
The period following the Cold War founding was the most tumultuous decade of the superpower
confrontation, and its most dangerous. From 1953-1963, tensions ran high in Europe.
Superpower clashes occurred over the political organization of Western Europe, the military
disposition of the Federal Republic of Germany, the status of West Berlin, and they ultimately
culminated in the Cuban Missile Crisis. Yet by the time of President Kennedy's assassination in
the autumn of 1963, the Cold War had "cooled down." The superpowers shifted much of their
attention to the third world for the final three decades of the conflict, and Europe was calm in
comparison. How did such a watershed transition in an erstwhile dangerous arena come to pass?
In essence, world politics calmed down when the Kennedy administration shifted to a balancing
strategy.
A stable political order then emerged based on the permanent division and subordination
of Germany. American power became permanently committed to the European continent, where
it would lead an alliance that integrated West German power to the status quo, while
counterpoising the might of Western Europe against Soviet expansion. On the other side of the
line, the Soviet Union dominated its Eastern European satellites, most notably East Germany,
mobilizing a powerful military alliance and imposing a political totalitarianism, both of which
prevented the Western orbit from moving East. Each side balanced the other perfectly, and
European policy was locked into the designs of the Superpowers. The result was the longest
period of peace in European history. But it could not come about until the last major adherents
to the older liberalism had left the scene. TLFP thus provides a useful tool for analyzing this
major American strategic change and its international political consequences.
As TLFP expects, during the negative liberal Eisenhower administration, American grand
strategy stayed on the buckpassing path set by Truman: Eisenhower pursued a European "third
force" with even more vigor than his predecessor, seeking to shift primary responsibility for
containing the Soviet Union to a European conglomerate. West Germany remained critical to
this strategy, as it needed to be strong enough to lead a united Europe, but dependent enough on
others that fear of German power would not fracture a balancing coalition. To this end,
Eisenhower pursued diplomatic policies that would tie the Germans to Europe and military
policies that would arm them with nuclear weapons. Eisenhower's refusal to compromise on his
ambitions for the FRG lay at the heart of Cold War tensions in the 1950s.
The positive liberal Kennedy completely reoriented American grand strategy, assuming a
balancing posture-towards both the Soviets and the Western Europeans. No longer interested
in an exit from Europe, American strategy under Kennedy actively sought to crush the possibility
of a third force, to better facilitate a compromise with Russia and protect liberalism in the West.
The FRG was denied nuclear arms and political independence, while Western Europe as a whole
was brought to heel within NATO. In return for the permanent American commitments that
guaranteed West German quiescence, the Soviets tacitly agreed to cease challenging the status
quo in Europe, most notably in Berlin. In this way, Kennedy's strategy led to the establishment
of Cold War bipolarity: Europe was peacefully managed by the superpowers, and the liberal
order that had arisen in the West was protected from the centrifugal forces of nationalism,
autarchy, and autocracy that might be produced by the tensions of power politics.
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The process underlying American strategic decision-making also strongly confirms
TLFP. Eisenhower concentrated on the growing material threat from the Soviet Union; he had
little interest in communism per se as a threat, and was personally willing to acknowledge the de
jure legitimacy of the socialist regime in East Germany. Diplomatically, he continued to craft
champion the third force through numerous institutional solutions, hoping to thereby shift
America's Cold War burdens to its European allies. Militarily, he kept the focus on nuclear
weapons and American offshore power. Much of his policy was driven by intense anti-statist
rationales and the fear of a garrison state emerging if America had to make permanent
commitments abroad.
For Kennedy's part, he feared Soviet power, but was more concerned with the effects it
might have on the Western liberal order. Kennedy's hostility to the third force was driven by the
fear that such a power conglomerate would quickly become illiberal-cither inward looking and
economically autarchic, or driven to outward aggression by nationalism and anti-democratic
impulses lying just beneath the surface of the Western European body politic. He therefore
sought more control over European foreign policy, diplomatically neutering the possibility of a
third force and asserting the primacy of American dominated NATO. Militarily, Kennedy
moved towards a more ground force-centric approach to the defense of Europe, as such forces
would both give more influence in a crisis situation and also cemented control of the alliance
with Germany.
The international system provided the major impetus behind American commitments in
both periods, though it cannot explain the change between Eisenhower's buckpassing and
Kennedy's balancing, as Soviet power made it a potential hegemon well into the 1960s.
Systemic feedback also continued to play an integrating role. West European resistance to the
EDC forced Eisenhower to fall back on other strategies for integrating Europe, most prominently
several policies for transferring nuclear weapons to Europe. This in turn, caused Soviet pressure
in the form of the Berlin crisis, to which the Eisenhower and Kennedy administration had
different responses. The constant level of geopolitical threat caused both administrations to
adjust their means and ends, but it was not until negative liberal impediments were removed that
America actually changed grand strategies.
This chapter seeks to demonstrate these claims and to root their causes in variables of
TLFP. I begin by measuring the independent variables, illustrating that while the level of
geopolitical threat remained constant, there was a major ideological shift between Eisenhower's
negative liberal administration and the positive liberal views of Kennedy. The next two sections
detail Eisenhower's buckpassing strategy and Kennedy's balancing strategy. I show that the
character of these grand strategies is consistent with my primary theoretical predictions and that
the process surrounding policy formation was driven by each administration's different liberal
concerns. A final section addresses potential alternate explanations for the American grand
strategy during the entire Cold War period covered in this study, from 1945-1963.
Measuring the Independent Variables
In this section I take measurements of the independent variables in order to generate
empirical expectations for TLFP. I am principally concerned with establishing the concept of
liberty held by Presidents Dwight Eisenhower and John Kennedy, who were the primary foreign
policy decision-makers in their respective administrations. As before, I survey mostly private
views expressed before each President took power, expressed across three substantive categories:
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explicit philosophical statements, attitudes towards political centralization, and views of fiscal
and economic issues. I conclude the section with a measurement of geopolitical threat from
1953-1963.'
EISENHOWER'S CONCEPT OF LIBERTY
Dwight Eisenhower was a negative liberal. His private discourse reveals a classical
Lockean approach to liberty, a deep fear of centralization, a strong defense of balanced budgets,
and a spirited defense of the free-enterprise economy. The idea of liberty as freedom from
constraint runs throughout his views.
PHILOSOPHY. Ira Chernus succinctly sums up Eisenhower's philosophical approach:
"when laid out the general's ideological views constituted a sort of primer in the popularized
Lockean theory that underlay so much of the discourse of his day." The key features of this
system were its design to secure "a maximum of individual liberty" and that its "insistence on
individual freedom springs from the unshakeable conviction in the dignity of man, a belief-a
religious belief-that through the possession of a soul he is endowed with certain rights." 2
The great threat to these rights was the central state. Eisenhower explained this threat in
his family discussion of a proposal to make a movie version of his life. Writing to his brother
Milton, he expressed skepticism, but hoped the project might express "the virtues of the
American system." Eisenhower thought that "the theme of the picture could take the slant of
glorifying opportunities presented under the American system and tend to support initiative,
effort, and persistence in the average American family, as opposed to the idea of collectivity that
discards self-dependence and is ready to trust to regimentation for a secure future." To his wife
Mamie, Eisenhower hoped the movie "might encourage the kids to work, and to depend on
themselves, rather than become to complacent with respect to the State's obligation to the
individual." 3
In other private remarks, Eisenhower displayed similar concerns. As President of
Columbia he defended teaching undergraduates about communism in a letter to Louis Smith: "I
believe all of us should be taught the inevitable results of adopting statism either through
inevitably drifting into it or through conquest from without... at first hand I know something of
the human stultification that comes about through paternalism that finally results in complete
Omitted here for space reasons is a survey of the views of Eisenhower and Kennedy's principal subordinates. In
Kennedy's case, his major cabinet secretaries and foreign policy advisors only increase the administration's positive
liberalism. Eisenhower's administration is more mixed, but the other major foreign policy figure, Secretary of State
John Foster Dulles, shared Eisenhower's negative liberal views. In both administrations the President was the
dominant force in foreign policy decision-making, meaning their political attitudes are a good proxy for the type of
liberalism present in the administration as a whole.
2 First quote in Ira Chernus, General Eisenhower: Ideology and Discourse (East Lansing, MI: Michigan State
University Press, 2002), p. 85. Second quote from Eisenhower speech to Daughter of the American Revolution, May
1947, in Rudolph L. Treuenfels, Eisenhower Speaks: Dwight D. Eisenhower in his Messages and Speeches (New
York: Farrar & Strauss, 1948), pp. 190-191.
3 Eisenhower to Milton Eisenhower, May 31, 1944, Alfred D. Chandler and Louis Galambos, eds., The Papers of
Dwight David Eisenhower (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins Press, 1970), 3: 1897, hereafter PDDE; Eisenhower to
Mamie Eisenhower, May 31, 1944, in Dwight D. Eisenhower, Letters to Mamie, ed. John S.D. Eisenhower (New
York: Doubleday Books, 1978), p. 184.
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loss of freedom and in the surrender of all personal initiative to absolute governmental
regimentation."4
Eisenhower displayed common negative liberal tropes about the value of democracy: it
was useful for preventing the rise of tyrants and the hijacking of the public good by special
interests. Writing early in the Second World War to Mamie, he worried about the revolutionary
upheaval the war was causing to human society, and the effects this might have on the American
political system. "Even after we have won the military victory" he wrote, "the problems facing
the world will be such as require courage equal to that of the battlefield... the danger is that
special economic, industrial, or social groups will apply pressures that will either be disruptive or
might force, for a time at least, the adoption of some form of dictatorship in our democracies."
The pent up demands resulting from fifteen years of material privation might overwhelm a
system of limited government to the benefit of rent seekers. This would be not only unfair, but a
grave threat to freedom. Democracy "if we have to define it in one word-must be grasped by
the word cooperation," Eisenhower thought. "If any group of individuals seeks only its own
immediate profit, it inevitably lessens the efficiency of the whole" at producing liberty for all.
Thus, democracy's primary value was to hamstring such special interests. In a letter to British
Field Marshall Henry Wilson he argued in this vein that that "the unrestricted genius of all the
people will in the long run be responsible for constructive development beyond that possible in a
regimented and police state." 5
CENTRALIZATION. Eisenhower advocated a limited night-watchmen style state to "carry
on necessary central functions, including the basic one of security," both from external threat and
internal crime and disorder. For these purposes it needed "rules and laws to control relationships
among individuals and protect the whole from without." But Eisenhower also felt keenly the
negative liberal fear of centralization. Writing a letter to a friend on the now mundane subject of
federal funding for education, he pronounced "one of my abiding convictions is that the more we
permit the Federal Government into such matters, except on the basis of research, the more we
are drifting towards an undesirable centralization of authority and power. That I am against." 6
The agent of the central state was the bureaucracy, for which Eisenhower had choice
words. Writing in his diary, he worried that "the trend towards government centralization
continues-alarmingly. In the name of 'social security' we are placing more and more
responsibility upon the central government-and this means that an ever-growing bureaucracy is
taking over an ever-greater power over our daily lives. Already the agents of this bureaucracy
cover the land... they nag, irritate, and hound every businessmen in the U.S." His dislike of
creeping bureaucratic influence made him detest the New Deal. The problem with Roosevelt's
program was that it "sought to substitute SECURITY for OPPORTUNITY." Talking to his
friend William Robinson, Eisenhower railed that "the unlimited growth of bureaucracy in
Washington is a national disgrace... unless this is cleaned up completely and thoroughly, our
Federal government in any hands faces a doubtful future." Chernus sums up Eisenhower's
negative liberal fear of central authority well: "in his political vocabulary, freedom was not
4 Eisenhower to Louis Smith, May 25, 1948, PDDE 10: 85.
5 Quotes in Eisenhower to Mamie Eisenhower, September 15, 1942, Dwight D. Eisenhower, Letters to Mamie, pp.
42-43; Chernus, General Eisenhower: Ideology and Discourse, p. 86. Eisenhower to Henry Wilson, October 30
1947, PDDE 9:2022.
6 First two quotes in Eisenhower speech to Daughter of the American Revolution, May 1947, in Rudolph L.
Treuenfel s, Eisenhower Speaks: Dwight D. Eisenhower in his Messages and Speeches (New York: Farrar & Strauss,
1948), pp. 190-191. Third quote in Eisenhower to Roger Williams, September 15, 1948, PDDE 10: 194.
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primarily the ability to make rational choices, but the freedom from external constraint, the
freedom to control oneself." Therefore, society must either be "governed by justice or enslaved
by force." 7
FISCAL AND ECONOMIC VIEWS. Eisenhower was a fiscal conservative, believing the
government should keep its budget balanced, avoid high spending, and keep down inflation. He
worried that if America's fragile fiscal house got out of order, the basis of its military strength
would be sapped and opportunity at home diminished. He was prone to somewhat wild-eyed
anti-tax rhetoric in his private correspondence, once writing a columnist to congratulate him on
the phrase "taxes turn free men into things of the government." Even when more rhetorically
restrained, he viewed government spending as a debit against the fruits of free labor, and warned
against "repressive taxation." For the same reason, Eisenhower feared the eroding solvent of
inflation, which chipped away at savings and investment, thus undermining hard work, free
enterprise, and personal virtue. Above all, Eisenhower believed in working conscientiously
towards a balanced budget. Eisenhower was ferociously anti-Keynesian, attacking the budget
theories of Truman's CEA head Leon Keyserling for several years after Eisenhower had
assumed the presidency. It was only by restraining the state's fiscal capacity that the relationship
between ends and means, between freedom and collective good, could be maintained.8
Eisenhower recognized that the main entry on the American fiscal ledger was military
spending, and was particularly determined to keep it in check. As early as 1949, before the
major increases in American defense expenditures, Eisenhower was writing in his diary that
America must "prepare a position of strength...without bankrupting ourselves." The theme of
national bankruptcy was a common one in his discourse as time went on, as he warned that the
American people could "eventually destroy ourselves through expenditures we cannot afford."
Trying to maintain absolute security was counter-productive to freedom: "if we are then trying to
defend a way of living, freedom which is tied up with free enterprise, we cannot bankrupt the
system at home by pretending to mobilize forces that are going to protect it." Ultimately, it was
a question of balance. "A democracy will always have a deficit in the desirable strength of its
security establishment," Eisenhower argued. "Some middle line must be determined between
desirable strength and unbearable cost."9
Eisenhower placed fundamental importance on capitalism and a free-market economy.
Indeed, free enterprise was the bedrock principle protected by the American system: "if the
individual is to be truly free, he must be provided with the opportunity to gain a livelihood
through means of his own choosing." When the state interfered in the economy, the end result
was that individuals "would necessarily respond only to orders from the government."
Individual opportunities would be eliminated and individual initiative destroyed. The growth of
the state, the regulation of business, and the reduction of freedom were all tied up together in
Eisenhower's opposition to much of the New Deal. Writing to himself in his diary about why he
had not taken his opposition public, he noted in passing "as between the so-called concept of the
7 Quotes in Eisenhower diary entry, January 14, 1949, PDDE, 10: 431; Chernus, General Eisenhower: Ideology and
Discourse, p. 91, caps in original; Ibid., p. 87.
8 Eisenhower to George Sokolsky, January 20, 1949, PDDE 10: 445. Eisenhower's fiscal views are well known.
For an example, see John L. Gaddis, Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of Postwar American National
Security Policy (New York: Oxford University Press, USA, 1982), pp. 132-134.
9 Quotes in Eisenhower diary entry, January 27, 1949, PDDE 10: 449; and Chernus, General Eisenhower: Ideology
and Discourse, p. 164.
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welfare state and the operation of a system of competitive enterprise there is no doubt where I
stand."10
Such free-market support led him to be very skeptical of the labor movement. While
sympathetic to some labor goals and irritated with high-handed management tactics, Eisenhower
believed the government had little place in disputes over wages. Labor leaders were "forever
seeking laws to hamstring management," instead of enhancing productivity by becoming more
efficient. Instead of profiting through the voluntary cooperation of the free-market, labor unions
"have become so unreasonable in their demands that they are defeating their own ends." Writing
to labor leader Phillip Murray, he confessed "I most earnestly believe that whenever these
matters can be solved locally or by private institutions we are badly advised to permit federal
participation.""
COMPOSITE CODE. An ideologue in the least derogatory sense of the term, Eisenhower
was a firmly within the camp of negative liberty. He despised bureaucracy, distrusted
centralization, worried over fiscal profligacy, and was committed to a free enterprise economy
with little state interference. As a post-Great Depression American, he had made his peace with
some parts of the New Deal, meaning he departs somewhat from the ideal typical negative
liberty advocate. But he is at least solidly within the set of negative liberty, easily more within
than without. Conservatively, I code him as NL: Medium.
Table 7.1: Eisenhower's Concept of Liberty
Explicit Centralization Fiscal views Overall
philosophy
Eisenhower Anti-statist, Highly Fiscal NL Medium:
opportunity decentralist; conservative; solidly within
focused, anti- anti-regulation, the set.
individualist. bureaucracy. anti-labor.
KENNEDY'S CONCEPT OF LIBERTY
John Kennedy was a positive liberal, whose type of liberalism trended more positive as
he separated his politics from those of his virulently negative liberal father. His private discourse
reveals a basic support for the welfare state, centralization of power, expansionary fiscal policy,
and government intervention in the economy, stemming from his analysis of comparative social
systems as a young man. Though occasionally voicing negative liberal views early in his career
and in anti-communist contexts, he was in fact greatly concerned by the decadence of negative
liberal individualism.
10 First two quotes from Eisenhower speech to Daughters of the American Revolution, May, 1947 in Treuenfels,
Eisenhower Speaks: Dwight D. Eisenhower in his Messages and Speeches, pp. 190-191; third quote in Eisenhower
diary entry, January 1, 1950, PDDE 11: 886.
" Quotes in Chernus, General Eisenhower: Ideology and Discourse, p. 91; Eisenhower diary entry January 1, 1950,
PDDE 11: 886; and Eisenhower to Phillip Murray, January 17 1949, PDDE 10:439. See also Chemus, General
Eisenhower: Ideology and Discourse, pp. 174-176 on Eisenhower's relationship with labor.
314
PHILOSOPHY. Kennedy's starting point for political analysis was the importance of re-
distribution and government intervention for creating real freedom. He seems to have developed
these views during college on a pivotal summer trip to Europe. There, he had the opportunity to
observe aristocracy, fascism, and communism, while struggling with the different social systems
in his trip diary. Of the upper class French he wrote that "while they all like Roosevelt, his type
of government would not succeed in France, which seems to lack the ability of seeing a problem
as a whole. They don't like [Premier] Blum as he takes away their money and gives it to
someone else-that to a Frenchman is tres mauvais." In attacking both parties to the Spanish
Civil War, he noted that "at the beginning the government was in the right, morally speaking, as
its program was similar to the New Deal." Later, during a brief interval at Stanford, he would
point "to FDR as a model of how to make big changes without overturning traditional
institutions." Clearly, the basic philosophy of positive liberty at the heart of the New Deal was
congenial.12
Personally, Kennedy's own vision of freedom emphasized active participation and the
development of valued faculties characteristic of positive liberty-he had a teleological vision of
freedom. As a young man, he contended in his senior thesis that democracy was valuable
"because it allows for the full development of man as an individual." Reflecting privately for his
memoirs on audiotape before assuming the presidency, he recalled that "I saw how politics filled
the Greek definition of happiness-'a full use of your powers along lines of excellence in life-
affording scope."' He argued that "everything now depends upon what government decides.
Therefore, if you are interested, if you want to participate, if you feel strongly about any public
question," politics was the place to be-and his list of what counted as a 'public question'
included subjects as broad as "labor, what happens in India, [and] the future of American
agriculture." Kennedy's own vision of freedom stressed active participation and government's
role in deciding many questions. 3
CENTRALIZATION. Influenced by his father's views, Kennedy occasionally harped on
negative liberal themes in public speeches, especially in an anti-communist context. He referred
to a "scarlet thread that runs throughout the world" and noted that "the right of the individual
against the state is the keystone of our Constitution." Along these lines he voted in Congress for
the Twenty-Second Amendment limiting a President to two terms and would also defend
Congressional committee prerogatives against institutional centralization.' 4
However, these expressions were a minor theme against a backdrop of skepticism
regarding the inefficiency and decadence of undirected individualism. The major theme of his
senior thesis at Harvard, soon after published as a reasonably prominent book, was the
inefficiency of democratic capitalism in foreign policy. The British humiliation at Munich was
caused by Britain's unwillingness to pay for rearmament, a product of classical liberal illusions
and the free play of self-interest in a democracy. Even as the storm in Europe approached,
"every group wanted rearmament, but no group felt there was any need for it to sacrifice its
privileged position." This was a general problem of negative liberty: "when it requires a period
of years to build up an industrial system able to produce this armament, we see the disadvantages
of democracy's position. She is forced to pay for everything out of our budget, and she is limited
1I have added a comma to Kennedy's first quote in Robert Dallek, An Unfinished Life: John F. Kennedy, 1917-
1963 (New York: Little, Brown and Company, 2003), pp. 49-50; Nigel Hamilton, JFK: Reckless Youth (New York:
Random House, 1995), p. 184. Final quote is Dallek's paraphrase of a Kennedy interlocutor, p. 67.
13 Dallek, An Unfinished Life, pp. 64, 120.
"4 Ibid., p. 143, 217; Hamilton, JFK: Reckless Youth, p. 776.
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by the laws of capitalism-supply and demand." Without the ability to control prices, direct
production, and increase revenues, liberal democracies were threatened. The lesson for America
was obvious: "instead of claiming that our great national wealth and high standard of living are
due to our democratic capitalist system, we should realize the great natural resources we have.
Maybe they were the best form for developing the country, but that doesn't mean they don't have
to be proved the best today." The modem world called for more centralization and control. 5
Kennedy harped on such views throughout the Second World War. He detested efforts to
gainsay wartime practices, fuming in a private letter that "This war is not a debate over war
potentials and possible production limits... it is not a war that can be won by the blue-prints of
bombers that some day will cover the sky. This war must cease to be run as a political battle.
Generals must take charge-must, if necessary, regiment the country to the extent that makes the
Nazis look like starry eyed individualists if we are ever going to come out on top." Spinning
wild geopolitical fantasies about Japan invading America, he concluded in another letter that the
war was much more important than "parity prices, 40-hour weeks, cost-plus contracts, what
happens to the U.S.A." These complaints were just an example of how America was
succumbing to British individualist decadence: "in a war like today's, tradition and way of life
and a great past history are merely excess baggage that impedes movement." In short, Kennedy
embraced centralization with gusto.' 6
FISCAL ROLE AND ECONOMIC VIEWS. Kennedy began his political career as a fiscal
moderate, but rapidly shifted towards a more expansive role for government spending. Early in
his congressional career, he would occasionally play the balanced budget card as a national
security issue, and there is evidence to indicate he was uncomfortable with the degree of
spending desired by his working class constituents. But by the time he arrived in the Senate in
1953 he had adopted conventional Keynesian views: his first major effort as a freshman senator
was to produce an incredibly detailed report promoting a massive federal subsidy of the New
England economy. Moreover, as he neared his run for the Presidency, he surrounded himself
with Keynesian advisors. No less a figure than Paul Samuelson wrote the pre-inaugural
assessment of the American economy for the transition team, which Kennedy approved. The
report mentioned "the mistaken notion that the economy is unable to bear extra-burdens" from
defense spending, and recommend that defense increases "can only help, rather than hinder the
health of our economy in the period immediately ahead." As Kennedy's head of the Council of
Economic Advisors would later put it, his growth-oriented fiscal views "put at his disposal, like
nothing else can, the resources needed to achieve great societies at home and grand designs
abroad."' 7
Kennedy did not develop sophisticated views on domestic policy until he was running for
Congress after the war. Though occasionally expressing balanced budget views and a reluctance
to go as far on economics as some of his working class constituents, his positive liberalism
increased over time. The appointment of Theodore Sorenson as a policy advisor and Kennedy's
principal .speechwriter marked this evolution, of which Kennedy was quite conscious. As he
reassured Sorenson, who harbored doubts that Kennedy's past record made him too conservative,
"you've got to remember I entered politics out of my father's house." But the past was not
"5 Dallek, An Unfinished Life, p. 64; Hamilton, JFK: Reckless Youth, pp. 318-19.
16 Hamilton, JFK: Reckless Youth, pp. 465, 481, 482.
"7 Quotes in Gaddis, Strategies of Containment, p. 204. On Kennedy's early fiscal views, see Dallek, An Unfinished
Life, pp. 142-143.
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indicative of the present, and Kennedy had formed his own views. Even Joseph Kennedy
himself was forced to admit to Sorenson that "you couldn't write speeches for me. You're too
much of a liberal. But you writing speeches for Jack is different." 8
Indeed, Kennedy moved over time from an incoherent mix of his father's fiscal
conservatism and his own appreciation of the New Deal, to a more consistent positive liberalism
he viewed as a moderate alternative to other social systems abroad. This came out in his
stringent anti-communism, which was based in part on staving off radicalism at home. In
attacking Henry Wallace as soft on communism, he sought to defend the superiority of the mixed
economy in left-wing terms: "many people will tell you" Kennedy argued, that "the Russians are
achieving economic security at not too great cost in loss of personal freedom. The truth is that
the Russian people have neither economic security nor personal freedom." There followed a
prodigious attack on Soviet economic production, followed by the sobriquet "Is that economic
security? If it is I hope and pray that we never have economic security in the United States."19
Kennedy's alternative was a government-guided capitalism that created effective freedom
for all. He insisted against his father that he "was not for laissezfaire-business did need
regulation by the government 'to eliminate the trends of over-production and low purchasing
power."' Kennedy defended his party affiliation by listing a long string of New Deal
accomplishments and concluding "most important, in my opinion, the Democratic party
recognizes that our prosperity is precarious and to protect it the government must be prepared to
use its strength and its resources in fighting economic stagnation where ever it threatens." He
made his major issues housing and labor. Kennedy attacked the anti-labor Taft-Hartley
amendments to the Wagner Act viciously, and claimed that "the only time that private enterprise
alone anywhere near met the demand for houses was in 1925." By the time he had reached the
Senate, he held conventional liberal views on the economy. His fundamental New Deal
orientation took him towards the positive liberal viewpoint.2 0
COMPOSITE CODE. Kennedy held fairly typical views on positive liberty associated with
his support for the New Deal. He believed from an early age that government intervention was
necessary to secure economic liberty; that active participation in political affairs was an
especially valuable kind of freedom; and that political centralization needed to replace
decentralized individualism in American society. Though initially retaining some of his father's
conservative economic and fiscal views, he shifted left towards more fiscal and economic
interventionism as he matured politically. By the time he ran for President, Kennedy held the
conventional attitudes of positive liberty, sitting in the ideological center of the Democratic
Party. I code him conservatively PL: Medium.
18 Both quotes in Ibid., p. 180. See also Ibid., p. 221 for further examples of Kennedy's rejection of his father's
ideology, and pp. 142-143 for his early negative liberal expressions.
19 Hamilton, JFK: Reckless Youth, p. 788.
20 Joan Blair and Clay Blair, The Searchfor JFK (New York: Berkley Publishing Corporation, 1976), p. 464;
Hamilton, JFK: Reckless Youth, p. 785; Dallek, An Unfinished Life, p. 144.
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Table 7.2: Kennedy's Concept of Liberty
Explicit Centralization Fiscal and Overall
philosophy economic views
Kennedy Conventional Prominent Early budget PL Medium:
New Deal advocacy of balancer, solidly within





I turn now to coding the European balance of power during the Cold War transition from
Eisenhower and Kennedy, between 1953 and 1963. To do so, I rely, as before, on two central
concepts of power. Initially, I aim to assess the latent economic potential of the European great
powers. I employ three different indicators to get a sense of whether there was any one power
economically strong enough to potentially over-run the continent. First, I compare the European
poles on the Correlates of War (COW) index of steel production and energy consumption; this
measure provides a rough take on economic size and high technology industrial potential.
Second and third, I compare great powers at the same level of economic development using
Angus Maddison's series of historical GDPs and Paul Bairoch's index of total industrial
potential. Maddison's series is conventionally regarded as the best measurement of raw
economic size, while Bairoch's index includes a series of high-technology industries beyond
steel production, which can be misleading on its own. I start the comparisons in 1947, the first
year for which reliable figures are available across all indexes.
Next, I examine the military balance of power, by comparing the relative size of
European armies. The idea here is to assess if any power would have a decisive advantage in a
short war, independent of its industrial potential. Again, these numbers need to be treated
cautiously. Aggregate measures of military personnel are a poor substitute for an analysis of the
actual conventional balance. Nevertheless, they can be an illuminating window into the broader
strategic context.
These indicators show that the Soviet Union remained a potential hegemon throughout
the period and by some measures increased the size of its advantage. Its share of steel, energy,
and high technology industrial production increased throughout the decade. Soviet GDP
increased in relative size for most of the fifties and was overtaken by European economic growth
as the decade turned, leaving it with a still sizeable absolute advantage. Its military advantage
peaked in the mid 1950s, but it retained a favorable force-ratio thereafter.
Still, the potential for a balancing coalition within Europe remained. Even on
unfavorable measures, the EEC six maintained economic equality for most of the period; by
GDP they even held substantial superiority over the USSR. European rearmament, the
development of nuclear weapons in large numbers, and the demobilization of many (probably
not very useful) Soviet personnel made a military defense of Western Europe at least feasible.
The Soviet Union was a potential hegemon but Europe also had potential balancers.
318
LATENT ECONOMIC POWER. Table 7.3 shows the COW data for energy and steel
production, while table 7.4 gives the values from the representative years reported in Bairoch's
broader index of industrial potential. Ratios are given between the Soviet economy and that of
its next leading competitor. These figures show the familiar story of skyrocketing Soviet
production and stagnating British growth. By the COW figures, the USSR produced more than
half of Europe's economic might by 1961; West Germany had overtaken Britain as the second
leading power in 1959. In the Bairoch data, Soviet industrial power more than doubles between
1953 and 1963 while British size increases by about twenty-five percent. In both cases, the
Soviets hold around a two and a half fold advantage over the second leading power by decade's
end.
But as noted earlier, these numbers have probably lost the bulk of their utility by the time
Europe had recovered from the Second World War. By the 1950s, European economies had dug
themselves out of their hole and maintained similar levels of economic development-the
industrial revolution has done its work. As that level of economic development increased
overtime, the importance of steel production as a measure of technological sophistication was
drastically reduced. As the world economy integrated, at least in the West, the location of steel
production came to matter less and less. And as European economies became more
sophisticated, gross energy consumption mattered less than how efficiently that energy was
converted into real wealth. In short, latent economic power was more and more obvious in the
overall size of European economies as time ran forward.
Table 7.3: Relative Percentage of European Industry, 1953-1963 (COW)
1953 1954 1955 1956 1957 1958 1959 1960 1961 1962 1963
USSR 44.8 45.1 45.3 46.1 47.5 50.3 50.8 49.6 51.2 53.4 53.7
Britain 23.0 22.4 22.5 21.4 20.6 19.1 17.9 18.7 17.5 16.3 16.4
FRG 19.5 20.0 20.5 20.7 20.3 18.9 20.3 20.8 20.2 19.6 19.0
France 12.7 12.6 11.6 11.8 11.5 11.7 11.0 10.9 11.1 10.8 10.9
USSR/Br 1.95 2.01 2.02 2.16 2.31 2.64 2.51 2.39 2.53 2.72 2.83
or FRG
(594)
USSR/EEC .9 .9 1.0 1.0 1.1 1.2 1.2 1.1 1.6 1.7 1.8








The GDP data in table 7.5 likely tell a more accurate story. The picture is still one of
unbalanced power. The relative size of the Soviet economy peaks at 1.62 times the next leading
power in 1958 and hovers near a one and a half fold advantage over the entire period. This is a
significantly greater degree of economic superiority (on the continent) than had previously been
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observed in European history. At the same time, the foundations for a balancing coalition are
also obvious. From 1953-1963 the EEC six out-produced the Soviet Union by about forty
percent in aggregate terms; this disparity would be enhanced with the addition of British power.
Indeed, with the exception of the early 1960s in the COW data, the other industrial production
measures also show the EEC at least keeping pace with the Soviet economy.
Table 7.5: Relative Percentage of European Industry, 1953-1963 (Maddison GDP)
1953 1954 1955 1956 1957 1958 1959 1960 1961 1962 1963
USSR 37.2 37.1 37.5 38.6 39.1 39.2 37.8 38.3 37.7 38.4 37.0
Britain 24.3 24.0 23.2 22.1 21.7 20.7 21.0 20.1 20.3 19.8 20.3
FRG 22.3 23.8 23.5 23.7 24.2 24.3 25.4 25.4 25.2 25.4 25.8
France 16.2 16.1 15.8 15.7 16.0 15.8 15.8 15.7 15.8 16.3 16.9
USSR/Br 1.53 1.54 1.59 1.63 1.57 1.62 1.49 1.51 1.53 1.51 1.44
or FRG
(55-)
USSR/EEC .62 .62 .62 .64 .62 .65 .61 .62 .62 .61 .57
MILITARY POWER. Table 7.6 presents COW data on the size of European standing armies
from 1953-1963. Sadly, the utility of these numbers also plunges by this point in time, since
they give little nuance into the actual relative strengths involved in what had become a highly
anticipated potential military clash in Central Europe. A number of non-trivial observations can
still be made from the data.
First, the Soviets continued to modernize and reconfigure their powerful military during
the period, shutting down paper divisions and moving forces to the Central Front. They certainly
maintained conventional superiority over the Europeans; whether their actual superiority was as
large as the early two and a half to one force ratios or as small as the later forty percent
advantage is not clear. Second, in the last half of the decade, Germany rearmed and Europe
began to produce a still lower, but not incomparable, number of troops than the USSR. British
and Dutch forces declined during the 1950s, while the strength of French and Italian
contributions increased. Finally, European forces were backed by six ready American divisions
and a nuclear strategy during the period. But most post M-day divisions were anticipated to
come from Europe, and it is unclear how many more ready divisions might have been produced
without the American contribution. In any event, the United States did not even consider a
conventional defense of the continent under Eisenhower, so the Europeans did not need to plan
for one.
The conclusion I draw from these observations is that an organic European defense of
Western Europe was by no means inconceivable after German rearmament, particularly if the
Europeans could gain a nuclear capacity. Though work on the early Cold War conventional
balance remains spotty, NATO could have probably managed a non-nuclear defense by the early
1980s. There is at least some evidence to indicate that NATO was very close to such a capability
in the early 1960s, at least before Vietnam. The upshot is that while Soviet military superiority
" These changes are well documented in John S. Duffield, Power Rules: The Evolution ofNA TO's Conventional
Force Posture (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1995).
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needs to be acknowledged, so too does the existence of a military counter-weight in Western
Europe.2 2
Table 7.6: Size of European Standig Armies, 1953-1963 (COW)
1953 1955 1957 1959 1961 1963
USSR 5,800,000 5,800,000 4,500,000 3,600,000 3,000,000 3,110,000
Britain 865,000 809,000 702,000 565,000 475,000 450,000
FRG 0 205,000 70,000 290,000 350,000 425,000
France 699,000 802,000 913,000 992,000 720,000 735,000
Italy 330,000 318,000 321,000 321,000 470,000 515,000
Netherlands 203,000 188,000 173,000 158,000 141,000 130,000
USSR/EUR 2.77 2.50 2.24 1.80 1.55 1.39
COMPOSITE CODE.
strongly weighted towards
Economic indicators show that the balance of power in Europe was
the Soviet Union, which qualified as a potential hegemon from 1953-
1963. In raw economic capacity, the USSR outstripped its nearest rival by fifty to one hundred
percent over the course of the period, depending on the measure. In military strength, it was the
clearly dominant power on the ground. However, the potential for an organic European
balancing coalition continued to exist, as the economic strength of Western Europe combined
met or exceeded the Soviet economy. Militarily, Western Europe was approaching Soviet power
in the total numbers of ground forces, which probably understates their ability to defend in
Germany, given that nuclear use was likely.
CODING CONCLUSIONS
Under both Eisenhower and Kennedy, Europe faced a large geopolitical threat from the
Soviet Union, which was a potential hegemon. The continued presence of such a powerful state
implies that the American incentives for international commitments to protect West European
industry should remain in place, and the Cold War should continue. Primary source evidence
indicates that Dwight Eisenhower is best classified as a negative liberal and John Kennedy as a
positive liberal. The variation in the dominant concept of liberty between the Eisenhower and
22 On growing NATO strength during the Cold War, see Phillip A. Karber and Jerald A. Combs, "The United States,
NATO, and the Soviet Threat to Western Europe: Military Estimates and Policy Options, 1945-1963," Diplomatic
History 22, no. 3 (Summer 1998): 399-429. Robert McNamara, at least, believed that the NATO could defend on the
ground in Western Europe in the 1960s without nuclear weapons for between thirty and ninety days. See, e.g., Alain
C. Enthoven and K. Wayne Smith, How Much is Enough?: Shaping the Defense Program 1961-1969 (New York:
Harper and Row, 1971), Ch. 4. On NATO's conventional strength in the 1980s-after some important but perhaps
not earth-shattering changes in the intervening period-see John J. Mearsheimer, "Why the Soviets Can't Win
Quickly in Central Europe," International Security 7, no. I (Summer 1982): 3-39; Barry R. Posen, Inadvertent
Escalation: Conventional War and Nuclear Risks (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1991), Ch. 3.
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Kennedy administrations means that we should see different strategies for pursuing systemic
imperatives. Under Cold War conditions, negative liberty's proclivities for buckpassing ought to
be expected under Eisenhower, and positive liberty's tendency towards balancing should be
exhibited by the Kennedy administration.
Eisenhower's Buckpassing Strategy
From 1953-1960, the Eisenhower administration pursued a strategy of buckpassing. The
basic concept of this strategy was a continuation of the "third force" idea: America would build
Western Europe into an independent pole of power that could balance the Soviet Union by itself.
America would then pass the buck to this "United States of Europe," withdrawing from the
continent and positioning itself as the balancer of last resort. The strategy recognized a need to
keep the Soviets from absorbing Western European industry and sought influence over the
international power constellation consistent with this aim. But the primary mechanism for
managing the balance of power was free-riding-Eisenhower sought to reduce American costs
by shifting burdens to an integrated Europe.
We can infer this strategy from its component policies. Eisenhower's diplomatic policies
focused on supranational European integration. Integrative projects like the European Defense
Community (EDC) and European Economic Community (EEC) were designed to create a single
European pole by uniting the economic and military foundations of power across national
boundaries. American defense policy focused on burden sharing and a military division of labor:
Eisenhower envisioned removing American forces from the continent and leaving conventional
defense to the Europeans. American nuclear power would stand as a last line of defense if the
Soviets began to over-run Europe. In the interim, Eisenhower focused the American effort on
stand off forces. He employed a strategy of decisive nuclear escalation in the defense of Europe
that would minimize American state-building costs. Finally, though eager to avoid confrontation
with the Soviets, Eisenhower refused to compromise on his plans for creating an independent
European nuclear power, a critical part of the third force program and one that required giving
West Germany some nuclear capability. Together these policies show an administration
committed to passing the buck: Europe would be built up and then left largely to defend itself.
This section establishes the buckpassing character of Eisenhower's grand strategy,
showing it to be in accord with the theoretical expectations generated by TLFP. I also show that
the process evidence surrounding policy formation is consistent with the theory: this strategy was
driven by negative liberal rationales, by negative liberal fears of cost and commitment, and by
negative liberal preferences for burden-sharing relationships and off-shore military power.
Moreover, geopolitical forces also impacted American strategy as TLFP expects. The
international system provided the motivation for American commitments, while feedback from
European reactions these projects helped integrate Eisenhower's diplomatic and military means
with his political ends. In short, Eisenhower chose to pass the buck because it allowed him to
split the difference between the existence of geopolitical threats and his negative liberal
concerns. I proceed by surveying the major American initiatives across three policy areas:




American diplomatic efforts towards building a European pole were focused on
supranational European integration. By creating supranational foundations for power, America
could one day hope to exit Europe. I treat three major elements of Eisenhower's attempt to build
a self-sufficient European pole: the EDC, EEC, and attitudes towards British participation in
European structures. These all reveal a revived and expanded focus on shifting burdens to a
European center of power.
EUROPEAN DEFENSE COMMUNITY. The heart of Eisenhower's diplomatic policy was the
EDC negotiated by the Truman administration. Recall that the EDC was a treaty for a
supranational army that integrated the militaries of "the six" countries at the heart of European
integration: France, West Germany, the Benelux countries, and Italy. The EDC was to be
commanded by the NATO Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) initially, but was
ultimately designed to act independently. It is no exaggeration to say that all of American
foreign policy turned on this issue during the first two years of the administration. Efforts to
ratify the EDC motivated American posture towards the Soviets, American support for French
policy in Indochina, delayed American defense and military plans, and were the primary object
of America's West European diplomacy until the defeat of the treaty in August 1954. It was, as
Eisenhower said, "our one great objective" to which other priorities must be subordinate-"he
wanted everyone to keep still" until the treaty was ratified.
The EDC was vital because it solved America's central strategic problem: the military
disposition of West Germany. Without a strong defense contribution by the FRG, America
would have to defend Europe in perpetuity. But other European states were terrified of a
resurgence in German military power. A supranational army would solve these problems by
ensuring Franco-German military cooperation and serving as the core of an anti-Soviet balance
of power. As one American diplomat aptly described,
Our policy in essence has been based on the premise that if Europe is to be defended, the major part of
such defense must be borne by the Europeans. This can only be achieved if there is a strong and united
Europe. The heart of the problem of Europe's strength is the relationship between France and Germany. If
France and Germany are woven together in a European fabric, Europe will be strong. If they cannot pull
together in the same harness, Europe will remain weak and divided and hence indefensible. The additional
and essential increment of strength which the United States has been willing to provide to European
defense will be meaningless unless there is a strong and united Europe. In other words, if Europe remains
weak and divided, the United States will be frittering away its resources, which are not unlimited, in a
program which has no real meaning.
This belabored emphasis on European strength and a minimal American commitment is
characteristic of a buckpassing strategy and of negative liberty's cost cutting logic.2 4
The EDC served a geopolitical objective, while also satisfying the negative liberal desire
for lower costs through allied independence. As Eisenhower memorably put it, "as far as he was
concerned personally, the Russian menace alone would provide sufficient justification for this
course. It reminded him of the story of the man who was asked why he did not go to church any
23 NSC Meeting, December 10, 1953, FRUS, 1952-1954, V: 449-54, quotes on 451 and 450. On the EDC generally
see Marc Trachtenberg, A Constructed Peace: The Making of the European Settlement, 1945-1963 (Princeton, NJ:
Princeton University Press, 1999), pp. I 10-125; James McAllister, No Exit: America and the German Problem,
1943-1954 (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2002), Ch.5 and esp. pp. 222-224.
24 MacArthur-Laniel meeting, December 4, 1953, FRUS: 1952-1954, V: 1740-1744, quote on 1742. To be sure, the
administration, especially Dulles, also hoped the EDC would dampen Franco-German rivalry and contribute to
European peace.
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more. He replied that there were seven reasons, the first of which was that he had been thrown
out and the six others did not really matter." But the point was to solve the geopolitical problem
while avoiding its costs: "The American people were not avid for power or leadership,"
Secretary of State Dulles encouraged French Prime Minister Laniel. "They wanted to see the
age-old leadership of the Western World flower again under France."2 5
The French were very skeptical of the EDC. They feared, correctly, that America
intended to abandon them to their German neighbors and constantly pressed for an ironclad
American military guarantee of the EDC's integrity: an assurance that American troops would
remain on the continent to prevent German domination of the institution. As French Foreign
Minister Bidault put it bluntly: "with you, yes, without you, no." But this kind of guarantee
would vitiate the entire point of the EDC for Eisenhower. Why bother building European
strength if American strength will always be there? As he bitterly complained to Dulles, "After
all that we have done to try to help Europe to help itself-and that, of course, was what EDC
was-the Europeans come back to us seeking further commitments. They are absolute masters of
the art of getting us to do for them things which they ought to do for themselves." American
statesmen refused to offer the French anything more than empty diplomatic phrases, privately
described as "nothing more than an effort to get timid men to overcome their own uncertainties."
This negative liberal fear of over commitment probably doomed the EDC.2 6
Indeed, the European resistance to American policy caused Eisenhower to seek new
diplomatic means to serve his negative liberal political goals. In August of 1954 the Mendes-
France government in France let the EDC treaty be defeated on a procedural motion. Over the
rest of the year the Americans and the Europeans would work out a solution for German
rearmament within NATO that did not involve supranational institutions. FRG sovereignty
would be mostly restored. West Germany would rearm within NATO, though its forces would
be carefully controlled: the Germans would be allowed neither to have nuclear weapons nor to
evict NATO forces from their country. Nominally secured by the non-supranational Western
European Union, the FRG's compliance with these terms would be in fact guaranteed by a
NATO presence within its borders-a presence founded on an American military contribution.
The failure of the EDC represented a major blow to the Eisenhower buckpassing strategy, and
the negative liberal commitment concerns that drove it.2 7
But despite the pressure of the intemational system, the death of the EDC did not
represent the end of the third force policy. Almost as soon as the vultures had left the carcass of
the EDC, American diplomats were looking for ways to restart the project of supranational
integration. As Dulles noted at one point, "almost any instrumentality was desirable if its use
could develop the European rather than the national principle." 2 8
EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY. An instrument appeared in 1955 that looked very
suitable for American buckpassing purposes: the proposal to develop a European supranational
25 Eisenhower-Laniel meeting, December 5, 1953, FRUS, 1952-54, V: 1769-1774, Dulles quote on 1771,
Eisenhower quote on 1772.
26 Plenary Tripartite meeting, December 6, 1953, FRUS, 1952-1954, V: 1794-1806, Bidault quote on 1800. NSC
Meeting, February 26, 1954, FRUS, 1952-1954, VII: 1221-1232, Eisenhower quote on 1230. NSC meeting, March
4, 1954, FRUS, 1952-1954, V: 886-890, third quote 887. For a state department estimate that America had never
committed to station troops in Europe for any length of time, see McAllister, No Exit, pp. 236, fn. 213.
27 This summary of the "Paris Accords" agreement on German rearmament follows Trachtenberg, A Constructed
Peace, pp. 125-128.
28 NSC meeting, November 21, 1955, FRUS, 1955-1 957, V: 803-806, quote 806.
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customs union, the EEC. Though wary of public pressure after the EDC debacle, the
administration was not shy about privately urging the Europeans onward and promising the
Europeans open cooperation at the appropriate juncture. The logic of American support had not
changed: the administration consistently spoke in terms of building European strength to balance
the Soviet Union, mobilizing latent European resources, and taking the burden off of American
taxpayers.2 9
Eisenhower saw the EEC as a supranational body aimed at building the sinews of "a third
great power bloc, after which development the United States would be permitted to sit back and
relax somewhat." Western Europe had all the preconditions to become "a solid power mass," if
it could mobilize its economic potential. Once its economies were linked, the pre-conditions for
the supranational military strength the EDC had represented would be in place. In short, "with
the common market Europe would be a third world force along with the US and the Soviet
Union. If Europe does not have a common market, it will remain weak."3 0
Such a development would solve the American concern about the balance of power. The
implications for negative liberty were just as considerable: reduced American commitments and
a greater ability to free-ride. In its present divided state, Dulles argued, Europe was seen "as
subject to being captured by the Russians or as representing some kind of charge on the US
which the American public is not prepared to carry indefinitely. A united Europe, by contrast,
could be as powerful as the United States or the Soviet Union," certainly strong enough to resist
the Russians unassisted. Indeed, Dulles believed that "the Europeans have an obligation to tie
themselves together and to attain strength in that way so that it will not be necessary to call upon
the US again."
Negative liberty's impact is further reflected in the extreme depth of the American desire
to trade control in Europe for reduced American costs. In response to concerns about "any
danger of separateness on the part a unified Europe," Eisenhower responded that, in addition to
being unlikely, the current European division was worse: "weakness could not cooperate,
weakness could only beg." Dulles believed that, as such, the crisis over the Suez invasion was
actually "a very healthy development" if it spurred "these nations to try and mold themselves
into a third force." These projects were not, according to the Secretary of the Treasury, "purely
philosophical as far as the nation's check-book was concerned" but were rather an essential part
of reducing long-term American burdens. The EEC and other integrative projects were just that
fundamental. It was not a typical piece of bluster, then, when Dulles told Adenauer that
"complete sovereignty for the many nations of Europe... is a luxury which European countries
can no longer afford at US expense."32
BRITISH PARTICIPATION. One important obstacle to the achievement of European
integration was the British government. In a remark that is probably too good to be historically
29 On the general American approach see also Geoffrey Warner, "Review: Eisenhower, Dulles and the Unity of
Western Europe, 1955-1957," International Affairs 69, no. 2 (April 1993): 319-329.
30 NSC meeting, November 21, 1955; Dulles-Adenauer, June 12, 1956; in FRUS, 1955-57, XIX: 150-153 (quote
150), and XXVI: 107-121 (quote 116). See also Eisenhower-Mayer, February 8, 1956; Dulles-Strauss, May 14,
1956; both in FRUS 1955-57, IV: 408-409, 438-441, on European economic potential.
3' Dulles-Adenauer, May 4, 1957; Dulles-Erhard, June 7, 1955; in FRUS, 1955-57, XXVI: 230-243 (quote 240), IV:
291-292 (quotes both pages).
32 First five quotes are in Warner, "Unity of Western Europe," pp. 325-326. The Dulles threat appears in Dulles-
Adenauer, May 4, 1957, FRUS, 1955-57, XXVI: 230-243, quote 240. See also NSC meeting, November 21, 1955,
FRUS, 1955-1957, XIX: 150-153, on the strategic potential of a third force.
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accurate, the British representative at the Messina conference where the common market was
negotiated purportedly summed up his opposition thus: "the future treaty you are discussing has
no chance of being agreed; if it was agreed, it would have no chance of being ratified; and if it
were ratified it would have no chance of being applied. And if it were applied it would be totally
unacceptable to Britain." As Dulles often noted, like the Truman administration before him, the
British naturally thought in terms of division on the continent, not unity, and they furthered this
traditional vision through several schemes to water down European proposals. These included a
"Grand Design" aimed to blur the difference between supranationality and simple cooperation
between sovereign nations, and plans for a free trade area they hoped would rival the EEC and
displace support for it. 33
But the administration actively opposed these British maneuvers. Dulles believed that
"the participation of the United Kingdom was not essential" for integrative efforts; in truth, he
often argued that it was a positive hindrance. The administration made clear any free-trade area
should be put on ice and only negotiated after the EEC had been ratified and put in place. Dulles
was openly scornful of other British plans, telling Adenauer that "he agreed that there are some
tendencies to endanger the prospects for practical European projects by superimposing rather
vague, more generalized plans. The United States Government, he assured the Chancellor, would
not participate in such maneuvers, and specifically had no intention of joining the Grand
Design." At bottom, given their geography the British probably couldn't be trusted to be a first
line defender of the continent, and they certainly showed no enthusiasm for any of the measures
necessary to assume such a role. "Only the Community of Six offers promise of opening the
way to a genuine United States of Europe," Dulles told Eisenhower, and that meant freezing out
the British. The "special relationship" was not so special in this policy area of primary
importance.34
AMERICAN MILITARY POLICY
Eisenhower's political plans were reinforced with a military strategy aimed at the same
ends: transitioning Europe into self-defense, and reducing American costs through a more
selective military strategy. This strategy, sometimes called the "New Look," depended heavily
on nuclear weapons and corresponding air and naval forces, while eschewing a strong role for
American ground forces. It found its operational expression in the NATO war plan MC-48 and
in Eisenhower's plans for nuclear sharing. These latter plans were in some sense a military
substitute for the diplomatic failure of the EDC, and demonstrated showing that Eisenhower
would adjust his buckpassing goals but not abandon them.
" Geir Lundestad, "Empire" by Integration: The United States and European Integration, 1945-1997 (Oxford,
England: Oxford University Press, 1998), p. 50. See also, Ibid., pp. 40-43; Geir Lundestad, The United States and
Western Europe since 1945: from "Empire" by invitation to Transatlantic Drift (Oxford, England: Oxford
University Press, 2003), pp. 91-96 on the clashes with the British approach. For other examples of the
administration's worries about British involvement in European schemes see NSC meeting, October 6, 1954, FRUS,
1952-54, V: 1380; Dulles-Spaak meeting, December 17'h, 1955; State-AEC meeting, January 25, 1956; both in
FRUS, 1955-1957, IV: 370, 395; Lundestad, "Empire" by Integration: the United States and European Integration,
1945-1997, p. 51; Warner, "Review: Eisenhower, Dulles and the Unity of Western Europe, 1955-1957," pp. 325-
326.
34 State-AEC meeting, January 25, 1956; Dulles-Adenaeur, May 4, 1957; Dulles-Eisenhower, January 9, 1956; in
FRUS, 1955-1957, IV: 391, XXVI: 240, and IV: 388.
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THE NEW LOOK. The New Look was an explicitly buckpassing military posture. It
focused on "the principle of concentration of forces." American ground troops would be drawn
down and eventually removed from Europe, reducing the stress on the American populace and
federal budget. American defense policy would instead place an "emphasis" on "more fluid and
mobile forces:" air power, naval power, and above all, nuclear weapons. The New Look
envisioned a division of labor between America and Europe. "We would do the 'big stuff
(large-scale retaliatory attack). Our allies were expected to handle local hostilities," Dulles
asserted during the second term. Eisenhower agreed: "our policy should be that our friends and
allies supply the means for local defense on the ground and that the United States should come
into the act with air and naval forces alone." As Eisenhower's primary defense document, NSC
162/2, summarized: "In Western Europe, a position of strength must be based mainly on British,
French and German cooperation in the defense of the continent." The primary defense burden
borne abroad, America could reduce its long-term costs through stand-off power.
This free-riding military posture was driven by classic negative liberal concerns: fears of
inflation eating away at the value of work, budget deficits destroying the value of the currency
earned by workers, and taxes stealing the fruits of their labors. Early drafts of NSC 162/2 argued
that "excessive government spending leads to inflationary deficits or to repressive taxation, or to
both" and that "tax rates are so high and the structure of the tax system so bad that normal
economic incentives for long term growth are seriously restricted." It was not for nothing that
Eisenhower made his Treasury Secretaries and Budget Directors permanent member of the NSC
throughout his administration. 36
Even worse was the long-term threat of a controlled economy and an end to the system of
free enterprise. As Eisenhower argued:
The United States was confronted with a very terrible threat, and the truth of the matter was that we have
devised no way of meeting this threat without imposing ever-greater controls on our economy and on the
freedom of our people. We had been trying, in other words, to have our cake and to eat it at the same time.
We were engaged, continued the President, not only in saving our money or in defending our persons from
attack; we were engaged in the defense of a way of life, and the great danger was that in defending this way
of life we would find ourselves resorting to methods that endangered this way of life. The real problem, as
the President saw it, was to devise methods of meeting the Soviet threat and of adopting controls, if
necessary, that would not result in our transformation into a garrison state.
The President demanded that threats be assessed not just by examining the Soviet Union's
military power, but also through anticipating the domestic responses that this power might
prompt. The President argued against the idea that "we should do what was necessary even if the
result was to change the American way of life. We could lick the whole world, said the
President, if we were willing to adopt the system of Adolph Hitler."37
' NSC Meeting, August 27, 1953; NSC Meeting, February 28, 1957; and Draft of NSC 162, September 30, 1953; in
FRUS, 1952-1954,11: 443-455 (quote 447), FRUS 1955-1957, XIX: 425-442, (Dulles and Eisenhower quotes 449)
and FRUS, 1952-1954, II: 491-514, (quote 507.)
36 Draft of NSC 162, September 30, 1953, FRUS, 1952-1954, 11: 491-514, esp. 500-503, quotes 501. See also
Richard H. Immerman, "Confessions of an Eisenhower Revisionist: An Agonizing Reappraisal," Diplomatic History
14, no. 3 (1990): p. 321, n. 21.
37 NSC Meeting, September 24, 1953; NSC Meeting, October 7, 1953; both in FRUS, 1952-1954, II: 464-475, 514-
534, quotes 469, 519. On the general issue of the fear of the garrison state, rife in both the Truman and Eisenhower
administrations, see Michael J. Hogan, A Cross of Iron: Harry S. Truman and the Origins of the National Security
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A final concern was with the impact of arms policy on individual rights, with a special
emphasis on the perils of conscription. It was certainly not acceptable to continue polices that
might extend the draft "unless we are prepared to move towards further restrictions upon the
freedom of individual citizens. Significant moves in that direction would tend to alter the
character of the free institutions and values which our security programs are designed to
preserve." The individualist focus is also demonstrated in a certain amount of anti-McCarthyism
rhetoric, a growing problem whose salience was only increased by active security policies: "the
morale of the citizens of the United States must be based both on responsibility and freedom for
the individual.... It is essential that necessary measures of protection should not be so used as to
destroy the national unity based on the lasting values of freedom."38
These negative liberal rationales all led Eisenhower to understand the New Look as
nothing more than a return to the old look in American strategy, with some modifications for
new technical circumstances. The long-standing American preference was for "a minimum
military establishment and mobilization base that could be expanded promptly in case of need."
American forces in Europe were a "temporary expedient" and a "stop-gap operation" en route to
a strategy where the allies defended themselves. Once implemented, this strategy would "restore
Japan and Germany as strong defenders against Russia, allowing the United States to be a central
'keep."' Motivated by Eisenhower's traditional American concerns about liberty, and modeled
on the initial American approach to the Cold War, the New Look was simply a "reaffirmation
and clarification of what he had always understood."39
MC-48. The operational output of the New Look was MC-48, NATO's war plan for
Europe. The plan embodied the negative liberal commitment to standoff power and cost savings
in a brutal manner: through quick nuclear escalation. NATO would use tactical nuclear weapons
on concentrations of Soviet armor in order to equalize the conventional balance; whence NSC
162/2's famous phrase: "in the event of hostilities, the United States will consider nuclear
weapons as available for use as other munitions." But this would only open the door for Soviet
nuclear use, which meant that tactical nuclear defense would have to be coupled with a strategic
nuclear attack as well. "The only presently feasible way of stopping an enemy from delivering
atomic weapons" MC-48 grimly noted, "is to destroy his means of delivery at source. This will
require early atomic counter-attack against the enemy's delivery system."40
The American buckpassing strategy ultimately rested on a hair-trigger nuclear posture.
Though often swearing up and down that the Soviets would start the war, Eisenhower and Dulles
both made repeated references to launching strategic forces on alert or, "as soon as he
[Eisenhower] found out Russian troops were on the move." "Our striking power must blunt the
attack at its source" one report advised, and the President agreed: "we must not allow the enemy
State (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1998); Aaron L. Friedberg, In the Shadow ofthe Garrison
State: America's Anti-Statism and its Cold War Grand Strategy (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2000).
3 Draft of NSC 162, September 30, 1953, FRUS, 1952-1954, 11: 491-514, quotes 502, 511. For some of the
repeated military worries about the draft, see Ibid., 446, 448, 469-471.
3 NSC Meeting, September 24, 1953; Cutler-Dulles, September 3, 1953; Legislative leadership meeting, December
14, 1954; all in FRUS, 1952-1954, II: 464-475, 455-457, 824-827, quotes 470, 456, 825-826. See also Eisenhower-
Dulles, September 8, 1953, in Ibid., 460-463.
4 NSC 162, October 30, 1953, FRUS, 1952-1954, 11: 577-597, quote 593. Trachtenberg, A Constructed Peace, pp.
156-160 has a good summary of the basic military situation. MC-48 can be found in Gregory W. Pedlow, ed., NATO
Strategy Documents (Brussels, Belgium: NATO International Staff Central Archives), quote p. 233. See David Alan
Rosenberg, "The Origins of Overkill: Nuclear Weapons and American Strategy, 1945-1960," International Security
7, no. 4 (Spring 1983): pp. 33-44 for penetrating analysis of the American preemptive doctrine.
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to strike the first blow." At one NSC meeting, "the President stated that our only chance of
victory in a third world war against the Soviet Union would be to paralyze the enemy at the
outset of the war.' 4 '
The incentive to pre-empt led to a second feature of MC-48: pre-delegation of the
authority to use nuclear weapons to NATO SACEUR and his subordinate commanders. As SAC
commander Curtis LeMay would put it, probably with Eisenhower's backing, "if I see the
Russians are amassing their planes for an attack, I'm going to knock the shit out of them before
they get off the ground." The same applied for SACEUR. Meetings with his military advisors
produced a consensus that a war in Europe would be begun "on the principle of the inherent right
of a commander to defend his forces." And Eisenhower maintained a very close relationship
with SACEUR generals during this period, such that "no such [official] understanding" on pre-
delegation was required. A nuclear-based strategy was cheap in dollars and American lives, but
entailed a higher risk of war. In short, protecting negative liberty at home required quick pre-
emption abroad.
NUCLEAR SHARING. NATO's dependence on nuclear weapons put America's Western
European allies in an awful position. If it ever came to a fight, there was a strong chance Europe
would be a radiating casualty of the American-Soviet rivalry. If the Europeans pushed America
too hard, they might be abandoned to the Russians. But if they tied themselves too tightly to the
U.S., they might be incinerated by the Russians. It was hard to tell which was worse. "A naked
promise of nuclear protection" from the United States was "not a sound basis for any country's
security" it was argued at a NATO meeting. The allies needed their own protection. "The
strategic concept contemplated that everyone should have an atomic capability," the British
stressed in meetings with Dulles about NATO strategy-even German units would have to be
armed with American nuclear weapons.
This international pushback horrified large parts of the American foreign policy
establishment and spurred domestic criticism of Eisenhower's military policy. But the statesmen
at the top were more than happy to help the Europeans develop atomic independence. If
strategic integration meant European nuclear capability or a permanent American ground
presence, Eisenhower would take the former. "For God's sake, let us not be stingy with an
ally... instead of being generous, we treat many of our allies like step-children," he argued.
Eisenhower "had always strongly favored the sharing of our weapons" because there should be
"no monopoly" on the possession of nuclear weapons within NATO.44
In the short-term, a series of ruses were developed to give the allies de-facto control over
nuclear weapons while circumventing congressional controls. For example, nuclear-armed
German fighter-bombers were guarded on the runway by only a single American private, and
dual key missiles in Europe saw the second key go missing. Eisenhower and the allies both
understood that these were controls in name only. As Eisenhower said to de Gaulle, the dual key
4' First three quotes in Ibid., pp. 42, 38, and 47. NSC meeting, December 4, 1954, FRUS, 1952-1954, II: 803-806,
fourth quote, 805. See the sources cited in Trachtenberg, A Constructed Peace, p. 164 for evidence of American
desires to launch on alert. I have followed the general argument on pp. 160-164.
42 On this issue, see Ibid., pp. 164-173, quotes on 171, 169, 165, and 170. Later versions of the NATO war-plan
under Eisenhower were not quite as aggressive, but did not change the central elements.
43 First quote is from Trachtenberg, A Constructed Peace, p. 194, see also pp. 176-178. Anglo-American meeting,
December 1, 1956, FRUS, 1955-1957, IV: 123-133, second quote 125.
44 NSC meeting, November 21, 1955, in FRUS, 1955-57, XIX: 150-153, quote 151; Trachtenberg, A Constructed
Peace, p. 197.
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system was "an illusory precaution" and "it would not be to difficult to obtain the key in a real
emergency... [the French could] always arrange to seize control of the key." He was just as
blunt to SACEUR: "we are willing to give, for all intents and purposes, control of the weapons.
We retain titular possession only."45
Eisenhower's long-term solution was an independent European deterrent: the Multilateral
Force (MLF). Intermediate range nuclear missiles would be given to NATO and deployed on
NATO submarines manned by international crews. SACEUR would command the force, but in
a major change, SACEUR would now be a European general. "When there was an American
commander," Eisenhower told a startled de Gaulle, "other countries looked too much to the
United States to help them and did not accept their own responsibilities." The heart of the plan
was to turn NATO over to the Western allies. There would be no American veto over the use of
the proposed force, and a European general at the head of a largely European alliance would
make decisions surrounding it. The Americans might even be willing to do away with the dual-
key hypocrisy, and give complete and open control of the warheads to the Europeans. Though
the MLF did not get off the ground before the end of Eisenhower's term, he considered it his
parting gift to Kennedy-"a legacy of the finest ideas and plans this administration could
develop." It certainly embodied the negative liberal principles Eisenhower had sought to defend:
46
stand-off power, allied independence, and a buckpassing grand strategy.
RESPONSE TO EUROPEAN THREATS
Eisenhower's perception of European threats is most clearly evident in his position
during the Second Berlin Crisis. He had little inclination to oppose communism per se and was
willing to recognize the realities of the East German regime. It was the Soviet threat to Western
Europe that concerned him. However, he was willing to go to the very brink of nuclear war in
order to continue his buckpassing strategy-meeting the threat to Western Europe by balancing
was no solution for Eisenhower.
MATERIAL THREAT AND THE BERLIN CRISIS. In November 1958, Nikita Khrushchev
initiated the second Berlin crisis-the Russians were threatening war unless the Western powers
negotiated a settlement normalizing the status of Berlin. In six months the USSR would sign a
peace treaty with its East German ally which would not recognize Western rights in Berlin. If
the Western allies attempted to maintain their position by force, the Soviets would defend East
Germany. If an agreement could not be reached, either the West would have to liquidate its
position in Berlin or risk nuclear war to maintain it.
The aggressive behavior of the Soviets underscored the massive power behind Soviet
policy. Yet Eisenhower showed a great willingness in private to compromise. He and Dulles
were both ultimately willing to live with de facto recognition of East Germany, odious though it
might be-like Truman before him, the ideological posture of the East mattered little to
Eisenhower. He also displayed some willingness to yield the Western military position in Berlin.
He considered the troops behind Soviet lines to have been a mistake from the beginning and was
willing to negotiate an end to the American military presence. Indeed, Eisenhower displayed a
4 Quote in Ibid., p. 209. See also pp. 193-200. Second quote in Eisenhower-Norstad meeting, June 9, 1959, FRUS,
1958-1960, VII: 461-464, quote 462. On the training and manning of German units see Ibid., pp. 194-196; Marc
Trachtenberg, History and Strategy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1991), pp. 187-192.
46 Trachtenberg, A Constructed Peace, p. 215. For in depth analysis of the MLF under Eisenhower see Ibid., pp.
204-215. Eisenhower quote in NSC meeting, November 17, 1960, FRUS, 1958-1960, VII: 648-660, quote 654.
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great interest in various disarmament proposals that might help facilitate an American exit from
Europe more broadly. 47
But in practice, Eisenhower made no proposals to end the crisis, because he would not
cross three red lines. First, he was unwilling to adopt the British position of finding a graceful
means of surrender. If America was unwilling to risk nuclear escalation over Berlin, "we would
first lose the city itself and, shortly after, all of Western Europe. If all of Western Europe fell into
the hands of the Soviet Union and thus added its great industrial plant to the USSR's already
great industrial might, the United States would indeed be reduced to the character of a garrison
state if it was to survive at all." The stakes in question were geopolitical in nature, with awful
consequences for negative liberty if American credibility was doubted.4 8
Second, for these same reasons, Eisenhower was unwilling to yield on the question of
FRG nuclear weapons. The Soviets were clear from early in the crisis that the de-facto nuclear
control enjoyed by the FRG was their real target. Though acknowledging, "the importance
which he felt the Russians attached to a confirmation of the post-war German borders, and of the
real fear they have of a reunited, armed Germany," the Eisenhower administration was unwilling
to budge from its nuclear sharing policy. He told Prime Minister MacMillan "flatly that he
would take a strong Germany. He pointed out that the West was afraid of a strong Germany only
when there was a weak Soviet Union. Now the central problem was the strength of the Soviet
Union." The balance of power required either a strong Germany or a forward deployed America,
and Eisenhower was unwilling to change his buckpassing strategy. High geopolitical threat kept
America on the continent, but did not end its attempts to leave.49
Finally, maintaining the buckpassing approach meant considerable deference to the
allies. Eisenhower "thought that he could strike a bargain with Khrushchev... but he knew our
allies would not accept his acting unilaterally." In order to build European strength, the
Europeans must be permitted a policy of strength, especially the West Germans. Eisenhower
was willing to exchange influence over European policy in order to further his third force
buckpassing objectives. So Eisenhower refused to push for a settlement that violated Adenauer's
hard line of no East German recognition. "A great deal is to be said in favor of the status-quo [in
Berlin]" Dulles argued, but "that is a position we cannot take publically." Eisenhower perceived
a long-term geopolitical threat that required a European pole of power. In order to build that
pole, his short-term solution to the Berlin Crisis ultimately amounted to pure deterrence: "a very
simple statement to the effect that if the Russians want war over the Berlin issue they can have
it."50
Kennedy's Strategy of Balancing
47 On the American willingness to deal and to accommodate its allies, see Trachtenberg, A Constructed Peace, pp.
258-261. On the crisis more generally during the Eisenhower period see Trachtenberg, History and Strategy, pp.
185-215,. esp. fn. 56 on Eisenhower's attraction to disarmament and disengagement. Dulles was less willing to
tolerate the loss of Berlin than Eisenhower.
4 8 NSC Meeting, May 1, 1958, FRUS, 1958-1960, III: 79-98, quote 89.
49 Eisenhower-Macmillan meeting, March 28, 1960, FRUS, 1958-1960, VII, part I: 258-262, quotes 258-59, 260-
261.
50 Eisenhower-Herter meeting, October 16, 1959, Declassified Document Reference System [DDRS], 1982/2219;
Dulles to Eisenhower, February 6, 1959, FRUS, 1958-1960, VIII: 334-335, Dulles quote 335. Final Eisenhower
quote in Trachtenberg, History and Strategy, p. 194.
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John Kennedy assumed the Presidency in 1961 and changed American grand strategy to
balancing, a posture it would retain in Europe until the end of the Cold War. The basic
mechanism of this strategy was a firm and permanent commitment of American power to
Europe. Kennedy took an opposite diplomatic tack from Eisenhower: he sought to prevent the
emergence of a third force at every opportunity. Instead, American diplomats sought to
dominate Western Europe and mange European politics through the NATO alliance. Doing so
provided the surest method of protecting the open system of democracy and free trade that had
developed after World War 11. European dependence would also allow a ratcheting down of the
Cold War, increasing stability through a bipolar management of the conflict. The aim was to
balance against the Soviets as well as the West Europeans, buying increased American influence
over the European power structure at the cost of a permanent commitment to the continent.
We can infer this strategy from its different policy elements. Kennedy pursued detente
with the Soviet Union, tacitly agreeing to ensure West German quiescence in return for an end to
threats against West Berlin. American diplomatic and military policy supported this posture.
Diplomatically, America sought to control European policy through British entry into European
institutions and sought to limit European independence by cracking down on signs of non-NATO
military cooperation. Militarily, the new doctrine of "flexible response" stressed the importance
of raising the nuclear threshold in the event of war. The resulting focus on ground forces
justified the centralization of nuclear weapons in American (and out of German) hands; the
permanent commitment of American ground forces grudgingly brought the FRG around to
permanent non-nuclear status.
Moreover, these policies served positive liberal ends as well: Kennedy's diplomatic
policy sought to protect democracy and free trade in Western Europe through the peaceful
management of European affairs, while flexible response created the military options to bolster
liberalism inside and outside of Europe. Together these policies formed a balancing posture: the
Soviet Union would be contained, and Western European politics managed, by permanent
forward American commitments.
This section establishes the character of Kennedy's new balancing strategy. Furthermore,
I demonstrate that positive liberal worries about democracy and free-trade abroad drove many
policy initiatives and informed preferences about cost and control. In short, Kennedy chose to
balance in order meet the geopolitical threat of the Soviet Union while also protecting liberal
values abroad. I proceed, as usual, by examining policy across three areas: I detail American
policy towards the Soviet Union, diplomatic policy towards the European allies, and military
doctrine.
RESPONSE TO EUROPEAN THREATS
The first element of the new American balancing strategy is made clear in Kennedy's
approach to the Berlin crisis. The Kennedy administration came to power anticipating a renewal
of the Berlin crisis and actively seeking solutions to the problem. Like Eisenhower, Kennedy
was primarily concerned about the balance of European power; unlike Eisenhower, he saw the
United States as the keeper of that balance. Kennedy sought not deterrence, but d6tente: a
negotiated settlement and corresponding decrease in superpower tensions.
MATERIAL THREAT AND THE BERLIN CRISIS. Unlike Eisenhower, Kennedy was willing
to make two major concessions in return for the guarantee of American rights in Berlin: a
permanently non-nuclear West Germany, and a permanent American commitment to Europe to
ensure FRG compliance. Even before the erection of the Berlin Wall in August 1961, Kennedy
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had assured Khrushchev "that the US is opposed to a buildup in West Germany that would
constitute a threat to the Soviet Union." After the wall was up, Kennedy instructed the State
Department to prepare to solve the German problem by considering how to negotiate "a
limitation or prohibition of nuclear arms in either part of Germany... [and] A non-aggression
pact between the NATO and the Warsaw pact countries." 1
During those fall 1961 negotiations, Rusk told Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko "If
there were a clear understanding of Western rights in and access to Berlin, we could look into
broader questions relating to Germany and into security arrangements in order to improve
stability in Central Europe." Later, he intimated that "disengagement is not profitable because it
would create a vacuum. However, the US takes disarmament very seriously and is prepared to
see what progress could be made in that field. It is useful to see how confrontation in Central
Europe could be reduced. It is in the interest of both sides to prevent the spread of national
nuclear weapons." In 1963, concessions were even more explicitly offered on the issues of
nuclear sharing and the MLF: "if we could work out an understanding that there would be no
more nuclear powers in either the Western camp or in the Socialist camp perhaps the Western
powers would not feel the need for an MLF but could work out some other arrangements for
European security."
Those "other arrangements for European security" soon became obvious: just before
Kennedy's death, it became official American policy that "the United States will maintain in
Germany ground forces equivalent to six divisions as long as they are required." Dean Rusk
announced this commitment publically in a speech in Frankfurt. In the next few years, the
United States would sign and ratify the Limited Test Ban Treaty and the Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Treaty and would force the FRG, under protest, to follow suit. Though never
explicitly articulated, the parameters of the Cold War settlement were clear. To preserve the
status quo, Kennedy and his lieutenants were willing to make American commitments firm,
costly, and permanent. America had adopted a balancing posture.
Also unlike Eisenhower, the Kennedy administration was not above negotiating behind
the backs of its allies and presenting them withfaites accomplis. Allies were told of American
proposals immediately before negotiations, or even after, and were only informed, not consulted.
This deepened the already rancorous Franco-American split and convinced West German leaders
they were being sold out (which, given Kennedy's position on FRG nuclear armament, was
basically correct). By spring of 1962, Adenauer was denouncing American Berlin policy at
public press conferences and engaging in a whispering campaign behind closed doors. But all to
little avail. Kennedy was willing to play hardball with the NATO allies. As he had put it earlier,
the allies expected him "either to threaten nuclear war to preserve the present status quo in Berlin
with the fairly clear indication that if Khrushchev called his bluff he would in fact be asked not
to start the war he was threatening" or "to make concessions in order to reach an agreement with
the Russians which the French and the Germans could then blame him for." For Kennedy's
5 Kennedy-Khrushchev meeting, June 4, 1961; Kennedy-Rusk meeting, September 5, 1961; both in FRUS, 1961-
1963, XIV: quotes on 91, 393. In this section, I have turned some of the cable jargon and omissions into standard
English.
5? Rusk-Gromyko meetings, September 28, 1961; September 30, 1961; both in FRUS, 1961-1963, XIV: 439-441,
456-460, quotes 441, 459. Fisher paper on Harriman mission, June 20, 1963, FRUS, 1961-1963, VII: 728-733, quote
733.
5 NSAM 270, October 29, 1963, FRUS, 1961-1963, IX: 98-100, quote on 99. On the tacit settlement between the
superpowers, see Trachtenberg, A Constructed Peace, pp. 3 79-402.
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balancing strategy to work, America needed more influence over the policy of other powers. In
order to get a deal, Kennedy seized control of NATO policy towards the Soviets.5 4
In some respects, Kennedy and Eisenhower had similar threat perceptions. For both,
American credibility was at stake in an area of geopolitical importance; as Kennedy put it, "if the
US were driven out of West Berlin by unilateral action, and if we were deprived of our
contractual rights by East Germany, then no one would believe the US now or in the future. US
commitments would be regarded as a mere scrap of paper." But they had two different responses
to the similarly perceived threat. Rather than leave the balance of power to the Europeans,
Kennedy wanted to manage it with an American presence: "The US is not asking the USSR to
change its position" Kennedy argued to Khrushchev, "but it is simply saying that it should not
seek to change our position and thus disturb the balance of power. If this balance should change
the situation in West Europe as a whole would change and this would be a most serious blow to
the US. Mr. Khrushchev would not accept similar loss and we cannot accept it either."55
The difference in strategy stemmed in part from Kennedy's lack of negative liberal
impediments. Seeing no need to purchase American security on the cheap, Kennedy was willing
to commit America to Europe in perpetuity. And it stemmed in part from Kennedy's positive
liberal agenda abroad. He was very concerned about the advance of liberalism in the third world,
and anxious not to lose these areas to communism. Kennedy aptly summarized some motives of
his European settlement during the height of the Franco-American crisis in 1963: "it is
regrettable that there are such problems with and in Europe because today's struggle does not lie
there, but rather in Asia, Latin America, and Africa. The whole debate about an atomic force in
Europe is really useless, because Berlin is secure and Europe as a whole is well protected. What
really matters at this point is the rest of the world."56
AMERICAN DIPLOMATIC POLICY
In opposition to the Eisenhower approach, Kennedy's diplomacy abhorred and feared the
creation of a European third force. European independence could only gum up the works of the
emerging Soviet-American d6tente and it might threaten the liberal system that had emerged in
the West after the war. Kennedy's balancing strategy applied to his allies as well as the Soviets:
he aimed to turn existing European institutions towards American ends and crushed new
attempts at independent European cooperation. Kennedy's anti-third force balancing strategy,
and its positive liberal roots, are evident in American attitudes towards European economic and
military integration.
ECONOMIC INTEGRATION AND BRITISH PARTICIPATION. The Kennedy administration
viewed European integration as an economic loser for America and therefore spent little political
capital on new supranational initiatives. Existing European institutions like the EEC were
valuable politically if they could be used to control allied policy and buttress liberal values, but
could be dangerous if they produced an independent third force. The Kennedy administration
therefore spent the bulk of its diplomatic effort on trying to ensure the "right kind" of European
community.
14 On friction with Western Europe over American Berlin policy, see Ibid., pp. 329-348, esp. pp. 346-348. Quote on
p. 343.
ss Kennedy-Khrushchev meeting, June 4, 1961, FRUS, 1961-1963, XIV: 87-96, esp. pp. 95-96. Quotes on 89-90,
91.
56 Kennedy-Spaak meeting, May 28, 1963, FRUS, 1961-1963, XIII: 582-587, quote 587.
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Positive liberal imperatives set the vision of European integration in the new
administration: the right kind of community was one that America could manipulate and control.
The head of the State Department's intelligence arm noted that NATO and other European
institutions served to inculcate a "sub-balance of power rivalry" which "offers certain advantages
to the United States... As one state moves into disagreement with specific American
policies.. .the others tend to move nearer the US." The strategy did not go unnoticed. After
Secretary Rusk castigated the French ambassador Alphand about evils of a third force, the
ambassador observed that "the US would sometimes be accused of playing one European power
against the other, sometimes of favoring a United Europe in order to be able to dominate it
better."57
Thus, in contrast with the Eisenhower administration, Kennedy saw British participation
in European institutions as positive: the key to controlling European politics was expanding the
EEC to include Britain. In the words of one top official "we hoped that if England went into
Europe, it would take a sense of 'special relationship' with it, and that we would then have a
'special relationship' with Europe." Dean Acheson put the matter with characteristic bluntness:
America must get Britain into the EEC to "act as our lieutenant (the fashionable word is
partner)." Though softer language about Britain increasing European "stability" was more often
used, the basic idea was clear: Britain would act as a kind of Trojan horse for American interests
and would help steer European unity towards American ends. 58
As a result of British entry and American influence, European unity would remain
oriented towards positive liberal values like free trade. The lead Europeanist in the State
Department, George Ball, fretted that "both Germany and France have strong potential which
would tend over the long run to make the EEC an inward-looking organization" and damned
European "moves toward autarky and the third force delusion." Even at the nadir of American
relations with de Gaulle, Charles Bohlen, ambassador to France under Kennedy, still argued that
the European "community will and should survive. Therefore we must bend our efforts to seeing
that, as far as it lies within our power to influence events, it develops [as] an outward looking
community." The inclusion of historically liberal Britain would be a big help in this regard.
Moreover, a British led EEC would protect democracy in Europe. The Kennedy
administration considered French and German democratic and market institutions fundamentally
unstable. They were prone to collapse and disintegration if overly stressed by nationalism; free
trade and free elections could quickly turn into autarky and autocracy. As Ball put it to
Kennedy, "France conceals within her body politic deep divisive forces. Only by diluting those
57 First quote in Frank Costigliola, "Kennedy, the European Allies, and the Failure to Consult," Political Science
Quarterly 110, no. I (Spring 1995): p. 110. Second quote from Rusk-Alphand meeting, May 28, 1962, FRUS,
1961-1963, XIII: 708-713, on 713.
58 Unnamed official quoted in Costigliola, "Kennedy, the European Allies, and the Failure to Consult," p. 111.
Acheson quoted in Frank Costigliola, "The Pursuit of Atlantic Community: Nuclear Anns, Dollars, and Berlin," in
Kennedy's Quest for Victory: American Foreign Policy, 1961-1963, ed. Thomas G. Patterson (Oxford, England:
Oxford University Press, 1989), p. 27. The more common type of language is exemplified by Ball: "We were
betting that the addition of a third major pillar in the European edifice would render it structurally stable and proof
against the erosion of any one pillar." Kennedy also took this line: "As to the Common Market, the President said
that if Great Britain joined, Europe would be strengthened and stabilized." See Ball-Kennedy, June 20, 1963, FRUS,
1961-1963, XIII: 204-213, quote 205-206; and NSC Meeting, January 22, 1963; FRUS, 1961-1963, VIII: 457-462,
quote 459.
" Ball-Caccia meeting, May 2, 1961; Ball to Bruce, March 14, 1963; Bohlen-State, February 3rd, 1963; all in
FRUS, 1961-1963, XIII: 9-12, 527-528, 171-173, quotes on 10, 527-528, 172.
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forces within the larger caldron of Europe can Frenchmen achieve lasting political stability." De
Gaulle, he warned was taking France down the wrong path domestically: "each week de Gaulle's
France grows perceptibly more absolutist... France conceals a profound political malaise. De
Gaulle will not last forever and the hazards involved in France's ultimate return to constitutional
government [are] an omnipresence that hangs heavily over Europe." Germany was even worse,
in some regards, and America "face(s) dangerous weather in the Federal Republic." After
detailing the nationalist threat to Germany, Ball concluded "I am not overstating the dangers. No
one can speak with assurance of the pressures and counter-pressures that may shape the future of
a post-Adenauer Germany." An, actual, vital third force was likely to shed its internal liberalism
in an attempt to compete with the Soviets.60
The solution was to dilute these anti-liberal tendencies in institutions that stronger more
liberal states dominated. Writing later, at the time of Britain's second attempt to join the EEC,
Ball summarized these liberal motives:
Britain's application to accede to the Rome Treaty is epic in its implications... For three hundred
years Britain has been a stranger to revolution, while France has endured absolutism, two empires,
five republics, two constitutional monarchies, and two dictatorships. In the ninety-five years since
it became a nation, Germany has averaged one violent change of government every twenty-four
years. The Weimar Republic and the Fourth Republic each saw twenty-two governments during
their brief life spans, while in contrast, Britain has had only six governments. Intimate British
participation... could moderate these latent instabilities and provide a permanent balance, securing
democracy in Europe. 61
In brief, Kennedy's balancing strategy was committed to managing European politics. The right
kind of European institutions could be useful in this task by allowing America to divide and
conquer its allies, and by combating nationalism and illiberalism with Britain's liberal influence.
MILITARY INTEGRATION. The wrong kind of European unity was cooperation in the
military sphere, outside of American dominated NATO. The Kennedy administration viewed
such cooperation as independent European action they needed to prevent if American influence
and European liberalism were to be saved. Secretary of State Dean Rusk attacked the third force
in a meeting with the French ambassador, hammering that "this touched a very sensitive nerve.
The concept that Europe could be the arbiter between the US and the Soviets was basically
fallacious." Rusk threatened further that "If ever Europe decided to play an independent role,
issues between the US and USSR would be greatly reduced. In a sense, the US rather than
Europe was the 'third force' in this combination." Kennedy was even more blunt, arguing to the
French that "we did not fear a third force would be neutralist. We were concerned, instead,
about whether there would be a wholly separate, independent force unrelated to American
responsibility and interest." 62
In January 1963, American relations with its allies reached a low point: de Gaulle vetoed
the entrance of Britain into the EEC and signed a treaty of friendship with West Germany that
promised independent military cooperation. Kennedy administration officials were
60 Ball-Kennedy, June 20, 1963, FRUS, 1961-1963, XIII: 204-213, quotes 206-208. 1 have changed the verb tense
in Ball's first quote to agree with my sentence.
61 Ball quoted in Pascaline Winand, Eisenhower, Kennedy, and the United States of Europe (New York: St. Martin's
Press, 1993), pp. 273-274.
62 Rusk-Alphand meeting, May 28, 1962, FRUS, 1961-1963, XIII: 708-713, Rusk quotes 709. Kennedy-Malraux
meeting, May 11th, 1962, FRUS, 1961-1963, XIII: 695-701, quote 697.
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unremittingly hostile to de Gaulle's proclamation of "a 'European' Europe under French
leadership capable of functioning as third great power concentration of international political
force." They worried about the General's appeal throughout NATO, arguing that his themes of
European economic, military, and political independence "have considerable political potential
in the hands of de Gaulle and perhaps other European leaders who are convinced that nineteenth
century nationalism is the motor force of international affairs. Effective manipulation of these
nationalistic forces could result in serious erosion of American position." A third force would
reduce American control of the diplomatic situation in Europe, and trigger the anti-democratic
and nationalistic forces Americans were trying to eliminate. In short, as one official put it, a
united Europe "would present us with a more formidable challenge than the present divided
Europe."63
The Franco-German treaty of friendship sent the American third force fears into over-
drive. It "created a new situation," one where "de Gaulle might try to organize the Six and create
a nuclear force responsible to this grouping." Yielding this kind of control was unacceptable.
"As soon as the French have a nuclear capability... we have much less to offer Europe" Kennedy
argued, making the emerging European political bloc more appealing to the Germans. That
would be the end of the line for American policy, since "if we are not vital to Germany, then our
NATO strategy makes no sense." Kennedy went so far as to urge investigation into "the
possibility that de Gaulle had concluded that he would make a deal with the Russians, break up
NATO, and push the U.S. out of Europe."64
Kennedy's balancing strategy could not permit a loss of so much influence over
European politics. The American response was a threat to march American troops out of Europe
if the Germans ratified the Franco-German treaty without reservations. Kennedy recognized that
"the threat of withdrawing our troops was the only sanction we had" and the source "of our
bargaining power." Kennedy was willing to use the NATO alliance as an instrument of
American hegemony, using the American commitment as leverage over its partners. American
officials high and low made this point to the FRG, with a range of tones and diplomatic
language, but the point was best put by Dean Acheson: "the Germans either thought the
Americans were stupid or... the Germans were admitting that they were duplicitous." They could
have French cooperation or American protection, but not both.65
American officials also tampered with FRG domestic politics in order to ensure a
favorable reception to American threats. The Kennedy administration played up splits in
Adenauer's Christian Democratic Union party, "discreetly encourag[ing] [Adenauer rival]
Erhard to insist that the Germans would ratify the treaty with France only with two reservations":
British membership in the EEC and the political supremacy of NATO. By early February Erhard
was attacking Adenauer's policy publically and there was a civil war in the ruling coalition. The
West Germans did ultimately ratify the treaty, but with a long prologue of reservations stressing
their fealty to NATO and the United States. It was the beginning of a process that would lead to
the ousting of Adenauer, the great savior of post-war Germany, essentially at the bidding of the
American government. The United States also advised the SPD rivals of the CDU on their
foreign policy position, part of their ongoing reorientation away from an anti-NATO nationalism
63 Bohlen-State, February 3rd, 1963, FRUS, 1961-1963, XIII: 171-173, first two quotes 172. Last quote in paragraph
from Thomas Hughes, relayed in Costigliola, "Kennedy, the European Allies, and the Failure to Consult," p. I 11.
" NSC meeting, January 31, 1963; NSC meeting, January 25, 1963; both in FRUS, 1961-1963, XIII: 156-163, 487-
49],quotes on 158, 488, 491.
6 NSC meeting, February 5, 1963, FRUS, 1961-1963, XIII: 173-179, quotes on 176, 178, 179.
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and towards d6tente. In order to save the supremacy of NATO as a hegemonic instrument,
American policy was instrumental in reorienting the domestic politics of its German ally.66
AMERICAN MILITARY POLICY
Kennedy's balancing strategy was reflected in the military doctrine of flexible response,
though the actual operational changes of this doctrine have sometimes been overstated. The
essence of flexible response was to reduce the importance of nuclear weapons and increase the
relevance of conventional capabilities. The contribution of flexible response to the American
balancing strategy can be seen in two areas: the centralization of control over nuclear weapons
and investment in ground force capabilities. 67
CENTRALIZING NUCLEAR WEAPONS. The reduced emphasis on nuclear weapons
facilitated greater control over the management of European politics: flexible response provided
a rationale for ending the Eisenhower nuclear sharing schemes and the political independence
that came with them. The insistence on fighting a conventional war for as long as possible was
obviously attractive to European publics and not one that European governments could disavow
publically. But nuclear weapons would need to be tightly controlled in order to keep a war
conventional and employed very selectively in order to avoid a massive exchange. Centralizing
the control of nuclear weapons in the hands of the American government ensured there would be
no third force. 68
The Kennedy administration came to office intent on making itself the nuclear master of
Europe. The famous "Acheson report" on NATO nuclear policy bluntly stated that "use of
nuclear weapons by the forces of other powers in Europe should be subject to U.S. veto and
control." These concerns were ultimately and begrudgingly relaxed for Britain, and eventually
even for France. But Germany had to be prevented from developing an independent nuclear
capability. In the words of McGeorge Bundy, it was a "fixed point" of American policy "that
Germany should not have independent control of nuclear weapons." 69
These desires led to a series of important policy decisions that placed control of nuclear
weapons in American hands. Permissive action links, which secured nuclear weapons against
unauthorized use, were placed on all the American nuclear weapons in Europe. Special
emphasis was placed on establishing control over the many tactical nuclear weapons that had
proliferated under Eisenhower's de facto sharing policy. SACEUR, who under MC-48 had
amounted to an independent political actor representing European interests, had his wings
clipped. Pre-delegation authority to SACEUR was curtailed, the European commander became
66 Ibid., quote on 176; see also NSC meeting, January 25, 1963, in Ibid., p. 490 for a similar suggestion by Ball.
Good accounts of American manipulation of the FRG domestic scene are Trachtenberg, A Constructed Peace, pp.
374-379; Christopher Layne, The Peace ofIllusions: American Grand Strategy from 1940 to the Present (Ithaca,
NY: Cornell University Press, 2006), pp. 101-103.
67 For an analysis questioning the significance of flexible response, see Francis J. Gavin, "The Myth of Flexible
Response: United States Strategy in Europe during the 1960s," International History Review 23, no. 4 (December
2001): 847-875.
68 The counter-force/no cities nuclear posture associated with flexible response, and used to justify American
nuclear control, was the part of the doctrine most clearly associated with propaganda rather than policy. On the use
of these ideas to secure American nuclear weapons see Trachtenberg, A Constructed Peace, pp. 315-321.
69 Policy Directive, April 20, 1961, FRUS, 1961-1963, XIII: 288-290, quote 289. Bundy quoted in Trachtenberg, A
Constructed Peace, p. 284.
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just another American General rather than a political figure, and General Norstad was removed
from the position when he objected to the changes. 70
Moreover, the plans to make Europe an independent strategic entity were killed.
Norstad's plan for a NATO land based missile force that could make NATO a "fourth nuclear
power" was rejected on the grounds that European nations could easily seize control of the
weapons. And the Kennedy administration changed the MLF from a force designed to empower
European independence to one with an American veto. The proposal lived on for years but it
was a "debating trick" and a "fraud;" "not a real force, but a fagade" aimed at promoting the
illusion of European nuclear participation amidst the reality of American control over the
weapons, and with it the European political environment.7'
Indeed, these changes all promoted American control over European policy. Kennedy
worried that since the allies were "no longer dependent on the U.S. for economic assistance, the
European states are less subject to our influence. If the French and other European powers
acquire a nuclear capability they would be in a position to be entirely independent and we might
be on the outside looking in." But if America was going to defend Europe, it was going to call
the military and political shots: Kennedy stressed "our inability to accept the notion that we
should stay out of Europe's affairs while remaining ready to defend her if war should come...
We cannot and will not stand apart from these [policy] questions as long as our strength and will
are committed to the defense of Europe against any Soviet attack."72
All the disputes surrounding nuclear weapons during the period were really just
reflections of an unacceptable push for a politically independent third force. As Kennedy
remarked about his recalcitrant allies, "if Europe were ever to be organized so as to leave us
outside, from the point of view of these great issues of policy and defense, it would become most
difficult for us to sustain our present guarantee against Soviet aggression. We shall not hesitate
to make this point to the Germans if they show signs of accepting any idea of a Bonn-Paris axis.
General de Gaulle really cannot have both our military presence and our diplomatic absence."
Seizing control of nuclear weapons cut off this possibility. Moreover, if America was going to
permanently defend Europe, then she alone would decide whether to escalate to nuclear war.
Bundy summed up the policy well: "We must not be pushed around by British, or French, or
German propaganda, and we must be careful to frame our policies in terms of American interests
and American leadership. We are bound to pay the price of leadership-we may as well have
some of its advantages." 73
CONVENTIONAL FOCUS. Furthermore, the positive liberal focus on ground forces
provided more control on the battlefield. Such flexibility was useful for managing a military
situation in Europe now envisioned lasting far into the future. The logic of a conventional
ground force doctrine was undeniably attractive to the administration. "We attach the greatest
importance to 'raising the threshold' beyond which the President might have to decide to initiate
the use of nuclear weapons," Rusk wrote, and it was essential to ensure that "nuclear capabilities
as may be required to deter more massive Soviet aggression will not be automatically used in the
70 This follows the account in Ibid., Ch. 8. On changes to SACEUR's authority see esp. pp. 298, 300-302, 309.
7" Norstad quoted in Ibid., p. 310. Descriptions of the MLF are in Bundy to Kennedy, June 15, 1963; Bohlen-
Kennedy, February 16, 1963; NSC Executive Committee Meeting, February 12, 1963; all in FRUS, 1961-1963,
XIII: quotes on 593, 760, and 499.
72 NSC Meeting, January 22, 1963, FRUS, 1961-1963, VIII: 457-462, quote 459; Kennedy-Gavin, May 18, 1962,
FRUS, XIII: 704.
73 Ibid., 704; Bundy outline for Kennedy's talk to NSC, January 17, 1962, DDRS 1991/3578.
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event [conventional] forces become engaged against forces not themselves using nuclear
weapons." 74
With the United States in Europe deep into the future, it was also important to plan for
multiple contingencies. The need for control over many potential situations was outlined from
early in the administration:
It is essential that we adopt an insurance philosophy and hedge against uncertainty by buying alternative
future options for our military capabilities. We must procure 'lead time' reduction, making decisions now
to buy particular kinds of productive capability that we may never use. We must start development
programs in the full realization that, because of changed and unforeseen circumstances, some may not be
needed by the time they are completed. We must try to design our posture so that its effectiveness will not
be seriously degraded by changes in objectives or circumstances.
In the environment of a long-term commitment, past plans for a massive conventional attack had
to give way to preparing for the many less likely ways a war could proceed. It was "For this
reason also we must avoid exposed strategic systems that depend for their survival on quick
decisions that might have to be made in ambiguous circumstances." The forward management
of European affairs implied a need for flexibility and a range of military options.
This need for greater manipulation of the European battlefield led to a series of small but
substantial improvements to American ground forces. These included modernization of major
fighting vehicles, a reorganized division structure, increases in airlift and tactical air support, and
improved logistics and supply within Europe. Combined with new analysis in the McNamara
pentagon, these improvements created the belief that NATO could fight a conventional war
without nuclear escalation for much longer than previously anticipated-perhaps for between
thirty and ninety days, depending on the analysis. McNamara wrote that NATO conventional
forces "are strong enough to keep [nuclear escalation] from being forced on us early. In any
event, this decision should not be regarded as automatic." NATO could not fight indefinitely
under flexible response, but "The conditions for a sustained non-nuclear defense of Europe are
now in sight," a very different situation from the Eisenhower years.76
Increased ground force capabilities were also valued for their political potential. Ground
forces also promised to help spread and defend liberal values by reinforcing or building liberal
regimes. Kennedy's strong interest in counter-insurgency capabilities is well known-he sought
to create a nation-building capacity that could help build democracy and liberal institutions in the
third world. This kind of influence would enable America to expand the geography of the Cold
War in defense of its values outside of Europe. As Kennedy grimly put it in advocating such
measures, "The record of the Romans made clear that their success was dependent on their will
and ability to fight successfully at the edges of their empire. It was not so clear that we were yet
in a position to do the same." 77
74 Rusk to McNamara, February 4, 1961, FRUS, VIII: 24-27, quotes on 26 and 27.
7 McNamara to Kennedy, February 20, 1961, FRUS, VIII: 35-48, quotes on 37 and 39.
76 McNamara to Johnson, December 19, 1963, FRUS, 1961-1963, VIII: 565-587 details the American defense plans
shortly after Kennedy's death. Quotes on 586. On ground force and analysis improvements see Duffield, Power
Rules, Ch. 5; Enthoven and Smith, How Much is Enough?, Ch. 4.
77 NSC meeting, January 18, 1962, FRUS, 1961-1963, VIII: 238-242, quote on 240. On Kennedy's interest in
Counter-insurgency see Andrew F. Krepinevich, The Army and Vietnam (Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins
University Press, 1988), Ch. 2; Elizabeth N. Saunders, "Transformative Choices: Leaders and the Origins of
Intervention Strategy," International Security 34, no. 2 (October 1, 2009): pp. 137-141, 144-149.
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Counter-Arguments
Against the argument made in the two Cold War chapters, a pair of important alternative
explanations might be advanced. First, it could be argued that balance of power alone is
sufficient to explain changes in American grand strategy from 1945-1963. Specifically, rising
Soviet capabilities explain early increases in American commitment, while the changing nuclear
balance and the implications of Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD) explain the transition from
buckpassing to balancing. Second, one might contend that economic explanations of some kind
have purchase in the Cold War period. While general sectoral theories have avoided the Cold
War period, more nuanced case studies have argued that American economic interests and ideas
were important to understanding strategic change. In particular, one might contend that the
sectoral make-up of the body politic permitted American commitments in the early Cold War, or
that the rise of Keynesian economic doctrines is sufficient to explain the Cold War strategic
change.
THE CHANGING MILITARY BALANCE. It is possible to argue that the military balance of
power alone drove the character of American commitments in the early Cold War; versions of
this argument have been made by historians and political scientists. In the early Cold War
period, for instance, John Mearsheimer has argued that "no great power or combination of great
powers existed in Europe" powerful enough to "prevent the Soviet army from over-running those
regions, and therefore the United States had no choice but to check Soviet expansion." For
similar theoretical reasons, Dale Copeland asserts that "As early as mid-1945, American concern
for the long-term rise of the Soviet state drove U.S. leaders to implement a vigorous and
destabilizing containment strategy."78
Variation in the intensity of American commitments was driven by changes in the
military balance, particularly the breaking of the American nuclear monopoly in August, 1949.
As Marc Trachtenberg observes, "The strategy of building up American and allied power,
especially the dramatic shift in late 1950 on the German question-that is, the opting for the
rearmament of West Germany-clearly has to be understood in this context." It was the massive
build up of American nuclear power brought on by these decisions that laid the foundations for
Eisenhower's defense policy of nuclear pre-emption and the New Look. If war looked likely to
come, "it might be dangerous to try too hard to avoid a showdown. Given the way the military
balance was bound to shift, the United States would be well-advised to make its stand sooner
rather than later." American military doctrine matched its strategic capabilities and underwrote
its political program.79
It was the coming of nuclear parity, so the argument might continue, that caused the
change in American grand strategy. Growing Soviet weapons production and delivery capability
gradually eroded the American nuclear advantage. Once it became clear that America would
inevitably suffer unacceptable nuclear retaliation in any war, Eisenhower's plan for preemptive
nuclear escalation became untenable. Moreover, the Berlin crisis and the Cuban missile crisis
illustrated that both sides understood the realities of a MAD world-the need for caution, and the
illogic of choosing to fight a nuclear war. Kennedy therefore changed to a conventional military
78 John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York: Norton, 2001), p. 327; Dale C. Copeland,
The Origins ofMajor War (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2001), p. 146.
79 Trachtenberg, History and Strategy, pp. 148, 147.
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strategy more suited to strategic stalemate and which reduced the chances of accidental war. The
resulting permanent commitment was thus not actually costly, because it was clear to the
Kennedy administration that the Soviets were sufficiently chastened by MAD that they would
never start a war on purpose. Balancing was just an admission of the nuclear age's undeniable
logic.8 0
These kinds of arguments have real merit, consistent with the impact of the international
system posited by TLFP. I have argued in Chapter Six that the threat of Soviet hegemony had a
tremendous impact on American threat perception and quickly caused decision-makers to
recognize the need for some kind of commitment to shape the balance of power. Furthermore,
growing Soviet capabilities did indeed spur more intense commitments and served as an
integrating force on American grand strategy, forcing policy-makers to come to terms with the
inadequacy of several buckpassing schemes.
However, the rapid rise of Russian strength did not trigger a full commitment to Europe.
Mearsheimer's contention that "the United States had no buckpassing option, and thus it had to
do the heavy lifting itself' is simply incorrect. The international system admitted, and American
decision-makers perceived, two choices for containing the USSR: concentrated European power
or forward deployed American power. The negative liberal administrations of the early Cold
War spent most of their effort on behalf of the former option.8 1
The striking character of American grand strategy during the Truman and Eisenhower
administrations is how early power realities were perceived compared to how later policy-
responses developed. Admiral Leahy had argued as early as 1944 that the signal feature of world
politics was "the recent phenomenal development of heretofore latent Russian military and
economic strength-a development which seems certain to prove epochal in its bearing on future
politico-military international relationships, and which has yet to reach the full scope attainable
with Russian resources." The OSS warned Truman in April 1945 that "Russia will emerge from
the present conflict as by far the strongest nation in Europe or Asia-strong enough, if the
United States should stand aside, to dominate Europe." 82
And yet, American diplomats spent the better part of two years trying to make an
amicable settlement with the Soviets that would forestall American commitments, first under
Byrnes until the reparations stop, and then again under Marshall's initial policy before the ERP.
When it finally became clear that the Soviets would not cooperate and that Western Europe
would have to be rebuilt, considerations of Russian power meant American commitments
increased. But they were focused on the creation of a third force, not the commitment of
American power.
Similarly, the breaking of the American nuclear monopoly in 1949 yielded no policy
dividends for a year. Truman, Acheson, and others remained completely opposed to German
rearmament before the autumn of 1950, the most obvious step towards addressing Western
conventional inferiority in light of new Soviet capabilities. American rearmament efforts, in the
form of NSC-68, were put on ice before Korea, and American policy continued to focus on
European integration in the form of the ECSC. Even after American diplomats reluctantly
conceded that an American commitment to Europe would have to be made in order to facilitate
80 These kinds of arguments are common in, for example, the discussion of the Cuban missile crisis. See the
examples reviewed in Marc Trachtenberg, "The Influence of Nuclear Weapons in the Cuban Missile Crisis,"
International Security 10, no. 1 (Summer 1985): 137-163.
81 Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, p. 323.
82 Copeland, The Origins of Major War, pp. 150-151.
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German rearmament, they aimed at only temporary moves. American policy was based on the
hope of the EDC, which could defend Europe after an American departure. This is not that
growing Soviet strength had no effect; it certainly did. It is only to say that American the
changing military balance was not fully determinative of American strategy, and in fact, was
inhibited by ideological obstacles directing American strategy towards buckpassing.
The argument from the military balance is also flawed in its attempts to explain the
transition from buckpassing to balancing. For one thing, both Eisenhower and Kennedy
perceived a decisive American nuclear advantage until at least 1963. Kennedy in particular
viewed this advantage as a wasting asset that justified a hard line during the Berlin crisis. So
both Presidents viewed a nuclear first strike as tenable during their administrations, and neither
felt compelled by the shadow of parity to change their strategy. 83
More importantly, both administrations spent considerable effort thinking about the
coming of parity, but arrived at different solutions on the same facts. Of projected Soviet
estimates, Eisenhower complained in 1958 that he "was sick to death of timetables; he had had
experience with them for years, and they never proved anything useful." In light of approaching
nuclear parity, Dulles and others in the administration pressed for a more conventional defense.
But Eisenhower led his own faction that favored retreating into a pure deterrence strategy, as he
"did not believe that limited war was possible in Europe and thought that the NATO
[conventional] shield could be symbolic." The problem of nuclear plenty was deeply debated in
the Eisenhower administration, but it did not change American military policy or its strategic
posture.84
The same information did help push the Kennedy administration towards flexible
response. But surprisingly, Kennedy actually held precisely the views that would have made
Eisenhower's strategy viable: the belief that small numbers of nuclear weapons had big political
effects. As shown above, Kennedy had deep fears that French or German nuclear weapons
would provide them with political independence and a credible defense without American aid.
He had the same view about China, arguing that "we will have a difficult time protecting the free
areas of Asia if the Chinese get nuclear weapons," presumably because America would be
deterred from nuclear use and conventionally deterred by local inferiority. He also told the
British that a small force of air delivered ballistic missiles "should be capable of deterring Mr.
Khrushchev. He pointed out that twenty missiles in Cuba had had a deterrent effect on us."
Indeed, despite believing in the political possibilities of deterrence, Kennedy opted for more
control and a balancing strategy.85
In short, the perception of the nuclear balance did not vary enough to cause the grand
strategic change. Both administrations knew they possessed a first strike capability in the
present, both feared about its erosion in the future, and both believed in the possibility of a
deterrence strategy for the Europeans. But their fundamentally different kinds of liberal
preferences led to two different reactions to the same beliefs: Eisenhower embraced deterrence
and the devolution of nuclear capabilities to the Europeans, while Kennedy rejected them.
83 Trachtenberg, A Constructed Peace, pp. 179-183, 294-297.
84 NSC meeting, January 6, 1958; Dulles-Anderson-McElroy meeting, October 24, 1959; in FRUS, 1958-1960, III
and VII (1): 4-9, and 488-494 respectively, quotes on 7, 489. For the debate in the Eisenhower administration, see
Ibid., pp. 183-188.
85 For Kennedy's views on deterrence, see Ibid., pp. 318-321. NSC meeting, January 22, 1963; Kennedy-MacMillan
meeting, December 19, 1962; in FRUS, 1961-1963, XIII and VIII: 457-462, and 1091-1101 respectively, quotes
462, 1094.
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ECONOMIC EXPLANATIONS. Sectoral economic theories predicting partisan changes in
grand strategy have avoided examining American grand strategy during the Cold War, and with
good reason. However one codes American strategy during the period, it is quite clear that
similar grand strategies were pursued across party lines. In this study, the obvious example is
similar approaches of the Truman and Eisenhower administrations. Nonetheless, other theories
have emphasized the remarkable bipartisan coalition that came to support the historic departure
of American Cold War commitments. Many-sometimes mutually contradictory-theories have
contended this coalition was founded on economic roots. Other economic explanations have
emphasized variation in acceptance of Keynesian economic doctrines as the critical element in
American willingness to take on more foreign commitments. I address both possibilities below.
Many different theorists have stressed the "liberal internationalist" or "Cold War
consensus" that came to dominate American politics in the late 1940s and 1950s. Peter
Trubowitz and Charles Kupchan stress that a North-South alliance between outward oriented
economic interests came to dominate the Democratic Party, and to a lesser extent, the Republican
Party. As they put it, the "Northeast's rising position in the world economy was increasing the
region's support for economic openness and giving it a direct interest in the prosperity and
stability of Europe, its main export market," while "The South's export of raw materials was still
the mainstay of its economy. Southern dependence on international stability and open markets
readily translated into support for multilateral institutions such as the United Nations and the
Bretton-Woods system, which promised to check aggression and prevent the spread of economic
nationalism." This bipartisan support was necessary to sustain America's long-term strategy of
power projection and international cooperation. 86
Jack Snyder argues that American Cold War grand strategy was crucially supported by
foreign policy logrolling caused by "the temporary stalemate between internationalist and
nationalist economic interests in American society, and because the internationalist/nationalist
cleavage cut across party lines." The problem was that "On most issues the votes of moderate
Republicans were needed to offset defections by significant numbers of southern Democratic
nationalists." In order "To maintain harmony within the Republican Party," the economically
outward oriented interests who dominated the Democratic Party had to make concessions to
internationalist Republicans who "needed to win credit as people who could deliver on issues the
[economically inward oriented] nationalists cared about."8 7
Various hypotheses on the nature of these concessions have been offered. Snyder focuses
on the addition of more "Asia-first" elements to American global strategy to appease a small
group of China-lobby Republicans, whose hard-line anti-communist rhetoric was a politically
useful tool for economically inward oriented Republicans more broadly. Benjamin Fordham
argues that Truman tacitly conceded small business Republicans a domestic anti-communist
campaign rooted in suppressing labor-unions. But under any hypothesis, American
commitments could not have been increased during the early Cold War without bipartisan
political support.8 8
86 Charles A. Kupchan and Peter L. Trubowitz, "Dead Center: The Demise of Liberal Internationalism in the United
States," International Security 32, no. 2 (Fall 2007): p. 17.
87 Jack L. Snyder, Myths ofEmpire: Domestic Politics and International Ambition (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University
Press, 1991), p. 280.
88 Ibid., Ch. 7; Benjamin 0. Fordham, Building the Cold War Consensus: The Political Economy of U.S. National
Security Policy, 1949-51 (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 1998), Ch. 1. Thomas Christensen makes a
similar argument, though he emphasizes the role of public opinion on Congress rather than cartels of economic
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The biggest examples are the approval of the ERP and the Korean War build-up. The
gap between the strident ideological tone of the Truman doctrine speech and its more limited
objectives is often cited as they key to mobilizing Congressional support for the American
commitment to Europe, particularly the Marshall plan. And in Gaddis' words, the anti-
communist rationale of the Korean war "was so serendipitous" for the implementation of NSC-
68 "that some students of the subject have implied complicity on the part of American
officials... in bringing it about." Fordham basically alleges that Dean Acheson and other
outward oriented hawks worked to bring America into the war exactly so as to ensure political
cover for the European build-up. The purpose of the build-up was to solve the "dollar gap"
problem in Europe, providing a ready source of foreign exchange for Europeans so as to buttress
the international economic order and help Europeans buy American goods. 89
For certain, Congress had to provide funds for American foreign policy, and therefore
each Cold War administration had to expend effort to obtain its approval of critical programs.
No doubt, strong mobilizing rhetoric was used to rally the public and to form a bipartisan
consensus in the legislature. But there is very little in the way of actual evidence that any
administration was denied important goals it wanted, or ratcheted back objectives it would have
otherwise sought, because of Congressional or public resistance. The first Truman
administration thought the temporary and economic character of the ERP was a feature, not a
bug. Truman made heroic efforts to keep down defense spending prior to Korea, even in the face
of opposition from the military and administration hawks. Policy under Marshall was to focus
on economic recovery and European integration, not American commitments.
Moreover, there is only modest evidence that Truman intended to raise defense budgets
before Korea. Fordham emphasizes that Truman brought John Foster Dulles and Averill
Harriman on board to help with the political management of NSC-68's implementation, and
shows how negative liberal leaning elements in the administration had been cleverly
marginalized by Acheson and Nitze. However, he also concedes that Truman was publically
proclaiming further Defense budget cuts in the months prior to Korea and thought the budget for
NSC-68 "was definitely not as large as some people seem to think." He had further put the
document on lock-down and assigned it to die a slow death in an inter-agency committee
dominated by fiscal hawks. On the most generous interpretation possible, Truman might have
been prepared to fight a political battle for moderate increases in defense spending, which would
have required bipartisan cover. Such a limited increase could not have solved the dollar gap, or
served the economic interests alleged to be implicated in concerns about foreign exchange.
More likely, is that NSC-68 had no chance of becoming government policy before Korea. 90
More damningly for economic explanations, American buckpassing policies actually hurt
the economic interests they are alleged to have served. The heart of American strategy was the
economic unification of Europe, which was founded on explicit discrimination against American
goods. This was the core of a regional rather than a multilateral trading strategy: Europe's
markets would have low internal barriers to trade, much like trade between the American states,
but would have a high external tariff protecting them from foreign competition and creating
space for state industrial policy. As Federico Romero concisely summarizes: "the supranational
interests. See Thomas J. Christensen, Usefid Adversaries: Grand Strategy, Domestic Mobilization, and Sino-
American Conflict, 1947-1958 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1996), Chs. 2-3.
89 Gaddis, Strategies of Containment, p. 107; Fordham, Building the Cold War Consensus, Chs. 3, 5; Snyder, Myths
ofEmpire, pp. 279-296; Christensen, Useful Adversaries, pp. 49-58.
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institutions... embraced only a limited number of core countries; [their] sectoral policies
reinforced, rather than transcended, national industrial plans; and the community could well have
developed into an updated version of a cartel... the liberalization of trade and payments within
the OEEC... entailed deep and durable discrimination against dollar imports... [and] an
indefinite postponement of the return to multilateralism and currency convertibility." 91
American statesmen deliberately opted for European unification over a multilateral free-
trading strategy, which ought to have been the priority of a sectorally driven outward coalition.
Instead, America diplomatically supported the ECSC and then loaned it $100 million in start up
capital-in other words, financing American export competitors. During the 1950s, the State
Department repeatedly defeated the more economically focused Treasury and Commerce
departments on matters of economic strategy. "In their [Treasury] view," Romero argues, "the
American national interest required a prompt end to discrimination against the dollar... [and] a
more open system of trade and payments," and so supported Britain's return to Sterling
convertibility and GATT liberalization. But these economic benefits were forgone. State
"recognized that [strategic gains of regionalism] were well worth both the sacrifice of American
exports and the temporary shelving of plans for multilateralism and currency convertibility. "92
America thus supported the discriminatory European Payments Union and weighed in
against premature Sterling convertibility. The State Department consistently won battles against
Commerce in its desire to support the ECSC. And in supporting the EEC, as shown above, the
State Department deliberately undercut the more liberal British alternative of a free-trade area. It
also shelved GATT negotiations and debate on liberalization until the EEC treaty could be
shepherded through protectionist European parliaments. Moreover, the discrimination against
American money and goods was coupled with a greater opening of the American market to
European manufactures under Eisenhower. In short, American statesmen crafted a strategy that
negatively impacted both American exports and import competitors. Both the Truman and
Eisenhower administrations disadvantaged their respective coalitions, and left economically
preferable alternatives on the table. They did so because European integration "was vital to the
security of the United States" and commercial issues "necessarily subordinate. "93
Another possible explanation would emphasize the rise of Keynesian economic doctrines
during the Kennedy administration compared with their absence under Eisenhower. Such
theories encouraged a belief in simultaneous consumption and possession of the macroeconomic
cake. Eisenhower, who took the standard orthodox view of balanced budgets, feared what
permanent defense commitments abroad and their corresponding high defense budgets would do
to the American economy. But the Kennedy administration adopted the Keynesian view that
such prolonged government spending would stimulate demand and strengthen the economy. The
resulting budget deficits were inconsequential, and could even be helpful during an economic
downturn. Thus, Kennedy and the Keynesians who came after him saw no economic tension in a
balancing strategy, while Eisenhower's buckpassing was designed to eliminate just this tension.9 4
91 Federico Romero, "U.S. Attitudes Towards Integration and Interdependence: The 1950s," in The United States
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York: St. Martin's Press, 1996), p. 105.
92 Ibid., pp. 107, 105.
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346
This argument is true as far as it goes: economic doctrines did have an important
influence on the grand strategies of both Kennedy and Eisenhower. However, there is good
reason to believe that politicians adopt Keynesian views for normative reasons, rather than on the
merits. That is, economic views are highly correlated with concepts of liberty, which is why
they are included among TLFP's indicators for measuring varieties of liberalism. 95
Furthermore, Keynesian economics cannot explain the positive agenda abroad under
Kennedy. While expansionist economic doctrines might establish a permissive condition for
commitment abroad, they do not explain the American focus on managing European politics and
protecting free trade and democracy in Europe. An unalloyed Keynesianism might allow a drift
towards higher defense budgets and more ground forces. But the centralization of nuclear
control, the promotion of the British Trojan horse in the EEC, and the virulently anti-third force
views of the Kennedy administration have different roots-in positive liberty's preferences for
political control and liberal values abroad.
Other examples of the link between Keynesianism and foreign policy expansion should
lead us to be wary of its causal power. It has often been speculated that the Truman
administration's conversion to Keynesian doctrines under Leon Keyserling was a key facilitator
of NSC-68 and subsequent American commitments. Keyserling had supposedly "persuaded
Truman to endorse the eventual feasibility of a $300 billion gross national product" through
economic management designed to "expand the pie, not argue over how to divide it." But as we
have seen, Keyserling had not convinced Truman prior to Korea that defense ceilings could be
raised or that unbalanced budgets should be accepted in principle. Indeed, most historians now
agree that "there is no evidence that Truman had abandoned his fundamental view that protracted
deficits were not only dangerous, but positively immoral." As Michael Hogan puts it, "The
Keynesian revolution did not disturb so much as a hair on his neatly combed head" and he turned
to the new economics out of "expediency" rather than "conviction." Economic doctrines have
tended to be adopted in order to facilitate strategic decisions, not the other way around. 96
Conclusion
The decade between Eisenhower's assumption of the Presidency in 1953 and Kennedy's
assassination in 1963 saw the climax of the Cold War. Given the potentially violent conclusion
to the confrontation, the thirty-year length of the d6nouement that followed almost seems
reasonable. A period that began in tension and escalated towards war over high geopolitical
stakes, concluded in a status-quo peace that made Europe something of a strategic backwater.
The world had changed, and so had America.
Measurements of potential power and observations of American diplomacy alike reveal a
similarity between the Eisenhower and Kennedy periods. Both administrations feared Soviet
power; both administrations worried over American credibility. These common fears are
obvious in a number of common policies. Each administration took a similar line on the Berlin
crisis: America was willing to compromise on many substantive issues, but was unwilling to let
9s Studies that underscore the importance of pre-existing desires for the adoption of Keynesian ideas include Peter
A. Hall, ed., The Political Power of Economic Ideas: Keynesianism across Nations (Princeton, NJ: Princeton
University Press, 1989); Jeffrey Legro, Rethinking the World: Great Power Strategies and International Order
(Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2005), Appendix 1.
96 Gaddis, Strategies of Containment, p. 92; Friedberg, In the Shadow of the Garrison State, p. I 11; Hogan, A Cross
of Iron, p. 71.
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American credibility or West European industry remain threatened. Both administrations
understood that Europe required a (perhaps temporary) defense from Soviet aggression, and
designed military policies to bring it about. And while the administrations differed on European
integration, their diplomacy with the Western allies was driven by an attempt to generate a
desired European response to Soviet pressure. In short, the geopolitical threat of Soviet power
forced both administrations to commit American power to Europe's defense in an attempt to
contain the Soviet Union.
However, Eisenhower and Kennedy differed on how to do so. The Eisenhower
administration preferred a buckpassing strategy. Like their predecessors in the Truman
administration, Eisenhower and his lieutenants viewed the American commitment to Europe as
temporary, and sought to build an independent power complex in Western Europe that could
bear the primary burden of balancing against the Soviets. To this end, Eisenhower sought to
build the foundations of power in Europe on a supranational basis: economically in the EEC;
militarily in the EDC, the NATO nuclear stockpile, and MLF; and politically in vision of an
integrated and independent Europe that he would not compromise with either the British or the
Soviets.
The Kennedy administration chose a balancing strategy: it made the American forward
commitment permanent, in order to better manage European politics. Kennedy ceased the strong
support for European integration displayed under Eisenhower, and instead tried to use European
institutions to divide and conquer the allies. This made Kennedy far more receptive to British
participation in Europe, viewing Britain as a Trojan horse who would represent American
interests, and far more willing to make the compromises with the Russians that could bring
detente in Europe. Indeed, America was eager to guarantee West Germany's non-nuclear status
to the Soviets, because a major motivation for the new American strategy was to ensure that
there would be no independent European foreign policy. To this end, Kennedy sought to
centralize control of nuclear weapons through a new military doctrine, and crush Franco-German
attempts to cooperate outside the NATO alliance.
These differences in grand strategy were rooted in fundamental differences in philosophy.
Eisenhower's pre-presidential statements clearly reveal a man steeped in the negative liberal
tradition that long dominated American history: focused on individual rights, concerned about
excessive political centralization, fiscally conservative, and opposed to government intervention
in the economy. And indeed, fears about the impact of foreign policy on American liberties
animated the Eisenhower buckpassing strategy. The Eisenhower administration was worried
about the costs of a long-term diplomatic commitment to Europe, and was particularly concerned
that defense policy might damage the free-enterprise economy, fleece the taxpayer, and require
conscription. The threat of a regimented garrison state that trampled individual liberties in the
name of collective security was omnipresent. These rationales led to a military strategy that
emphasized standoff forces, relying on quick escalation with comparatively cheap nuclear
weapons, and envisioning a transition of conventional responsibilities to the Europeans.
Kennedy had a much different political worldview: he accepted the positive liberal
assumptions of the New Deal. Kennedy was concerned about the decadence of individualism
and the necessity of economic security, in favor of the centralization of government power, held
expansionary fiscal views, and supported government management of the economy. He
therefore had few of Eisenhower's concerns about the costs of foreign policy, seeing no need to
secure Western Europe on the cheap. He did, howcvcr, display positive liberal concerns about
democracy and free-trade abroad. One of the motivating fears driving the Kennedy approach on
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European integration was the possibility that without an American and British presence,
European initiatives would only lead to the nationalism that had twice torn the continent apart.
Europe had to be delicately managed in order to protect it from itself: a third-force would
threaten democracy and bring-about autarchy. A focus on ground forces buttressed this bid for
diplomatic hegemony. The permanent commitment of troops in Germany made NATO's




Conclusion: American Grand Strategy, Past and Future
I have attempted three tasks in executing this study. First, I have sought to conceptualize grand
strategy as an object of inquiry, understanding it as a state's vision for the international
configuration of power and its mechanism for realizing these preferences. Second, I have
integrated propositions deduced from ideological and power political paradigms into a new
theory of American grand strategy, which I term a Theory of Liberal Foreign Policy (TLFP).
Third, I have tested this theory on the puzzling variation in American grand strategy towards the
European great powers from 1914-1963, which has previously resisted a unitary interpretation.
In so doing, I divided the entire period into five cases and compared TLFP to the strongest
available competitors in each era. Each empirical chapter has used congruence testing and
process-tracing to assess TLFP's validity.
This chapter has four parts. First, I summarize the argument of the study. Second, I use
the comparative method to highlight TLFP as the motor of major changes in American grand
strategy over time. Though no comparison can be perfectly controlled, the observation of a
single country's behavior in a single empirical domain plausibly holds a series of perturbing
factors constant. I compare the five cases in a manner designed to isolate change on one of
TLFP's variables and illustrate the results this variation brought about; this also serves to
summarize much of the congruence and process-tracing evidence from the case studies. Third, I
assess the power of alternate explanations. Finally, I draw lessons from the study for the future
of American foreign policy.
The Argument
The argument I offer this study can be summarized in several short pieces. I begin by
explaining my synthetic approach to theory building, rooted in the empirical and theoretical
puzzles of American foreign policy and international relations theory. Next, I review the concept
of grand strategy and how it can vary. I then proceed to outline the two concepts of liberty
within the liberal tradition, my measurement scheme for charting their variation, and the effect
these norms have on preferences for American foreign policy. Subsequently, I present several
insights from balance of power theory that also influence American strategic choice. I conclude
the argument by integrating the liberal and realist propositions into TLFP and detailing the
theory's outcome and process predictions.
MOTIVATION AND APPROACH. My approach to theory development has been synthetic
rather than competitive. I take for granted that realist and ideological theories have much to tell
us about world politics in general and American foreign policy in particular. However, variation
in American grand strategy over long periods of time is anomalous for existing theories, and
America is an outlier case with extreme values on both geopolitical and ideological variables.
Rather than stage a contrived battle between only partially armed theories destined to end in a
bloody draw, it seemed more fruitful to take advantage of the peculiar aspects of the American
case to refine and integrate work from existing paradigms into a single model.
Not only does this approach create a powerful lens for studying a puzzling case, it
establishes a theoretical baseline from which further research can proceed in cases where
ideological and power political variables take on a range of values. Moreover, it advances some
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long-standing intra-paradigmatic debates by examining them within the particularly vivid context
of extreme values. Realists have often disagreed on how much power states seek and the
strategies they will use to pursue it. Theorists of liberal ideology have identified a consensus
liberal view of international politics, but also identify two ways in which it has been applied by
liberal statesmen. TLFP produces a novel answer as to what drives variation in the application
of liberal strategies, while also integrating realist insights. Finally, the American case is
intrinsically interesting from a policy perspective. As the leading state in the international
system, American grand strategy going forward is likely to greatly affect the future of world
politics, and it is well worth understanding the theoretical underpinnings of its posture.
I have argued that the primary requirement for a theory of American foreign policy is its
ability to explain when the United States will make costly commitments abroad and when it will
retrench. That is, any useful theory will need a motor that explains variation, specifying a
"propulsive force" and a "retractive force" that drive variation in the American posture. Because
existing theories either do not specify these forces or face empirical anomalies, a new theory is
required to adequately capture the changes in American behavior.
DV: GRAND STRATEGY. I claim that such changes are best understood in terms of grand
strategy: a state's plan for managing the balance of power. This is not an explicit plan or any
individual policy, but rather a pattern that emerges from the sum of all high-level policies and
describes a state's over all posture in world politics. Grand strategies are comprised of a set of
preferences for acceptable and unacceptable international power constellations, as well as a
mechanism for how these preferences will be obtained. In general, grand strategies feature a
trade off between cost and control: postures which provide more influence over the balance of
power tend to be more costly, and vice-versa.
I thus arrange grand strategies on a continuum of increasing degree of power
management and delineate distinct grand strategies on the continuum by their mechanism. Four
ideal type grand strategies can be identified, running from lesser to more intense involvement in
managing international power configurations: non-entanglement, buckpassing, balancing, and
preponderance. These strategies can be measured by inferring their existence from elements
common to all grand strategies: threat perception and response; diplomatic policy; and military
policy. By examining how these elements interact, we can infer a state's preferred power
configurations and the strategic mechanism by which they will be achieved. Explicit statements
on these issues by the statesmen who executed the policies are also useful evidence for coding
grand strategy.
IV: CONCEPTS OF LIBERTY. The core innovation of TLFP has been to root changes in
American grand strategy to changes in the content of the liberal tradition. I contend that there
has always been an important ambiguity at the heart of liberal thought: whether freedom is to be
understood as a negative concept prohibiting interference or constraint, or as a positive ability to
act or exercise abilities on behalf of valued goals. In domestic politics, negative liberty is
associated with opposition to coercive power of the state, while positive liberty is more
supportive of using the state to provide the capacities and pre-conditions for effective action.
Concepts of liberty can be measured by examining the discourse of presidents and other
foreign policy-makers before their time in power. Three substantive categories of expression are
especially germane to making these measurements: explicit philosophical statements; attitudes
towards the centralization of power; and views about the fiscal and economic role of the state.
By surveying the preponderance of evidence across these categories, individuals and
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administrations can be assessed to lie to a greater or lesser degree within the ideal typical
categories of negative and positive liberty.
Competing concepts of liberty have been the subject of domestic political debate since
the inception of the American Republic. This debate has gone through, very roughly, three
phases. Before the twentieth century, negative liberty was the dominant understanding of
freedom among American elites. By the mid 1960s, positive liberty was dominant among the
national security class and today underpins the philosophy of both major political parties. In
between, competing interpretations of liberalism struggled mightily with each other in American
domestic politics. This struggle had major implications for American involvement in
international politics.
LIBERAL PREFERENCES. In foreign policy, advocates of negative liberty will usually
prefer less intense strategies of power management, in order to avoid the creation of a
constraining and coercive central state needed to execute more ambitious postures. Negative
liberty therefore acts as a retractive force on American commitments. Negative liberals will
respond to fewer threats, attempt to reduce strategic costs, avoid alliances and use them for
burden sharing, and prefer standoff forms of military power. For psychological reasons, negative
liberals will protect their central liberal norm of avoiding a large state by denying the need for its
existence-they will acknowledge few threats of any kind and insist that international liberalism
will spread best under its own power.
Partisans of positive liberty will favor more intense strategies of power management, in
order that liberal values might be spread abroad and American rights vindicated. Positive liberty
is a propulsive force: positive liberals will perceive more threats, seek greater control over world
politics, favor alliances as instruments of political influence, and take a special interest in ground
forces. Positive liberals have no psychological need for an optimistically biased assessment of
threats and will therefore be more influenced by traditional liberal fears of encroaching
international illiberalism. They will, however, seek to deny that they are trapped in a world of
power politics and war. Instead, they will affirm that the American state has the capability to
vindicate its values abroad and move the international system towards its natural liberal order, in
a manner directly analogous to the way the American state intervenes to advance effective liberty
at home.
IV: SYSTEMIC INFLUENCES. These propositions are combined with insights from balance
of power theory to form TLFP. I argue that America's geographic advantages are such that it is
extraordinarily secure. Its statesmen do not feel geopolitical pressures the way European leaders
do and under most circumstances America "can take as much or as little of the war as it will."
The one exception is the presence of a potential hegemon in Europe-a state so powerful that it
could potentially conquer all of Europe's industrial power and then devote its undistracted
attention to the Western hemisphere. The presence of such a state generates forces pushing
American strategy towards the center of the power management continuum: statesmen will have
a strong incentive to oppose potential hegemons before they conquer Europe, but at the same
time, the resistance of other states to being dominated will also usually inhibit American
preponderance. In addition, the international system will also serve as an integrating force in
American grand strategy. Though leaders are prone to deny trade-offs and avoid hard choices,
strategic fantasy crashes hard against power political reality. Interaction with the international
system will, over time, force statesmen to rationally adjust their ends and means towards one of
the ideal type strategies.
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The presence of potential hegemons can be ascertained by assessing the relative
economic potential of the European great powers, their standing military might, and qualitative
assessments of their military quality. A potential hegemon will far surpass its leading competitor
on one or more of these indicators and will exceed the strength of plausible coalitions.
TLFP'S PREDICTIONS FOR STRATEGIC OUTCOMES. Together, the independent variables of
TLFP generate a set of ceteris paribus expectations about the grand strategy the United States
will adopt. If no potential hegemon exists, the retractive force of negative liberty will push
America towards non-entanglement, as American leaders attempt to reduce to a minimum the
costs to liberty associated with an active foreign policy. But if positive liberty is dominant
instead, American strategy will be propelled forward to greater commitments, as statesmen seek
to provide the foundations for liberal societies abroad, vindicate the rights of Americans in world
politics, and secure the United States from illiberal threats. Whether these commitments will
take the form of balancing or preponderance will depend on the size of America's relative power
advantage and the reaction of European states. Positive liberal ideals will tend to push towards
preponderance, usually through some liberal organizational scheme effectively privileging
American power, but the international system will tend to resist such outcomes, pushing
American policy towards balancing.
If a potential hegemon is present in Europe, the natural proclivities of both liberalisms
will be restrained. Negative liberals will understand that America must make commitments to
meet the geopolitical threat, but will seek to shift the burdens to others through buckpassing.
Positive liberals will see no need to economize on security and will also see opportunities to
advance liberal goals on the margins, opting instead for the greater influence of balancing.
TLFP'S PROCESS PREDICTIONS. Of course, all things are not always equal. The social
world being a complex place, factors beyond the motor forces of TLFP's model can sometimes
affect the course of American grand strategy. Fortunately, TLFP also posits a set of causal
processes that should be evident in American foreign policy decision-making if the model is
correct. If these processes are consistently observed they strongly substantiate the theory, since
they are in many respects unique predictions we would not expect to hold if some other factor
were doing the work.
When negative liberty is present we should expect to find a distinctive set of anti-statist
and non-interference rationales driving policy choice. We should see a general desire to reduce
the costs of foreign policy and a diminution of perceived threats: liberal ideological fears will be
minimized and only very powerful states will be worrisome. Cost aversion should also be
expressed in an opposition to alliances and military spending. If negative liberals take on
international commitments, they should highlight the burden-sharing functions of such
engagements. If military forces are built, the emphasis should be on stand-off forces rather than
ground forces.
Conversely, if positive liberty is dominant, a general emphasis on protecting and
promoting liberal values abroad should be observed. With no psychological need to reduce
threats, fears of illiberal ideology and smaller concentrations of power should produce more
concern. Positive liberals should seek more control over the balance of power, favoring
alliances, international organizations, and military power as tools for doing so. Diplomatic
connections will be valued mostly as a means of influencing the policy and general orientation of
other states, even at the expense of added costs. Militarily, ground forces will receive special
attention because of their greater ability to influence political outcomes and alliance
commitments.
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When potential hegemons appear, statesmen should be found fearing their capacity to
conquer Europe and even their possible penetration of the Western hemisphere. These fears
should push leaders to exert more control over the balance of power, even at added costs, and
even against other retractive forces. Furthermore, we should see the influence of the
international system exert an integrating force on American grand strategy over time. Statesmen
have political and psychological incentives to avoid hard choices and deny the necessity of value
trade-offs, particularly between cost and control. They will tend to believe that their low cost
policies can provide all the control they need. But if ends and means are poorly adjusted, grand
strategies are likely to fail. As statesmen confront the hard realities of the international system,
they will be forced towards the integration of policy ends and means, approaching more closely
one of the four ideal type grand strategies.
Comparative Analysis
This section compares American strategy in the five cases studied in order to isolate the
causal effects of TLFP's variables. As the empirical work amply reveals, these cannot be
considered fully controlled comparisons: other possible variables of interest do move over time
and even occasionally perturb American strategy. In truth, the experimental logic of controlled
comparisons is almost never fully realized in social analysis, a point developed at length by John
Stuart Mill when he formalized their use in the nineteenth century.'
Nevertheless, the comparative method is useful in this context. For one thing, a great
many other potentially important variables remain constant. American national culture, the
character of its party system, its basic regime type and institutional arrangements, its geographic
location, and its status as the leading economic power in the system are all more or less invariant.
By contrast, the balance of power abroad and the character of liberal ideology at home both do
change, but rarely together, making comparisons potentially useful. And having just studied the
cases to be compared in depth, we have a good sense of what potential perturbing variables
might be and how they might confound the analysis. I note the areas where this seems possible
in the following section on alternate explanations.
I proceed in two parts. First, I compare eras with similar balances of power but different
dominant concepts of liberty; I then hold eras with similar concepts of liberty constant while
comparing across the structure of the system. I find that changes in TLFP's variables are
responsible for change in American grand strategy in the manner expected by the theory.
LIBERALISM IN ACTION
In this section I compare American grand strategies in eras without a potential European
hegemon and then in eras with a potential hegemon. I find that changing concepts of liberty in
the White House led to different approaches to treating similar strategic problems, in the man'ner
predicted by TLFP. Positive liberals had more demanding visions for the balance of power in
Europe, favored more commitments in order to shape that balance, and used those commitments
for influence over the orientation of others. Negative liberals faced the same problems with less
ambitious power configurations in mind, minimized American commitments, and used those
John Stuart Mill, A System of Logic: Ratiocinative and Inductive (London, England: Harper and Brothers, 1874),
Bk. VI.
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commitments as a means to shift costs to others. Both types of administration were ultimately
driven by a vision of the liberal gains their strategy would secure, either at home or abroad.2
NO POTENTIAL HEGEMON. Woodrow Wilson and the interwar Republican
administrations of Harding, Coolidge, and Hoover all faced European power constellations
without a potential hegemon. Before the Great War, European power appeared balanced, with
Germany possessing a modest economic advantage over Britain and military equality with the
Entente; prior to American entry the war looked to be a stalemate. After the war, all these
administrations perceived variations on a devastated and chaotic Europe, but one without an
aggressive leading power. What is more, Wilson and his Republican successors shared similar
strategic perceptions and ideological beliefs. All parties considered America to be more or less
immune from geopolitical threats. All shared the same broad liberal outlook, hoping for a
peaceful, democratic, and economically open Europe, and finding the causes of European
instability in its illiberalism and power political ways. But Wilson and the Republicans of the
1920s responded in very different ways to similar international circumstances.
Wilson was simply unwilling to tolerate European anarchy on a permanent basis. From
the very beginning of the Great War, he was thinking in terms of a unipolar Europe managed by
a collective security apparatus, led by benevolent American power. Only such a centralized
power configuration could promote "the development of constitutional liberty in the world."
Indeed, Wilson's envisioned League of Nations would both bolster and grow liberal regimes and
be supported by them, in a mutually reinforcing system. And only an end to European
illiberalism could ensure that militarist and autocratic powers would not one day threaten the
United States, although even with a German victory, Wilson did not anticipate this result in the
short term.
Wilson understood that securing a unipolar League capable of managing European power
would require a major American commitment. Though he perhaps never realized quite how
extensive such a commitment would have to be, his positive liberal goals nonetheless pulled him
towards an extensive set of military investments and diplomatic engagements. These were
especially remarkable given their departures from American tradition. He built the first
peacetime army of any real size since the Civil War before entering the European conflict. Once
he realized that his strategy of neutrality and peace without victory was doomed, he chose to
utilize conscription to deploy a massive land army to Europe rather than fight a limited naval and
financial war.
Whether or not Wilson's commitments could have ever led to real American
preponderance is an open question because his policies were never realized. But the fact that the
envisioned mechanics of collective security were fanciful should not obscure the great
importance Wilson placed on the League or the forward commitments he was willing to make on
its behalf. The League was the method by which liberalism would expand and make progress in
world politics. "We have said that this war was carried on for a vindication of democracy,"
Wilson argued in Paris, and "if we were ready to fight for this, we should be ready to write it into
the covenant." To give the League a chance to operate, he was willing to commit America to a
separate entangling alliance with France, to allow a potentially enduring French occupation of
the Rhineland, and to place a division strength American force there as a tripwire. These
forward commitments of political and military assets would have placed America in the center of
European power politics during the 1920s.
2 Unless otherwise footnoted, any quotes that follow are reproduced from the empirical chapters.
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Thus, when faced with a malleable distribution of power in Europe, Wilson was drawn to
a grand strategy of preponderance by his liberal aims. When forced to choose between cost and
control, he consistently took on more commitments rather than reduce his goals. Wilson had a
genuinely unipolar vision for the future of the European politics; his forward commitments
achieved a balancing posture before he left office.
The Harding administration rapidly disassembled this posture, and the interwar
Republicans were all content to choose non-entanglement over any costly connection with
Europe. They, too, confronted a continent rent by political turmoil and economic distress that
threatened their basic liberal hopes. But the interwar Republicans' vision for the balance of
power emphasized the distance of the American pole from Europe and a willingness to tolerate a
number of power constellations. The 1923 French invasion of the Ruhr threatened civil war in
Germany, general war in Europe, and the economic collapse of the developed world. The
Harding administration's reaction was that "each side would probably have to 'enjoy its own bit
of chaos' until the disposition to create a fair settlement had been created." Later, growing
German power became worrisome, but American diplomats would not "ask the Krupp factories
to go out of the business of making ploughs because, in war, they might make guns." America
would help where it could, but would not commit to shaping the balance of power. America's
twin strategic principles were: "Independence-that does not mean and has never meant
isolation. Cooperation-that does not mean and has never meant alliances or political
entanglements."
The interwar Republicans relied on mechanisms of deterrence and non-interference to
achieve a detached position. American defenses were minimized, but kept sufficient to defend
the continent and the naval approaches to the Western hemisphere. The American position on
the Rhine was liquidated as fast as political circumstances would permit. No French treaty was
ever ratified; no neutered version of the League ever agreed upon. Such commitments as
American statesmen would make had to be relatively costless-American diplomats negotiated
the Dawes settlement, but were "not in a position to guarantee this financing or to assume any
responsibility in regard to it." Security commitments were out of the question: America did "not
believe that the peace of the world or of Europe depends upon or can be assured by treaties of
military alliance."
Above all, the United States refused to forgive Allied war debts, which were "loans from
individual American citizens rather than contributions from the Treasury of the United States."
There could be no settlement to the reparations tangle that would "transfer the burden of
reparation payments from the shoulders of the German taxpayer to those of the American
taxpayer." The negative liberal ideals of the interwar Republicans privileged avoiding resource
extraction over shaping the balance of power. Their philosophy sought "how to fully assert a
helpful influence abroad without sacrificing anything of importance to our own people." In
practice, this approach meant that little influence was asserted in order that anti-statist values
might not be sacrificed. The final result was a grand strategy of non-entanglement.
POTENTIAL HEGEMONS. The Truman and Eisenhower administrations both faced a
brooding leviathan in the form of the Soviet Union, one whose power was growing rapidly and
threatened to overwhelm a shattered Western Europe. The Kennedy administration faced the
same threat, though of a somewhat lesser degree, as Europe had recovered and rearmed in the
intervening years. Roosevelt faced a different and even more dangerous potential hegemon after
1940, a Greater Germany on the march. Each of these administrations was deeply concerned for
the survival of Western Europe and about the implications of a European hegemon for American
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security. And each administration also wanted a liberal Europe that was peaceful, prosperous,
and economically open. The presence of a large geopolitical threat imparted some similarity to
the strategy of all four administrations. Yet two distinct approaches are evident. The negative
liberals of the early Cold War sought to recreate an organic European balance of power that
could catch the buck and prevent Soviet hegemony. They were bookended by positive liberal
administrations that desired the greater control of balancing and aimed at extensive forward
commitments of American power.
Both the Truman and Eisenhower administrations envisioned the creation of a third force
in Europe: an independent power complex that could balance Soviet power largely on its own.
Fifteen years of military and diplomatic activity were devoted to building the political and
economic foundations of this unit. The Marshall Plan's object was to rebuild Europe
economically, "to combat not communism, but the economic maladjustment which makes
European society vulnerable to exploitation." An economically integrated Europe would be a
"third force which was not merely the extension of US influence but a real European
organization strong enough to say 'no' both to the Soviet Union and to the United States."
American support for the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), the European Economic
Community (EEC), and other integrative projects were motivated by the same vision: to turn
Europe into "a solid power mass." Dulles summed up his administration's enthusiastic support
for the EEC: "with the common market Europe would be a third world force along with the US
and the Soviet Union. If Europe does not have a common market, it will remain weak."
Other integrative projects paved the political and military route for a third force. The
North Atlantic Treaty helped facilitate West German integration with what American diplomats
perceived as a paper promise. The European Defense Community (EDC) was intended to be a
truly European army "that the United States will be able to leave to the European nation-
members the primary responsibility... of maintaining and commanding." The Multilateral Force
(MLF), in its original form, was a similar idea but with nuclear weapons, seeking to turn Europe
into an independent nuclear power. American diplomats hoped all of the above projects would
have not just military and economic, but specifically political elements-they would create a
European political consciousness and institutional structures for united action. For this reason,
both Truman and Eisenhower emphasized working primarily with France and Germany to build
the nucleus of the third force, because they did "not wish to see this progress retarded by British
reluctance."
The basic mechanism of all these projects was free-riding: America would pass the buck
to the third force in order to reduce its own costs. Americans saw Europe as "representing some
kind of charge on the US which the American public is not prepared to carry indefinitely."
European strength was in American interests because "weakness could not cooperate, weakness
could only beg." As that strength was being built, both the Truman and Eisenhower
administrations favored a nuclear heavy strategy that reduced overall American costs, especially
in the form of ground force deployments. Both administrations concurred with Eisenhower's
statement that "Our policy should be that our friends and allies supply the means for local
defense on the ground and that the United States should come into the act with air and naval
forces alone." And each eagerly anticipated a return to "a minimum military establishment and
mobilization base that could be expanded promptly in case of need." These cost reductions
would benefit American liberty at home by reducing taxes, avoiding inflation, and forestalling
the approach of the garrison state. Soviet power had to be balanced in some fashion, but the
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Truman and Eisenhower administrations preferred to forgo control in Europe in the hopes of
reducing American commitments.
The Kennedy administration had an opposite set of preferences: it sought more influence
over its Western European allies and accepted a permanent balancing commitment in order to
obtain it. Rather than moving towards a withdrawal from Europe, Kennedy announced that "the
United States will maintain in Germany ground forces equivalent to six divisions as long as they
are required." Rather than pursuing an organic European center of power, America now aimed
not to "disturb the balance of power" already in existence, believing that "If this balance should
change, the situation in West Europe as a whole would change and this would be a most serious
blow to the US." A series of forward commitments were made under Kennedy. A tacit deal was
cut with the Soviets, protecting Berlin in exchange for an American guarantee of Germany's
permanent non-nuclear status. NATO moved towards a more conventional strategy of "flexible
response," with American ground forces modernized and assigned a new emphasis on stopping a
conventional attack. And European institutions were encouraged-but as instruments of
direction and control, rather than independence.
Indeed, the Kennedy administration denied the legitimacy of the entire third force idea,
which "touched a very sensitive nerve. The concept that Europe could be the arbiter between the
US and the Soviets was basically fallacious." Britain was encouraged to join European
institutions in order divide them: Britain was to "act as our lieutenant (the fashionable word is
partner)." Kennedy reacted quickly to crush the beginnings of a nascent entente between France
and West Germany, intervening in German politics and telling the West Germans they had to
choose France or NATO, and that NATO operated under American aegis. The MLF was turned
from a real proposal into a long-running comic opera, significantly altered to disguise the reality
of European nuclear dependence with the fagade of some kind ofjoint control. Kennedy bluntly
described the aims of the American balancing posture: "we did not fear a third force would be
neutralist. We were concerned, instead, about whether there would be a wholly separate,
independent force unrelated to American responsibility and interest."
At the heart of Kennedy's strategic change was a positive liberal worry about the
persistence of democracy and open-trading systems in Europe. The Kennedy administration felt
that "both Germany and France have strong potential which would tend over the long run to
make the EEC an inward-looking organization" and damned European "moves toward autarky
and the third force delusion." A British presence in Europe would strengthen the free-trading,
open-economy forces on the continent. Moreover, individually, European "conceals within her
body politic deep divisive forces. Only by diluting those forces within the larger caldron of
Europe[an]" institutions could these political energies be prevented from destroying European
liberalism. In short, a third force on the continent would either be an autarkic and possibly
illiberal entity, or it would tear itself to pieces through illiberal impulses from within. This
outcome had to be avoided as surely as a Soviet conquest of Europe. Permanent and costly
American forward commitments were the key to managing both problems. Whereas fifteen
years of American diplomacy had drawn back from this conclusion, Kennedy never blinked.
Though the specific power configuration in Europe was radically different under
Roosevelt, after the fall of France it shared an essential character with the Cold War cases: a
potential hegemon threatened Europe. Like Kennedy, Roosevelt found limited commitments
unacceptable-German power at the center of Europe, even contained German power, was
intolerable. After the fall of France he was advised by his military to abandon Britain and
concentrate on defending American shores. But he decided instead to increase aid to Britain and
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planned a military force "for other purposes... than the strict defense of the western
hemisphere." Lt. General Stanley Embick and other isolationist officers close to Roosevelt
frequently militated against a full commitment to the British Empire, and even George Marshall
thought that "we will not need a 4,000,000 man Army unless England collapses." Roosevelt
instead favored Admiral Stark's analysis that German power would have to be utterly destroyed
by a large ground army. He deliberately made a series of commitments designed to clear the
domestic hurdles to that Army's deployment: Lend-Lease, the undeclared war in the Atlantic,
and ultimately, the provocation of Japan.
Roosevelt's preference for a full American commitment to balancing is explained at least
in part by his positive liberal beliefs. To be sure, the international system was sending a strong
signal that the United States needed to prop up the balance of power in some way. But the
historical debate over what, exactly, Roosevelt was doing; the presence of strong buckpassing
voices in the administration; and the increased plausibility of a buckpassing strategy after the
Soviets entered the war all show that the system did not fully determine American behavior. It is
no accident the same military planning documents advocating the destruction of Germany also
argued that "the possession of a profitable foreign trade, both in raw material and in finished
goods" and "the establishment of regimes favorable to economic freedom and individual liberty"
were critical national interests. 3 It is no coincidence that an administration which had spent
several years worried about expanding German autarky quickly went to work planning for a
post-war world based on free-trade.
Like Kennedy after him, Roosevelt was not too concerned about pushing around
European allies if it would lock in a liberal order: Roosevelt considered the post-war settlement
"his particular preserve" and the Europeans "were to be told just where they get off." So
important was the post-war trading structure that Lend-Lease was used as a club against the
British to pave the "way toward either cracking now or laying the foundations for cracking the
Ottawa [Imperial Preference] agreements." Was the man who talked privately of the importance
of the four freedoms in negotiations with the British a year before deploying such rhetoric
publically just kidding? Was he just placating Churchill when he wrote that the British
economic deference would allow the Allies to "organize a different kind of world where men
shall really be free economically as well as politically?" Such a conclusion is implausible. It is
possible that any American administration would have found itself involved in the European
ground war, though I believe that question open. But it is certain that Roosevelt's liberal aims
could only be achieved through such commitments.4
SUMMARY. By holding the structure of the international system constant, it becomes
obvious how different liberal ideals shape American foreign policy. Positive liberals tend to see
more danger in the international system, whether from material or ideological sources.
Confronted with similar situations, negative liberals downplay threats. Positive liberals push
American commitments outward in search of influence, while negative liberals try to retract
them in order to control costs. Alliances and ground forces form the heart of positive liberal
3 Recall from Chapter Five that this was no boilerplate language-Marshall thought the addition of liberal interests
were "purely political" and protested that they were "out of place in this paper." Embick and his cohorts were livid.
One planner raged that such goals amounted to "the imposition of our own ideology upon the world." But if the
language was political, so were the planning documents, which were drawn up at Roosevelt's request and tailored to
his interests.
4 David Reynolds, The Creation of the Anglo-American Alliance, 1937-41: A Study in Competitive Cooperation
(Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1982), p. 254.
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grand strategies, since they help provide control over the balance of power. Negative liberals
prefer more distant political connections, burden-shifting, and stand-off forces. The international
system plays a major role in the foreign policy of both negative and positive liberals, but the two
ideologies interpret its demands in different ways.
GEOPOLITICS IN ACTION
I now compare administrations with similar ideological valence but different geopolitical
circumstances. I find that geopolitical forces had a profound effect on how similarly oriented
statesmen made policy. As TLFP predicts, the presence of a potential hegemon provided a very
substantial incentive for American leaders to make commitments propping up the balance of
power. In the same vein, the more dangerous the balance of power, the more quickly American
strategy integrated its political and military ends and means. When geopolitical threat was less
severe, statesmen could persist with flawed strategies for greater periods of time and could also
pursue more ambitious liberal goals of one kind or another.
POSITIVE LIBERALISM. The administrations of Woodrow Wilson, Franklin Roosevelt,
and John Kennedy were all importantly influenced by positive liberalism. These ideas oriented
American grand strategy outward in the service of vindicating liberal values, albeit with different
emphases among administrations. But each administration was broadly interested in protecting
democracy, open economies, and American trading rights. Each leader sought to promote peace
through using American power to expand liberalism. The impact of the liberal influence,
though, turned on the character of the balance of power.
The Wilson administration had the most malleable balance of power to work with:
initially, a stalemated war in Europe, and after the war, a shattered continent eager for help. It
does not surprise, therefore, that Wilson's vision was the most grandiose. From the first guns of
August, he had decided that "No nation shall ever again be permitted to acquire an inch of land
by conquest," and "there must be an association of nations, all bound together for the protection
of the integrity of each, so that any one nation breaking this bond will bring upon herself war;
that is to say, punishment, automatically." Wilson never really abandoned these goals. Even as
the realities of power politics made themselves clear at the Paris Peace Conference, he fought
hard to win positive guarantees of territorial integrity in the League covenant and harsh sanctions
against violators of the treaty. Wilson valued these as integral to the collective security system
and paid dearly to get them; if they do not impress the geopolitically minded it is only because
geopolitical forces pressed weakly on American minds in 1919.
The lack of major systemic pressure during the era of the Great War allowed Wilson to
get by with a disintegrated grand strategy, one whose liberal aims far outstripped America's
diplomatic and military means. Wilson's idea that biased neutrality would somehow help secure
European acceptance of an American dominated League was the stuff of liberal dreams. Yet
America dawdled through three years of buckpassing because statesmen in the grips of fantasies
can maintain them at length when not confronted with systemic reality. Interestingly, Wilson's
belated realization that the Allies were playing him for a sucker did cause a more coercive
position towards them and a more even-handed overture towards Germany. But like the
Godfather, Wilson's offer to Germany was nothing. Wilson had vague promises. Germany had
tangible submarines. It is hard to tell whose judgment was objectively "worse," but the Kaiser at
least had a semi-plausible theory of victory.
Even after unrestricted submarine warfare was launched, Wilson labored for seven weeks
to keep his buckpassing strategy alive. Of the major American statesmen, only Lansing
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entertained any fears of a German victory, and only occasionally. The rest of Washington was
convinced of eventual, and probably imminent, Allied triumph. America went to war, not for
fear of geopolitical dangers, but in pursuit of liberal opportunities. It was only the obvious
disintegration of his faux-neutral posture that led Wilson to the conclusion war could not be
avoided: he could not fight a naval and financial war without becoming obviously partisan. If
the League of Nations was to be kept alive, Wilson would have to bring it into existence at the
peace table himself, a process that was facilitated by the influence of a massive land
commitment.
All that said, once in Europe, the balance of power did have an integrating influence on
American strategy. To construct the League, Wilson was forced to make commitments he would
have preferred not to make. That he did not shrink from them underscores his positive
liberalism; that he was forced to confront the choice is the work of geopolitical reality. Against
his preferences, Wilson committed 200,000 troops to police a fairly harsh armistice, in return for
making the League the top agenda item in Paris. To gain French acceptance of the Treaty he
agreed to extraordinary departures from the American tradition: an explicit alliance, a tripwire
occupation force, and a semi-permanent occupation of the Rhineland. Furthermore, he was
forced to reckon with the possibility of democratic backsliding in Germany and agreed to
disassemble large elements of German power. Wilson's grand strategy was a dream castle
whose increasingly concrete balancing foundations were forced on him by power political
realities.
Roosevelt and Kennedy both pursued somewhat less ambitious liberal goals in more
constrained geopolitical environments. Roosevelt faced the more fluid geopolitical environment
of the two, even after the fall of France. He was interested primarily in ensuring an open world
economy and hoped, for a time, that it could be obtained through negotiations with Hitler and
political settlements in Europe. After the fall of France, Roosevelt quickly realized that to
guarantee an end to European autarky, America would have to make large and costly
commitments: German power would have to be smashed, new economic arrangements
negotiated, and some kind of political system created in Europe. The creation of a nine million
man army and the invasion of Europe was no mean feat; nor were the complicated diplomatic
and political maneuvers required to gain American entry into the war. But Roosevelt did not
seek Wilsonian preponderance, and he was vague on exactly how much of an American
commitment he envisioned after the war. Roosevelt strategy aimed to vindicate liberal values,
but the system focused his attention on the most immediate problem: destroying the wehrmacht.
Kennedy had the least ambitious goals of the positive liberals and the most geopolitical
constraints-he sought to maintain the liberal status-quo in Western Europe in a relatively stable
bipolar system further pacified by growing nuclear arsenals. The Kennedy administration was
deeply conscious of the limits Soviet power placed on American behavior, and vice-versa,
hoping to negotiate a mutually acceptable settlement. But an independent European pole would
only gum up the works. The prospect of an autonomous and potentially nuclear armed Germany
was clearly behind much of Moscow's aggressive behavior in Berlin, and in truth, that prospect
was no more acceptable to Kennedy and his lieutenants. Even if a third force could be formed, it
was more likely to be malignant than useful: there was a strong possibility that it would become
autarkic and inward focused, or that it might rip itself apart with illiberal divisions in trying to
compete with the Soviet Union. Fortunately, the system permitted a simple solution-a
permanent American commitment and a bipolar balance of power.
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Roosevelt and Kennedy also had balancing strategies with more ends/means integration
than Wilson, again with Kennedy's greater geopolitical constraints producing the more coherent
posture. Once the Germans ruled most of Europe, Roosevelt rapidly moved towards greater
commitments and abandoned the hope that open trade could co-exist with Nazi power.
American grand strategic commitments were probably over-extended before its entry into the
war. But this strategic disintegration had domestic political roots. Public and congressional
restraints resisted balancing commitments, which meant Roosevelt had to stretch limited
resources over two theaters; indeed, he ultimately needed help from American overextension in
the Pacific theater to clear the domestic hurdles to full intervention against Germany. In a sense,
this moderate disjunction between ends and means was made possible because buckpassing was
still an option: Roosevelt's domestic opponents could deploy effective arguments. Still, just as
notable is the speed and adroitness with which Roosevelt switched strategies while maneuvering
around considerable domestic obstacles. Increasing integration in American grand strategy was
due to the strong signal being sent by the international system.
Kennedy's balancing strategy was very well integrated from the day he took office. The
system gave him very few options: he could balance the Soviets with either American or
European power. He never had any intention of leaving Europe or handing the reigns over to a
third force; indeed, the international friction during the period was largely due to the Soviet
failure to accept power realities for several years. Kennedy's diplomacy may have enraged the
Europeans, but it served its purpose: the EEC was turned from a potential nucleus for power
political action into a talking shop for economic issues; the MLF shifted from a real force to a
strategic farce; nuclear weapons were taken out of the hands of the Germans for good; and all
Western Europe was made to understand that America was the master of NATO. It is probably
true that Kennedy's conventional orientation towards military issues did not advance as far as it
might have, though American doctrine would evolve in this direction over the course of the Cold
War. Even so, Kennedy's own assessment of the European situation well summarizes the power
of structural constraints: "it is regrettable that there are such problems with and in Europe
because today's struggle does not lie there, but rather in Asia, Latin America, and Africa. The
whole debate about an atomic force in Europe is really useless, because Berlin is secure and
Europe as a whole is well protected. What really matters at this point is the rest of the world."
NEGATIVE LIBERALISM. The interwar Republicans and the early Cold War
administrations were all pervaded by negative liberal ideas, though the intervening revolution in
American domestic politics ratcheted down their intensity in the second post-war period. These
domestic changes also gave each administration a different focus on the types of liberal values to
be preserved and the locus of the international threat to those values. Still, each negative liberal
administration shared an emphasis on preserving the liberty of American citizens: protecting
them from the interference of the government and restricting the state's size and scope. The
international system became a key determinant of how much, and how well, negative liberty
could be preserved.
The interwar Republicans faced the least dangerous balance of power during the entire
study, and it is unsurprising that they had the most opportunity to indulge their negative liberal
priorities. Their disarmament on land is surprising, even given American standards, but the
interwar Republicans felt defense budgets were "first and primary obstruction" to prosperity.
Kellogg hit the structural role on the nose: "our detached position and our geographic isolation
from those areas of the world where conflicting territorial or political issues have led to the
maintenance of large standing armies" was the permissive factor allowing American land
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armament to be "voluntarily reduced to the minimum." The same is true of the fanatical
American devotion to collecting war debts. While the sums involved were in no sense trivial,
they held the key to political stability in Europe. The interwar Republicans saw repayment as
little less than a natural right, and though willing to compromise on the total amount of interest,
were unwilling to budge on the principal, or the principle, at stake. That they could take this
position owed to the quiescent nature of the balance of power: "this country may enjoy a great
deal of prosperity even when very unsatisfactory conditions prevail abroad."
Truman and Eisenhower faced a very different world and were forced to concede state-
building of which Harding, Coolidge, and Hoover would have never dreamed. A national
security state was constructed, large proportions of GDP devoted to defense, and conscription
maintained. The Soviet threat was responsible. As Eisenhower put it, "If all of Western Europe
fell into the hands of the Soviet Union and thus added its great industrial plant to the USSR's
already great industrial might, the United States would indeed be reduced to the character of a
garrison state if it was to survive at all." To preserve as much of traditional American life as
possible, some commitments would be needed.
But these commitments did not need to be permanent or exorbitantly costly, which led
both administrations to a series of efforts aimed at constructing a European super-state.
Eisenhower was thus citing a real factor, but also being somewhat disingenuous, when he
justified these integrative efforts by arguing that "as far as he was concerned personally, the
Russian menace alone would provide sufficient justification for this course. It reminded him of
the story of the man who was asked why he did not go to church any more. He replied that there
were seven reasons, the first of which was that he had been thrown out and the six others did not
really matter." The unmentioned six reasons in these cases were the preservation of American
anti-statist values, and they certainly mattered in the fifteen years of American buckpassing.
The balance of power also exerted more integrating pressures on the Cold War
administrations than the interwar Republicans, though all the negative liberal administrations did
a fair job of matching ends and means. In some sense, American strategy in the 1920s was
disintegrated, since each administration preferred a stable and liberal Europe but made very few
commitments to bring one about. Because the European power constellation was not yet
radically unbalanced, America could get by with this disjointed policy for twelve years before it
collapsed. But in another sense, the interwar Republicans got remarkable mileage out of the
modest commitments they were willing to make. The virtually costless American role in the
Dawes and Locarno negotiations really did help create a brief period of peace, stability, and
increasing prosperity in Europe. Hoover's efforts to save the system collapsed in part because he
was unwilling to sacrifice negative liberty on its behalf. He was ultimately comfortable with this
choice. Even during the Great Depression, the American economy produced a great many
fiddles, which interwar Republicans were content to play as Europe burned.
The pressure of the international system is much clearer in the strategy of the Truman and
Eisenhower administrations. The fifteen years after the Second World War saw generally
increasing commitments by the United States, as elements of the buckpassing strategy proved
inadequate and had to be replaced by new schemes. Once it became clear that European industry
was going to be down and out for some time, Soviet non-cooperation became more threatening,
and the Marshall plan was instituted to help rebuild a third pole. After the Soviets gained a
nuclear capacity and apparently instigated aggression on the periphery, America rearmed and
permanently committed troops to Europe. After the EDC failed, the Eisenhower administration
fell back on the EEC, nuclear sharing, and the MLF. The continued succession of plots and
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plans for buckpassing shows the resilience of negative liberty as a motive for American strategy,
but it also underscores the integrating pressure of the international system.
SUMMARY. By holding concepts of liberty constant, the impact of the international
system on American grand strategy is clear. When a potential hegemon is present in Europe,
statesmen have strong incentives to make commitments and will do so quickly, often against
other countervailing forces. For the same reason, political ends and means tend to get integrated
more swiftly into coherent grand strategies when power is radically unbalanced. Policy must be
changed quickly to avoid disaster. On the other hand, when power is more balanced abroad,
American leaders can commit or not commit at their pleasure. There is much more space to
indulge liberal preferences, and strategies can remain disintegrated for longer periods of time.
Liberalism pervades American foreign policy, but the international system shapes its scope for
influence.
Alternate Explanations
In this section, I address alternate variables that might have plausibly disrupted the
comparisons just discussed. I do so by summarizing the evidence from the "counter-arguments"
sections of the five cases. I address economic, bureaucratic, institutional, and realist
explanations for strategic change.
I find that existing bureaucratic theories have little support, largely because they lack the
necessary variation over time to explain strategic change. They also leave few signatures in the
policy-making process that would lead us suspect them of exerting great influence. Economic
arguments have sufficient variation to predict change, but over-predict variation in American
strategy while under-explaining actual variation. Broadly institutional theories, emphasizing the
importance of the separation of powers and public opinion, clearly have exerted influence on the
course of American commitments. But they have done so in an erratic and idiosyncratic manner,
while often being overridden by the power of other variables. Finally, some defensive variant of
structural realism is plausibly consistent with many of the observations examined in this study.
However, this is because a purely structural argument must trade heavily on the under-
specification of its independent variable, the underdevelopment of its core logic, and the under
appreciation of process evidence from American strategic decision-making.
BUREAUCRATIC THEORIES
Bureaucratic theories of American foreign policy are most commonly used to explain
disintegration and failure in American grand strategy. They lack a theoretical motor positing
when and why American commitments expand and retract abroad. As an invariant cause,
bureaucratic politics poses few problems for the comparisons above. This study has examined
the broad family of bureaucratic explanations in the two cases where they are most often
invoked: American non-entanglement in the 1920s and the road to war in 1941. Even in these
areas of strength, bureaucratic explanations provide only limited traction in illuminating the
character of American foreign policy.
It is often alleged the American strategy in the 1920s was the product of pushing and
hauling between various weak bureaucracies, many of which had been penetrated or replaced by
private financial interests. The result was America's economic expansionism but political
isolation, a foreign policy that served Wall Street but ultimately ended disastrously for the
country. However, the interwar Republicans were more than capable of political involvement
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when they thought it was judicious-though that was rarely enough. Still, American diplomats
took control during the Dawes negotiations to dictate a settlement against the interests of
American bankers and in favor of American preferences for Europe's geopolitical structure.
That these commitments were extremely mild was the product of ideological reluctance and
adroit diplomatic exploitation, not bureaucratic incapacity, turmoil, or abdication.
Organizational politics are also used to explain American over-extension in the Pacific
under Roosevelt and the resulting war with Japan in 1941. Roosevelt was a capricious and
undisciplined decision maker, so the story goes, and left the implementation of critical aspects of
American strategy in the hands of feuding bureaucracies. The result was a strategy where
inadequate American resources were stretched over two theaters; one that ended in an
unintentional Japanese war when hawks gained control of policy at the crucial moment. The
documents tell a different story. Roosevelt understood and was intimately familiar with the
military details of his policy; he ordered or at least tacitly approved all major military planning
and naval deployments. He also understood the logic of the situation in the Pacific, but
deliberately switched to a highly coercive policy in the summer of 1941. American means were
not adequate to the balancing strategy Roosevelt pursued, but this disintegration was the result of
domestic obstacles. On nearly every matter of strategic importance, Roosevelt was calling the
shots and made the final decisions. Organizational feuding was his servant, not his master.
SECTORAL ECONOMIC THEORIES
Sectoral economic theories have theoretical horsepower in abundance. Their motor lies
in changing coalitions of economic sectors which cause the propulsion and retraction in
American grand strategy. Sectors that have economic interests in the European core will tend to
support more committed strategies in the hopes of keeping peace blooming and business
booming. Sectors that do not have such interests will see such commitments as a waste of time
and money. Competing sectors will find their political expression in the American party system.
In most theories, the Democratic Party is ascribed the outward looking interests, due to an
agricultural, financial, and large industrial political base, with the Republican party representing
inward looking interests of labor-intensive industry, non-competitive agriculture, and small
business. With the exception of Republican victory in 1921, these variables remained constant
when American strategy shifted, making it unlikely that coalitional patterns perturb the
comparisons above.
Sectoral theories face numerous empirical problems. To begin with, they over-predict
American strategic change: American grand strategy does not shift every time partisan control of
the White House does. In this study, the major example is the transition from Truman to
Eisenhower during the early Cold War. The supposedly outward looking party was replaced by
the supposedly inward looking party, both of whom pursued the same strategy-one which
consisted of biasing European institutions against American trade! It is also worth noting that
Republican and Democratic administrations exchanged power throughout the late Cold War, but
each retained essentially the same balancing strategy initiated under Kennedy, regardless of
partisan stripe.
A second problem is that sectoral theories under-explain observed variation in American
grand strategy. Intra-administration variation is opaque to such theories, since without some
kind of shift in economic preferences or the economic spill-over effects of American policy,
strategy should remain constant. The most sophisticated of the sectoral theorists, Kevin Narizny,
essentially admits that he cannot account for Wilson's decision to go to war in 1917, and he does
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not event try to explain the choice of a ground intervention over a naval and financial war. The
timing of American shifts to buckpassing and balancing in the run-up to World War Two also
occurred within a single administration representing the same set of interests.5
Most importantly, sectoral theories are at odds with the evidence from the strategic
policy-making process. Wilson chose to tacitly support the British blockade even though it
infuriated his southern agricultural base. He also said publically that foreign trade was not very
economically important for American prosperity, noting that "If you take the figures of our
commerce, domestic and foreign included, you will find that the foreign commerce... does not
equal 4 percent of the total. Now, is 4 percent creating the 96 percent?" This is, to put it mildly,
a very odd position for the leader of the outward oriented economic coalition to take.6
The inter-war Republicans were certainly hesitant to make costly commitments to
Europe. But all of the energy behind their attempts at European stabilization came from an
interest in free trade and open financial flows supposedly represented by the opposite party.
Hoover justified these interests in traditional internationalist language arguing that without "the
products we exchange, not a single automobile would run; not a dynamo would turn; not a
telephone, telegraph, or radio would operate." The supposed economic interest of the
Republican Party in peripheral expansion was manifested through naval disarmament, another
odd position for such interests to take. Narizny claims that Republican administrations were
constrained by the national debt, but their decision to pay it off so aggressively was a free choice,
and one made for ideological reasons. It seems unlikely that the coalitional shift occurring in
1921 impacted the comparisons above, since the political parties seemed to have acted
differently than sectoral theories posit.
During the Cold War, the Truman administration's commitments were made reluctantly,
with deeper involvement corresponding to changes in the balance of power, not changes in
economic interests. And both the Truman and Eisenhower administrations encouraged the
formation of European cartels and economic discrimination against American merchants. They
did so in the hope that this would lay political foundations for a third force and facilitate
American withdrawal from the continent-the interests of outward oriented sectors be damned.
Keynesian additions to sectoral economic theory gain only modest traction at the expense
of theoretical coherence. Kennedy was the first American president who actually accepted
Keynesian doctrines. Such views did, to a certain extent, serve as a permissive condition for
increasing defense spending and accepting a more expansive strategy. But they had little impact
on the policies at the heart of Kennedy's European strategy: nuclear centralization, institutional
restraint of Western Europe, and the attack on the third force. This strategic absence results from
Keynesianism's lack of a propulsive force for commitment abroad. Expanding American
commitments may have been permitted by a new understanding of economic means, but they
were driven by positive liberal motives.
Among other presidents, Roosevelt and Truman (after Korea) were operational deficit
spenders, but were not influenced by Keynesian ideas. Indeed, Truman deployed these ideas for
political purposes, and only under protest. As Michael Hogan puts it, "The Keynesian revolution
5 Kevin Narizny, The Political Economy of Grand Strategy (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2007), p. 138,
where he admits that "it is quite possible" that none of the competing economic explanations from the historical
literature "alone would have been sufficient to make [Wilson] ask for a declaration of war," but that they might still
be viewed, "at least indirectly," through his sectoral prism.
6 Ross A. Kennedy, The Will to Believe: Woodrow Wilson, World War I, and America's Strategyfor Peace and
Security (Kent, OH: Kent State University Press, 2009), p. 35.
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did not disturb so much as a hair on his neatly combed head" and he turned to the new
economics out of "expediency" rather than "conviction." Roosevelt neither cared much about
balanced budgets nor accepted the Keynesian theory justifying unbalanced budgets. Yet during
this period, American strategy shifted rapidly towards more commitment at several points. The
international system and ideological aims provided the propulsion in American strategy, not new
theories of what the United States could or could not afford.
INSTITUTIONAL THEORIES
Scholars have sometimes pointed to the separation of the legislative and executive
branches of American government, and their openness to penetration by public opinion, as key
factors in determining American foreign policy. On the surface, though, these are constant
features of the American political context, which makes it difficult for them to explain variation
in American grand strategy. Moreover, intuitively, these factors seem more likely to serve as a
"drag" on American foreign policy, rather than a "push." That is, they have an easily
understandable retractive force, but a vaguer basis for a propulsive force, and no readily
identifiable clutch with which to change gears. It may be possible to construct an institutional
theory with adequate variation to explain American strategic change, but I am not aware of any
existing effort. The evidence of this study shows, I believe, that any such theory would meet
empirical difficulties, and I have not been inspired to make the attempt. Even so, institutional
factors clearly have some bite and could potentially impact the controlled comparisons just
discussed.
In general, the evidence from this study shows that institutional opposition, public
opinion, and other repositories of "traditional American isolationism" exert a slight drag on
American foreign policy, but one that decision-makers can overcome when they are even
modestly motivated. Wilson did have some concern for public opinion and some anti-militarist
worries, but he also scorned the idea of cowering before the public and was not afraid to build up
the American military or commit it abroad. He proved able to deftly manipulate the public over
the Zimmerman telegram and during two years of brinksmanship over German submarines.
Similarly, there was certainly congressional and public opposition to major concessions
on war debts and further armament during the 1920s. But the interwar Republican
administrations largely shared these sentiments, and rarely came into conflict with them. Where
they did disagree on specific matters, the executive tended to coerce the legislature into doing its
will. Congress outlawed debt settlements with the terms that Harding and Coolidge negotiated,
legislation which they blithely ignored in favor of presenting Congress with afait accompli. And
though Congress consistently resisted defense spending, the interwar Republicans occasionally
thought it wise to spend more on the Navy or Air Corps-which they did successfully, over
some congressional objections. If the public cared, the New Era Republicans didn't notice.7
7 Though this study has not treated institutional factors in its examination of the Cold War cases, the results would
look much the same. For certain, decision-makers in all three Cold War administrations studied cared about public
and congressional opinion, and worried that it might restrain them from making needed commitments. But neither
the Congress nor the public restrained the executive from anything of importance it wanted to do. In fact, the much
heralded "liberal internationalist consensus" was the product of adept congressional management across several
administrations. See Charles A. Kupchan and Peter L. Trubowitz, "Dead Center: The Demise of Liberal
Internationalism in the United States," International Security 32, no. 2 (Fall 2007): 7-44.
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The eccentric conclusion to Woodrow Wilson's diplomacy was clearly one case where
institutional division mattered: the Constitution required ratification the Versailles Treaty by
two-thirds of the Senate; it also requires periodic elections to the upper chamber, which swung a
number of seats towards the Republican opposition by narrow margins in 1918, giving them
control of the body by two votes. Republican control of debate allowed Henry Cabot Lodge to
organize a coalition of Senators around reservations to the treaty and the numbers game for
ratification made this position the pivotal one.
But none of this explains why some version of the Treaty was not ratified. Lodge's
political position was weak, since there were many "mild reservationists" who were willing to
compromise. The treaty itself was popular, as was the French alliance and even the occupation
of the Rhineland. It was Wilson's unwillingness to compromise, abetted in the end by a
personality altering stroke, which killed the treaty while he was president. His insistence on an
all or nothing outcome allowed a small group of "irreconcilable" opponents of the League to
swing their votes between defeating Wilson's treaty and defeating Lodge's reservations.
Moreover, it was by no means a forgone conclusion that some form of the Treaty couldn't have
been ratified in the early 1920s. After all, the American commitments to Europe were what
really mattered, and these commanded popular and congressional support, at least for a time. It
was the election of Harding-a staunch opponent of the League and of American commitments
abroad-which sealed the fate of Wilson's strategy
In the end, a number of contingent and unusual factors combined to influence American
strategy from 1919-1921. Though this perturbs the comparison between concepts of liberty
under different structural circumstances, the very combination of factors involved makes it
unlikely the League fight was decisive. Harding himself toyed with ratifying a neutered version
of the treaty in order to appease the public, but not caring to protect the actual commitments
embedded in Wilson's strategy, he decided it wasn't worth the fight. A different Republican
nominee in 1920 or a Democratic victory might have produced a different outcome.
However, domestic political factors applied clear and consistent pressure to Roosevelt's
foreign policy in the 1930s, serving as a major impediment to American commitments. Public
opinion was uniformly opposed to a full commitment to the European war, though as
circumstances progressed the public was more willing to tolerate risks. Both before and after the
disasters of 1940, Congress frequently bludgeoned Roosevelt's preferred foreign policy, causing
him to lose key votes of repeal on the neutrality acts, to spend substantial time and effort rallying
Congressional support on issues like Lend-Lease, and narrowly failing to defeat Roosevelt on
other important issues. These political forces nearly capsized Roosevelt's strategy and caused
him to trim his own sails. The diplomatic record is replete with Roosevelt's decisions to avoid
pushing American commitments too far and his concerns over public and congressional reaction,
especially regarding ground forces.
Even so, Roosevelt was able to manipulate and overcome these constraints as systemic
pressures became more intense. In 1939, he was willing to go to the mattresses over an
unbalanced rearmament plan designed to aid Britain and France rather than take the more
politically easy tack of focusing on American defenses. After May 1940, a series of measures
brought America ever closer to war in the Atlantic: support for the British, Lend-Lease, and the
policy of undeclared naval war. Finally, in the summer of 1941, Roosevelt went all-out towards
provoking Japan and accepting over-commitment across two theaters, likely hoping that a Pacific
War would also allow him to enter the anti-Nazi conflict through the back door. Roosevelt was
able to execute most of these measures on his own discretion, but a few required congressional
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approval, or at least non-interference. When the stakes were highest, institutional forces were
not strong enough to restrain an executive bent on making commitments.
STRUCTURAL REALISM
Geopolitical forces obviously had a tremendous impact on American grand strategy
towards Europe, a fact taken into account in constructing TLFP. It is possible, however, to
construct a plausible explanation for changes in American posture based entirely on structural
variables. Such a theory, though vaguely defined at points, has superficial empirical appeal. I
outline and critique this approach below.
A committed structural realist might concur with TLFP that America's geographic
position gives it an enormous defensive advantage, one that provides no incentive for
commitments abroad as long as robust multipolarity holds in Europe. However, a structural
realist might allege that the threat of a potential hegemon is so great that anytime multipolarity
appears to be failing-any time it looks like there may be a major power war-offshore powers
will look to prop up the balance of power in some fashion. Such states are likely to try
expending as little effort as possible at first, which means buckpassing is the first choice option.
But as buckpassing fails, and multipolarity falls apart, states like America will have to balance, at
least until multipolarity can be restored.
On the surface, these predictions appear to correlate with much of the variation in
American grand strategy. The start of World War One, so the story would go, signaled that
America needed to at least buckpass to hedge against German victory, which it promptly did.
After three years of continued aggression, and an Entente that looked like it needed help to stay
in the game, America balanced. Having achieved its aim of restoring multipolarity, it sensibly
returned home. Once it became clear that Hitler was threatening to start a major power war,
statesmen started to buckpass again in order to hedge against a German victory. But this time
multipolarity collapsed in spectacular fashion, and America was drawn into balancing again.
The second act of the European civil war destroyed multipolarity forever, though the initial
generation of American statesmen was unaware of this fact. They therefore spent a lengthy
period attempting ever more innovative ways to buckpass. Still, bipolarity was at hand and
Kennedy finally bowed to its logic, perhaps because imminent parity in nuclear weapons made
its rigors less costly.
The first thing to note about this explanation is that it partakes heavily of structural realist
indeterminacy-it omits discussion of its key independent variable, the character of failing
multipolarity. Without more specification about the nature of its independent variable, it cannot
provide a consistent theoretical answer to several important questions. First, what distributions
of power cause America to move from non-entanglement to buckpassing? In 1914, it apparently
took a system-wide war. In 1937, Hitler had not yet begun his aggression, but Roosevelt was
already reaching for influence to bolster the European balance. What distributions of power
cause America to move from buckpassing to balancing? In 1917, a stalemated war in Europe
was enough. It took the collapse of France in 1940, plus another year and a half of dithering.
And from 1945-1960, buckpassing continued in the face of bipolarity until Kennedy somehow
woke up to the truth. None of the power distributions that correlate with strategic change are
obviously all that similar, and an extended analysis of the economic data increases rather than
decreases the puzzle.
Second, a full development of the core logic underpinning the purely structural realist
explanation seems at odds with American behavior. Theoretically, massive wealth and
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geopolitical distance seem to lead to an inference that America ought to wait until the last
possible minute to commit to bolstering the balance of power. After all, the whole idea of the
theoretical appeal to potential hegemons is that America can afford to free-ride, and will desire to
do so, until a power appears that might be able to overcome America's enormous defensive
advantage. This logic ought to predict late, and probably failed, buckpassing, followed by
balancing. Yet the three cases of buckpassing all occurred quite early. It would seem that
America's giant moats make it feel incredibly secure, right up until there is any kind of
disturbance in Europe, at which point American statesmen begin to worry about a long string of
falling dominoes building a bridge across the Atlantic.
Furthermore, once buckpassing has begun, ought not America's defensive advantages
incentivize continued buckpassing as long as possible? Why would a purely anti-hegemonic
America commit before it becomes clear that multipolarity cannot be maintained without
American troops on the ground? Isn't the most likely trigger for balancing the partial collapse of
multipolarity? This condition held in 1940, but Roosevelt then took eighteen additional months
to get into the war, demonstrating that even then a buckpassing strategy still had possibilities. It
did not hold at all in 1917 or 1961.
Even granting, for a moment, that the Entente was in the midst of collapsing in 1917,
nothing about the situation forced Wilson to make a large ground commitment-particularly
seeing as his insistence on an independent American Army led that commitment to be postponed
and operationally less significant. A naval and financial war would have worked just as well to
end the submarine threat to Britain and prop up the Allies in the trenches. And during the Cold
War, the possibility of multipolarity was growing more robust as time moved forward: Europe
was growing rich, and nuclear weapons were decreasing the relevance of Soviet industrial and
conventional advantages.
Third, the structural realist explanation is at odds with what we observe in the process of
American decision-making. The implication of a theory based entirely on America's huge
defensive advantage is that American commitments ought to be propelled by fears that its
advantage is about to erode precipitously. We ought to observe decision-makers at least worried
that the balance of power is about to collapse. Again, Roosevelt is the best case for a purely
structural explanation. Even before the fall of France, it is possible to find him expressing
concern about Allied prospects in a European war.
However, Roosevelt also frequently talked in private along the lines that "France could
[not] penetrate the German frontier. It would cost France a million men to do this. Neither could
Germany overcome the Maginot line... Russia cannot strike effectively at Germany across
Romania. Neither could England be effective" on land. Indeed, his entire policy of helping the
Allies through air rearmament was based on the premise that the defense held the advantage in
Europe, and that therefore any war would be one of bombing, economic blockade, and
starvation. After May 1940, a major change in threat perception occurs, but even then,
Roosevelt's administration provided him with ample arguments that American security rested
only on the preservation of the British home islands, the Royal Navy, and the Red Army.
From the moment Wilson decided to buckpass until the day he asked Congress for a
declaration of war, he believed the Allies were going to win the war. On February 15, 1917,
Wilson "was not in sympathy with any great preparedness," arguing "that Europe would be man
and money poor at the end of the war." Most of the major events supporting the argument the
multipolarity was failing in 1917 occurred after America joined the fray: the French Army did
not mutiny until May, the Bolshevik revolution was nearly eight months in the future, and
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Caporetto did not occur until late October. The March mutiny of Russian troops and Kerensky's
corresponding revolution occurred before American entry, but were interpreted in a positive
light. Unrestricted submarine warfare had begun, but Wilson showed no sign of worrying that it
was a major problem. Most of official Washington agreed with these assessments. Indeed, a
leading American general noted in mid-1917 that the Army "did not assume that the Entente
Allies were in such a condition" as they turned out to be, and that "our knowledge of what seems
to be the real situation began to clarify shortly after the arrival of the English and the French
missions" in April and May, 1917. American commitments under Wilson were simply not
motivated by a fear of an eroding defensive advantage.
In the late 1960s, Eisenhower and Kennedy shared a similar view of the European
balance of power: America had a decisive nuclear advantage in Europe, but it was a wasting
asset. Eisenhower "did not believe that limited war was possible in Europe" while Kennedy
thought that very small European nuclear forces "should be capable of deterring Mr.
Khrushchev. He pointed out that twenty missiles in Cuba had had a deterrent effect on us." In
short, nuclear weapons were game changers; even in small numbers that made aggression
extremely difficult. The difference between the two administrations was that MAD was an
outcome of great rejoicing for Eisenhower, "since the NATO [conventional] shield could be
symbolic." For Kennedy, MAD was a matter of deep concern: "As soon as the French have a
nuclear capability... we have much less to offer Europe," Kennedy argued, and "if we are not
vital to Germany, then our NATO strategy makes no sense." The irony of America's fifteen year
struggle to buckpass is that it had finally found the solution to its eroding defensive advantage
right as it opted to change strategies. The Kennedy administration was no more concerned, and
probably even less concerned, about the European balance than Eisenhower.
All of this is simply to say that structural conditions alone do not explain American
strategy. The international system sent a powerful signal that could not be ignored from 1940
through the end of the period covered here. Moreover, the international system served as an
integrating force for American strategy and a permissive condition for liberal aims, even when
there was no potential hegemon. Given the "difficulty" of the American case for geopolitical
theories, one must conclude that this study gives them increased credence, and that it
demonstrates just how powerful a factor the international system can be. But there is much more
to the story of American grand strategy.
The Future ofAmerican Grand Strategy
I conclude this study by using TLFP as a tool for speculating on the future of American
foreign policy. Such an exercise must be approached with caution, for two reasons. First,
TLFP's empirical domain of European great power politics does not appear likely to play as
dominant a role in future world politics as it has in the past. Rigorously adapting TLFP's
expectations for other areas would probably require some adjustments to account for important
factors not considered in this study. Second, the future values of TLFP's independent variables
cannot be estimated with any precision. Power trends and political thought have surprised
observers in the past and are likely to do so again.
Even so, an uncertain lens applied to unfamiliar terrain can still bring important features
into focus. Moreover, I believe we can predict with confidence that American grand strategy
will critically impact world politics in the decade to come. If for no other reason, trying to
anticipate America's future course is a worthy enterprise. I approach this task in two parts. I
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begin by using TLFP to interpret the recent past history of American grand strategy in Europe, in
order to establish a basis for thinking about the current values of TLFP's variables and the
present character of American grand strategy. I then propose two types of foreign policy
problems the United States is likely to face in the coming decades, and their potential outcomes
if TLFP's variables remain at their present values. I also consider ways in which TLFP's
variables might change, and the effects these changes might have.
TLFP AND POST-COLD WAR FOREIGN POLICY
I hope that the reader will accept, for the sake of the argument, the following
propositions. First, with the collapse of the Soviet empire, the threat of a European potential
hegemon disappeared. America was left with a massive power advantage over a weak
multipolar system-a situation different in degree, but not in kind, from the position it held after
the First World War. Second, American presidents in the post-Cold War era have shown few
inclinations towards negative liberal ideals. Certainly, none of the centralizing fears and distrust
of economic interventionism expressed by Coolidge or Harding are anywhere evident, and even
the more restrained worries of Eisenhower seem largely absent. I grant that negative liberal
rhetoric is still strikes a powerful cord in American culture, and that it can often be heard during
election season. But it seems to be in eclipse among the American elite-policy-makers from
both parties appear to have accepted a large and growing centralized state involved in the
management of a mixed economy.
I therefore posit that the positive liberal ideals historically accompanying these trends
were present in the two Bush administrations as well as those of Clinton and Obama, though a
serious investigation of this claim would require a great deal of evidence. Given the diminished
power constellation of Europe, TLFP would expect positive liberals to pursue a grand strategy of
preponderance. Depending on the extent of American superiority and the degree of resistance
from the system, the strategy might or might not be pressured back towards balancing. What
have we observed?
American grand strategy in Europe after the fall of the Berlin wall appears to be a model
strategy of preponderance. America has not only remained the dominant European great power,
but it has expanded its political reach through its command of NATO. Four important policies
reveal this trend.
First, the conclusion of the Cold War saw the United States support the expansion of
NATO to include a re-unified Germany. To obtain these ends, Washington played diplomatic
hardball with the Soviets, forcing Moscow to accept American terms as though it had "suffered a
reversal of fortunes not unlike a catastrophic defeat in war." The Americans were no less stem
with the Germans themselves: the conditions for reunification were that "Germany would
continue to rely on NATO for protection.... The Germans would thus forego pursuit of a purely
national defense, including the development of their own nuclear weapons." President George
H.W. Bush pithily summarized American attitudes: "What worries me is talk that Germany must
not stay in NATO. To hell with that! We prevailed, they didn't. We can't let the Soviets snatch
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victory from the jaws of defeat." There was only one pole left in Europe and neither the
Germans nor the Russians would be allowed to think otherwise.8
Second, during the 1990s, NATO expanded eastward to the borders of the former Soviet
Union, threatening Moscow's security and assuming responsibility for states that were strategic
liabilities. America supported this policy for positive liberal reasons: to secure liberal values in
Eastern Europe and to protect them in Western Europe. Undersecretary of Defense Walter
Slocombe defended the policy by arguing that "We have the possibility to build a system in
Europe-and indeed the entire world-organized on the model of... liberal market democracies
living in peace with their neighbors." President Clinton publically remarked that "I came to
office convinced that NATO can do for Europe's East what it did for Europe's West: prevent a
return to local rivalries, strengthen democracy against future threats, and create the conditions for
prosperity to flourish." The logic was similar to that employed by Kennedy and Wilson: without
a security umbrella, Eastern Europe would be torn with illiberalism and strife; such "instability"
might even "spill over" into the West European core and trigger illiberal impulses there. The
future was better for all parties if America expanded its position as hegemonic manager of the
system.9
Third, NATO expanded its mission to include putting out fires along the European
periphery, which culminated in two wars against unpleasant regimes in the former Yugoslavia.
Ethnic Serbian leadership in both the Bosnia and Kosovo wars was perceived as brutal and
illiberal, a fit target for reform with U.S. power. The conflicts were also tied to larger grand
strategic concerns. As President Clinton wrote, "If the [Dayton] negotiations fail and the war
resumes, there is a very real risk that it could spread beyond Bosnia, and involve Europe's new
democracies, as well as our NATO allies." Furthermore, war would disrupt the economic
relationships that had led to a prosperous market economy in Europe and lowered restrictions on
American commerce. Defending the Kosovo intervention in terms reminiscent of Roosevelt,
Clinton noted that "If we're going to have a strong economic relationship that includes our
ability to sell around the world, Europe has got to be key.... That's what this Kosovo thing is all
about." Wars on the European periphery were caused by illiberalism and threatened to upset the
liberal order that Washington had been protecting and expanding. Intervention was the obvious
solution.10
Finally, America worked diligently to ensure that NATO maintained its position as the
hegemonic security institution on the continent. Washington worked hard to squash the potential
emergence of any independent poles of military power, most notably in its reaction to the
European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP). The ESDP, and especially its Rapid Reaction
Force, threatened to produce an autonomous military capability in Europe outside American
control. Rather than accept the potential for reduced American costs, the Clinton and George W.
Bush administrations reacted with unremitting hostility. Both administrations sought to divert
European efforts towards a separate response force within NATO. They also laid down
principals stating that America could only accept a European force that did not diminish NATO's
8 Phillip Zelikow and Condoleezza Rice, Germany Unified and Europe Transformed: A Study in Statecraft
(Cambridge, M.A.: Harvard University Press, 1995), pp. 197, 169-170; George Bush and Brent Scowcroft, A World
Transformed (New York: Knopf, 1998), p. 2 5 3 .
9 Christopher Layne, The Peace of Illusions: American Grand Strategy from 1940 to the Present (Ithaca, NY:
Cornell University Press, 2006), pp. 112, 255, n. 121.
' "Letter from President Clinton to Speaker of the House Newt Gingrich," White House Press Office, November
13, 1995, p.1; Layne, The Peace of Illusions, p. 13 1.
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role, duplicate NATO's capabilities, or discriminate against NATO members outside the EU. In
short, NATO was to have the right of first refusal on any security issue, and rival organizations
would exist only at its sufferance. It is not surprising that the Europeans have apparently decided
an ESDP is more trouble than it is worth."
TLFP AND THE FUTURE OF WORLD POLITICS
The American grand strategy in after the Cold War Europe logically follows from
TLFP's variables, which plausibly hold values that would predict a strategy of preponderance.
What does this bode for the future of American foreign policy? Here I look at two areas outside
of TLFP's domain, but relevant to the future course of international relations: great power
politics in Asia and American intervention in the developing world.
The development of great power politics among the rising powers of Asia will be
contingent, in part, on what role America decides to play. How will an economically powerful
China interface with other states in the region? Will Asia become a bipolar or multipolar
system? What course will regional rivalries take, such as those on the across the Sea of Japan?
To what extent will Asian politics become institutionalized, and what will be the nature and
scope of those institutions? American strategy will importantly influence the answers to those
questions.
Similarly, the economic change and political stability of the developing world will be
shaped by American choices. Will the United States continue to prioritize political democracy
and economic freedom as essential goals of its foreign policy? Is it likely to engage in further
attempts at regime change in the Middle East and Southwest Asia? Will the American military
continue to focus on counter-insurgency operations and how likely are such campaigns in the
future? How will the problem of international terrorism emanating from the developing world
manifest itself?
If the predominance of positive liberty among the American security elite continues to be
combined with unrivaled American power, TLFP predicts that American grand strategy will
continue on its post-Cold War course for quite some time. In both Asia and the developing
world, the United States is liable to pursue an expansive and expensive foreign policy. Though
point predictions about foreign policy are probably beyond the ken of any social science theory,
this study suggests some general answers to the questions above.
The United States is likely to remain heavily engaged in Asia and will be a potential
source of friction in Asian politics. Positive liberal statesmen will probably perceive threats to
liberal values in Asia in the absence of American political influence. They are likely to see
reduced American engagement as an invitation for illiberal forces in China, and perhaps even
Japan and South Korea, to cause trouble. Under current conditions, Washington is therefore
likely to pursue and increase its diplomatic engagement in the Pacific. Militarily, American
naval dominance is likely to lead to a quiescent security arena in the short term, but statesmen
will be tempted to look for ways to project power and influence onto the mainland. America will
pursue institutions to the extent that it believes they can provide a source of control over its allies
and will accept increased costs and risks to do so. Washington's traditional "hub-and-spoke"
" On the ESDP see Barry R. Posen, "European Union Security and Defense Policy: Response to Unipolarity?,"
Security Studies 15, no. 2 (2006): 149-186; Layne, The Peace ofIllusions, pp. 113-116.
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system of alliances in Asia developed in part to ensure a predominant American influence over
politics in Northeast Asia, and will continue to be valued by diplomats for that reason.12
But the degree to which Asian states are willing to tolerate such control will be a major
influence on America's posture in the region. As geopolitical insights indicate, there are always
strong incentives to resist pressures that infringe on national sovereignty. There have been
growing signs of resistance to American hegemony in Japanese politics, although their future is
highly uncertain. Furthermore, China's rise is leading to the development of institutions within
Asia that America is unlikely to dominate. Such an eventuality will increase both the American
reliance on its traditional alliance system and the tensions that system causes. Fortunately, the
potential for catastrophic blunders of the sort Europe saw in the twentieth century is lessened-
Asian geography provides neither an easy route for conquest nor an easy outlet for an American
foothold. Still, a strategy of preponderance is sure to involve America reaching out for more
political control, with resulting pushback.1 3
American diplomats will also continue to pursue democracy and free-markets in the
developing world and will occasionally find excuses to use become militarily involved in the
internal politics of other states. Barack Obama's recent adventure in Libya is a good example,
and likely to remain typical. The potential to impact the development of liberal institutions
abroad will be strongly tempting to positive liberal statesmen. They are also likely to believe
that illiberal regimes produce conflicts, and that those conflicts will spill-over and affect liberal
institutions in other places. Such threats will give additional incentives to act. Whatever the
opinions of the American military, American statesmen will likely remain interested in counter-
insurgency capabilities and will find reasons to use them. The threat of terrorism will be
explicitly connected to the absence of liberalism, and to the potentially transformative power of
ground forces. In short: get ready for more of the same. If present conditions persist, history
will not repeat itself, but it will, as is said, rhyme.
However, it is not clear that American power will remain unchallenged, nor that positive
liberty will remain the elite consensus forever. Two plausible sources of geopolitical and
ideological change are apparent, and either of them could provide sources of restraint on
American foreign policy.
First, if China's rapid economic growth continues, it may well become a kind of peer
competitor to the United States, providing some of the effects of a potential hegemon. This
could create pressures for a grand strategy of balancing rather than preponderance; a China
interested in playing a global role could discipline American foreign policy across a range of
areas. Consider the evolution of the bipolar structure in Europe-after Kennedy accepted a
permanent American presence in Germany, Europe was locked into the kind of stability
predicted by structural realist theory. Competition ensued, to be sure, but core issues were
handled with discipline and prudence on both sides. A Chinese peer competitor would not have
identical results, and could potentially lead to increased competition in the periphery, but it might
also provide a source of restraint on American commitments currently lacking.
12 On America's Asian alliances, see Victor D. Cha, "Powerplay: Origins of the U.S. Alliance System in Asia,"
International Security 34, no. 3 (Winter 2010): 158-196.
1 For an excellent discussion of the course of security politics in Japan, see Richard J. Samuels, Securing Japan:
Tokyo's Grand Strategy and the Future of East Asia (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2007). On the impact of
geography on Asian politics, see Robert S. Ross, "The Geography of Peace: East Asia in the Twenty-first Century,"
International Security 23, no. 4 (Spring 1999): 81-118.
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Second, American ideology might very well evolve in a negative liberal direction-ideas
are hard things to kill. The recent rival of libertarian rhetoric under the "Tea Party" umbrella
points to the persistence of individualist, de-centralist, and laissez-faire sentiments in American
culture. The movement has also been intermittently associated with calls for a restrained foreign
policy, especially among new congressmen, although the Tea Party's commitment to these ideas
is certainly open to question. This study has shown, however, that a committed ideologue in the
White House can accomplish a great deal-it is not implausible that a genuine Tea Party
sympathizer might secure a major party nomination and win the Oval Office. Indeed, I would
speculate that presidential elections are key mechanisms for ideological revival and renewal.
The diffuse negative liberal sentiment currently seen in parts of the American electorate could
very well find influence in American foreign policy through its impact on party competition.
But even if the Tea Party is just an ideological vessel for populist reaction, there are
larger forces within the American body politic that may revive some form of negative liberalism.
America will face, eventually, a severe fiscal crunch: it supports a large welfare state and a large
military with a low tax base and high debt. Working out the painful compromises necessary for
fiscal sustainability is liable to involve ideological entrepreneurship. Such ideas will probably
have to justify ratcheting back state power and authority, even if only modestly. American
culture suggests that political ideologies are likely to be expressed in liberal terms, and American
political discourse could well begin to see a fusion of classical negative liberal tropes with more
modem expectations about the state. As this study has demonstrated, once an ideology is in
place it can have a powerful effect. The political movement that is able to manage America's
fiscal crunch may be imbued with the ideological resources that independently move America
towards less commitment abroad.
All of the preceding is, of course, just speculation. The larger point is that TLFP has
provided real leverage in explaining past American behavior and plausibly helps explain the
recent expansion of American grand strategy. Neither geopolitical nor ideological forces have
gone away, whatever their present values. If American grand strategy is going to change,
TLFP's variables will likely be involved in some fashion.
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